Chairman of the EEOC, 1966-1967
During the time I was Chairman, the Commission struggled with a
number of substantive and procedural problems, as might be expected
of a new agency. One substantive issue stood out then, and remains
today, as the outstanding challenge and accomplishment of the time.
That was the definition of discrimination.
In 1966, conventional wisdom involved a debate as to what
constituted discrimination and what constituted disadvantage. The
Commission saw resolution of this debate and development of a
meaningful definition of discrimination as its most important task.
The issue, of course, was whether educational and experiential
short fallings were to be viewed as disadvantages possessed by the
individual seeking employment or as discriminatory obstacles
imposed by the employer.
The Commission resolved this issue by recognizing that, in the
absence of a clear justification, requirements of this sort
constituted discrimination when they disproportionately impacted on
a protected population. The matter was fully set to rest in a
Commission decision that held that a requirement of a sixth-grade
education in a southern plant was discriminatory against blacks. I
cannot state the nature of the job involved, because it would
reveal the employer. I can state that the job was simple labor with
no skill demand. The sixth grade education requirement served no
function other than to preserve the white character of the work
force.
In time, of course, the Supreme Court defined this phenomenon as
disparate impact discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. The
Commission's earlier adoption of this approach in defining
discrimination for purposes of its determination of reasonable
cause was a step of great significance.
See also: Chairman Stephen N.
Shulman's bio
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