MCKENZIE L.,1 COMPLAINANT, v. MEGAN J. BRENNAN, POSTMASTER GENERAL, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE (EASTERN AREA), AGENCY. Appeal No. 0120073428 Hearing No. 470-2007-00038X Agency No. 1C-451-0057-06 October 14, 2015 DECISION On July 30, 2007, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's July 3, 2007 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.2 The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission MODIFIES the Agency's final order. ISSUES PRESENTED The issues presented are: 1) whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) properly issued a decision without a hearing; 2) whether Complainant is substantially limited in the major life activities of performing manual tasks or working; 3) whether the Agency failed to provide Complainant with a reasonable accommodation when it forced her to work in cold conditions and ordered her to operate machinery; and 4) whether the Agency is liable for compensatory damages. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Mail Processing Clerk at the Agency's Cincinnati, Ohio Processing and Distribution Center. Complainant has Systemic Lupus Erythematosus, which causes fluid to accumulate in her lungs. Consequently, Complainant suffers from coughing and problems associated with the regulation of her body temperature. According to Complainant, she sometimes experiences heat and cold at the same time in different parts of her body. Additionally, Complainant suffers from Raynaud's Disease, which is a circulatory disease that causes numbness, pain, weakness, and stiffness in the middle finger of her right hand. Further, repetitive motion or vibration causes stiffness in her right hand. Complainant's physician has restricted her from peeling labels, repetitive motions, and working in cold environments, and informed her that she must wear cotton gloves. Complainant primarily cased mail at a standard case, which was a reasonable accommodation for her medical conditions. Investigative File (IF), Affidavit A. In that assignment, Complainant sat at a case and placed mail into a hole at the case. Affidavit B, p. 3. On August 11, 2006, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of disability (Lupus and Raynaud's Disease) when, in April 2006, management assigned her to work in a cold area and required her to operate a vibrating machine, which exacerbated her medical condition. In an investigative affidavit statement, Complainant stated that Lupus caused fluid to develop in her lungs and coughing. Complainant stated that because of her condition, her physician restricted her from working in a cold environment and directed her to wear cotton gloves instead of latex or plastic gloves. Complainant further stated that her mail case was too close to the air conditioning vent upstairs, which made her cold. Complainant stated that after she reported that she was cold to her supervisor (S1), S1 moved her downstairs in September 2005 away from the vent. Complainant further stated that in April 2006, the Manager of Distribution Operations (Manager) moved her back upstairs. She stated that she did not complain to S1 again about the cold upstairs because S1 was only infrequently on her floor. Complainant stated that she kept a jacket in the office and wore gloves. Complainant further stated that she does not operate the Delivery Bar Code Sorter (DBCS) because of her medical restrictions. However, she stated that, on an unspecified date in April 2006, S1 told her to run the machine for a few minutes, although Complainant told S1 that she could not operate the machine. Complainant stated that she operated the machine for less than ten minutes and continued stamping mail thereafter. Complainant stated that the person who normally operated the DBCS was taken off the machine so that she could have a conference with S1. S1 stated that she was aware that Complainant has Raynaud's Disease but was unsure if Complainant ever told her she has Lupus. S1 stated that Complainant submitted documentation to another management official, which said that she cannot "jog" mail because of her condition. S1 further stated that she does not believe that Complainant's condition substantially limited her ability to perform major life activities. S1 further stated that Complainant requested not to work on automated equipment, and that management accommodated Complainant by placing her in the manual unit. S1 stated that when Complainant complained that her letter case was too close to the air conditioning vent, she asked Complainant if she would rather work on another floor away from the air conditioning. S1 further stated that Complainant chose to stay in the unit on the same floor. S1 stated that she contacted the Maintenance Department, which moved Complainant away from the vent, and Complainant no longer complained about the cold. S1 stated that although Complainant provided a note that said that she could not "jog" mail, Complainant did not inform S1 that her condition was exacerbated by working on the vibrating DBCS machine.3 The Manager stated that he has been aware that Complainant suffers from Raynaud's Disease since July or August 2006. The Manager stated that Complainant told him that her condition prevents her from working in the cold or on machines because of the vibration, but she did not provide him with any medical documentation regarding her condition. He stated that, based upon Complainant's discussions with him, he assigned her to a warm environment and manual tasks. The Manager further stated that after he assigned Complainant to a warmer environment on a different floor, she did not complain to him about the matter. The record contains a copy of a Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) certification form submitted by Complainant's physician dated February 28, 2003. Exhibit 3, p. 1. On the form, Complainant's physician stated that Complainant had "Raynaud's Disease of the Hands." The physician further indicated that Complainant had a chronic condition aggravated by cold that may cause episodic periods of incapacity. The record also contains another FMLA certification form dated March 25, 2005, in which Complainant's physician stated that Complainant was indefinitely restricted from exposure to cold, pushing or pulling, and lifting more than 10 pounds for two months. Exhibit 7, p. 1. Additionally, the record reveals that in an Office of Workers' Compensation form dated September 19, 2005, Complainant's physician restricted her from lifting more than 20 pounds intermittingly for two hours per day or one hour per day continuously; sitting for more than one hour intermittently; standing more than eight hours continuously per day; and operating machinery. Exhibit 12, p. 1. At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an AJ. Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ's Decision On January 31, 2007, the Agency moved for a decision without a hearing in its favor, to which Complainant responded in opposition. In her response, Complainant argued that she was an individual with a disability covered by the Rehabilitation Act because she had FMLA certification that described her as having a chronic condition that required her to take muscle relaxers, blood thinners, and antidepressant medications. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ granted the Agency's motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing in favor of the Agency on June 28, 2007. In that decision, the AJ concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute in this case because Complainant failed to show that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of working or any other major life activity. Therefore, the AJ concluded that Complainant was not an individual with a disability entitled to coverage under the Rehabilitation Act. The AJ did not address whether the Agency failed provide Complainant with a reasonable accommodation for her medical conditions because she determined that Complainant was not an individual with a disability. The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully adopting the AJ's findings. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Complainant did not submit a statement on appeal. The Agency requests that we affirm its final order because Complainant is not an individual with a disability. The Agency further maintains that, even if Complainant were an individual with a disability, it provided her with a reasonable accommodation by moving her to a different floor away from the air conditioning vent when she complained about the cold. The Agency maintains that Complainant failed to inform management that she was cold after she moved to a different floor. STANDARD OF REVIEW In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge's determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law"). ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Decision without a Hearing The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). As discussed in detail below, we find that the issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate. However, we find that the AJ erred when she found in favor of the Agency rather than Complainant. Individual with a Disability Whether proceeding under a disparate treatment or reasonable accommodation analysis, a complainant who is claiming disability discrimination must first establish that he or she was an individual with a disability at the time of the alleged unlawful discriminatory conduct. Kershner v. Dep't of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01995575 (Feb. 15, 2002). Under the Rehabilitation Act, an ""individual with a disability" is defined as an individual who: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). Major life activities include performing manual tasks and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). EEOC regulations provide that a "substantial limitation" occurs when a complainant is "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The regulations also instruct us to take into account "(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact ... from the impairment." Id. at § 1630.2(j)(2). Under the laws in effect at the time this claim arose, the relevant inquiry when addressing the major life activity of performing manual tasks is "whether the claimant is unable to perform the variety of tasks central to most people's daily lives, not whether the claimant is unable to perform the tasks associated with [her] specific job." Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002). The type of evidence most relevant to this inquiry includes, for example, an individual's ability to do household chores, bathe, brush one's teeth, prepare meals, and do laundry. Id. at 201-203.4 In order to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the Commission's regulations require that an individual be restricted from performing either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1999). Additionally, we note that determinations regarding whether a complainant is an individual with a disability must be made on a case-by-case basis. Long v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05A01062 (Sept. 26, 2002). In this case, the AJ found that there was insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Complainant is substantially limited in the major life activity of working. However, we find that the AJ erred in her analysis and conclusions. The AJ overlooked evidence that demonstrated that Complainant is substantially limited in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. Specifically, the evidence reflects that Complainant suffered from Systemic Lupus Erythematosus and Raynaud's Disease, which resulted in Complainant experiencing body temperature regulation problems and numbness and pain in her fingers and hands.5 Complainant stated that because of her condition, she was severely restricted in her ability to do housework and chores because of the pain she experienced in her hands. Specifically, Complainant stated the following: Attacks last up to 20 minutes, and I have to warm my hands to try to recover. My life activity limitations are limits on housework, no vacuum cleaning, pain in doing dishes forces me to stop and wait for pain to subside, my husband has kidney failure and has home dialysis for ten hours a night and I have to carry 2 gallon bags of liquid from the basement. I cannot carry more than one bag at a time (he gets three per night) and carrying the one bag causes pain. Any repetitive motion, raising my hand above the shoulder or working in the cold will cause stiffness and loss of use of my hand. I also have tendinitis in both arms which causes swelling in forearms and loss of strength in hands and wrists. I can't hardly [sic] use my hands at times, and my hands were in casts in 2001 for six weeks. IF, Affidavit A, p. 2. We find that Complainant described considerable difficulty performing tasks central to most people's daily lives. Additionally, Complainant stated that when she experienced pain in her hands, she could not recover use of her hands for 20 minutes. The record further reflects that Complainant's hand condition is chronic, she often suffers from the effects of the condition, and she has had the condition since at least February 2003. Therefore, we find that Complainant is substantially limited in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. See Marziale v. BP Products North America, Inc., No. 1:05cv741, 2007 WL 4224367 (S.D.Ohio 2007) (Plaintiff who could not cook, clean dishes, or operate vacuum cleaner without pain substantially limited in major life activity of performing manual tasks). Further, although working should be analyzed only if no other major life activity is substantially limited by an impairment, we find that the AJ erred when she found that Complainant was not substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans With Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (Enforcement Guidance - ADA), No. 915.002 at Question 4 (March 25, 1997). The record reveals that Complainant had a long-term restriction that precluded her from operating machines, lifting more than 20 pounds, standing more than one hour per day, pulling or pushing, and working the normal duties of her Mail Processing Clerk position. Consequently, Complainant was precluded from a broad class of jobs that require use of a machine. We therefore find that Complainant was also substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See De Los Santos v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01974430 (May 23, 2001) (Commission found complainant was regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working because a broad range of Postal jobs require continuous heavy lifting, pushing, pulling, standing, and reaching). We note that the Agency did not provide any evidence that rebutted Complainant's statements or the documentary evidence regarding her condition. Therefore, we find that Complainant has shown that she was substantially limited in the major life activities of performing manual tasks and working. Accordingly, we find the AJ erred in finding that Complainant was not an individual with a disability covered by the Rehabilitation Act. Reasonable Accommodation Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. §1630.9. In this case, Complainant contends that the Agency failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation when in April 2006, the Agency moved her to a work area that was too cold. Upon review, we note that Complainant acknowledged that she did not complain to S1 about the cold in the new work area. In fact, Complainant did not contend that she reported the cold conditions in the new work area to any management official during the relevant time period. Because temperature sensitivity is a subjective condition and office climates naturally change from moment to moment, it was reasonable to expect Complainant to inform management when the office was too cold for her. There is simply no evidence that the Agency was aware Complainant was cold in the new work area. Thus, we find that Complainant failed to provide any evidence from which it could be reasonably concluded that the Agency failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation when she worked in a cold environment in April 2006. However, Complainant further contends that the Agency failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation when, in April 2006, it ordered her to work on the DBCS machine in violation of her medical restrictions. The record reveals that in Office of Workers' Compensation Programs documentation dated September 19, 2005, Complainant's physician informed the Agency that Complainant was restricted from working on any machinery because of her medical conditions. S1 stated that during the relevant time period, she was aware that Complainant was restricted from working on the DCBS machine. We note that, although the investigator asked S1 specific questions about whether she directed Complainant to operate the machine despite her restrictions, S1 failed to answer the question directly. Instead, S1 responded, "Complainant bid on an automation job (which includes sweeping and loading on a DBCS)." However, the record reveals that during the relevant time period, Complainant had been reassigned to case mail and was not operating the DBCS because of her medical restrictions. Moreover, when the investigator asked S1 how long Complainant was required to work on the machine on the day in question, S1 stated, "I don't know. None after she brought in documentation." This statement is an unclear response to a clear question that both asserts that S1 does not know the answer to the question, and that Complainant was not required to operate machinery after she brought in documentation without specifying when Complainant presented documentation. As such, we determine that S1 did not deny that she ordered Complainant to work on the DBCS machine in April 2006. Additionally, the record reveals that Complainant submitted documentation restricting her from working on the machine in September 2005. Moreover, on the day in question, Complainant told S1 that she could not operate the machine because of her restrictions, and S1 acknowledged that she was aware that Complainant was restricted from operating machines. Thus, the only reasonable conclusion is that the Agency was on notice that Complainant was restricted from working on machinery when S1 directed her to do so in April 2006. Consequently, we find that the Agency failed to provide Complainant with a reasonable accommodation when it insisted that she work outside her restrictions. Regarding the appropriate relief to award Complainant, we note that Complainant requested compensatory damages. We note that an agency which has failed to provide reasonable accommodation may nonetheless avoid liability for compensatory damages if it can demonstrate that it acted in good faith. As explained in Guilbeaux v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0720050094 (Aug. 6, 2008), "a good faith effort can be demonstrated by proof that the agency, in consultation with the disabled individual, attempted to identify and make a reasonable accommodation [citation omitted]." In Guilbeaux, the Agency, while not immediately successful in providing reasonable accommodation, nonetheless was conscientious in its efforts to do so. In this case, the Agency was informed by Complainant's physician that Complainant could not operate machinery because of her medical conditions; the Agency reassigned Complainant to duties that did not involve operating machines; S1 knew that Complainant was restricted from operating machines; S1 insisted that Complainant operate a machine despite Complainant's protestations that doing so would violate her medical restrictions; and Complainant operated the machine under pressure from S1. In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the Agency acted in good faith. Moreover, we note that Complainant contended that her condition was exacerbated by the Agency's insistence that she operate the DBCS. Consequently, we find that the Agency is liable for Complainant's compensatory damages. In summary, the Commission finds that the AJ erred when she found that Complainant is not an individual with a disability entitled to coverage under the Rehabilitation Act. The Commission further finds that Complainant was not denied a reasonable accommodation when the Agency moved her to a work area that was too cold. Finally, the Commission finds Complainant was denied a reasonable accommodation when management ordered her to work outside her restrictions, and that the Agency is liable for compensatory damages associated with this action. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Commission AFFIRMS the final order with respect to its finding that the Agency did not violate the Rehabilitation Act when Complainant worked in cold conditions in April 2006. The Commission REVERSES the Agency's final order's finding that the Agency did not violate the Rehabilitation Act when management ordered Complainant to operate machinery. We REMAND this matter to the Agency for further processing in accordance with this decision and the ORDER below. ORDER The Agency is ordered to undertake the following remedial relief: 1. Undertake a supplemental investigation to determine Complainant's entitlement to compensatory damages. The Agency shall give Complainant notice of her right to submit objective evidence (pursuant to the guidance given in Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993)) and request objective evidence from complainant in support of her request for compensatory damages within forty-five (45) calendar days of the date complainant receives the agency's notice. No later than ninety (90) calendar days after the date that this decision becomes final, the Agency shall issue a final agency decision addressing the issue of compensatory damages. The final decision shall contain appeal rights to the Commission. The Agency shall submit a copy of the final decision to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below. 2. Ensure that Complainant is provided with a reasonable accommodation for her disability at all times she is entitled to such an accommodation. 3. Provide each of the individuals responsible for violating the Rehabilitation Act in this case and all management at its Cincinnati, Ohio Processing and Distribution Center with at least eight (8) hours of training on their responsibilities, rights and obligations under federal equal opportunity laws and regulations. The training must pay particular attention to management's obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. 4. Consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against the responsible management officials. The Commission does not consider training to be disciplinary action. The Agency shall report its decision to the compliance officer. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If any of the responsible management officials have left the Agency's employ, the Agency shall furnish documentation of their departure date(s). 5. Post a notice of the finding of discrimination in accordance with the below-entitled paragraph, "Posting Order." 6. Submit a report of compliance, as provided in the below-entitled paragraph, "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the Agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits due Complainant, including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented. POSTING ORDER (G0914) The Agency is ordered to post at its Cincinnati, Ohio Processing and Distribution Center copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0610) If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0815) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0610) This decision affirms the Agency's final decision/action in part, but it also requires the Agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final decision on your complaint. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or ""department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: Carlton M. Hadden Director Office of Federal Operations Footnotes 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website. 2 This case arose before January 1, 2009, the effective date of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, which made a number of significant changes to the definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Because this matter occurred in 2006, the Commission will use the analytical framework as it existed before the enactment of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, to determine whether Complainant is an individual with a disability. 3 We note that the record in this case does not define the term "jog mail." However, the Agency's website glossary defines jogging mail as hitting or shaking a handful of mail pieces against a hard service to align their edges. Accessed on March 20, 2012 at http://about.usps.com/publications/pub32/pub32_terms.htm. 4 We note that Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams has been superseded by statute, The Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325 (2008)). However, the events of this complaint occurred before the Amendments became effective on January 1, 2009. 5 Because we are finding that Complainant is substantially limited in performing manual tasks, we decline to address whether she is also substantially limited in body temperature regulation.