Emiko S., Complainant, v. Anthony Foxx, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency. Appeal No. 0120120933 Hearing No. 410-2009-00025X Agency No. 2007-21584-FAA-03 DECISION Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant's appeal from the Agency's November 14, 2011 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the final order. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an Air Traffic Control Specialist at the Atlanta Air Traffic Control Tower in Hapeville, Georgia. The complexity of the work of an Air Traffic Controller varies at various facilities, and Air Traffic Controllers have to go through a series of tests (called being "checked out") when they move to a new facility with more complex work. Complainant worked her way up to Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in February 2005, and needed to be checked out again. Complainant had difficulty completing the training and resigned from the certification program. Complainant then asked the Agency to find her an alternate position that matched her skills and the kind of work she had previously performed at Chicago Midway Airport. Complainant suffered an on-the-job injury in December 2005, went out on sick leave, and began receiving workers' compensation benefits from the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP). On June 15, 2006, management determined that Complainant was medically disqualified from performing the duties of the Air Traffic Controller position. On September 11, 2006, Complainant's manager (M1) sent Complainant a Notice of Proposed Removal due to her failure to maintain medical certification. The proposed removal noted that the Agency was willing to search for an alternative position for Complainant. Complainant challenged the removal claiming that she was disabled, and that the Agency failed to provide her with a transfer as a reasonable accommodation. In October 2006, the Agency offered Complainant a Program Management Specialist position at the Peachtree City facility. Complainant rejected the offer reasoning that she could not drive more than 30 miles, and the offered position was beyond that distance. On November 26, 2006, the Southern Region Reasonable Accommodation Committee met to address whether Complainant was entitled to an accommodation. The Agency sent Complainant a letter requesting that she provide medical documentation regarding her condition. Complainant responded on January 22, 2007, with medical documentation from her psychologist. Her psychologist stated that Complainant required a position in a stress-free environment and one that did not require ongoing attention to detail for extended periods. On January 29, 2007, the OWCP sent Complainant a letter informing her that the Program Management Specialist position was suitable and in accordance with her October 2006 medical documentation. The letter noted that it had received Complainant's rejection of the offer and requested documentation in support of Complainant's claim that she was restricted from driving more than 30 miles. M1 discussed the matter with Complainant's attorney in February 2007, and noted that Complainant's most recent medical documentation raised a question as to whether Complainant could even perform some of the alternative jobs she sought. Complainant's attorney provided the Agency a list of specific vacancies for which Complainant was qualified, and requested that the Agency transfer her into one of those positions. The Agency did not respond. Complainant was removed from the Agency on August 18, 2007. Complainant filed an appeal with the Agency under the Agency's Guarantee of Fair Treatment appeal process that allowed her to arbitrate whether she had been provided fair treatment. In December 2007, the arbitration panel found that the Agency was justified in removing Complainant based on medical disqualification; however, it had not made sufficient efforts to arrange a transfer for her. The arbitrators did not award Complainant back pay, but found that she should be restored to duty and the Agency should continue to try and find a job for her. The Agency resumed the job search for Complainant and, in July 2008, offered Complainant a Secretary position, which was on Complainant's original list of vacancies. The Agency, however, withdrew the offer prior to her acceptance. In August 2008, the Agency again offered Complainant a Secretary position, and Complainant accepted. On October 12, 2007, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female), disability, age (51), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when she was denied reasonable accommodation and subsequently removed after she was injured in November 2005 and was unable to perform Air Traffic Controller duties. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ held a hearing on September 14, 2009, and issued a bench decision immediately thereafter. In the decision, the AJ initially found that Complainant had not established a prima facie case of race, sex, age, or reprisal discrimination. First, the AJ determined that Complainant failed to show that similarly situated employees outside of her protected classes were treated more favorably. The AJ noted that while Complainant identified employees who received assignments, the AJ found that Complainant had presented no challenge to the Agency's assertion that it was common for Air Traffic Controllers to be discharged without an offer of alternate employment. In addition, the identified employees worked under different managers and in different facilities. The AJ further determined that Complainant failed to otherwise raise an inference of discrimination. As a result, the AJ found that Complainant had not been discriminated against as to those bases. With respect to Complainant's reasonable accommodation denial claim, the AJ determined that Complainant had established that she is an individual with a disability. Next, the AJ found that Complainant had shown that there were at least two vacancies for which she was qualified, those being the secretarial positions. The AJ noted that the Agency placed many Controllers who became disabled into those positions, but the success rate was less than 50%. Nonetheless, Complainant showed the existence of openings in secretarial positions during the time that the Agency should have been seeking to arrange a transfer, and that the transfer from Controller to Secretary was one that the Agency effectuated in other cases. Thus, the AJ concluded that the Agency should have commenced its effort to find alternate employment at the time Complainant notified the Agency of her desire for an alternate assignment. The Agency did so, but the AJ found that it should have continued its efforts at least through the time Complainant was removed. Complainant demonstrated that the Agency failed to do so. The Agency conducted a job search in August 2006, and those efforts were supplemented by the OWCP's search in Fall of 2006. The AJ found that there was no showing of any efforts taken during the period of January 2007 through the date of the Complainant's removal in August 2007. Moreover, Complainant introduced evidence of at least two vacancies that would have been appropriate transfers for her. Complainant received no explanation back in 2007 why she could not be placed in one of these positions, and the Agency presented no evidence at the hearing as to why that could not have been done prior to 2008. As a result, the AJ concluded that the Agency failed to reasonably accommodate Complainant by transferring her into a secretarial position. The AJ held a hearing with respect to damages on August 22, 2011, and issued a bench decision on September 28, 2011. As to non-pecuniary compensatory damages, the AJ noted that Complainant had been diagnosed with major depression before the Agency's denial of reasonable accommodation. Consequently, the AJ found that to the extent that Complainant was emotionally vulnerable, her condition was made worse by the Agency's discriminatory acts, and the Agency is responsible for those damages. Complainant introduced evidence from her therapist describing the stress she suffered, including her worries about future employment. In addition, Complainant testified that she experienced weight gain, hair loss, and migraine headaches. The AJ noted that the Agency could have brought Complainant back to work in February 2007 and did not do so until August 2008. Thus, the AJ found that there was a period of a year and a half that she suffered additional emotional harm as a result of the Agency's failure to accommodate her. Accordingly, the AJ found that Complainant was entitled to $45,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. Next, the AJ awarded Complainant back pay in the amount of $14,718.71 subject to the normal deductions, including Complainant's thrift savings plan contributions as well as the Agency's normal matching contribution. In addition, the AJ awarded Complainant restoration of the sick and annual leave she would have accrued from March 2007 through August 2008. Finally, the AJ awarded Complainant $37,169.00 in attorney's fees and costs. The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully implementing the AJ's decision. The instant appeal followed. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant contends that the AJ erred in failing to conclude that she established intentional discrimination based on her protected classes. Complainant argues that clear and unrefuted evidence showed that no attempt was made to place her into vacant positions for which she qualified. Further, Complainant alleges that she showed that the Agency subjected her to reprisal by failing to accommodate her. In addition, Complainant argues that the AJ's procedural and evidentiary rulings prejudiced the presentation of her case by not ordering the Agency to produce requested documents and limiting the examination of certain witnesses. As to damages, Complainant contends that she suffered from panic attacks, hair loss, weight gain, loss of sleep, crying spells, feelings of despondency, migraines, anxiety, and aggravation of loss of concentration as a result of the Agency's failure to accommodate her. Further, Complainant claims that she was rendered unable to concentrate on or attend to her children. Likewise, she states she was unable to care for her elderly parents in the manner in which she had been for the period following her threatened removal through the date she was finally rehired by the Agency following the Guaranteed Fair Treatment Appeal decision. Accordingly, Complainant requests that the Commission award her $300,000.00 in compensatory damages. Finally, Complainant argues that the back pay award should have been calculated based on the highest vacant position for which she was qualified as of January 2007, the Air Traffic Control Specialist position. Accordingly, Complainant requests that the Commission modify the final order. In response, the Agency initially provides evidence that it has restored 312 hours of leave to Complainant's leave balance and paid her $37,169.00 in attorney's fees; $45,000 for compensatory damages; and, $14,718.71 (minus applicable taxes and deductions) in back pay. Next, the Agency states that the AJ correctly found that Complainant failed to meet her burden of establishing discrimination based on race, sex, age, and reprisal as she failed to prove that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals. Further, the Agency maintains that the AJ correctly found that the Agency did not deny Complainant reasonable accommodation by not placing her in positions for which she was unqualified. The Agency notes that the AJ did an in-depth analysis of the different types of positions that Complainant applied to and noted the several areas for which Complainant failed to prove her qualifications. The AJ did find that Complainant met her burden in showing that she was qualified for placement into vacant secretarial positions and the Agency's failure to place her in a vacant secretary position before August 2008 resulted in a failure to reasonably accommodate Complainant. Finally, the Agency asserts that Complainant is not entitled to any further award for compensatory damages or back pay. Therefore, the Agency requests that the Commission affirm its final order. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-16 (Nov. 9, 1999). ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The AJ's Handling of the Hearing At the outset, the Commission will address Complainant's arguments related to the AJ's handling of the hearing. Complainant claims that the AJ made several procedural and evidentiary rulings which prejudiced the presentation of her case. In addition, Complainant complains that the AJ erred in limiting her attorney's questioning of certain witnesses. The Commission notes that EEOC regulations and Commission precedent provide AJ's with broad discretion in matters relating to the conduct of a hearing, including discovery orders and determinations regarding admission or exclusion of evidence or testimony of witnesses. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(e); EEOC Management Directive 110 for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEOC MD-110), at 7-5 (1999). The record does not reveal any procedural errors that disadvantaged Complainant's case. Thus, the Commission finds that Complainant failed to establish that the AJ abused his discretion in the manner in which he managed and adjudicated this case Disparate Treatment and Reprisal To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). The Commission finds that substantial record evidence supports the AJ's determination that Complainant failed to establish that she was subjected to discrimination or reprisal as to her medical disqualification and removal. Management testimony revealed that while some individuals were placed in alternate employment after being medically disqualified, it was more common for Air Traffic Controllers to be discharged. Complainant failed to show that similarly situated employees outside of her protected classes were treated more favorably or otherwise raise an inference of discrimination or reprisal. In addition, the Commission finds substantial record evidence supports that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Namely, the Agency proposed her removal based on her medical disqualification, but offered to search for an alternative position for her. In October 2006 and January 2007, Complainant was offered a Program Management Specialist position; however, Complainant refused because the position was located outside of driving limitation. The Employment Services Manager testified that the Agency conducted a job search for Complainant in August 2007, around the time of her removal. Id. at 126-27. In addition, M1 testified that OWCP was conducting a job search as well, and it was his understanding that OWCP was dealing directly with Complainant. ROI, Ex. B. Around July 2008, the Agency conducted another job search and found a Secretary position for which Complainant was qualified, and Complainant subsequently accepted the offer. Hr'g Tr., at 144. The Commission finds that Complainant failed to show that the Agency's reasons for its actions were pretextual. As a result, Complainant finds substantial record evidence that Complainant was not subjected to discrimination or reprisal as alleged. Notwithstanding this finding of no discrimination, the Commission agrees with the AJ and finds substantial evidence shows that the Agency's efforts to accommodate Complainant were not sufficient under the Rehabilitation Act. Neither party raised any challenges to this finding; therefore, the Commission will next address the AJ's award of damages. REMEDIES Pursuant to section 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a complainant who establishes his or her claim of unlawful discrimination may receive, in addition to equitable remedies, compensatory damages for past and future pecuniary losses (i.e., out of pocket expenses) and non-pecuniary losses (e.g., pain and suffering, mental anguish). 42 U.S. C. § 1981a(b)(3). For an employer with more than 500 employees, such as the agency, the limit of liability for future pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages is $300,000. Id. Non-pecuniary Compensatory Damages Non-pecuniary losses are losses that are not subject to precise quantification, i.e., emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation, injury to credit standing, and loss of health. See EEOC Notice No. 915.302 at 10 (July 14, 1992). There is no precise formula for determining the amount of damages for non-pecuniary losses except that the award should reflect the nature and severity of the harm and the duration or expected duration of the harm. See Loving v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01955789 (Aug. 29, 1997). The Commission notes that non-pecuniary compensatory damages are designed to remedy the harm caused by the discriminatory event, rather than punish the Agency for the discriminatory action. Furthermore, compensatory damages should not be motivated by passion or prejudice or "monstrously excessive" standing alone but should be consistent with the amounts awarded in similar cases. See Ward-Jenkins v. Dep't of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01961483 (Mar. 4, 1999). On appeal, Complainant contends that she is entitled to $300,000.00, based on the significant emotional and physical distress she suffered after the Agency failed to accommodate her. Complainant states that she suffered acute exacerbation of severe anxiety and depression, hair loss, weight gain, sleeplessness, and migraines, as evidenced by her medical records. After careful consideration of the evidence of record, the Commission concludes that the AJ's award of $45,000.00 for non-pecuniary compensatory damages insufficient to remedy to the harm the Agency's action caused Complainant. The Commission finds $60,000.00 to be an appropriate amount as Complainant presented sufficient objective evidence to establish that the Agency's actions caused her emotional distress for an extended period of time. The Commission notes that this amount is not "monstrously excessive" standing alone, is not the product of passion or prejudice, and is consistent with Commission precedent. See Complainant v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 0720130013 (Aug. 14, 2014) (Complainant awarded $65,000 where Agency's failure to accommodate resulted in exacerbation of post traumatic stress disorder, depression, stress, and elevated blood pressure); McCoy v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01A43628 (Sept. 22, 2005) (Complainant awarded $50,000 where Agency's failure to accommodate resulted in increased fatigue and exhaustion due to stress, sleeplessness, feelings of hopelessness and fear, and frequent headaches. Pre-existing depression and multiple sclerosis also contributed to symptoms.); Stephens v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, EEOC Appeal No. 01A53933 (Mar. 24, 2006) (Complainant awarded $55,000 where Agency's failure to accommodate resulted in emotional distress, inconvenience, and mental anguish, as well as anxiety about finances). Back Pay Complainant challenges the AJ's award of back pay, arguing that she is entitled to an award based upon the Air Traffic Controller Specialist position which was vacant on January 17, 2007. The Commission finds that substantial record evidence supports the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to show that she had the required experience for that position. The record evidence shows that this position required experience at the J-Level. ROI, Ex. F-1. While Complainant submitted evidence showing that her pay equaled or exceeded individuals working at the J-Level, the AJ noted that pay rates for Controllers were determined both by the level of the facility that they work at and their length of service. Thus, the mere fact that an employee made less than Complainant did not prove that the employee's grade level was lower. Complainant failed to produce evidence conclusively showing that she had the requisite experience for a J-Level position. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the AJ's award of back pay was appropriate. Finally, the Commission notes that Complainant raised no challenges to the AJ's award of attorney's fees and costs. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, the Commission MODIFIES the final order and directs the Agency to comply with the Order below. ORDER The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial action to the extent it has not already done so: 1. Within 120 days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall pay non-pecuniary compensatory damages to Complainant in the amount of $65,000.00. 2. Within 120 days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall promote Complainant to the Secretary, FV-218-E, or adjust her pay to the amount equivalent to the level associated with that position and award future salary increases at that level. 3. Within 120 days of the date of this decision becomes final, the Agency shall pay Complainant $14,718.71 in back pay. In addition, the Agency shall restore the sick leave and annual leave that Complainant would have accrued had she been recalled to work in March 2007. 4. Within 120 days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall pay Complainant $37,169.00 in attorney's fees and costs. 5. The Agency shall provide training to the responsible management officials regarding their responsibilities under EEO laws, with a special emphasis on the Rehabilitation Act and reasonable accommodation. 6. Consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against the responsible management officials. The Commission does not consider training to be disciplinary action. Within 30 days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall report its decision to the Compliance Officer referenced herein. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If any of the responsible management officials have left the Agency's employment, then the Agency shall furnish documentation of their departure date(s). 7. The Agency shall immediately post a notice in accordance with the paragraph below. The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying that the corrective action has been implemented. POSTING ORDER (G0914) The Agency is ordered to post at the Atlanta Air Traffic Control Tower copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0610) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action"). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations February 20, 2015 __________________ Date 2 0120120933 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 2 0120120933