Complainant

v. 

Eric H. Holder, Jr.,
Attorney General,
Department of Justice
(Federal Bureau of Investigation),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120122878 
Agency No. FBI-2010-00132

DECISION

Complainant timely filed an appeal from the Agency's final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).  For the following reasons, the Commission REVERSES the Agency's final decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the Agency properly found that Complainant failed to establish that was he subjected to discrimination based on his religion, as alleged. 

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Legal Administrative Specialist (LAS), Work Process Unit 2 (WPU2), for the Records Management Division (RMD) in Winchester, Virginia. Report of Investigation, Complainant's Aff., at 1. Complainant was hired as a LAS on March 1, 2009, and was subject to a one-year probationary period. 

After being hired, Complainant initially was supervised by the Unit Chief (UC1) and was subsequently assigned to the Acting Unit Chief (UC2) with WPU2. UC2's Aff., at 3. Both UC1 and UC2 felt that Complainant was not performing up to standards. Id. As a result, Complainant was placed on a 90-day Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) on September 28, 2009. Id. UC1 and UC2 felt that Complainant was having trouble keeping up with metric production rates regarding case completion. The PIP as written noted that Complainant was performing at an unacceptable level and must improve his performance level to "Minimally Successful" in three critical elements. After the PIP was implemented, UC2 met with Complainant on a weekly basis to provide him with feedback and assistance with his work. According to UC2, the Assistant Section Chief (ASC) told her that Complainant would be terminated at the conclusion of his PIP if his performance did not improve. UC2's Aff., at 4. During this time, UC2 felt that Complainant's work had improved, considering his performance to be minimally successful. Id. at 3. While Complainant's PIP was ongoing, WP2 was absorbed into Work Process Unit 1 (WPU1), and the Unit Chief (UC3) (female, Christian) for WPU1 became Complainant's new supervisor in November 2009. As a result, Complainant needed to complete his PIP under UC3 with a "Minimally Successful" rating in order to avoid possible termination. 

After Complainant was assigned to work under UC3, he and UC3 had a conversation about Christianity and the fact that Complainant worked as youth minister. U3's Aff., at 3. It was also known that UC3 taught Sunday school and that her children attended a private religious school. According to Complainant, UC3 was aware that he would read the Bible during his lunch breaks because she could see his desk from her office. Complainant's Aff., at 4-5. Complainant stated that he had difficulty working under UC3, and felt that she took issue with his Bible reading during lunch. Id. UC3, however, refuted that she took issue with his Christianity or Bible reading. 

Sometime later, UC3 asked a LAS Team Leader (TL1) not to help Complainant with his work or answer anymore of his questions due to reported rumors that employees were completing Complainant's work for him. UC3's Aff., at 5-6.  However, TL1 thought that Complainant was improving under the PIP and that his performance was at the minimally successful performance level. TL1's Aff., at 6. Complainant also felt that his performance had improved. Another LAS Team Leader (TL2) who was assigned to mentor Complainant felt that Complainant had trouble analyzing material and that such a deficiency made it difficult for him to move to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) training. TL2's Aff., at 4. TL2 felt that Complainant's work product was not good, and did not seem to improve. Id.

On November 27, 2009, UC3 assigned Complainant 27 cases that had formerly belonged to the Senior LAS. TL1 thought that the 27 cases assigned to Complainant were very complex, and indicated that such a difficult caseload would usually be divided up among team members. TL1's Aff. at 5. However, TL2 did not feel this case assignment was unusual because Complainant had fewer cases in his queue than others in the unit. T2' Aff., at 4-5. TL2 also felt the 27 cases could not be divided up because most of them would be closed with a single letter. Id. 

Subsequently, after a coworker (female) complained to UC3 about Complainant's socializing, Complainant approached the coworker and asked her why she fabricated the matter and jeopardized his career. UC3's Aff., at 11-12. The coworker apparently was so upset over the confrontation with Complainant that she left work the same day and took leave thereafter. Id. As a result, UC3 counseled Complainant about his confrontation with the coworker and considered the matter closed. However, UC1 thereafter made the ASC aware of Complainant's confrontation with the coworker. ASC's Aff., at 6-7.  UC1 told the ASC that the coworker was so upset over the confrontation with Complainant that she (the coworker) left work immediately thereafter. Id. The ASC then also counseled Complainant over the matter, feeling that "he could not allow employees to initiate disputes which ultimately result in their peers being intimidated." Id. After the incident with the coworker, according to UC3, the ASC stated that management intended to terminate Complainant due to his behavior with the coworker. The ASC believed that Complainant's work did not meet the minimum requirements, and his presence in office was becoming disruptive. Id. at 8. The ASC met with UC3 and the Section Chief, reaching the determination that Complainant "was not working out as an employee." Id. at 7.

On December 16, 2009, UC3 sent an e-mail with the subject, "For your eyes only" to employees outlining new team assignments. The e-mail did not assign Complainant to a team because UC3 was aware that Complainant would be fired. UC3's Aff., at 14-15. Days later, on December 18, 2009, UC3 met with Complainant in her office, telling him that he would not be attending FOIA training. Id. According to UC3, she felt sorry for Complainant and attempted to relate to him in the context of their Christianity. Id. Therein, according to UC3, she told Complainant that "perhaps God wanted him to do something else with his life," and that "he should go home and listen to what God wanted him to do." Id. However, Complainant's version of the meeting with UC3 on December 18, 2009, was as follows:

[UC3] asked me to close the door. She then told me that she saw me at my desk, looking through the Bible, and that I acted like I loved God, but had a "serious spiritual disconnect." [UC3] asked me, "Do you even read your Bible? Do you really even love Jesus, and love God?" [UC3] continued that she was not really sure if I knew God and what he wanted for me. [UC3] asked, "Maybe you need to go home and listen more to what he is trying to tell you because I don't think he wants you to be here. . . ." [UC3] referenced the Book of Job and said that Job lost everything but maintained a good attitude. 

Complainant's Aff., at 16.

Complainant averred that UC3 gave him the impression that she disapproved of his religious beliefs. Id. at 16-17. Complainant indicated that a number of employees in the office attended the same church as him and he felt that UC3 was not happy about that. Id. 

The next month, on January 13, 2010, UC3 gave Complainant an "Unacceptable" rating on his Performance Appraisal Report (PAR), noting that Complainant had problems with his work. UC3's Aff., at 16. UC3 also cited the incident involving Complainant and the coworker. Id. The PAR was authorized by the ASC as the reviewing official. Id.  TL2 also felt that the rating was appropriate, stating that Complainant "did not grasp basic concepts of case processing . . . ." TL2's Aff., at 6.  Complainant subsequently met with the Division Operations Manager (DOM) about his PAR. Complainant also initiated the grievance process, which resulted in the RMD Assistant Director and Human Resources personnel reviewing his PAR. The grievance process, completed on February 17, 2010, upheld the "Unacceptable" rating. During the grievance process, the ASC became aware of UC3's December 18, 2009, religious comments and admonished her about them, saying that such references were inappropriate in the workplace. ASC's Aff., at 8-9. The ASC also issued UC3 a letter of instruction and asked her to remove the Bible from her office. Id. 

Management moved forward with the process to terminate Complainant. However, Complainant ultimately decided to resign and tendered his resignation on February 22, 2010. Complainant resigned before the termination was effected. The DOM averred that Complainant's conflict with his coworker was not the reason for the termination recommendation, and that management would have found a way to deal with this personnel issue if his work product would have been satisfactory. DOM's Aff., at 7.

On April 2, 2010, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the basis of religion (Baptist) when:  

1. from November 2009 through February 23, 2010, UC3 made disparaging comments about his religion and threatened his job;

2. UC3 advised TL1 not to answer his work-related questions;

3. UC3 assigned him to an excessive quantity of complex work to be performed at one time;

4. UC3 failed to assist him in completing his PIP;

5. UC3 excluded him from an e-mail;

6. in December 2009, UC3 criticized him for confronting a coworker;

7. he received an "Unacceptable" rating on his 2009 work appraisal; 

8. he was not selected to receive FOIA training; and

9. he was forced to resign from the Agency.  

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).  When Complainant did not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f), the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b).  In its decision, the Agency concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. 



Agency's Decision 

The Agency found it unlikely that either UC3 or the ASC acted with prohibited discriminatory intent towards Complainant's religion. The Agency noted that both UC3 and the ASC are both Christians and there is no evidence that they harbored any discriminatory animus towards Complainant's religion. The Agency also noted that Complainant's performance problems with the Agency pre-dated UC3's supervision of him. The Agency further noted that, although UC3 exercised questionable judgment regarding her alleged comments on December 18, 2009, her comments were not offensive or egregious. The Agency also noted that it had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The Agency noted that UC3 instructed TL1 not to help Complainant with his work because she wanted Complainant to solve his own problems so that he could learn his job better. The Agency further noted that UC3 assigned Complainant the 27 cases in November 2009 because she wanted to see how Complainant would perform and whether he would realize that half the cases could be resolved easily. The Agency additionally found no evidence that UC3 failed to assist Complainant with his PIP and no evidence of a discriminatory intent when Complainant was excluded from an e-mail in December 2009. The Agency further found that UC3 believed that Complainant confronted his coworker so aggressively that she became distraught, and therefore it was reasonable for a manager to criticize an employee for engaging in an unprofessional confrontation. The Agency stated that Complainant's poor performance appraisal from UC3 and ACS was appropriate because Complainant spent too much time socializing, engaged in unprofessional behavior, and failed to meet productivity work requirements. The Agency additionally stated that it was reasonable to withhold FOIA training from Complainant because he had failed to master his existing duties. The Agency found no evidence of harassment or evidence that its actions constituted a constructive discharge.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant asserts that ACS never looked at his work and only averred that his work was subpar due to input from UC3. Complainant states that UC3 rarely looked over his work and, if she did, signed-off on it as completed correctly. Complainant contends that evidence establishes that, after he was issued the PIP, his work was well above what was required of him. Complainant asserts that he was given all positive remarks on his case review sheets. Complainant states that TL1 and UC2 confirmed that he was improving under the PIP. Complainant maintains that UC3 made disparaging comments about his religion on December 18, 2009, and failed to provide assistance with his PIP. Complainant maintains that UC3 was deceitful regarding his performance and wrongfully ruined his career and reputation. Complainant believes that UC3 set him up to fail because she was unhappy with his Christianity.  Complainant contends that the coworker he confronted has lied on many other occasions about other similar incidents.




STANDARD OF REVIEW

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).  See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (Nov. 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law"). 

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Direct Evidence 

Upon review, we find that the Agency failed to recognize that this is a case where Complainant offered direct evidence that UC3 made a statement to him establishing that his Christian faith was a motivating factor in the decision to give him an unacceptable rating on his 2009 work appraisal at the conclusion of his PIP, thereby leading to the recommendation to terminate him. By overlooking this direct evidence, the final decision applied the incorrect legal analysis to the evidence of record. 

"Direct evidence" may be any written or verbal policy or statement made by a management official that on its face demonstrates a bias against a protected group and is linked to the complained of adverse action. See EEOC Revised Enforcement Guidance on Recent Developments in Disparate Treatment Theory, No. 915-002 (July 12, 1992) (Enforcement Guidance). A link between the evidence of bias and the challenged employment action can be shown if the biased statements were made by the decision maker or one who was involved in the decision, at or around the time the decision was made, even if the biased remarks were not specifically related to the particular employment decision at issue. Id., n. 8. When there is direct evidence of discrimination, the circumstantial evidence analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is inapplicable. See Arroyo v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120121771 (July 11, 2012) (citing Carson v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01871596 (Jan. 19, 1988)).

In the instant case, on December 18, 2009, as noted above, according to Complainant, UC3 commented that he had serious spiritual disconnect, questioned if he really loved Jesus, and said that God did not want him to be there, among other things. Complainant averred that UC3 gave him the impression that he was a bad Christian and disapproved of his beliefs. Complainant said that a number of employees in the office attended the same church as him and he felt that the UC3 was not happy about that. We point out that TL1 said that Complainant told her about UC3's comments, saying that UC3 told him (Complainant) that she felt his career choice contradicted God's will. TL's Aff., at 9. TL1 further averred that UC3 had made comments previously about other employees, such as, "You know they aren't Christian." Id. We note that UC3 confirmed that she did, in fact, speak to Complainant about his Christianity on December 18, 2009, and that she had sounded "preachy." UC3's Aff., at 15. Specifically, UC3 recounted that she told Complainant that perhaps God wanted him to do something else with his life and to go home and listen to what God wanted him to do. Id. We note that UC3 did not specifically deny that she claimed to love Jesus to Complainant, or that she said she did not think it was God's will for Complainant to be with the Agency. Id. Further, we note that, after the ASC became aware of the UC3's December 18, 2009, comments, he admonished her about them, saying that such references were inappropriate in the workplace. The ASC also issued UC3 a letter of instruction and asked her to remove the Bible from her office. Based on the above, we find that Complainant has provided direct evidence of religious-based discrimination. However, as explained below, we find that the Agency has established that it nonetheless would have taken the same actions against Complainant absent the discrimination.

Mixed Motive

Cases such as this, in which there is a finding that discrimination was one of multiple motivating factors for an employment action, i.e., in which the Agency acted on both lawful and unlawful reasons are known as "mixed motive" cases. See Enforcement Guidance. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, (CRA) an employer could avoid liability in mixed-motive cases if it could show it would have made the same decision even absent the unlawful factor. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989). However, the CRA effectively overruled the part of Price Waterhouse that allowed an employer to avoid liability in this way. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(m). Once a complainant demonstrates that discrimination was a motivating factor in the Agency's action, it is the Agency's burden to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action even if it had not considered the discriminatory factor. If the Agency is able to make this demonstration, the Complainant is not entitled to personal relief (i.e., damages, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or back pay) but may be entitled to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorney's fees and/or costs. See Walker v. Sov. Sec. Admn., EEOC Request No. 05980504 (Apr. 8, 1999); De Annas v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 0720060085 (July 25, 2007).

Here, with regard to claim 2, UC3 explained that she instructed TL1 not to help Complainant because she (UC3) wanted Complainant to work more independently, as it was reported that other employees did his work for him. UC3's Aff., at 18-19. Regarding claim 3, UC3 averred that she assigned Complainant the 27 cases to evaluate his performance and see if he would realize that many of the cases could be completed with just a letter. Id. at 9-10. We note that TL2 did not feel this case assignment was unusual because Complainant had fewer cases in his queue than others in the unit. TL2 also thought that the 27 cases could not be divided up because most were closed with a single letter. With respect to claim 4, the ASC indicated that UC3 was unable to afford Complainant the same attention as UC2 because the new WPU had double the amount of the employees, all of whom the UC3 was responsible for supervising. ASC's Aff., at 5. As for claim 6, we note that UC3 indicated that during a meeting with team leaders and mentors, a coworker reported that Complainant was not focused on his work. UC3 stated that after the meeting, the coworker came to her office visibly upset, stating that Complainant confronted her over her comments about him. We note that Complainant does not dispute that he confronted the coworker. Complainant's Aff., at 12. Also, other employees were aware that the coworker became upset after Complainant confronted her.  

With respect to claims 5, 7, 8, and 9, the record clearly reflects that Complainant had performance issues regarding his case completion and work product. We note that TL1 stated that Complainant "always struggled with certain aspects of the job." TL1's Aff., at 3. Also, TL2 averred that she provided UC3 with updates regarding Complainant's progress, which reflected that his work was poor. TL2's Aff., at 3-4.  TL2 elaborated that Complainant had had trouble analyzing material, and opined that such a deficiency would have made it difficult for him to move on to FOIA training. Id. We additionally note that the DOM averred that management would have found a way to deal with Complainant's confrontation of the coworker had his work product been satisfactory. DOM's Aff., at 7.  Most importantly, we note that Complainant was placed on the PIP before he was assigned to work under UC3, the responsible management official name here. 

Based on the above, we find that the Agency has shown that it would have taken the same actions toward Complainant, even absent any discrimination. Accordingly, we find that Complainant is not entitled to personal relief because the Agency would have, inter alia, given him his case work, his performance rating, and recommended him for termination, even if it had not considered his religion. 
 
Constructive Discharge

Complainant also asserted that, due to the working conditions, he was forced to resign in lieu of termination. In essence, he alleged that he was constructively discharged from his position. The central question in a constructive discharge case is whether the employer, through its unlawful discriminatory behavior, made the employee's working conditions so difficult that any reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled to resign. Carmon-Coleman v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 07A00003 (Apr. 17, 2002). The Commission has established three elements which a Complainant must prove to substantiate a claim of constructive discharge: (1) a reasonable person in Complainant's position would have found the working conditions intolerable; (2) conduct that constituted discrimination against Complainant created the intolerable working conditions; and (3) the complainant's involuntary resignation resulted from the intolerable working conditions. See Pernell v. Nat'l Archives and Records Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 0120051935 (Oct. 31. 2006). Here, we find that Complainant has failed to show that the conduct created an intolerable working condition. We note that Complainant resigned before the termination could be effected. It is clear that the termination process was just a formality at that point and his recommended termination was performance-based. Further, as noted above, it is clear that the Agency would have terminated Complainant absent any discrimination. As such, we cannot find that Complainant has established the he was constructively discharged from his position.
CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record, we REVERSE the Agency's final decision finding no discrimination, and we REMAND the complaint to the Agency to comply with the relief set forth in the Order below.

ORDER

The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:

1. The Agency is directed to provide EEO training for the named responsible management official addressing her responsibilities with respect to eliminating discrimination in the workplace with an emphasis on Title VII.

2. The Agency shall consider taking disciplinary action against the individual identified as being responsible for the discrimination perpetrated against Complainant. The Agency shall report its decision. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline.  If that individual has left the Agency's employee, the Agency shall furnish proof of the date of separation.

3. The Agency shall complete all of the above actions within 120 calendar days from the date on which the decision becomes final.

The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." 

POSTING ORDER (G0914)

The Agency is ordered to post at its Records Management Division in Winchester, Virginia facility copies of the attached notice.  Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.  The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.  The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. 




IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.  The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013.  The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant.  If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.  29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a).  The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.  See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g).  Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action."  29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408.  A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).  If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1.	The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2.	The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).  All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013.  In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604.  The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.  

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request.  Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration.  The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)

This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint.  However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision.  In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission.  If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.  Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.  "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.  Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.  See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c).  The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court.  Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.  Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:



______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations


March 27, 2015
Date

 
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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013



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0120122878