DAPHNE E. LAWRENCE, APPELLANT,
v.
MARVIN T. RUNYON, JR., POSTMASTER GENERAL, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, AGENCY.

Appeal No. 01952288
Hearing No. 270-94-9117X
Agency No. 1-G-701-2061-93

Appellant filed an appeal with this Commission from a final decision of the agency concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e etseq. The final agency decision was dated January 18, 1995. The appeal was filed on February 3, 1995. Accordingly, the appeal is timely (see29 C.F.R. §1614.402(a)), and is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly limited appellant's award of compensatory damages to losses of night differential pay.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, appellant contends that she is entitled to recovery of $100,000.00 in nonpecuniary compensatory damages for the embarrassment, ridicule, and defamation she suffered while being subjected to a hostile working environment. She contends that recovery of such damages is not dependent on having suffered emotional distress requiring therapy or hospitalization but may be established by a complainant's own testimony.

BACKGROUND

On July 22, 1993, appellant filed a formal EEO complaint, alleging that the agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex when she was subjected to sexual harassment in the form of a hostile working environment. The agency accepted appellant's complaint and conducted an investigation. On May 2, 1994, the agency advised appellant that it had completed its investigation and informed her of her right to elect either a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or a final decision without a hearing. Appellant requested a hearing before an AJ and the hearing was conducted on August 9 and 16, 1994. After the hearing, the AJ issued a Recommended Decision, finding that the conduct of appellant's acting supervisor (Supervisor A) was "severe and pervasive and created a hostile working environment for [appellant]." The AJ further held that the agency failed to take prompt or effective corrective action, noting that it first considered appellant to blame for one particular incident and then failed promptly to separate appellant from Supervisor A. The AJ noted that when the agency finally separated appellant and Supervisor A, it moved appellant to a new tour that resulted in the loss of night differential pay. In her Order, the AJ recommended, interalia, that the agency "[a]ward the [appellant] compensatory damages that she has suffered due to the harassment, including the loss of night differential pay (with interest)." The AJ directed appellant to provide the agency with information from which it could determine her entitlement to compensatory damages.

In its first final decision, the agency accepted the AJ's recommended decision and found that it discriminated against appellant when Supervisor A engaged in conduct creating a hostile working environment. It further held that appellant was entitled to compensatory damages and requested that she provide it with information in support of her claim. The agency provided appellant with a list of questions to answer relative to her request for such damages. In a December 29, 1994 sworn statement, appellant provided responses to the agency's questionnaire, describing the emotional and psychological impact of Supervisor A's conduct and the agency's failure to stop him. She also acknowledged that she did not seek psychiatric or psychological counseling or therapy.

In its second final decision, the agency ruled that appellant was entitled only to "compensatory damages" for loss of night differential pay.1 The agency noted that she "presented no evidence from a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other medical official explaining or diagnosing your emotional stress."It further noted that she failed to present evidence establishing a causal connection between Supervisor A's or the agency's conduct. For this reason, it denied her request for nonpecuniary compensatory damages. It is from this final agency decision that appellant now appeals.

The record and hearing transcript in this case indicate that appellant worked as a small parcel bundle sorter at the main post office in New Orleans, LA. Between 1991 and the summer of 1992, appellant and Supervisor A engaged in a consensual sexual relationship.2 Appellant testified that after the relationship ended, Supervisor A began to harass her. In particular, she testified that he would yell at her, say things of both a sexual and non-sexual nature in order to embarrass her, make sexual comments about her to co-workers, tell co-workers about their sexual relationship, and make up stories about her of a sexual nature. Other witnesses testified or provided affidavits stating that Supervisor A told them of his sexual relationship with appellant and/or of his sexual encounters with her.3

The record and hearing further describe one incident that led directly to appellant's filing of an EEO complaint. On June 7, 1993, Supervisor A paged appellant when he did not see her in her work area. Appellant stated that after hearing the page, she returned to the front of the machine she was using, asked why had he paged her, and after a short repartee between them, said "'F' you" to him. Supervisor A replied, "I already f----- you. I got what I wanted from you. "Immediately after this incident, appellant reported Supervisor A's action to Witness B, a Supervisor, and informed him of Supervisor A's other actions and prior conduct towards her. The agency initially questioned Supervisor A's failure to discipline appellant. Only after appellant sought EEO counseling and alleged sexual harassment did the agency take steps to remedy her concerns. The record indicates, however, that the agency moved appellant from one tour to another, which caused her to lose the night differential; that Supervisor A, who had been removed temporarily as an acting supervisor, supervised appellant over the July 4, 1993 weekend; and that from time-to-time he had some supervisory responsibility for appellant's performance.

At the hearing, several witnesses testified that Supervisor A's conduct caused appellant embarrassment and humiliation, noting that he made many sex-based comments about her or that he alleged that they engaged in sexual conduct. Witness C, a co-worker, testified that Supervisor A's conduct made appellant "upset" and "nervous." Witness B testified that appellant "was certainly distraught" after the June 7 incident. He also noted that she "was embarrassed" by the sex-based comments she feared Supervisor A might say or that he had said to her peers in the agency.4 Appellant confirmed Witness C's description of her as embarrassed. Witness D, a supervisor, testified that appellant was crying in his office as she described the June 7 incident.

The file includes a copy of a December 29, 1994 sworn statement from appellant, responding to a series of questions from the agency pertaining to her request for compensatory damages. In the statement, appellant acknowledged that she did not seek psychiatric or psychological counseling because of Supervisor A's conduct.5 She asserted, however, that she suffered injury as a result of his actions, citing embarrassment, humiliation, and defamation.6 Appellant contended that she suffered "weight loss, nausea, stomach problems, headaches, used sick leave due to emotional stress at work."She also contended that her work performance suffered because she had difficulty concentrating; she was irritable; had anxiety attacks; would cry at work when she learned of Supervisor A's false statements about her; had difficulty working with co-workers, who "shunned" her after receiving warnings from Supervisor A and other supervisors; and that her social life suffered for over a year after the incidents described in her complaint.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Legal Standards for Awarding Compensatory Damages

Section 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, Pub. L. No. 102-166, codified at 42 U.S.C. §1981a, authorizes an award of compensatory damages as part of make-whole relief for intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Section 1981a(b) (2) indicates that compensatory damages do not include back pay, interest on back pay, or any other type of equitable relief authorized by Title VII. Section 1981a(b)(3) limits the total amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded each complaining party for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, according to the number of individuals employed by the respondent. The limit for a respondent who has more than 500 employees is $300,000. 42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(3)(D).

The Commission has held that compensatory damages are recoverable in the administrative process. Jackson v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01923399 (November 12, 1992), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05930306 (February 1, 1993). Thus, if a complainant has alleged that s/he is entitled to compensatory damages and the agency or the Commission enters a finding of discrimination, the complainant must be given an opportunity to submit evidence establishing his or her claim. To receive an award of compensatory damages, a complainant must demonstrate that s/he has been harmed as a result of the agency's discriminatory action; the extent, nature and severity of the harm; and the duration or expected duration of the harm. Rivera v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157 (July 22, 1994), request for reconsid. denied, EEOC Request No. 05940927 (December 11, 1995); Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at 11-12, 14 (July 14, 1992).

The Commission's July 1992 notice set forth guidelines for use in establishing entitlement to compensatory damages. Seeid. at 8-14.Such damages may be awarded for past pecuniary losses, future pecuniary losses, and nonpecuniary losses directly or proximately caused by the agency's discriminatory conduct. Pecuniary losses are out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of the employer's unlawful action, including job-hunting expenses, moving expenses, medical expenses, psychiatric expenses, physical therapy expenses, and other quantifiable out-of-pocket expenses. Past pecuniary losses are pecuniary losses that are incurred prior to the resolution of a complaint via a finding of discrimination, the issuance of a full-relief offer, or a voluntary settlement. Future pecuniary losses are losses that are likely to occur after resolution of a complaint. Nonpecuniary losses are losses that are not subject to precise quantification including emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation, injury to credit standing, and loss of health.

"[C]ompensatory damage awards must be limited to the sums necessary to compensate [a complainant] for actual harm, even if the harm is intangible."Thus, a compensatory damages award should reimburse a complainant for proven pecuniary losses, future pecuniary losses, and non-pecuniary losses. A complainant has a duty to mitigate his or her pecuniary damages. If a respondent can prove that a complainant failed to exercise reasonable diligence to mitigate pecuniary damages, the damages award should be reduced to reflect all losses that could have been avoided with reasonable diligence. There are no precise formulas for determining the amount of damages for non-pecuniary losses. Damages awards for nonpecuniary losses that have been assessed by juries and courts have varied significantly. An award of compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses, including emotional harm, should reflect, however, the extent to which the respondent directly or proximately caused the harm and the extent to which other factors also caused the harm. An award of compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses should also reflect the nature and severity of the harm and the duration or expected duration of the harm.

In Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993), the Commission described the type of objective evidence that an agency may obtain when assessing the merits of a complainant's request for emotional distress damages:
[E]vidence should have taken the form of a statement by appellant describing her emotional distress, and statements from witnesses, both on and off the job, describing the distress. To properly explain the emotional distress, such statements should include detailed information on physical or behavioral manifestations of the distress, information on the duration of the distress, and examples of how the distress affected appellant day to day, both on and off the job. In addition, the agency should have asked appellant to provide objective and other evidence linking . . . the distress to the unlawful discrimination . . . .

Objective evidence may include statements from the complainant concerning his/her emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character or reputation, injury to credit standing, loss of health, and any other nonpecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of the discriminatory conduct. Statements from others, including family members, friends, and health care providers could address the outward manifestations or physical consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness, anxiety, stress, depression, martial strain, humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self-esteem, excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Objective evidence also may include documents indicating a complainant's actual out-of-pocket expenses related to medical treatment, counseling, and so forth, related to the injury allegedly caused by discrimination. In determining damages, the agency is only responsible for those damages that are clearly shown to be caused by the alleged discriminatory conduct, not for any and all damages in general.

Nonpecuniary Damages Awarded

Based on the record in this case and the legal standards governing awards of nonpecuniary damages, the Commission finds that the agency erred when it denied appellant's request for damages for harassment, embarrassment, humiliation, and defamation. In the instant case, the agency's second final decision denied appellant's request for compensatory damages based on a determination that she failed to present any evidence from a health care provider in support of her claim of emotional distress. The Commission has held that such evidence is not a mandatory prerequisite for recovery of compensatory damages. Carpenter v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995). Courts also have held that "expert testimony ordinarily is not required to ground money damages for mental anguish or emotional distress." Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 724 (1st Cir. 1994), citing Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 875 (10th Cir. 1989); Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 512 n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). A complainant's own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain his/her burden in this regard. See U.S. v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 58 (1993) (housing discrimination). As the court noted in Balistrieri,"[t]he more inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action; consequently, somewhat more conclusory evidence of emotional distress will be acceptable to support an award for emotional damages."Nonetheless, we further note that the absence of supporting evidence may affect the amount of damages deemed appropriate in specific cases.

In the instant case, appellant avers that she experienced embarrassment, humiliation, and defamation. She further asserts that the agency's actions caused her weight loss, nausea, stomach problems, headaches, emotional stress at work; difficulty concentrating at work; irritability, anxiety attacks; and that she would cry at work when she learned of Supervisor A's false statements about her and had difficulty working with co-workers, who "shunned" her after receiving warnings from Supervisor A and other supervisors. We note that although appellant did not provide statements from health care providers or others in response to the agency's request for evidence in support of her claim for nonpecuniary damages, several witness testified during the hearing as to her embarrassment and humiliation when learning of statements from Supervisor A concerning alleged sexual encounters and that she was "distraught" and cried following the June 7 incident. Finally, the record indicates that the agency failed to respond promptly to appellant's sexual harassment allegation and that the agency moved her from one tour to another, at a loss of compensation, in order to escape Supervisor A's supervision and harassment. We find that appellant has established that she suffered emotional distress as the result of Supervisor A's sexual harassment and the agency's failure to respond promptly her allegations. Accordingly, we find, notwithstanding appellant's admitted partial responsibility for the June 7 incident (she used profanity in addressing Supervisor A), that she is entitled to an award of compensatory damages.

Having determined that appellant proved that she suffered emotional distress causally connected to agency action, we must next determine the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded for that harm. In determining the amount of a compensatory damages award, we are guided by the principle that a compensatory damages award is limited to the sums necessary to compensate her for the actual harm caused by the agency's discriminatory action and attempt to affix a reasonable dollar value to compensate appellant for that portion of her emotional distress and related symptoms that were caused by the agency's discrimination. See EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at 13 (July 14, 1992).

We further note that damage awards for emotional harm are difficult to determine and that there are no definitive rules governing the amount to be awarded in given cases. In this regard, the Commission finds that a proper award must meet two goals: that it not be "monstrously excessive" standing alone and that it be consistent with awards made in similar cases. See Cyqnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989). We further recognize that jury and court awards for nonpecuniary damages based on humiliation and embarrassment have varied considerably. Seee.g., Kuntz v. City of New Haven, 3 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1590, 1592 (D.C. Conn.) ($500.00 award for emotional distress based on plaintiff's testimony that he was "disappointed", "cranky" with family and friends, "embarrassed" at not having been promoted, and had many sleepless nights), aff'd without opinion, 29 F.3d 622 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 667 (1994); Sassaman v. Heart City Toyota, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1230, 1236 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (jury award of $2,000.00 in nonpecuniary damages appropriate in sexual harassment case based on plaintiff's testimony concerning humiliating, degrading, and embarrassing conduct of four male supervisory employees and testimony of employer's medical expert that plaintiff likely would suffer "daily pain" having to work in hostile environment); See also Turic v. Hospitality House, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Mich. 1994) ($50,000.00 in sex and religion discrimination/termination case); EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. I11. 1993) ($50,000.00 in disability/termination case); McAdams v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 2 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1489 (D. Minn. 1993) ($35,000.00 in failure to accommodate case).

Based on the foregoing, including the nature and severity of harm to appellant and the actual duration of the harm, we find an award of $3,000.00 in compensatory damages for appellant's proven nonpecuniary loss is reasonable.7



CONCLUSION

Based upon a thorough review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to REVERSE the agency's final decision of January 18, 1995, and to ORDER the award of compensatory damages set forth below.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

The agency shall issue a check to the appellant for $3,000 within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final.

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post at its New Orleans District facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501 (e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. §1614.501 (e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. §1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. §1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively, the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action."29 C.F.R. §§1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. §1614.410.

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law, regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUSTBEFILEDWITHINTHIRTY (30) CALENDARDAYS of the date you receive this decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party WITHINTWENTY (20) CALENDARDAYS of the date you receive the request to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. §1614.407. All requests and arguments must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration, a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e etseq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§791, 794(c).The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Frances M. Hart
Executive Officer
Executive Secretariat

April 18, 1996

1. The agency mischaraterized night differential pay as a component of "compensatory damages." Appellant was entitled to reimbursement of night differential pay as a part of back pay. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).

2. Supervisor A was a part-time supervisor, who would fill-in for regular full-time supervisors as needed. The record indicated that he supervised appellant several times a month and once for a longer period of time.

3. Although Supervisor A denied making most of the statements attributed to him, the AJ found the testimony of other witnesses and appellant more credible. As is well-settled, the Commission gives deference to credibility determinations based on demeanor made by an AJ that are not contradicted by the record evidence. Muller v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05900634 (October 12, 1990). We find no basis to disturb the AJ's credibility findings in this case.

4. In his affidavit, Witness B stated that during his June 7 meeting with appellant, she was "distraught when she thought of [Supervisor A] spreading around more rumors about her . . . ."

5. Appellant stated that she met with an agency EAP counselor, but offered no support for this claim. She further stated that because of her embarrassment over this matter, she did not seek the assistance of a medical doctor and relied on over-the-counter medicines, such as Pepto-Bismol, Rolaids, and Tylenol, to remedy stomach problems and headaches.

6. In support of her defamation claim, appellant contends that Supervisor A falsely told co-workers that appellant and he had engaged in sexual activities behind a bank building and at work.

7. Because appellant did not provide any evidence to support her claim as to the physical consequences of the harassment (weight loss, nausea, stomach problems, and so forth); that co-workers shunned her; or that her work suffered because of the agency's actions, our award of damages does not encompass these allegations.

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dated ____________________ which found that a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e etseq has occurred at this facility.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment. The United States Postal Service affirms its commitment to comply with these statutory provisions.

The U.S. Postal Service, New Orleans District supports and will comply with such Federal law and will not take action against individuals because they have exercised their rights under law.

The U.S. Postal Service, New Orleans District has remedied the employee affected by the Commission's finding. The U.S. Postal Service, New Orleans District will ensure that officials responsible for personnel decisions and terms and conditions of employment will abide by the requirements of all Federal equal employment opportunity laws.

The U.S. Postal Service, New Orleans District will not in any manner restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates in proceedings pursuant to, Federal equal employment opportunity law.

29 C.F.R. Part 1614