SAMIRAT HAFIZ, PETITIONER, v. WILLIAM S. COHEN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, (DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY), AGENCY. Petition No. 04960021 Appeal No. 01945433 Agency No. CZ-92-04 GRANTING OF PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT INTRODUCTION On April 15, 1996, petitioner filed a Petition for Enforcement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Commission) requesting enforcement of the Commission's order in Hafiz v. Department of Defense (Defense Information Systems Agency), EEOC Appeal No. 01945433 (November 30, 1995). The Petition for Enforcement was properly filed in accordance with 29 C.F.R. §1614.503(a). For the reasons set forth herein, petitioner's petition is granted. ISSUE PRESENTED The issue presented is whether the agency followed the order in EEOC Appeal No. 01945433 to promote petitioner to the position of supervisory computer specialist, GM-334-13 and process a prospective claim for attorney fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. §1614.501. BACKGROUND Petitioner filed a complaint, alleging in relevant part, that she was discriminated against on the basis of national origin when she was not competitively promoted to the position of supervisory computer specialist, GM-0334-13, in the agency's Information Processing Center - Columbus (IPCC). It was a branch chief position for the End-User Computing Applications Support Branch (ERB). Following an investigation and hearing, an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ) issued a recommended decision finding discrimination with regard to the above matter. The AJ recommended, in relevant part, that petitioner be promoted to the position of supervisory computer specialist, GM-334-13, be awarded all benefits of employment lost from April 12, 1992 onward, and attorney fees, if applicable. The agency then issued a final decision in August 1994 "adopt[ing]" the recommended decision, but stated petitioner would be promoted to the position of computer specialist, GS-334-13, and receive the benefits of employment retroactive to April 12, 1992. In August 1994 petitioner wrote a letter to the issuer of the final decision stating that the appropriate relief constituted promoting her to supervisory computer specialist. Thereafter, in order to protect her appeal rights, petitioner filed a timely appeal from the final agency decision to the Commission making the same argument. Meanwhile, in a September 1994 letter to petitioner, an agency representative stated that the agency provided petitioner an offer of full relief to promote her to supervisory computer specialist, but she refused to accept the offer unless she was provided a specific effective date for the personnel actions involved. The letter stated that the agency would make a good faith effort to honor the terms of the final agency decision within 30 days of written verification from the Commission that she withdrew her appeal. Petitioner promptly responded to the agency representative. She contended that the above letter did not contain adequate assurances she would be provided full relief. Petitioner indicated that full relief be based on the AJ's recommended decision, not the final agency decision, and that compliance be based on more than a good faith effort. She explained that adequate assurance would constitute the agency offering a promotion to supervisory computer specialist retroactive to April 12, 1992, backpay, benefits and applicable attorney fees, and assurance that the relief would be provided immediately after she accepted the offer.1 In EEOC Appeal No. 01945433 (November 30, 1995) the Commission found that petitioner was entitled to be promoted to a supervisory computer specialist, GM-334-13, position. It advised that "if none is currently vacant, then petitioner is entitled to be placed in the original position for which she was nonselected, even if it means removing the original selectee [bumping] who was put there in 1992."The decision ordered the agency, in relevant part, to promote petitioner to the position of supervisory computer specialist, GM-334-13, and to process a prospective claim for attorney fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. §1614.501. After the Commission issued its appeal decision, petitioner and the agency submitted additional materials to the Commission. They are described below. The record contains a contemporaneous memo by the Deputy Director of the Defense Megacenter (DMC) in Columbus stating that in January 1995 he offered petitioner a choice of two supervisory computer specialist positions, and she chose the second. The memo stated it was explained to petitioner that the first position was a shift manager computer operations job that was performed on rotating shifts and had 30 subordinates, and the second was an applications support job with four subordinates. It stated that the second position was in the process of being established and classified, and would be available in one to two months. Petitioner does not dispute that she was told about the positions as described above. In her petition for enforcement, petitioner disputes that she was placed in the position she chose. She avers that she was not qualified to work in computer operations, and that she chose the branch chief position that was the subject of her complaint (which she refers to as "WECMSAB"). According to petitioner, it was vacant when the branch chief job in which she was placed was created.2 On April 4, 1995, soon after being assigned to the branch chief position in the above memo, petitioner wrote a letter to the agency's General Counsel (who was a point of contact for petitioner about her case) stating that while she was told she only had two subordinates assigned to her branch, she actually had no one to supervise. Petitioner explained that one person rejected the assignment, and the other was assigned to a specific project and located away from her area. In a January 1996 letter to a Commission compliance division, petitioner stated that she tried to establish the position, but to no avail. In a letter to the Director of the agency the same month, petitioner wrote that the WECMSAB branch chief position was vacant in July 1994, and asked why it was filled by another employee rather than her being placed in the position.3 Petitioner wrote that the branch chief position to which she was promoted was tasked with handling DMC internal applications development, but it did not have a budget, nor the hardware to perform this function.4 She wrote that she had inadequate staff in that the two people who were moved to her branch were actually only detailed there, did not want to be there, and hence created problems. In the above letter, petitioner added that while management averred her branch was tasked with handling all DMC internal applications development, most of this function was still performed by the position in the WECMSAB branch and other agency components. She added that when a Lieutenant pleaded with management to either move internal applications development to petitioner's branch and provide it sufficient staffing and management support and make it functional or dismantle the branch, the branch was simply moved to another division. In a subsequent letter to the Commission in January 1996, petitioner wrote that since April 1995 she supervised anywhere from one to four employees, a GS-12, a WS-11, and two GS-9s. The organizational chart petitioner submitted indicated she was supervising all these employees in January 1996. In support of her argument that her branch did not have the resources to accomplish its mission, petitioner submitted her performance appraisal for the period of March 20, 1995 to September 30, 1995. It stated three critical elements of the position were not rated due to the infancy of the branch and lack of sufficient personnel resources assigned to accomplish its mission. Petitioner contends that she was unable to perform these elements or the mission of her branch due to lack of staff. In her April 1995 letter to the General Counsel, petitioner contended that the branch chief job which was the subject of her complaint supervised 16 people. Petitioner contends the agency created an artificial position for her to circumvent the AJ's decision, and that it was not substantially equivalent to the job she was discriminatorily denied with regard to numbers of subordinates, material resources, and, apparently, level of functional work responsibility of the branch, and hence, not substantially equivalent with regard to promotional opportunities, job responsibilities, working conditions or status. Petitioner contends that the agency's failure to place her in the branch chief position which was the subject of her complaint or a substantially equivalent position has created a hostile work environment.5 She also raises new allegations of discrimination going to the agency interfering with her work. The agency avers that petitioner was placed in a position substantially similar to the job that was the subject of her complaint. According to the agency, a management team travelled from agency headquarter's to petitioner's work site and determined that petitioner's current position is substantially similar to the position she was denied. It contends that the work, promotional opportunities, job responsibilities (developmental/number of employees in the branch), working conditions and status are substantially similar. The agency does not submit a report or any statements from the evaluating management team. The agency denies that it created a position for petitioner. Different attorneys represented petitioner in her case against the agency. In her petition for enforcement, petitioner raises concerns about the agency's nonpayment of attorney fees to three attorneys. With regard to attorney S.K., petitioner avers that despite being promised payment from the agency, he has not received a check. Petitioner submits a letter from the attorney corroborating this statement. The agency avers that it approved payment of fees to attorney S.K. in the amount he requested. It does not submit documentation of payment, however. The agency states it paid attorney's fees and costs to attorney W.O. in the amount of $6013.63. He represented petitioner at the hearing. Attorney W.O.'s prior bill for fees and costs is not in the record, but it appears the agency paid them in full since petitioner wrote the agency in April 1995 stating she was billed $6013.63 for fees and costs by attorney W.O. and asking for payment. According to a subsequent August 1995 invoice in the record from attorney W.O., he drafted a letter to the agency concerning petitioner's "problems with supervisor." This invoice was for $50, and petitioner paid. Petitioner asks that the agency reimburse her for this fee, and it appears the agency did not do so. The agency did not approve compensation for the third attorney petitioner raised, attorney H.A. Petitioner's complaint contained multiple allegations, and the agency accepted petitioner's non-promotion allegation. However, in 1992 the agency procedurally rejected a portion of petitioner's complaint. Petitioner, through attorney H.A., appealed the rejection to the Commission. Subsequently, the agency rescinded the rejection. The Commission then issued a letter closing petitioner's appeal, apparently because the agency rescinded the rejection. Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the attorney fees she incurred related to the procedural appeal attorney H.A. filed in 1992. The record contains an itemized statement from attorney H.A. that indicates he charged petitioner a total of $250 in attorney fees. In response to petitioner's petition for enforcement, the agency contends attorney H.A.'s fees were not certified, the agency was not notified of his representation, and his services fell outside the scope of recoverable attorney fees as set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iv). Petitioner also contends that she is entitled to costs in pursuing her litigation. Specifically, petitioner requests $33.13 in postage and photocopying costs she was billed by attorney H.A. in connection with his work on her procedural appeal in 1992. Petitioner requests reimbursement for 200 miles of automobile mileage she states she incurred in five visits to attorney H.R. and an apparent associate, and $30 in related parking fees. Petitioner also seeks reimbursement for 2120 miles of automobile mileage that she states she incurred in five visits to attorney S.K. in 1994. Three of the trips were 530 miles, one was 440, and one was 90 miles. At the time, petitioner lived in Columbus, Ohio, and the attorney's office was in East Lansing, Michigan. Further, petitioner seeks reimbursement for 360 miles of automobile mileage that she states she incurred in eight visits to attorney W.O. Petitioner also seeks reimbursement for 70 miles of automobile mileage, and $12 in related parking fees she incurred in two trips to the court reporter to review depositions. In addition, petitioner seeks reimbursement for telephone, mailing, facsimile, and photocopying costs she personally incurred. Petitioner listed these expense categories by year totals (1994, 1995, 1996), and generally did not itemize the separate expenses in each category. The record contains little documentation of these expenses. The agency contends that petitioner's costs are not within the scope of recoverable costs as set forth in 29 C.F.R. §1614.501(e)(2)i(ii)(C) and 28 U.S.C. §1920. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The issue presented is whether the agency followed the order in EEOC Appeal No. 01945433 to promote petitioner to the position of supervisory computer specialist, GM-334-13 and to process a prospective claim for attorney fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. §1614.501.6 As an initial matter, petitioner contends that the branch chief position that was the subject of her complaint was vacant in July 1994, after the AJ issued the recommended decision. She also contends it was vacant again when the branch chief job she was placed in was created. It appears the agency went through one or more reorganizations, and it is unclear whether the branch chief job petitioner was discriminatorily denied in April 1992 was the same job she points to now. Moreover, assuming that it was, the record does not reflect why petitioner was not placed in that job. Implicit in the order in the Commission decision was that petitioner be placed in the branch chief job that was the subject of her complaint if it was vacant, or a substantially equivalent job if it was not vacant. Petitioner was offered a supervisory computer specialist position in September 1994. The record, however, does not reveal which branch chief job this went to and is not clear on the terms of the offer. In addition to her allegation that she should have been placed in the branch chief job that was the subject of her complaint, petitioner contends that she was not promoted to a substantially equivalent branch chief position. According to petitioner, the branch chief position to which she was promoted was tasked with handling all DMC internal applications development, but it did not have a budget, and did not have the hardware to perform this function. She contended that most DMC internal applications development were actually assigned to other agency components, and she had insufficient staff to perform the branch's mission and three of her critical elements. In stating that her branch chief job was not substantially equivalent, petitioner pointed to the relatively small number of subordinates in her branch. It reached its full compliment of four subordinates by January 1996. It is not clear whether petitioner is alleging that her branch had little work to do, or had insufficient staff to perform its actual or promised work. Petitioner mentioned a Lieutenant who could corroborate some of her claims, but the Lieutenant did not provide a statement. The agency disputes petitioner's characterization of the branch chief position to which she was promoted. It contends a headquarter's management team determined it was substantially similar to the branch chief position she was discriminatorily denied, but did not submit a report or any statements from the evaluating management team. We note that the measure of substantial equivalence should be based on the position that was the subject of petitioner's complaint as it existed in April 1992. We are unable to discern from the record whether petitioner was promoted to a substantially equivalent position. Petitioner and the agency provide different descriptions of petitioner's current job, and there is little corroborating information in the record to allow a determination on which version is correct. Further, the record is unclear on the breadth of the position petitioner was discriminatorily denied as it existed in April 1992. The Commission is remanding petitioner's petition for enforcement to the agency to supplement the record and to issue a new report of compliance to the Commission. The agency and petitioner disagree over the payment of attorney's fees and costs. As an initial matter, petitioner states that the agency has not paid attorney's fees to attorney S.K., and the agency counters that it approved payment. On remand, the agency shall also supplement the record with documentation of payment or explain why payment has not been made. A prevailing party for purposes of obtaining attorney's fees is one who succeeds on any significant issue which achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing the action. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978). However, a complainant is not a prevailing party as to unsuccessful discrete claims in the same complaint. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1983). Attorney H.A. represented petitioner regarding the agency's dismissal on allegations regarding training, working conditions, and official time. While the agency later accepted these allegations for investigation, petitioner was not a prevailing party as to any of them. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to have the agency pay the attorney fees of attorney H.A..7 By the same token, petitioner is not entitled to the costs she requested related to attorney H.A.'s representation or the mileage she incurred driving to visit this attorney. Petitioner is not entitled, pursuant to the instant petition for enforcement, to reimbursement for the $50 in attorney fees she paid to attorney W.O. for his letter to the agency in August 1995 concerning petitioner's problems with a supervisor. Petitioner does not indicate the letter was related to work on the instant complaint before us, and the record strongly suggests it was unrelated. While EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. §1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(C) appears at first reading to limit reimbursement for expenses to "costs" specified in 28 U.S.C. 1920 (witness fees, transcript costs, and printing and copying costs), courts have rejected assertions that reimbursable expenses are limited to those expressly mentioned. Rather, the award of reasonable out-of-pocket expenses include all those costs incurred by the attorney that are normally charged to a fee-paying client in the normal course of providing representation. Also, reasonable costs incurred by the prevailing complainant herself in the course of litigating her own EEO claim are compensable. Fiene v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04920009 (September 3, 1992). These may include such items as mileage, postage, telephone calls, photocopying, and any other reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the complaint. Id.; Carver v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04950004 (June 19, 1996). Accordingly, the agency's argument that none of petitioner's costs are within the scope of recoverable costs as set forth in 29 C.F.R. §1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(C) and 28 U.S.C. §1920 is incorrect. Hence, the costs petitioner states she personally incurred in litigating her EEO claim (mileage, related parking fees, telephone, mailing, facsimile, and photocopying), to the extent they are connected to the allegation upon which she prevailed (including efforts to obtain fees and costs) are within the scope of recoverable expenses. It is petitioner's burden to prove not only that she incurred such costs, but that they were reasonable. Carver. While costs associated with reasonable visits to a representative are reimbursable, an agency is only required to pay mileage expenses for such visits equivalent to the normal commuting area of the facility where the complaint arose when there are suitable representatives or attorneys, as applicable, therein. C.f. Holmes v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05920896 (April 22, 1993) (an employee-representative sought travel expenses to represent a complainant at an EEOC hearing). Petitioner seeks mileage costs associated with visiting attorney S.K., whose office is in East Lansing, Michigan, over 200 miles from Columbus, Ohio, where petitioner lived and worked. As Columbus, Ohio is part of a major metropolitan area with a number of suitable attorneys, to the extent petitioner's trips went beyond the local commuting area, they were not compensable. The Commission does not define the amount of miles in a "normal commuting area." The agency may use its travel regulations, which define the "normal commuting area" from an employee's normal duty station. Holmes. This is normally 50 to 75 miles. Id. An agency may make payment of costs contingent on a complainant providing documentation to support a claim for costs, such as bills for copying, telephone bills, or receipts for mailings. Davis v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 059101213 (March 1, 1991). The record contains documentation corroborating petitioner's mileage claims for visiting attorney S.K. The five dates she states she visited attorney S.K. appear in attorney S.K.'s itemized bill (on or about the same date), and are described as consultations with petitioner. However, there is no documentation in the record regarding her visits to attorney W.O., nor is there documentation of petitioner's parking fees. Further, the record contains no documentation to support petitioner's claim for telephone, mail, facsimile, and photocopying costs in 1994, 1995, and 1996. Also, for the most part her listing of these costs were generalized, so it would be difficult to determine if they were related to the allegation upon which petitioner prevailed or were reasonable. There is insufficient information in the record for the Commission to make determinations on the amount of costs to which petitioner is entitled, if any. Petitioner is no longer represented by an attorney. In accordance with agency precepts and the guidance in this decision, the agency shall solicit necessary information from petitioner to make a determination on the amount of costs to which petitioner is entitled. Carver, supra. Thereafter, the agency shall work with petitioner to reach an agreement on the amount of costs owed. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the agency shall pay petitioner any undisputed amount and in its compliance report to the Commission explain in detail, referring to supporting documentation, how it calculated costs due. Finally, to the extent petitioner is requesting compensatory damages for the agency's failure to comply with the order in EEOC Appeal No. 01945433, she is not entitled to such. A petitioner is not entitled to such damages because a petition for enforcement cannot change the result of a prior decision or enlarge or diminish the relief ordered. D'Andrea v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04930004 (March 17, 1994). Finally, if petitioner wishes to prosecute new allegations of discrimination, she should immediately seek EEO counseling. CONCLUSION Based on a review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons, the Commission grants petitioner's Petition for Enforcement of the order in Hafiz v. Department of Defense (Defense Information Systems), EEOC Appeal No. 01945433. The agency shall take the actions below. ORDER The agency shall supplement the record with information on whether the branch chief position that was the subject of petitioner's complaint, which petitioner indicated later took on the identity of "WECMSAB," was vacant and available for filling by petitioner after the agency received the AJ's recommended decision and again at a latter date. Further, the agency shall supplement the record with information on whether the WECMSAB branch chief position was the same job that was the subject of petitioner's complaint. If it was the same position and was available, the agency shall supplement the record with information on why petitioner was not placed in this position. The agency shall supplement the record with information on the full terms of the offer in September 1994 to promote petitioner to a supervisory computer specialist position, which branch chief job this entailed, and information about that branch, such as numbers of subordinates and scope of work performed by the branch. The agency shall supplement the record with information on whether the branch chief position to which petitioner was promoted is substantially equivalent to the branch chief position to which she was discriminatorily nonselected as it existed in April 1992. In so doing, the agency shall gather information going to petitioner's allegations regarding why the positions are not substantially equivalent, i.e., numbers and grade levels of subordinates, the actual functions of the two branches (as opposed to assigned missions that are not the actual functions of the branches), and the resources of the branches, such as computer hardware, to perform their functions. The supplementation should include documentation and statements, as appropriate. Further, if the agency headquarter's management team that determined the two positions were substantially similar issued a report or letter, it should be included in the supplementation. Also, the agency should take a statement from the Lieutenant who petitioner states can corroborate her claim that the position to which she was promoted was in effect not genuine, and should ask petitioner if others can corroborate her claims and follow up on these leads. Thereafter, the agency shall provide petitioner with a copy of the supplemental record and notify her of the right to add evidence to the record in the form of statements or other documentation. The agency shall then strive to reach a written agreement with petitioner settling the promotion matter. If the parties are unable to settle the promotion matter, the agency's compliance report to the Commission shall advise the Commission, with a detailed analysis referring to the supplemental documentation gathered, why it is the agency's position that it is in compliance with portion of the order in EEOC Appeal No. 01945433 that, as clarified in this decision, directed the agency to place appellant in the branch chief job that was the subject of her complaint if it was vacant, or a substantially equivalent job if it was not vacant. The agency shall then supplement the record with documentation of payment of attorney fees to attorney S.K., or provide an explanation for why the attorney has not been paid, and submit this to the Compliance Officer, as referenced below. Further, the agency shall solicit the necessary information from petitioner to make a determination on costs due, if any, in accordance with agency precepts and the guidance in this decision. If the agency wishes petitioner to verify her request for costs, it shall instruct her to do so. Thereafter, the agency shall strive to reach a written agreement with petitioner regarding the amount of costs due. If the agency is unable to reach an agreement, it shall pay any undisputed costs to petitioner, and in its compliance report to the Commission explain in detail how it calculated costs due, referring to supporting documentation. The agency shall complete all the above actions within 120 days after it receives this decision. It must submit a report of compliance to the Compliance Officer, and copy this report to petitioner. Unless settlements are reached regarding petitioner's promotion and the payment of costs, the agency shall submit the documentation it gathered regarding these issues. Any settlement reached shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer. If the parties do not reach a settlement on the promotion matter, the Commission's compliance officer shall, after receiving the agency's compliance report, promptly arrange the docketing of a petition for enforcement on the promotion matter. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the petitioner. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the petitioner may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. §1614.503 (a). The petitioner also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively, the petitioner has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action."29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying compliant is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the petitioner files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. §1614.410. RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (Q0993) This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court on both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing. It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e etseq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File Ai Civil Action"). FOR THE COMMISSION: Frances M. Hart Executive Officer Executive Secretariat July 11, 1997 1. After a finding of discrimination, a complainant is not required to accept an offer of full relief to be made whole. The agency is required to make the complainant whole for the discrimination found. 2. It appears there have been a number of agency reorganizations since petitioner was originally nonselected. 3. The AJ issued her recommended decision in May 1994, but it is not clear when it was received by the agency because it was originally sent to the wrong address. The agency issued its final decision on August 4, 1994. 4. Petitioner provided a small organizational chart. It is dated January 1996 and is entitled "Technical Support." It indicates the function of petitioner's branch is DMC internal support. 5. Petitioner also contends that she should be placed in the selectee's latest position, which he vacated in March 1996. However, this was not the branch chief position that was the subject of petitioner's complaint. 6. A reference to this regulation shows this includes costs. 7. Accordingly, we need not determine whether the agency was notified that attorney H.A. was representing petitioner, or whether his fees were certified.