Dawn R. Royal, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency. Request No. 0520080052 Appeal No. 0720070045 Hearing No. 430-2007-00003X Agency No. 2004-0652-2006101859 DECISION The agency timely requested reconsideration of the decision in Dawn R. Royal v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070045 (September 10, 2007). EEOC regulations provide that the Commissioners may, in their discretion, grant a request to reconsider any previous Commission decision where the requesting party demonstrates that: (1) the appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or (2) the appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(b). For the following reasons, the Commission denies the agency's request for reconsideration, and accordingly affirms the issuance of a default judgment in favor of complainant. ISSUES PRESENTED The issue presented is whether our previous decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law, or whether it would have a substantial impact on the policies, practices or operations of the agency, in upholding an Administrative Judge's issuance of a default judgment in complainant's favor as a sanction for agency actions. BACKGROUND In our previous decision, we reversed the agency's final order rejecting an EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) decision that entered a default judgment in complainant's favor. The AJ issued the default judgment as a sanction for the agency's failure to complete an investigation within the 180-day period specified at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(e). It is instructive, at this point, to revisit the circumstances leading to the default judgment. Complainant, a Staff Nurse Supervisor at the agency's Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Richmond, Virginia, filed a formal complaint on May 1, 2006, in which she claimed that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her race (African American) when, on March 14, 2006, she was not selected for the position of Nurse Manager, Unit 2E, Ambulatory Procedure Unit/Preadmission Screening Clinic, and when on March 28, 2006, she was not assigned duties that would enable her to be promoted. On May 25, 2006, the agency accepted the complaint for investigation. On October 4, 2006, 166 days after filing her complaint, complainant requested a hearing before an AJ. On October 13, 2006, the AJ issued an order giving the agency 15 days to produce the complaint file, including the report of investigation, or to show good cause for the failure to produce it. The AJ noted that failure to comply with the order might result in sanctions against the agency, including a default judgment in favor of complainant. The agency responded, stating that the order and complainant's hearing request were premature. On November 9, 2006, 192 days after complainant filed her complaint, the agency assigned an investigator to the discrimination complaint. Complainant resubmitted her hearing request on November 14, 2006, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(g).1 The agency forwarded the complaint file to the AJ on November 27, 2006, but noted that the investigation was incomplete. On December 28, 2006, 241 days after her complaint had been filed, complainant filed a motion requesting sanctions against the agency for failure to timely complete the investigation and failure to show good cause why it had not done so. In its response, the agency claimed that sanctions were not warranted because the complaint file had already been sent to the AJ, and the AJ had not re-issued the Order to Produce. The agency also claimed that complainant had attempted to abuse the EEO process by knowingly filing a premature hearing request. On December 29, 2006, the agency completed the investigation and sent copies of the report of investigation to the AJ and complainant. On January 30, 2007, the AJ issued an order directing the agency to show cause why a decision fully in favor of complainant should not be issued in light of the agency's failure to timely investigate the complaint. In its response, the agency claimed that it did not fail to investigate, but merely delayed the investigation, and that complainant had not been adversely affected by the delay. The agency also claimed that complainant has a history of abusing the EEO process and that a decision in favor of complainant would harm the VA Medical Center, as opposed to the agency entity that is responsible for conducting EEO investigations. The AJ issued an interim decision on February 15, 2007, sanctioning the agency for its failure to assign an investigator until after the expiration of the 180-day period to complete the report. The AJ entered a default judgment in favor of complainant, including relief in the form of a retroactive promotion to the position of Nurse Manager, back pay and benefits, and equal opportunity to participate in detail assignments. In the interim decision, complainant was instructed to submit within 15 days evidence in support of her claim for compensatory damages and a statement of attorney's fees and costs. However, complainant failed to respond in a timely fashion. The AJ then issued a subsequent decision on April 4, 2007, granting complainant the relief previously stated in the interim decision. The agency's April 26, 2007 final order rejected the AJ's decision. On appeal, the agency argued that the AJ abused her discretion in issuing a default judgment in favor of complainant. The agency claimed that complainant knew or should have known that her initial hearing request was premature, and that complainant experienced no adverse consequences as a result of the agency's delay in investigating the complaint. Further, the agency claimed that the AJ focused exclusively on the date the agency's investigation was due and its past transgressions, rather than complainant's errors and intentional disruptions to the discrimination complaint process. Finally, the agency argued that the AJ abused her discretion in imposing sanctions, which had the effect of promoting complainant to the position of Nurse Manager without a consideration of complainant's qualifications. Complainant responded, urging the Commission to affirm the AJ's decision. In our previous decision, we found that no investigation was ever begun, much less completed, within 180 days. We further found that the agency was well aware of its responsibility to comply with the regulatory time limit, but that it intentionally delayed doing so. We highlighted the fact that the Commission has the inherent power to protect its administrative process from abuse, and has the duty to ensure that agencies, as well as complainants, abide by its regulations. We also noted that 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(f)(3) authorizes EEOC AJs to sanction a party for the failure to respond fully and timely to requests for evidence. Accordingly, we found that the AJ did not abuse her discretion in issuing a default judgment as a sanction for the agency's dilatory actions. ARGUMENTS ON RECONSIDERATION In its request for reconsideration, the agency argues that our decision applied a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact and law which, if left to stand, would have a substantial impact on the policies, practices and operations of the agency. First, the agency argues that, to the extent the sanction was warranted, the AJ erred in not tailoring the sanction to the specific facts of the case and in not applying the "sanction factors" discussed in Voysest v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 01A35340 (January 18, 2005) and Gray v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 07A50030 (March 1, 2007) (see, infra). Although acknowledging the Commission's concerns about the effect that an agency's failure to timely complete an investigation would have on the integrity of the EEO process, the agency insists that the extent and nature of the agency's non-compliance does not warrant a blanket judgment finding that the agency intentionally discriminated against complainant. It argues that the AJ and the Commission should have considered other mitigating factors, such as the fact that the delay was very short (the investigation was completed within a little over two months from the date that it should have been completed), and that the cause of the delay was not an intentional act to prejudice complainant personally, but rather was due to an institutional lack of resources. The agency further argues that the sanction imposed on the agency is disproportionate to any harm caused by the delay. The agency argues that neither complainant nor the EEO process suffered any prejudice by the agency's actions. The agency also argues that allowing the decision to stand would have a negative impact on the policies and operations of the agency. It explains that ordering that complainant be promoted to the position at issue without any regard to her lack of qualifications is essentially a usurpation of the agency's right to make such personnel decisions. The Commission would impermissibly be acting as the super-personnel decision-maker for the agency, second-guessing the agency's selection decisions. Lastly, the agency argues that, contrary to what we stated in our previous decision, it provided documentation and explanations for its failure to investigate the complaint before the lapse of the 180-day period. It offered various declarations stating that budgetary constraints and the lack of resources prevented it from acting on the complaint faster. The agency asserts it has since implemented an action plan to complete its obligations in a timely manner. Complainant responded to the request for reconsideration by arguing that the previous decision should be upheld. In her reply brief, complainant posits that the agency did not show good cause for its delay in assigning an investigator. She states that "the regulatory scheme for processing complaints is slow enough without an agency simply refusing to bother conducting the investigations they are obligated to conduct." Further, she notes that the agency has "considerable resources" and if the EEO office does not "then that is entirely because it [the agency] has chosen not to put those resources into complying with the anti-discrimination laws." Finally, complainant notes that the agency's current disposition of investigations in accordance with the regulatory timeframe should not affect the Commission's decision about the agency's past actions in complainant's case. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Review of the AJ Decision The Commission's regulations afford broad authority to AJs for the conduct of hearings. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109 et seq.; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (MD-110), Ch. 7, Sec. III(D) (November 9, 1999). An AJ has inherent powers to conduct a hearing and to issue appropriate sanctions, including a default judgment. See id.; Matheny v. Department of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05A30373 (April 21, 2005); Rountree v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 07A00015 (July 17, 2001). Specifically, our regulations provide that where a party, inter alia, fails to respond to an order of an AJ, the AJ may, as appropriate, take action against the non-complying party pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(f)(3), i.e., an AJ may: (1) draw an adverse inference that the requested information would have reflected unfavorably on the non-complying party; (2) consider the requested information to be established in favor of the opposing party; (3) exclude other evidence offered by the non-complying party; (4) issue a decision fully or partially in favor of the opposing party; or (5) take other action deemed appropriate, e.g., payment of costs and expenses by the non-complying party. Id. Before taking any of the actions authorized by the Commission's regulations, an AJ must first issue a Notice to Show Cause to the non-complying party. MD-110, Chapter 7, Section III(D), fn. 6; see DaCosta v. Department of Education, EEOC Appeal No. 01995992 (February 25, 2000). Having reviewed the matter, we find that the AJ's decision to sanction the agency was proper. The AJ duly notified the agency, by order dated January 30, 2007, that it must show good cause for its failure to complete the investigation of complainant's complaint within 180 days of the date on which the complaint was filed. The agency, as noted above, claimed that it did not fail to investigate, but merely delayed the investigation, and that complainant had not been adversely affected by the delay. The agency further claimed that complainant has a history of abusing the EEO process2 and that a decision in favor of complainant would harm the VA Medical Center, as opposed to the agency entity that is responsible for conducting EEO investigations. Plainly, the AJ did not credit the agency's explanation as "good cause" for its failure to timely investigate the complaint. We note that the agency cited no authority in support of the proposition that willful delay in processing a complaint is perforce less harmful to a complainant's cause, nor less a violation of the integrity of the EEO process, than the flat-out refusal to investigate a complaint. Further, the agency has cited no authority in support of its argument that its delay should be excused because of financial constraints. We have seen this argument raised before in the context of disability accommodation. It is well-settled that an agency may not establish undue hardship as a defense to providing reasonable accommodation based on the financial resources of one component of its operations. Rather, we look at the agency's financial resources as a whole. See Preston v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120054230 (August 9, 2007); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p). Likewise, when considering whether an agency has the fiscal resources to comply with the requirements of the EEO process, it is appropriate to look to the agency as a whole. As complainant has persuasively argued, it is the agency's decision as to how it allocates its funding; the agency cannot expect to evade the consequences of its funding decisions. The agency's delay in completing the investigation within the 180-day regulatory period is no small non-compliance matter. Such a delay warrants a sanction. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Department of Education, supra (agency's lengthy delay in initiating and completing investigation of complaint within 180 days of filing was clear violation of EEO regulations, and of EEOC AJ's orders, which warranted sanction of agency). Determination of the Sanction In general, the Commission has held that sanctions, while corrective, also act to prevent similar misconduct in the future and must be tailored to each situation, applying the least severe sanction necessary to respond to the party's failure to show good cause for its actions, as well as to equitably remedy the opposing party. See Gray v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 07A50030 (March 1, 2007); Rountree v. Department of the Treasury, supra; Hale v. Department of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 01A03341 (December 8, 2000). The Commission has emphasized that the purpose of a sanction is to deter the underlying conduct of the non-complying party. See Barbour v. U. S. Postal Service, EEOC 07A30133 (June 16, 2005). The factors pertinent to "tailoring" a sanction, or determining whether a sanction is, in fact, warranted, include: (1) the extent and nature of the non-compliance, including the justification presented by the non-complying party; (2) the prejudicial effect of the non-compliance on the opposing party; (3) the consequences resulting from the delay in justice, if any; and (4) the effect on the integrity of the EEO process. Gray v. Department of Defense, supra; Voysest v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 01A35340 (January 18, 2005). We conclude that the default judgment in complainant's favor is warranted in this case for the reasons which follow. The agency's argument emphasizes that the delay in completing the investigation was very short (62 days), and that the cause of the delay was not an intentional act designed to prejudice complainant personally. The agency also argued that the complainant did not suffer any actual prejudice caused by the delay. However, given the length of time that the processing of a federal sector EEO complaint can take, any delays past the time frames in the regulations can impact the outcome of complainant's claims. Witnesses may retire or leave the agency, often without notice, or documents may be misplaced or destroyed (either intentionally or not) when the responsible party is not notified to maintain the documents as relevant to an on-going EEO investigation. The agency's assertion that complainant did not suffer any prejudice is speculative, at best. Although the agency's argument focuses on the first three factors, which consider the impact of the agency's non-compliance on an individual complainant, we find that in the case where an agency has not initiated an investigation that could reasonably be completed within the 180-day time frame, the fourth factor, the effect on the integrity of the EEO process, is paramount. Protecting the integrity of the 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 process is central to the Commission's ability to carry out its charge of eradicating discrimination in the federal sector. As we noted in our previous decision, the Commission has the inherent power to protect its administrative process from abuse by either party and must insure that agencies, as well as complainants, abide by its regulations. We have previously issued cases in which we have affirmed actions taken by AJs which were designed to bring to account an agency's non-compliance with the regulations or with Orders issued by an AJ. See Matheny, supra (Commission affirmed its right to issue default judgments); Waller v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 0720030069 (May 25, 2007), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520070689 (February 26, 2009) (Commission affirmed its right to issue monetary sanctions in the administrative process). See also Footracer v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A46020 (September 25, 2005) (Commission affirmed adverse inference drawn by AJ when agency witnesses discussed testimony with one another); Elston v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 07A50019 (October 18, 2005), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05A60283 (January 5, 2006) (Commission affirmed default judgment issued by AJ). In the instant case, the agency had not assigned an investigator until November 9, 2006, 192 days after complainant had filed her formal complaint, (May 1, 2006). Under the regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(e), an agency has 180 days from the filing of a formal complaint to complete the investigation. At day 180, the agency may ask the complainant to extend the period for investigation for an additional 90 days. Alternatively, a complainant may request a hearing before an AJ after day 180, even if no investigation has been completed. The regulations contemplate that the AJ would then oversee the completion and development of the record in that instance, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(a). Here, as noted above, the investigation was not commenced until day 192, and complainant requested a hearing on day 197.3 In the similar cases of Reading v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 07A40125 (October 12, 2006) and Lomax v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070039 (October 2, 2007), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520080115 (December 26, 2007),4 the agency waited until past day 180 to begin an investigation. An AJ issued a default judgment in Reading when the agency had failed to assign an investigator until after the 180-day period had passed, failed to provide the AJ with the investigative file when ordered and failed to provide any reason to the AJ for its failure to do so. Our decision in that case affirmed the importance of the agency's compliance with the regulations and its obligation to complete a prompt, fair, and impartial investigation of a complainant's complaint. We also emphasized the Commission's inherent power to protect the administrative process from abuse by either party. In Lomax, we affirmed the issuance of a default judgment, also for failure to conduct a timely investigation.5 We again emphasized our power to protect the integrity of the EEO process, and noted that the "agency's internal situation cannot be used as a defense to its failure to comply with the Commission's regulations." The agency argued that the facts in the instant case are similar to those in Gray v. Department of Defense, supra, and that as precedent, Gray would dictate that the default judgment be reversed. We distinguish this case from the facts in Gray, in that in the instant case, the agency had not begun the investigation until after the 180-day period had expired and complainant had requested a hearing. In Gray, however, the agency had begun the investigation 55 days into the 180-day period, and was delayed from completing it, in part, by the actions of the complainant when she disagreed with the definition of the issues to be investigated, and asked the investigator for an extension of time to complete her rebuttal statement, notwithstanding that she had already requested a hearing. We found in Gray that, although a sanction was appropriate for failure to produce the investigative record in accordance with the AJ's Order to Show Cause, the AJ had abused her discretion in the selection of a default judgment as a sanction, and should have more narrowly tailored the sanction imposed. In Gray, unlike in the case at bar, the agency had engaged in actions showing intent to comply with our regulation specifying that an investigation shall be completed in 180 days. Thus, we find that a sanction in the form of a default judgment is the appropriate sanction in this case. This decision turns on the fact that the agency failed to commence an EEO investigation that could reasonably be completed within the 180-day period following the filing of the formal complaint, as required by the regulations. Remedy Following Default Judgment Turning now to the issue of the consequences of a default judgment in favor of complainant which is the result of a sanction levied against an agency, we note that the remedy phase will take on greater importance in these instances. In Matheny v. Department of Justice, supra, we provided some guidance for AJs to use in crafting the appropriate remedy to award. The guidance provided is found in the discussion in Matheny relating to the applicability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(d) (formerly 55(e)) to default judgments issued in the Commission's administrative process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d) states that: "A default judgment may be entered against the United States, its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that satisfies the court." We noted: "As the Commission looks to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance, even as we are not strictly bound by them, we find that a judgment such as that entered by the AJ in the instant case would not be precluded under the Rules." The AJ in Matheny noted "instances where even the incomplete record before [her] contained evidence of the agency's retaliatory animus toward complainant" and support for his claims of pay disparity. We stated then that the finding by the AJ that complainant had made the minimal showing of support for his claims rendered the entering of a default judgment an appropriate action, because complainant's case was therefore supported by evidence satisfactory to the AJ. Following a decision to issue a default judgment for complainant, an AJ would then need to decide if there was "evidence that satisfies the court" which established complainant's right to relief. For example, the establishment of the elements of a prima facie case would be sufficient to show such a right. An AJ would have at his or her disposal the "pleadings" and the limited evidence available at that point in the hearings process. In the absence of a report of investigation, a complainant should be able to provide, if needed, his or her request for counseling (i.e., the informal complaint), the EEO Counselor's Report, the formal complaint (listing the bases and issues of the complaint) and the agency's letter accepting the complaint for investigation and defining the claims. At his or her discretion, the AJ could ask for an affidavit with more information, or could take limited testimony from the complainant in person. In addition, in the remedy phase, the complainant would provide evidence regarding entitlement to remedies such as back pay and compensatory damages, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, as well as any other claimed remedy. In a case such as the one at bar, the AJ would have to find that the complainant is qualified for the position at issue, thus negating the agency's concern that complainant could be awarded a position for which she is not minimally qualified. In the instant case, we find, in our review of record during the processing of this request for reconsideration, that complainant applied under the vacancy announcement posted December 27, 2005 for the Nurse Manager, Unit 2E-Ambulatory Procedure Unit, Preadmission Screening Clinic position. She was qualified for the position. The record evidence establishes that she was one of 5 applicants interviewed for the position, and that she scored second highest following the interviews for the position. The highest scoring candidate, not of her protected class (white), was selected instead. With respect to her claim that she was not assigned duties that would enable her to be promoted, we find that complainant sufficiently alleged that other employees, not of her protected class, were given detail assignments that would place them in a better position to receive promotions should a vacancy arise. The evidence before us satisfies the Commission that complainant is entitled to equitable remedies as a result of the default judgment in her favor.6 Additionally, we find that complainant should be given an opportunity to establish her entitlement to compensatory damages. Although in her decision of April 4, 2007, the AJ found that complainant's submission of evidence in support of her claim for compensatory damages was untimely, we find that the AJ's provision of 15 days to provide that evidence was an inadequate amount of time to obtain and submit the necessary medical documentation. Therefore, the case is remanded to the appropriate Hearings Unit for a determination of complainant's entitlement to compensatory damages.7 We note that the imposition of a default sanction would not carry through to the remedy phase of the hearings process, such that an agency would be barred from submitting a rebuttal to complainant's claims for compensatory damages. However, this would not be an opportunity for the agency to try to disprove complainant's actual complaint. CONCLUSION After reconsidering the previous decision and the entire record, the Commission finds that the request fails to meet the criteria of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(b), and it is the decision of the Commission to deny the request, but to modify the previous Order. The decision in EEOC Appeal No. 0720070045 is modified as noted in the Order, below. There is no further right of administrative appeal on the decision of the Commission on this request. The agency shall comply with the Order as set forth below. ORDER 1. Within thirty (30) days of the receipt of this decision, the agency shall retroactively promote complainant to the position of Nurse Manager, Unit 2E-Ambulatory Procedure Unit, Preadmission Screening Clinic, or a substantially equivalent position, with back pay and benefits; 2. The agency shall ensure that complainant has equal access to future developmental details and assignments if she requests them; 3. Within sixty (60) days of receipt of this decision, the agency shall process complainant's petition for attorney's fees and costs incurred for the successful defense of the agency's initial appeal, and of this request for reconsideration, in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501; and 4. The agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the EEOC Richmond Area Office the request for a hearing on complainant's entitlement to compensatory damages within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall examine the issue of complainant's entitlement to compensatory damages, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, consistent with this decision. The AJ shall issue a decision on the remedies awarded in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109 and the agency shall issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110. POSTING ORDER (G0900) The agency is ordered to post at its Veteran's Affairs Medical Center in Richmond, Virginia copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900) If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1208) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0408) This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action"). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Stephen Llewellyn Executive Officer Executive Secretariat _____09/25/09_____________ Date 1 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(g) states, in relevant part, that: "Where the complainant has received the notice required in paragraph (f) of this section or at any time after 180 days have elapsed from the filing of the complaint, the complainant may request a hearing by submitting a written request for a hearing directly to the EEOC office indicated in the agency's acknowledgment letter." 2 The agency did not offer any proof of complainant's alleged abuse of the EEO process. The Commission's own records do not show that complainant has filed excessive numbers of appeals of final agency decisions. In point of fact, the instant case is the only one in the Commission's records of appeals. Contra Stoyanov v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01A60843, 01A61391, 01A61781, 01A62205 & 01A62852 (August 31, 2006). Nor does the agency submit a record of numerous, frivolous EEO complaints filed by complainant. 3 We note that complainant previously had requested a hearing before the full 180 days allotted for investigation had elapsed. The agency was not sanctioned in connection with the show-cause order issued by the AJ at that time, and complainant's subsequent hearing request was in conformance with our regulations. 4 We note that the same agency regional EEO office was responsible for assigning an investigator in Lomax, Reading and the instant case. 5 We note that the complainant in Lomax filed his formal complaint four days after the complainant in this case, and the agency assigned an investigator on the same day as in the instant case. 6 For the sake of judicial economy and expediency in completing the processing of this complaint, we make these findings within the context of the request for reconsideration rather than remanding the case to an AJ for further proceedings on the issue of complainant's entitlement to equitable remedies. 7 The AJ noted in her decision that complainant did not submit a request for attorney's fees and costs incurred in the hearings process. ?? ?? ?? ?? 2 0520080052 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Washington, DC 20507 13 0520080052