Brian Utt, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency. Appeal No. 0720070001 Hearing No. 320-2003-8515X Agency No. 4E-800-0292-02 DECISION In conjunction with the issuance of its October 12, 2006 notice of final action, the agency filed a timely appeal requesting that the Commission affirm its rejection of an EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) finding of discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. The agency also requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of the relief ordered by the AJ. Complainant also filed a timely appeal on November 6, 2006, following his receipt of the agency's notice of final action. On appeal, complainant requests the Commission affirm the AJ's finding that complainant was regarded as disabled by the agency and subjected to discrimination on the basis of that perceived disability. Complainant also requests that the Commission increase the amount of compensatory damages he was awarded. ISSUE PRESENTED The issue on appeal is whether the agency discriminated against complainant on the basis of his disability when complainant was terminated as a part-time flexible (PTF) city letter carrier while he was a probationary employee. BACKGROUND From 1985 to 1988, complainant served in the U.S. Army as a combat engineer. Complainant advanced from the rank of E-1 to E-4, and he was honorably discharged. From 1990, until 1998, complainant worked for the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs as a nutritionist for a year and a half and then as a housekeeper. The housekeeping position required substantial walking, bending down, and reaching. From 1998 to 2001, complainant worked at the agency's Denver General Mail Facility (GMF) casing mail. Complainant's job performance was satisfactory while casing mail. He worked the night shift and resigned that position when the agency allegedly did not accommodate his sleep disorder by allowing him to work the day shift.1 In spring 2002, the agency offered complainant a PTF carrier position at its Glendale Post Office in Denver, Colorado. PTF carriers did not have a permanent mail route, but rather cased and delivered mail for absent (sick or vacationing) carriers assigned to particular routes. As a prerequisite to working as a carrier, the agency administered a physical examination which complainant passed. From August 6 - 9, 2002, complainant successfully completed 32 hours of training at the agency's mail carrier academy. On August 10, 2002, complainant began his 90-day probationary period at the agency's Glendale Post Office. Complainant received four non-consecutive days of training by four different trainers on four different routes (August 10, 12, 13, and 17, 2002). During training, complainant was assigned without a trainer to deliver mail on the street by himself. On August 20, 2002, complainant's ninth day of the probationary period, complainant twisted his left knee while delivering mail, and he reported this to his supervisor (S1) on August 21, 2002. On August 22, 2002, complainant arrived at work and had difficulty walking due to his knee injury. S1 recommended to her supervisor (S2) that complainant's employment be terminated based on "his job performance, unable to perform the job." S2 concurred with S1's recommendation to discharge complainant based on his performance, and complainant was told that he was being terminated. Complainant resigned, involuntarily according to complainant, his carrier position prior to the actual termination. On August 29, 2002, complainant's left knee was completely healed. During the two-year period prior to complainant's termination, there were 113 Denver area probationary city carriers hired. Of the six carriers who were separated from employment during this time, only complainant had a job injury during his employment with the agency. Complainant was terminated after his tenth day of employment and the other five probationary city carriers were terminated after the following number of days of employment at the agency: 33, 37, 44, 64, and 67. The two probationary city carriers who were terminated for poor performance were terminated after 64 and 67 days. Complainant filed an EEO complaint dated October 30, 2002, alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of his perceived disability (knee injury) when the agency terminated complainant's employment as a part-time flexible city letter carrier while he was a probationary employee.2 At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant timely requested a hearing which the AJ held on April 12 and April 18, 2005. On September 7, 2006, the AJ issued a decision finding the agency discriminated against complainant based on his perceived disability when it terminated him from employment. In addressing whether complainant was a qualified individual with a disability, the AJ found that S1 regarded complainant's knee injury as an impairment that prevented him from performing his mail carrier job. Specifically, the AJ found that "[S1] believed that the knee injury precluded [complainant] from walking a mail route including stair climbing, kneeling, lifting, and knee bending. She also believed that he would not recover from the knee injury." The AJ noted the agency's reason for terminating complainant, that he would not recover from his perceived serious knee problem, was not unique to the carrier position that complainant held and would exclude him from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Thus, the AJ found the agency regarded complainant as substantially limited in the major life activity of working in a class of jobs that involve manual labor. The AJ found the agency did not rebut this conclusion by S1's statement that there were "probably a lot of jobs he is capable of doing." Additionally, the AJ found that complainant met all of the experience and educational requirements for the PTF carrier position. The AJ noted complainant passed the required physical examination and completed the requisite training at the mail carrier academy. The AJ recognized complainant previously held a position with the agency where he demonstrated proficiency in casing mail for a period of three years. The AJ noted that complainant proficiently performed the essential functions of the carrier position for the 10 days he worked at the Glendale post office. Further, the AJ found that the knee injury did not prevent complainant from performing the essential functions of the carrier job since it was a temporary, non-severe injury that healed in a short period of time. Finally, the AJ found that complainant's "memory and coordination are normal or above and did not prevent his performance of mail casing or delivery, i.e., the essential functions of the carrier position." Thus, the AJ concluded complainant was a qualified individual with a disability. Addressing the agency's asserted reasons for terminating complainant's employment, the AJ rejected the agency's contention that complainant's job performance was unacceptably deficient during his first ten days of his probationary period. The AJ noted that S1 testified that complainant was deficient in the casing and delivery of mail, arrived late at the station after delivering his mail, did not case his mail with addresses all in the same direction, dropped his mail, and failed to take a shortcut on one delivery route which would have saved time. S1 testified that she counseled complainant several times concerning his performance deficiencies, stating that she explained the importance of casing mail with all the addresses in the same direction and instructed complainant on how to punch the clock rings correctly. Complainant disputed much of this testimony, asserting that his casing and delivery abilities fell within acceptable timeframes and testifying that he was never counseled by S1 on his casing or delivery skills. Complainant acknowledged that on one occasion he dropped his mail, but he stated that this was not unusual. The AJ found S1's testimony on complainant's purported casing and mail delivery problems inconsistent and contradictory and, on this basis, gave it little credence or weight. For example, the AJ noted that S1 testified that the first day casing mail on a new route was difficult and that it took three days to become familiar with a mail route. S1 stated that she would assign an experienced carrier to help a carrier who had not previously cased a particular route. However, on August 14, 2002, instead of following this practice, S1 assigned complainant to case a route for the first time by himself. Despite the departure from the agency's practice, the AJ found complainant cased that route within acceptable time limits. The AJ noted that on other days S1 provided assistance to complainant on his first day casing a route and complainant completed the casing on these days within acceptable time limits. Additionally, the AJ noted that initially S1 testified that complainant took three hours to deliver two blocks of mail on a daily basis and then later testified that only on two days of his employment with the agency did he take three hours to deliver two blocks of mail. The AJ also noted that in an August 30, 2002 electronic mail message, created by S1 to support her justification for firing complainant, S1 notes several occasions where she gave complainant corrective discussions about correct use of the time clock; however, there is no mention of any delivering or casing deficiencies. The AJ found it more likely than not that S1 did not counsel complainant about his casing or delivery skills. The AJ rejected the agency's assertion that complainant was not assigned to deliver mail by himself on August 10, 2002, his first day of training. Complainant testified that he was sent to deliver mail by himself after only a few hours of training on August 10, 2002. Trainer 1, who trained complainant on August 10, 2002, corroborated complainant's testimony that he was sent to the street by himself to deliver mail that day. The AJ noted that in opposition, the agency relied on S1's bare denial that complainant delivered mail alone, and on the fact that the clock rings show no entry of complainant delivering mail by himself on that date. However, the AJ did not afford the clock rings substantial evidentiary weight since the agency had argued inconsistently regarding the accuracy of the time clock records. Specifically, the AJ notes the agency argued on one hand that the records are an accurate business record kept by the agency while on the other hand, it argued that complainant repeatedly failed to make time clock entries reflecting on which routes he delivered mail. The AJ found by preponderant evidence that complainant delivered a mail route by himself on August 10, 2002. The AJ further found that S1 knew or should have known that complainant's on-the-job training was inadequate. S1 testified that it was standard operating procedure to provide new carriers three consecutive full days of mail casing and delivery training with a certified trainer. On complainant's first two days of training (August 10 and 12, 2002), the agency assigned complainant without a trainer to deliver mail on the street by himself. On his third day of training (August 13), the agency assigned complainant to train with a carrier who had no training experience. The AJ noted that after a union official complained to S1 about complainant's inadequate training, S1 assigned complainant to train with a carrier (August 17) who had no training experience. The AJ found despite the agency's practice of giving trainees hands-on experience in casing and delivering during training, the carrier assigned to train complainant on August 17, 2002, did not allow complainant to case mail. The AJ stated that, given this inadequate training and the short time that complainant had been on the job, S1 could not have concluded in good faith that complainant's performance was unacceptably substandard. The AJ found direct evidence that complainant's termination was related to his perceived knee impairment. Specifically, the AJ noted that S1 informed complainant that if he was injured and it prevented him from working, he would be subject to a serious personnel action, specifically, he "would be let go." The AJ noted that when complainant reported to work on August 22, 2002, and had difficulty walking due to a temporary, non-severe knee injury, S1 erroneously believed the injury was severe and permanent. The AJ found that based on S1's assumption about the knee injury, she recommended, and her supervisor concurred, that complainant should be immediately fired. The AJ noted that "[b]ut for the knee injury, [S1] would not have terminated [c]omplainant's employment on August 22." The AJ recognized that although S1 did not testify about her perception of his knee injury until April 2005, almost 2 1/2 years after complainant's termination, her statements still constituted direct evidence of discrimination. The AJ also rejected as not credible the agency's claim that complainant's termination was based in part on his failure to timely report his knee injury. The AJ noted S2 stated that failure to timely report the injury was a ground for termination. However, the AJ noted S2 accepted S1's recommendation to fire complainant before he found out about his knee injury. Even assuming the failure to timely report the knee injury was considered in the decision to terminate complainant, the AJ found complainant complied with all agency rules and procedures regarding the timely reporting of on the job injuries. Likewise, the AJ rejected the agency's argument that because complainant could not work on August 22, the agency could not assess whether complainant could perform the duties of the carrier position. The AJ found no distinction between firing complainant because of his knee impairment and firing him because he could not be observed performing his job because of his knee impairment. However, to the extent that observing complainant working is valid, the AJ found it significant that S1 did not inquire into the prognosis or possible duration of complainant's injury. Thus, the AJ concluded complainant was fired because of his knee impairment and the agency did not show by preponderant evidence that it would have terminated him for reasons other than his knee impairment. The AJ concluded that complainant was fired because of his knee impairment and the agency did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have terminated him for reasons other than his knee impairment. The AJ noted that S1 admitted in her testimony that complainant would not have been fired for these performance deficiencies, alone, because complainant's performance deficiencies had not yet risen to a level of concern that would warrant discharge. The AJ also found that S1 had informed complainant that if he was injured during his first 90 days of work and if any such injury prevented him from working, he would probably be subject to removal. S1 testified that when complainant reported to work on August 22, 2002, and she saw that he had difficulty walking due to the knee injury he experienced on August 20, 2002, she concluded (erroneously, as it turns out) that complainant's knee injury was severe and permanent and that it would prevent him from performing his assigned job duties. S1 testified that although she told S2 that complainant should be discharged based on his job performance, S1 would not, in fact, have made this recommendation based on complainant's alleged performance deficiencies, alone, and that, but for the knee injury, she would not have recommended the agency terminate complainant's employment on August 22.3 Finding S1's testimony credible on this point, the AJ found that S1 recommended to S2 that the agency terminate complainant's employment immediately because of S1's erroneous assumptions about the severity and permanency of complainant's knee injury, and that these erroneous assumptions amounted to a perception that complainant was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, the AJ did not find credible the agency's claim that complainant was terminated because of his poor performance as a carrier. Rather, the AJ concluded that S1's comment that she would not have terminated complainant, but for his knee injury, constituted direct evidence of discrimination based on disability. The AJ found complainant was entitled to reinstatement to the carrier position without serving a probationary period, back pay, compensatory damages in the amount of $25,000.00, and attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $51,672.17. Further, the AJ stated that if the agency appeals his decision, the agency shall comply with the provisions of 29 C.F.R. §1614.505 pending the outcome of the agency appeal. The agency subsequently issued a notice of final action rejecting the AJ's finding that complainant proved that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged. In conjunction with the issuance of its final action, the agency filed an appeal with the Commission. As an attachment to its brief, the agency provided interim relief to complainant by offering him a temporary or conditional restoration to duty as a PTF Letter Carrier at an installation of complainant's choice. The agency notified complainant that if he is interested in the offer, he should contact the agency's designated representative to obtain a list of available positions. The agency informed complainant he should notify the agency representative in writing, within 30 days from when he receives the agency's brief, whether he accepts the offer. Complainant filed an appeal after he received the agency's final action declining to implement the AJ's decision. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, the agency argues it did not regard complainant as disabled. Specifically, the agency states that S1 believed complainant was unable to perform the duties of letter carrier, but did not believe he was unable to perform a class or broad range of jobs. The agency states that the record shows that the letter carrier job was physically stressful and claims that S1's testimony regarding walking, stair climbing, kneeling, lifting and knee bending, related solely to the letter carrier job. The agency noted that S1 testified that "[t]here was probably a lot of jobs he is capable of doing," which it states implies that she did not perceive complainant as unable to perform a class or broad range of jobs. Further, the agency states the AJ only found complainant substantially limited in working and not walking or any other major life activity. The agency claims the AJ erred in finding that complainant's training was "grossly substandard." Specifically, in reaching the conclusion that the training was substandard, the AJ determined that: (1) complainant did not receive training while on the street during his first day on the job (rather than relying on the clock rings which showed complainant worked the same route as Trainer 1); and (2) complainant did not receive three consecutive days of training. However, the agency claims that complainant did receive training on the "street duties" as evidenced by the clock rings and the "Three Day New Employee Training Form" and Trainer 1's testimony that she made check marks on this form. The agency claims this is a case where complainant's performance was less than satisfactory during his probationary period and argues that he has not shown that the agency regarded him as disabled. The agency states that even if complainant is entitled to reinstatement, he should still be required to complete his probationary period. The agency states that if the AJ's decision is upheld and complainant is not required to serve a probationary period, then he would be afforded a windfall since there is no way to know if he would have successfully completed his probationary period.4 Moreover, the agency states that it satisfied its obligation to provide interim relief to complainant. Specifically, the agency noted it offered complainant, in writing, temporary or conditional restoration to duty in the form of an available PTF letter carrier position at the installation of complainant's choice and has notified him that it will pay interest on any amounts owed, but delayed. The agency notified complainant that if he is interested in accepting this offer, he should contact the agency's representative to obtain a list of available positions. Complainant was told to notify the agency's representative in writing, within 30 days from receipt, whether he accepts the offer. Further, the agency states that service under the temporary or conditional restoration provision will be credited towards the completion of complainant's probationary period only if the Commission upholds the AJ's decision. The agency specifies that this service shall not be credited toward the completion of complainant's probationary period if the Commission does not uphold the AJ's decision. On appeal, complainant argues that substantial evidence supports the AJ's finding that the agency regarded complainant as substantially limited in the major life activities of walking and performing manual tasks sufficient to preclude him from working in a class or broad range of jobs. Complainant also states that the timing of the termination shows that the agency was motivated to terminate him based on his perceived condition and not on poor performance. Alternatively, complainant argues that if the AJ erred in finding that the agency perceived complainant to be limited in the major life activity of work, the AJ's decision was still correct in finding that the agency regarded complainant as substantially limited in the major life activity of walking. Complainant also argues that the agency regarded complainant as substantially limited in the major life activities of learning and performing manual tasks. Moreover, complainant addresses the agency's argument that the AJ improperly found that complainant should be reinstated without having to serve a probationary period. Specifically, complainant states that where a probationary employee is terminated, it is appropriate to credit the employee for time previously served and to begin the probationary period from that point in time. Finally, complainant claims that the award of compensatory damages should be increased. Complainant states that in order to meet living expenses he: sold his 1985 Blazer for $1,100.00; sold his four-wheel recreational vehicle; sold a Yamaha Blaster, for $1,500.00; borrowed $3,000.00 from this aunt; and borrowed between $5,000.00 and $8,000.00 from his 76-year-old mother. Further, complainant states that he suffered from stress and low self-esteem as a result of the termination, had to sell his property, and secure loans. Complainant also notes he had trouble sleeping, gained about 15 pounds, and curtailed recreational activities such as playing basketball, fishing, and driving his recreational vehicle in order to look for employment. Complainant states the cases cited in the AJ's decision all indicate damage amounts greater than that awarded by the AJ. In response to complainant's appeal, the agency notes that both complainant and the agency agree that if reinstated, complainant should be required to complete his 90-day probationary period and thus, states the AJ erroneously ordered the agency to reinstate complainant without having to complete a probationary period. With regard to complainant's claim that the compensatory damages awarded by the AJ should be increased, the agency argues the AJ was in the best position to weigh the applicable evidence and testimony. Moreover, the agency notes that although the cases cited by the AJ involved greater awards, they also involved aggravating factors not at issue in the present case. Further, the agency states that the Commission has held that absent expert testimony or medical records, non-pecuniary losses should rarely be awarded. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, § VI.B. (November 9, 1999). An individual bringing a claim of discrimination on the basis of disability has the burden to show that he is an individual with a disability. Ceralde v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 07A00038 (August 2, 2001), request for reconsid. denied, EEOC Request No. 05A11133 (January 24, 2002). An individual with a disability is defined as one who (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2) has a record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(g). An impairment is substantially limiting when an individual is unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which he can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). Major life activities include working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). We find that the AJ properly determined that the agency regarded complainant as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. An agency regards an individual as substantially limited in a major life activity when it concludes that the individual has an impairment that significantly restricts him or her from currently performing a major life activity, even though the individual's impairment does not in fact substantially limit his/her ability to perform a major life activity; the impairment is only substantially limiting only as a result of the attitude of others; or the individual has no impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1). To be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, an individual must be regarded as having an impairment that significantly restricts him or her from currently performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(3). In the present case, S1 testified that after complainant injured his knee, she did not think complainant could do the physical requirements of the mail carrier job. Specifically, S1 stated that when complainant came in on August 22, 2002, he could not walk and she believed complainant could not do the stair climbing, knee bending, climbing, lifting, and kneeling requirements of the mail carrier job. S1 testified that she did not think complainant would recover from the knee problem and believed he was at risk for future knee injury. S1 did not make any inquiries about the limitations complainant might have or how long those limitations might last. We find the criteria used by the agency for terminating complainant's employment - that he could not do stair climbing, kneeling, lifting, knee bending and perform manual tasks - does not apply to some unique aspect of a letter carrier job. Thus, we find the agency not only regarded him as being unable to perform the job he held as a mail carrier at the agency, but also regarded him as being significantly restricted from performing jobs requiring manual labor. See Brown v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A45134 (June 1, 2006); EEOC Compliance Manual, Volume 2, EEOC Order No. 915.002 (March 14, 1995), section 902 at 54-55. Complainant must next show that he is a "qualified" individual with a disability. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(m). A "qualified" individual with a disability is an individual who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position. Id. The record in this case indicates that complainant met all the experience and education requirements for the PTF letter carrier position. Complainant successfully passed the requisite physical examination and completed 32 hours of training at the mail carrier academy. Further, the record indicates complainant successfully performed the duties of the position during the time he held the position such as casing and delivering mail. Thus, we find complainant was a qualified individual with a disability. Complainant has also established that he was subjected to an adverse action because of his disability. He established an "adverse action" in that he was terminated (his involuntary resignation) from the PTF carrier position on day ten of his 90-day probationary period. He established that this was "because of" his perceived disability through the direct evidence of S1's testimony that, but for complainant's knee injury, she would not have recommended his termination based on his alleged performance deficiencies. This direct evidence is buttressed by several pieces of additional evidence. First, the undisputed evidence shows that the other five individuals who were terminated during their probationary period were discharged after substantially more time on the job, and the only two probationary employees who were discharged for alleged inadequate job performance were discharged after working more than sixty days of their 90-day probationary period (in contrast to complainant's ten days on the job). This buttresses S1's testimony that complainant would not have been terminated for job performance deficiencies, alone, based on his first ten days of work. Second, substantial evidence supports the AJ's finding that S1 informed complainant that if he was injured during his first 90 days of work and if it prevented him from working, he would probably be subject to removal. This buttresses S1's admission that when she recommended to S2 that complainant's employment be terminated based on his performance, she was actually motivated by her erroneous belief that complainant's knee injury prevented him from performing his job duties. Once the Commission finds that an impermissible factor played a motivating part in the agency's employment decision, an agency may seek to limit the remedies available to a complainant by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered the impermissible factor. See 42. U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting various enforcement provisions of Title VII, including 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). Although the agency argued here that it would have taken the same action even apart from S1's belief that complainant's knee injury was severe and permanent, we find the agency's contention unpersuasive. During the hearing S2 stated that he considered two criteria equally in reaching his decision to terminate complainant: complainant's failure to timely report his on-the-job injury and S1's recommendations about complainant's performance. S2 testified that on August 22, 2002, he met briefly with S1 who recommended complainant's termination based on his performance. S2 stated that he concurred with S1's recommendation prior to speaking with complainant. According to his testimony, after meeting with S1, S2 then spoke to complainant regarding his injury. S2 stated that he did not know complainant was injured on the job until after he spoke with complainant on August 22, 2002. Thus, we find that S2 could not have relied on complainant's failure to report the on-the-job injury as a basis for complainant's termination since he stated he did not know the injury occurred on the job until after he decided to terminate complainant. Furthermore, we reject the agency's contention that complainant would have been terminated anyway as a result of his failure to timely report the knee injury in accordance with agency policy. Complainant stated that when he twisted his knee on August 20, 2002, it did not initially bother him. He states that when it began to bother him, he promptly reported it to S1 on August 21, 2002. The agency failed to show that complainant was not in compliance with the agency's rules and procedures regarding the timely reporting of on-the-job injuries. Moreover, the record reveals that S1 did not inquire about the circumstances surrounding complainant's knee pain, but rather, incorrectly assumed the injury was not job related. The agency also asserts that complainant was terminated because of his poor performance. The agency states complainant was deficient in delivery time, improperly cased mail, dropped his mail, failed to take shortcuts, and failed to properly use the clock rings. With regard to casing, the record shows that of the six days complainant worked but was not in training, complainant did not case on two of those days (August 14 and 15, 2002). Further, we note that on August 17, 2002, his last day of training, the carrier assigned to train complainant that day did not permit him to case mail, despite the agency's practice of giving trainees hands-on experience casing and delivering while being evaluated by their trainers. The record reveals that on the four days complainant was not in training and performed casing, his casing fell within acceptable standards (on two days complainant had help with casing and on two days he cased with no help). Moreover, we note in an August 30, 2002 electronic mail message justifying the reasons for complainant's termination, S1 did not mention casing as a problem for complainant. The record reveals that complainant did not properly punch the time clock to indicate the routes he worked and was counseled by S1 regarding this practice. Specifically, the record reveals that S1 spoke to complainant on August 12, 2002, about correctly punching the time clock. On the eight days following the August 12, 2002 discussion by S1 regarding the time clock, S1 noted that complainant had problems on six of those days and did better on one day and did a good job on the clock rings on another day. The record reveals that complainant's training on the time clock was minimal. Upon a review of the record, we do not find that the agency established that failure to properly punch the time clock was an independent basis for complainant's termination. The record reveals that complainant arrived late at the station after delivering his mail, and sometimes had help from other carriers to complete the delivery of his mail. The record shows that despite the agency's standard operating procedure to provide new carriers three consecutive full days of mail casing and delivery training with a certified trainer, on complainant's first two days of training (August 10 and 12, 2002), he was not afforded a full day of training on either of these days and was, in fact, assigned to deliver mail on the street himself. Additionally, on two of the days that complainant was trained (August 13 and 17, 2002), he was assigned trainers who had no training experience. While we note on one occasion complainant dropped his mail, the record reveals that it was not unusual for a carrier to occasionally drop their mail. Based on the inadequate training afforded complainant, the lack of corrective discussions by the agency on purported performance problems, and the fact that complainant worked only three days following his last day of training, we find S1 could not in good faith have concluded that complainant's performance warranted termination. Moreover, in her testimony, S1 stated that if complainant did not have the knee problem he would not have been fired on August 22, 2002. The record contains no evidence addressing how much longer complainant might have retained his employment with the agency if he had not been discharged on August 22, 2002. Thus, we find that the agency did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have terminated complainant regardless of his knee injury on August 22, 2002. Compensatory Damages To receive an award of compensatory damages, complainant must demonstrate that he has been harmed as a result of the agency's discriminatory action; the extent, nature and severity of the harm; and the duration or expected duration of the harm. See Rivera v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157 (July 22, 1994), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05940927 (December 11, 1995); Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at 11-12, 14 (July 14, 1992). An award of compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses, including emotional harm, should reflect the extent to which the respondent directly or proximately caused the harm, and the extent to which other factors also caused the harm. The Commission has held that evidence from a health care provider is not a mandatory prerequisite for recovery of compensatory damages. See Carpenter v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995). The absence of supporting evidence may affect the amount of damages deemed appropriate in specific cases. See Lawrence v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288 (April 18, 1996). After a careful review of the record, considering the nature of the discriminatory actions and the nature of the harm to complainant, we find the award of $25,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages by the AJ was appropriate. We note that complainant testified that as a result of the termination he suffered from stress, low self-esteem, difficulty sleeping and gained 15 pounds. Complainant also testified that he curtailed his recreational activities such as, playing basketball, fishing and driving his recreational vehicles. Complainant avers that as a result of the financial troubles stemming from his termination, he had to sell some personal property: his 1985 Blazer for about $1,100.00 and his four-wheel recreational vehicle, a Yamaha Blaster, for $1,500.00. Complainant states that he also borrowed $3,000.00 from his aunt and between $5,000.00 and $8,000.00 from his 76-year-old mother. Moreover, the record reveals that following his termination, complainant spent considerable time trying to secure another job. A year after the termination, complainant obtained a new job at the Department of Veterans Affairs. The Commission has awarded similar compensatory damages in a case similar to complainant's case. See Marriott v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 07A30073 (after a finding that complainant was terminated due to his disability, $25,000.00 in non-pecuniary, compensatory damages awarded based on complainant's own testimony that the agency's discriminatory actions sent him into "full blown psychosis" and based on contemporaneous psychiatric records that revealed discussions he had with his physician concerning his termination by the agency). Further, the amount of the award meets the goals of not being "monstrously excessive" standing alone, not being the product of passion or prejudice, and being consistent with the amount awarded in similar cases.5 Probationary Period On appeal, the agency claims the AJ erred by ordering complainant reinstated without having to serve the remainder of his original probationary period. We agree with the agency. Since complainant was wrongfully terminated after ten days of probationary employment, we find that complainant is required to complete the remaining original probationary period of employment. Wells v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01880979 (May 9, 1988) (citing Dorsett v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01830120 (December 13, 1983)). Such a remedy does not go beyond the make whole relief required by Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418-23. CONCLUSION We REVERSE the agency's finding that complainant was not subjected to discrimination based on disability when he was terminated and we ORDER the agency to provide the relief specified herein. ORDER To the extent it has not already done so, the agency shall take the following actions: 1. Within 60 days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall offer complainant in writing, the position of part time flexible city carrier, or a position of equal grade, pay, duties, responsibilities, and benefits, at the installation of complainant's choice. Complainant shall notify the agency within 30 days from the date he receives the offer, whether he will accept the offer. If complainant accepts the offer, he must complete the remaining portion of the original probationary period. The agency shall implement complainant's chosen option within two pay periods after receiving complainant's notification accepting the offer. The position shall be retroactive to the date complainant started his employment with the agency, i.e., August 10, 2002. 2. Within 60 days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay, with interest, and other benefits due complainant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. Complainant shall cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and benefits due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back pay and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a check to complainant for the undisputed amount within 60 days of the date the agency determines the amount it believes to be due. Complainant may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute. The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." 3. Within 60 days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall expunge from all official and unofficial files all documents referencing complainant's August 22, 2002 termination (involuntary resignation). 4. Within 60 days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall pay complainant $25,000.00 in non-pecuniary, compensatory damages. 5. Within 60 days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall pay complainant the sum of $51,672.17 for attorney's fees and costs. 6. Within 180 days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall provide eight hours of live, focused training to S1 and S2 regarding their obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. If either S1 or S2 is no longer an employee of the federal government, the agency shall furnish documentation of his/her departure date(s). 7. Within 180 days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against S1 and S2. The agency shall report its decision to the Compliance Officer, referenced herein. If the agency decides to take disciplinary action it shall identify the action taken. If the agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If either S1 or S2 have left the agency's employment, then the agency shall furnish documentation of their departure date(s). The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." INTERIM RELIEF (F0900) When the agency requests reconsideration and the case involves a finding of discrimination regarding a removal, separation, or suspension continuing beyond the date of the request for reconsideration, and when the decision orders retroactive restoration, the agency shall comply with the decision to the extent of the temporary or conditional restoration of the complainant to duty status in the position specified by the Commission, pending the outcome of the agency request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.502(b). The agency shall notify the Commission and the complainant in writing at the same time it requests reconsideration that the relief it provides is temporary or conditional and, if applicable, that it will delay the payment of any amounts owed but will pay interest from the date of the original appellate decision until payment is made. Failure of the agency to provide notification will result in the dismissal of the agency's request. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.502(b)(3). POSTING ORDER (G0900) The agency is ordered to post at its Glendale Post Office in Denver, Colorado copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900) If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1208) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M1208) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0408) This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action"). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Stephen Llewellyn Executive Officer Executive Secretariat 3/27/09 __________________ Date 1 This resignation and alleged failure to accommodate are not issues in the instant complaint. 2 Although complainant originally included retaliation as a basis for his complaint, he later withdrew the basis of retaliation at the hearing. Additionally, although the agency accepted for investigation the additional claim that on August 20, 2002, complainant was not given medical help or paperwork for an on-the-job injury, this issue was never specifically addressed by the AJ. On appeal neither party claims that the AJ erred by not addressing this additional claim and, therefore, we do not address this claim here. 3 Nothing in the record indicates that S1 mentioned complainant's knee injury to S2 when she recommended that the agency discharge complainant based on his performance, nor is there any indication that S2 knew the extent of complainant's knee injury, or that he was motivated in any way by complainant's knee injury, when he approved S1's recommendation that complainant be discharged based on complainant's performance during his first nine days of his probationary period. 4 Although the agency states complainant completed 12 days of his probationary period, the record reveals that complainant completed 10 days of the 90-day probationary period. 5 As neither party challenges the AJ's award of attorney's fees and costs, we will not address the AJ's award of attorney's fees and costs in this decision, except to order the agency to comply with the AJ's award of attorney's fees and costs. ?? ?? ?? ?? 2 0720070001 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Washington, DC 20507 18 0720070001