Darlene Gist, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast Area), Agency. Appeal No. 0720070081 Hearing No. 420-2006-00056X Agency No. 1H-351-0003-06 DECISION Following the agency's September 14, 2007 final order, the agency and complainant both filed appeals, which are accepted by the Commission pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). The parties accept the EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) findings of discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. On appeal, the agency requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of part of the relief ordered by the AJ. Specifically, the agency requests that the AJ's award of $62,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages and $63,548.50 in attorney's fees be reduced to $20,000.00 and $45,748.50, respectively. In contrast, complainant requests that the AJ's award in non-pecuniary damages, attorney's fees, and costs be increased to $125,000.00, $124,865.00, and $2928.21, respectively. For the following reasons, the Commission MODIFIES the agency's final order. ISSUE PRESENTED On appeal, the issue presented in this case is whether the AJ's award of non-pecuniary compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and costs is supported by substantial evidence in the record. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked as a full-time Custodian at the agency's West Station in Huntsville, Alabama. Before working as a Custodian, complainant had been a Mail Handler at the agency's Huntsville Processing and Distribution Center, where she experienced harassing and intimidating conduct from another employee. Complainant sought help from an Employee Assistance Program (EAP) counselor, who advised complainant to go to a medical professional. Complainant saw a psychologist, who subsequently informed the agency that complainant had made remarks that she might do bodily harm to the agency employee who was allegedly harassing her. Afterwards, complainant was issued a Work Capacity Certificate, which indicated that she had a major depressive disorder. However, the certificate also indicated that complainant did not pose a hazard to herself other others. Moreover, complainant obtained medical clearance forms indicating that she was fit for duty and was not a hazard to herself or others. Nevertheless, the agency removed complainant on July 21, 2003. Complainant filed an EEO complaint regarding her removal. On August 1, 2003, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, in which the agency agreed to expunge the removal from complainant's personnel file and place complainant in a full-time Custodian position, effective August 2, 2003. The settlement agreement also provided that management would "make a statement on behalf of [complainant] to restore her respectability among her peers." Complainant proceeded to work without incident as a full-time Custodian at the West Station. In May 2005, the Huntsville General Mail Facility (GMF) had several openings for Mail Handlers. On May 2, 2005 and August 31, 2005, complainant wrote two letters to the Plant Manager of the GMF requesting to be transferred to that facility as a Mail Handler. The Plant Manager never responded to complainant's requests. Complainant then wrote to the Plant Manager on September 20, 2005, requesting to be transferred to a Maintenance Support position. Again, the Plant Manager did not respond to complainant's request. In October 2005, complainant contacted an EEO counselor about her requests to transfer. The parties entered into mediation in November 2005. At the mediation, the Plant Manager told complainant that he was not going to allow her to transfer because of the events that transpired in 2003. On December 26, 2005, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when the agency did not grant her requests to be transferred to the Huntsville GMF.1 At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ held a hearing on May 1, 2007 and issued a decision on August 7, 2007. The AJ found that the agency discriminated against complainant on the bases of disability and reprisal when the agency did not permit complainant to transfer to the Huntsville GMF. The AJ found that complainant was a qualified individual with a disability and that the agency failed to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to transfer complainant. Specifically, the AJ found that there was no objective evidence that complainant posed a threat to the safety of others in 2005. As for the reprisal claim, the AJ found that complainant succeeded in establishing a causal connection between her prior EEO activity and the agency's present refusal to transfer her. The AJ concluded that the agency failed to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not granting complainant's transfer requests, and found discrimination on the basis of reprisal for prior EEO activity. For relief, the AJ awarded complainant placement in a Mail Handler position, retroactive to June 1, 2005, as well as back pay. The AJ also ordered the agency to post a notice of the finding of discrimination and have the responsible agency official undergo at least four hours of EEO training. The AJ issued complainant an award of $62,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages, $63,548.50 in attorney's fees, and $323.65 in costs. The agency subsequently issued a final order implementing the AJ's decision with respect to the findings of discrimination, transfer of complainant to a Mail Handler position, back pay, posting a notice of the finding of discrimination, training for the responsible agency official, and attorney's costs. However, the agency appealed the AJ's award of non-pecuniary compensatory damages and attorney's fees. Complainant subsequently filed an appeal, requesting increases in the AJ's award of non-pecuniary compensatory damages and attorney's fees and costs. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, § VI.B. (November 9, 1999). Compensatory Damages Compensatory damages may be awarded for past pecuniary losses, future pecuniary losses, and non-pecuniary losses that are directly or proximately caused by the agency's discriminatory conduct. See Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 14, 1992). Generally, a compensatory damages award should fully compensate a complainant for the harm caused by the agency's discriminatory action, even if the harm is intangible. Id. Non-pecuniary damages are designed to remedy a harm, not to punish an agency for its discriminatory actions. See Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1986) (stating that compensatory damages determinations must be based on the actual harm sustained and not the facts of the underlying case). A proper award of non-pecuniary damages should not be "monstrously excessive" standing alone, should not be the product of passion or prejudice, and should be consistent with the amount awarded in similar cases. See Ward-Jenkins v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01961483 (March 4, 1999). Section 1981a(b)(2) of the Civil Rights Act 1991 indicates that compensatory damages do not include back pay, interest on back pay, or any other type of equitable relief authorized by Title VII. Section 1981 a(b)(3) limits the total amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to each complaining party for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses, according to the number of persons employed by the respondent employer. The limit for an employer with more than 500 employees, such as the agency herein, is $300,000.00. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D). To receive an award of compensatory damages, a complainant must demonstrate that the complainant has been harmed as a result of the agency's discriminatory action, and establish the extent, nature, severity, and the duration or expected duration of the harm. Rivera v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157 (July 22, 1994), req. for recons. den., EEOC Request No. 05940927 (December 11, 1995); Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 14, 1992), at 11-12, 14. Objective evidence of non-pecuniary damages for emotional harm can include statements from the complainant concerning emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character or reputation, injury to credit standing, loss of health, and any other non-pecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of discriminatory conduct. Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993). Statements from others, including family members, friends, and health care providers can address the outward manifestations or physical consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness, anxiety, stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self-esteem, excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Id. A complainant's own testimony, coupled with the circumstances of that particular case, can suffice to sustain the burden of establishing emotional harm. Id. The more inherently degrading or humiliating the agency's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action. Id. However, the absence of supporting evidence may affect the amount of damages appropriate in specific cases. Id. In this case, the AJ awarded complainant $62,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. The AJ relied on complainant's hearing testimony that she suffered emotional harm from the agency's refusal to consider her requests for transfer. Specifically, she testified that she felt depressed and helpless and withdrew from her normal activities. She was extremely upset that the agency essentially labeled her a danger to others. Complainant testified that she spent less time with her family due to obsessing over the agency's actions, and separated from her husband. On appeal, the agency maintains that the AJ's award of $62,000.000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages should be reduced to $20,000.00 because (1) complainant's testimony about her emotional distress reflected that it was due to the effect of filing and processing her EEO complaint, rather than the agency's refusal to respond or grant her requests for transfer; (2) complainant was the only witness to testify on the issue of non-pecuniary damages; (3) the amount of $20,000.00 is comparable to awards in similar cases. In response, complainant contends that the AJ's award in non-pecuniary compensatory damages should be increased to $125,000.00 because (1) her emotional distress was caused by the agency's actions, rather than the stress associated with litigating her EEO complaint, and (2) the amount of $125,000.00 is comparable to awards in similar cases. Based on the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's award of $62,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages is sufficient to remedy the emotional harm caused by the agency's actions and is supported by substantial evidence in the record. At the hearing, complainant testified that she became emotionally distressed after the November 2005 mediation when she learned that her requests for transfer had been denied because management held, and acted on, a two-year old misperception of her as a bad, violent person. She felt that she was reliving the events of 2003 again, even though those events were supposed to be behind her. She testified that she had problems sleeping, withdrew socially from her family, lost sexual interest, and separated from her husband as a result of the agency's refusal to acknowledge and grant her transfer requests. We find that $62,000.00 is an appropriate amount because complainant presented sufficient evidence to establish that she suffered significant emotional problems, such as mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and injury to character or reputation, as a result of the agency's actions. We find that this amount is consistent with prior Commission precedent. See McCann v. Department of Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01971851 (October 23, 1998) ($75,000.00 awarded in non-pecuniary damages where complainant suffered from numbness, anger, insomnia, a prolonging of additional depression, flashbacks, nightmares, intrusive bad thoughts and memories; fear, fatigue, overall sour mood, diminished pleasure in activities, some social withdrawal, less confidence on the job and a constant fear of unjustified job loss); Finlay v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01942985 (April 29, 1997) ($100,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages for severe psychological injury over four years which was expected to continue for an indeterminate period of time, including ongoing depression, frequent crying, concern for physical safety, loss of charm, lethargy, social withdrawal, concern for physical safety, recurring nightmares and memories of harassment, a damaged marriage, stomach distress, and headaches). Moreover, the Commission finds that complainant's hearing testimony indicates that the psychological and emotional harm did not result merely from the stress of litigating her EEO complaint, but rather from the realization that management refused to respond to or grant her transfer requests because it still erroneously viewed her as a potentially dangerous or violent person. Therefore, we find that an award of $62,000.00 is appropriate because it is based on the emotional and psychological harm experienced by complainant as a result of the agency's actions, and it takes into account the nature and duration of the harm. Attorney's Fees The Commission, an agency, or an AJ may award complainant reasonable attorney's fees and other costs incurred in the processing of a complaint regarding allegations of discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). Attorney's fees are computed by determining the "lodestar," the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B). The number of hours should not include excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; Bernard v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861 (July 17, 1998). A reasonable hourly rate is a rate based on "prevailing market rates in the relevant community" for attorneys of similar experience in similar cases. Cooley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960748 (July 30, 1998) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)). The attorney requesting the fee award has the burden of proving, by specific evidence, entitlement to the requested fees and costs. Hyde v. Department of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120073964 (November 24, 2009); Koren v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05A20843 (February 18, 2003). EEOC regulations require the complainant's attorney to submit a verified statement of attorney's fees and other costs to the agency or AJ within thirty days of receipt of the decision and submit a copy of the statement to the agency. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(2)(i). A verified statement of fees and costs includes: (1) an itemized list of services rendered; (2) documentary evidence of reasonableness of hours; (3) documentary evidence of reasonableness of rate; and (4) documentation of costs. EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 11, § VII.A. (November 9, 1999). If an AJ determines that an adjustment to the lodestar is appropriate, the AJ may calculate the adjustment by either adding or subtracting a lump sum from the lodestar figure or by adding or subtracting a percentage of the lodestar. Id. at 11-8. The AJ has discretion to determine the amount of the adjustment, which should normally be no more than seventy-five percent of the lodestar figure. The AJ must provide a detailed written explanation of why the adjustment was made, and what factors supported the adjustment. Id. In this case, complainant requests $124,865.00 in attorney's fees and $2,928.21 in costs. Complainant's attorney submitted to the AJ itemized lists of the types of services and number of hours performed, as well as affidavits detailing that the hourly rates for attorney and paralegal work were $425.00 and $90.00, respectively. In response, the agency identified several charges that appeared vague, redundant, or excessive. The agency also maintained that the requested hourly attorney rate of $425.00 should be reduced to $300.00 because (1) the hourly rate of $425.00 is not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) the attorney's federal court experience is irrelevant to determining rates charged in the federal sector administrative process. The AJ determined that the claimed total hours performed on this case was excessive for the twelve-month period of litigation. The AJ reduced the compensable hours by fifty-percent, thereby adjusting the attorney's hours worked from 293.80 to 146.90 and the paralegal's hours worked from 67.30 to 33.65. In contrast, the AJ found the hourly rates of $425.00 for the attorney and $90.00 for the paralegal to be reasonable and customary within the lodestar calculus. Upon review, the Commission finds that the majority of the hours listed in the fee petition are sufficiently documented to support a determination that the nature and purpose of the activities described by complainant's attorney were reasonable. However, the Commission also finds that some of the entries were excessive and warrant an across-the-board reduction. For example, an entry dated September 18, 2006 states that five hours were spent on telephone calls with the client and the agency's attorney scheduling depositions and discussing people who were hired by the agency. Other entries that appear excessive include those from September 28, 2006 to October 18, 2006, indicating that complainant's attorney worked over nine hours on a four-page motion to amend the complaint to include disability as a basis of discrimination. The Commission finds, however, that the AJ abused his discretion in applying a fifty-percent across-the-board reduction in fees to the total hours billed because the AJ's explanation is not justified. The fact that more than a certain number of hours were spent litigating a case over a twelve-month period is not a sufficient reason to reduce a fee by half. Complainant's attorney achieved complete success in this case. Given the relatively few number of billing entries that appear to be excessive, the Commission finds that an across-the-board reduction of hours by ten percent to be reasonable. Therefore, the attorney's hours worked is reduced from 293.80 hours to 264.42 and the paralegal's hours worked is reduced from 67.30 to 60.57. As for hourly rates, the Commission finds that there is substantial evidence to support the AJ's finding that the reasonable hourly rate for the attorney is $425.00. In contrast, the Commission modifies the AJ's finding of the reasonable paralegal hourly rate from $90.00 to $95.00 for the reasons explained below. The Commission has previously held that the most reliable evidence for establishing reasonable hourly rates for private attorneys is the hourly rate customarily charged by those attorneys for fee-paying clients. Cooley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960748 (July 30, 1998); Chris v. Central Intelligence Agency, EEOC Appeal No. 01956844 (July 19, 1996). Documentary evidence to show the reasonableness of an hourly rate include the following: an affidavit stating that the requested rate is the attorney's normal billing rate; a detailed affidavit of another attorney in the community familiar with prevailing community rates for attorneys of comparable experience and expertise; a resume; a list of cases handled; or a list of comparable cases where a similar rate was accepted. EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 11, § VII.A. (November 9, 1999). In this case, complainant's private attorney provided an affidavit explaining that he charged an hourly rate of $425.00 for fee-paying clients in employment discrimination cases and ERISA actions, and that his firm charged an hourly rate of $95.00 for paralegal work. The attorney averred that he had over twenty-five years of experience litigating civil rights and employment discrimination cases. The attorney also included a supporting affidavit from another attorney in the community with thirteen years of experience litigating employment and civil rights cases. In the supporting affidavit, the supporting attorney averred that (1) the hourly rates for cases such as this ranged from $200.00 to $450.00; (2) her own hourly rate was $300.00; and (3) the hourly rate of $425.00 was reasonable for complainant's attorney because of his reputation and greater experience. Finally, complainant's attorney provided a copy of a fee award in his geographic area before a federal district court in 2003 in which he was awarded attorney's fees based on an hourly rate of $375.00. Therefore, the Commission finds that there is substantial evidence to support the determination of reasonable hourly rates for the attorney and paralegal to be $425.00 and $95.00, respectively. Costs A prevailing party is entitled to recovery of costs, including witness fees, transcript costs, and printing and copying costs. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(C). Additionally, the Commission has held that recoverable costs may include reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney during the normal course of representation, such as costs associated with mileage, postage, telephone calls, and photocopying. Poquiz v. Department of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0720050095 (April 10, 2008); Hafiz v. Department of Defense, EEOC Petition No. 04960021 (July 11, 1997). We have consistently held that fee applicants who wish to be reimbursed for incurred costs must submit adequate documentation in support of the expenses incurred, such as copies of telephone bills or receipts. See Davis v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120053186 (April 24, 2007); Poquiz v. Department of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0720050095 (April 10, 2008). In reimbursing the costs of litigating this case, the AJ found that complainant did not provide sufficient documentation to support the requested total of $2928.21. The AJ only reimbursed complainant $323.65 for the costs that were supported by documentation: hotel and food for the night prior to the hearing ($83.65) and mileage expenses ($240.00). Complainant's attorney primarily contends that reasonable costs in this case should include $968.60 for transcribing depositions,2 $1,216.96 for online legal research,3 and $418.74 for photocopy and facsimile charges. The record includes an itemization of costs for online research, transcripts, facsimile charges, and photocopy charges. On appeal, complainant's attorney provides a receipt for transcribing complainant's deposition ($95.30), an invoice for transcribing the depositions of other witnesses ($873.30), and a computer printout generated by the attorney's law firm stating the total cost of legal research is $3,461.65. Upon review, we find that the record contains sufficient documentation to support complainant's claim of $968.60 for transcribing depositions and $1216.96 for online legal research. See Abate v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01971418 (March 24, 2000) (allowing recovery of legal research expenses); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(c)(2)(ii)(C). However, for the remaining $418.74 in facsimile and photocopy charges, the Commission finds that there is insufficient documentation in the record to make a determination on the amount of costs for which complainant is entitled. We recognize that receipts for costs, such as internal photocopies and online legal research, may not always be available when a law firm uses billing meters and timers. Davis v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120053186 (April 24, 2007). In these situations, we require the fee applicant to submit a verified statement of costs, which should include: a list of services rendered itemized by date, a detailed summary of the task, the rate, and, where practicable, the names of the people performing the tasks. Id. Here, complainant's attorney, whose law firm utilizes billing meters and timers, submitted a verified statement of costs that listed the services rendered (itemized by date), and the rates. But no detailed summary of the substance of the tasks was included for the Commission to determine what documents were faxed or copied. Therefore, we determine that a reasonable expectation of the amount of costs claimed for the faxes and photocopies is fifty percent of $418.74, or $209.37. See generally, Bernard v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861 (July 17, 1998) (applying across the board reduction of costs by fifty percent where insufficient information provided by complainant to make a determination on reasonableness of costs requested). Thus, we find complainant is entitled to total costs in the amount of $2,718.58. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, the Commission MODIFIES the agency's final order with respect to non-pecuniary compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and costs as reflected above. The agency is directed to comply with the Order below. ORDER To the extent that the agency has not done so, the agency is ordered to take the following actions: 1. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall place complainant in the Mail Processing Clerk position, retroactive to June l, 2005, and issue new personnel forms showing complainant's tenure in said position; 2. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall pay complainant $62,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages; 3. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall tender to complainant back pay, along with all the rights and benefits that would have accrued but for the discrimination, retroactive to June 1, 2005, computed according to the applicable provisions of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501, with interest computed in the manner prescribed by 5 C.F.R. § 550.805; 4. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall pay complainant's counsel $118,132.65 in attorney's fees and $2,718.58 in costs; 5. Within ninety (90) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall provide training to the responsible management officials regarding their responsibilities under EEO laws, with a special emphasis on the Rehabilitation Act and reprisal for prior EEO activity; 6. The agency shall consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against the responsible management officials. The Commission does not consider training to be disciplinary action. The agency shall report its decision to the Compliance Officer. If the agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. The agency shall provide a report of its compliance with Paragraphs 1 through 6 of this Order to the Compliance Officer as referenced below. Copies must be sent to complainant and her representative. POSTING ORDER (G0900) The agency is ordered to post at its General Mail Facility in Huntsville, Alabama the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900) If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1208) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M1208) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0408) This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action"). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations April 22, 2010 Date 1 On October 11, 2006, complainant filed a motion to amend her complaint to include disability as a basis of discrimination with the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) assigned to her case. The AJ subsequently granted complainant's motion to amend the complaint. 2 Although the fee petition requests reimbursement of $960.60, the actual bills for transcribing complainant's deposition ($95.30) and the depositions of other witnesses ($873.30) total $968.60. 3 Although the actual bill for online legal research totaled $3,461.66, the fee petition requests reimbursement of only $1,216.96 for online research because complainant's attorney received a discount on the bill. ?? ?? ?? ?? 2 0720070081 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 2 0720070081