Complainant, v. Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Agency. Appeal No. 0720130035 Hearing No. 550-2009-00209X Agency No. HS08TSA008204 DECISION Following its August 16, 2013, final order, the Agency filed a timely appeal which the Commission accepts pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). On appeal, the Agency requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of an EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) finding of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Agency also requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of the relief ordered by the AJ. For the following reasons, the Commission REVERSES the Agency's final order. ISSUES PRESENTED Did a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ) err when she concluded that Complainant was subjected to retaliatory harassment without considering the Supreme Court's decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013)? Did the AJ err when she did not allow an Agency witness to testify? Was Complainant was subjected to retaliatory harassment from 2005 through 2009, or just from 2008 through 2009? Did the AJ properly dismiss Complainant's constructive discharge claim? Were the AJ's pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensatory damages awards appropriate? BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Transportation Security Specialist at the Reno International Airport in Reno, Nevada. Complainant filed a previous formal complaint in 2005, in which he named his second-level supervisor (S2) as the responsible management official. Complainant alleged that when he initiated the EEO complaint in 2005, the Assistant Federal Security Director of Operations (S1) called Complainant into his office and told him to "drop his EEO case" against S2. Complainant did not amend that complaint to include this statement. Complainant alleged in the instant complaint that between 2005 and 2008, both S1 and S2 engaged in a pattern of harassment against him for filing his 2005 EEO complaint. The harassment allegedly intensified in July 2008 when Complainant learned that the office supervisory structure was reorganized and S1 would now be his first-level supervisor. Complainant expressed concern to S2 regarding having S1 as his direct supervisor, but S2 told him, "That's how it is going to be." On July 22, 2008, Complainant declined to meet with S1, reportedly in an effort to avoid harassment from him. Complainant states that, subsequently, S2 yelled at him and asked him for the names of all the people with whom he conferred about his harassment claims. Complainant left work that day and did not return to work for medical reasons for the remaining five months of his employment with the Agency. Complainant subsequently emailed S1 and S2 and told them that he notified his attorneys, D.C. officials, and his Congressmen about their hostility towards him. Complainant initiated EEO Counselor contact on July 28, 2008. The record reflects that S1 was notified of Complainant's EEO Complaint in August 2008. In September 2008, S1 began to rapidly and systematically reject work reports that Complainant had submitted two months earlier. Although Complainant was off work on medical leave at the time, S1 made sure that Complainant received notification of the rejected reports while he was recuperating at home. On November 4, 2008, S2 was sent a letter by the Office of Civil Rights regarding Complainant's discrimination complaint. S1 was copied on the letter, despite him being named as a responsible management official. On November 26, 2008, S1 sent Complainant a letter requesting further medical information. In his letter, S1 instructed Complainant that the medical documentation must have an original signature, a requirement that the Agency had not previously imposed on Complainant. Additionally, the letter further stated that the failure to provide the requested documentation could lead to Complainant's termination, which Complainant interpreted as a threat. On November 28, 2008, Complainant was investigated by the Reno Police Department after a burglary occurred at the Agency facility. S1, who had previously worked for the Reno Police Department, identified Complainant as a suspect even though there is no dispute that Complainant had not been at work since July 22, 2008. Complainant was taken to the Reno Police Department, questioned for the crime, and threatened with incarceration. Ultimately, the police determined that Complainant was not a suspect in the crime. In January 2009, Complainant was in the process of leaving TSA for a new position at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). On January 2, 2009, S1 emailed the individual responsible for processing worker's compensation claims at the Agency to call attention to Complainant's EEO history and to inquire about how to inform the FAA of Complainant's previous EEO history. The record shows that Complainant filed a worker's compensation claim in 2006 for work-related stress reportedly caused by retaliation and harassment because of his race and EEO activity. In S1's January 2, 2009, email, he wrote: "[Complainant] is reporting to work for the FAA as of Feb. 1, 2009. I know you work for TSA, however, should [Complainant] file a [w]orker's comp claim with the same issue he raised while employed [by TSA], this knowledge may prove beneficial for [FAA]. I am unaware of how these channels work from agency to agency, but I think the problem is with the person and not the system, and no other organization should be made to "assume" it is the fault of the agency and assume liability. On September 13, 2008, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency subjected him to harassment on the bases of national origin (Hispanic) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity from July 2008 until December 2008. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing and a hearing was held on November 30, December 1, and December 2, 2011. The first AJ assigned to the case (AJ1) issued a decision on liability on June 12, 2012, finding that Complainant established that he had been subjected to harassment on the basis of reprisal. AJ1 ordered the parties to prepare for the remedies phase of the hearings process. AJ1 subsequently left the Commission and another EEOC AJ (AJ2) took over the case. AJ2 held a hearing on damages on July 10, 2012, and issued a decision on July 11, 2013. The Agency subsequently issued a final order rejecting AJ1's finding that Complainant proved that the Agency subjected him to harassment as alleged, and rejecting AJ2's determination of remedies. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, the Agency contends that AJ1 erred when she concluded that S1 subjected Complainant to retaliatory harassment without considering the Supreme Court's decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013). Additionally, the Agency contends that AJ1 erred when she did not allow S2 to testify as an Agency witness. Finally, the Agency contends that AJ2's award of compensatory damages should be reduced from $55,000 to $10,000. In a cross-appeal, Complainant requests that we clarify whether AJ1 concluded that Complainant was subjected to retaliatory harassment from 2005 through 2009, or just from 2008 through 2009. Further, Complainant contends that AJ2 erred in his calculation of non-pecuniary compensatory damages by awarding only $55,000 despite significantly higher awards by the Commission in cases in which the complainants suffered similar harm. Complainant contends that AJ2 erred when he found that Complainant's resignation was not a result of the Agency's retaliation. Finally, Complainant contends that AJ2's 75 percent across the board reduction of the hours worked by Complainant's attorneys was in error, as well as AJ2's other determinations that resulted in a deduction of Complainant's requested attorney's fees and costs. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, at § VI.B. (August 5, 2015). Causation Standard The Agency argues that AJ1 erred when she did not identify the causation standard she applied in finding retaliation. The Agency asserts that the Supreme Court's decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, supra, should apply. In that case, the Court analyzed the standard for causation for Title VII retaliation claims, and noted that Congress' specific language in Title VII stating that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" (emphasis added), required the proper causation standard for retaliation claims to be a "but for" standard. However, in Petitioner v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Petition No. 0320110050 (July 16, 2014), the Commission found that the "but for" standard discussed in Nassar does not apply to retaliation claims by federal sector applicants or employees under Title VII or the ADEA because the relevant federal sector statutory language does not contain the "because of" language on which the Supreme Court based its holdings in Nassar and in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (requiring "but for" causation for ADEA claims brought under 29 U.S.C. § 623). These federal sector provisions contain a "broad prohibition of 'discrimination' rather than a list of specific prohibited practices." See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 487-88 (2008) (holding that the broad prohibition in 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) that personnel actions affecting federal employees who are at least 40 years of age "shall be made free from any discrimination based on age" prohibits retaliation by federal agencies); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (personnel actions affecting federal employees "shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"). In Petitioner v. Department of the Interior, supra, the Commission clarified the causation standard for retaliation claims under Title VII or the ADEA for federal sector applicants or employees. Specifically, the Commission found that the anti-retaliation provisions make it unlawful to discriminate against any individual because he or she has complained, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, hearing, or litigation under the employment discrimination statutes. The Commission reiterated what a complainant must generally do to prove retaliation: To prevail, [Petitioner] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) was subject to an . . . adverse action; and (3) there was a causal nexus between the two. The causal nexus requires a showing that retaliation for her prior protected activity more likely than not caused the challenged actions.... Additionally, the Commission has a policy of considering reprisal claims with a broad view of coverage. See Carroll v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05970939 (Apr. 4, 2000). For example, retaliatory actions which can be challenged are not restricted to those which affect a term or condition of employment. Rather, a complainant is protected from any discrimination that is reasonably likely to deter protected activity. See EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8, "Retaliation," No. 915.003 (May 20, 1998), at 8-15; See also Carroll. A review of AJ1's decision on liability reveals that AJ1 properly laid out this standard on page 9 of the decision.1 Further, we find that AJ1 properly applied the facts of this case to the reprisal legal standard to conclude that Complainant had been subjected to harassment based on reprisal. Specifically, Complainant participated in prior protected EEO by filing previous EEO complaints and alleging in his prior workers compensation claims that he had been subjected to unlawful discrimination and harassment. He also engaged in protected activity when he opposed the harassment directly to S1 and S2, and informed S1 and S2 that he had discussed the harassment with his attorneys, D.C. officials, and Congressmen. AJ1 also correctly found that Complainant was subjected to adverse actions by S1, such as when he began to rapidly and systematically reject work reports that Complainant had submitted two months earlier, told him to bring in more thorough medical documentation, told the police that Complainant should be a suspect in a burglary at the facility that led to Complainant being questioned in a police station and threatened with incarceration, and tried to inform Complainant's future employer about his prior protected EEO activities. We agree with AJ1 that these actions are reasonably likely to deter an individual from engaging in the EEO process. We find that Complainant was able to show causation because the record establishes that retaliation for his prior protected activity more likely than not motivated the challenged actions. AJ1 did not find S1 credible when he tried to explain the reasons for his actions, and AJ1 described S1's testimony as "shifty and remarkably uncomfortable" and stated that "[S1's] testimony was not credible and this lack of credibility... contravenes any and all of the explanations he and other witnesses proffered as to why [he] took the actions he did ...". AJ1 decision at 16. Further, AJ1 found S1's credibility so lacking that she rebuked him on the record for lacking candor and truthfulness. We do not find anything in the record that would cause us to second guess AJ1's credibility determinations. Finally, we agree with AJ1 that the adverse actions were severe and/or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment, and that the Agency was liable for the harassment. Therefore, we find that AJ1 came to the correct conclusion that Complainant was subjected to harassment on the basis of reprisal for his prior protected EEO activity. Denial of S2 as a Witness at the Hearing The Agency asserts on appeal that AJ1 erred when she did not allow the Agency to call S2 as a witness even though he was available to testify at the hearing. The record shows that S2 was approved as a joint witness during the prehearing conference. However, soon after the prehearing conference the Agency notified AJ1 and Complainant that S2 had retired from the federal government and that the Agency was not able to secure him as a witness; as a result he would not be testifying at the hearing. When the hearing began on November 30, 2011, the Agency again confirmed that S2 would not be testifying. The Agency did not inform AJ1 and Complainant that it was able to procure S2 as a witness until after the hearing had begun. The AJ considered the harm to the Agency if S2 was not permitted to testify and weighed that against the harm to Complainant had S2 been permitted to testify without notice of his willingness to appear. AJ1 ultimately determined that allowing S2 to testify would prejudice Complainant and therefore denied the Agency's request for S2 to testify. We agree with AJ1 that allowing S2 to testify without previous notice to Complainant would have prejudiced Complainant because his attorneys did not have time to prepare to examine S2. See Kitchen v. National Labor Relations Board, EEOC Appeal No. 0720110017 (May 1, 2013) (AJ properly excluded subject witnesses and documents that Agency did not present until right before hearing because it would have been prejudicial to complainant's preparedness and ability to defend). As a result, we find that AJ1 properly denied the Agency's request to allow S2 to testify. Clarification of Harassment Timeframe Complainant requested that we clarify the decision on liability as to the timeframe that AJ1 found that Complainant was subjected to discrimination. Specifically, Complainant asserts that AJ1 found that the harassment occurred between 2005 and 2009. However, AJ2 determined in his decision on damages that AJ1 found that the harassment occurred between July 2008 and January 2009. A review of AJ1's decision, as well as the other documents in the record such as the hearing transcript and the report of investigation, establish that Complainant was subjected to discrimination from February 2005 through January 2009. For example, on page 15 of her decision on liability AJ1 stated: As to the [C]omplainant's harassment claim, beginning with [S1's] admonition to [C]omplainant to drop his 2005 complaint, through [S1's] appointment to be [C]omplainant's direct supervisor, and S2 yelling at [C]omplainant for complaining about this reorganized line of authority, Complainant was subjected to a continuing series of actions he considered to be offensive. As discussed above, these actions intensified during the five month period before [C]omplainant sought employment away from the Reno TSA office and S1 communicated to the TSA's worker compensation official that FAA should be warned about [C]omplainant's propensity to file EEO complaints. Throughout the record Complainant alleged that he was subjected to harassment from February 2005 through January 2009, and AJ1 clearly found that the harassment began in February 2005. Further, the record supports the contention that, while the harassment intensified in July 2008, it had begun years earlier. As a result, we find that AJ2 erred when he limited the harassment timeframe to six months from July 2008 through January 2009, and we clarify that the correct timeframe in which the harassment occurred is February 2005 through January 2009. Constructive Discharge Claim Complainant raised a claim of constructive discharge for the first time during the hearing on damages. AJ2 noted that Complainant did not previously request to amend his complaint to include a claim of constructive discharge, even though he had been given many opportunities to do so during the investigation stage and during the liability hearing stage before AJ1. AJ2 ultimately found that Complainant was not forced to transfer, forced to involuntarily resign, or subjected to a constructive discharge. A review of the record finds that Complainant, who was represented by an attorney, failed to raise a constructive discharge claim with the EEO Counselor or in his formal EEO complaint. Additionally, there is no indication that Complainant requested to amend his complaint during the investigation stage or during the liability hearing stage to include a constructive discharge claim. We have previously held that it is not appropriate for a complainant to raise new claims for the first time after a hearing has been conducted, including in claims for compensatory damages. See De Los Santos v. Environmental Protection Agency, EEOC Appeal No. 0120091233 (July 12, 2012) (complainant not entitled to compensation for cash award because neither in complaint nor during hearing did he raise an allegation he was discriminated against when he was denied cash award); Lemons v. Bureau of Prisons, EEOC Appeal No. 0120102516 (Nov. 16, 2011); Hubbard v. Dep't of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 01A40449 (Apr. 22, 2004). Allowing Complainant to raise a claim of constructive discharge during the remedy stage of the hearing process would result in prejudice to the Agency because the claim had not been previously investigated and the Agency did not have an opportunity to question Complainant about it during the hearing on liability. As a result, we dismiss this claim. Remedies Non-Pecuniary Compensatory Damages During the damages portion of the hearing process, Complainant requested an award of $200,000 in non-pecuniary damages. AJ2 limited the period for damages to six months between July 2008 through January 2009, and ultimately awarded Complainant $55,000 for non-pecuniary compensatory damages. In a claim for compensatory damages, a complainant must demonstrate, through appropriate evidence and documentation, the harm suffered as a result of the agency's discriminatory action; the extent, nature, and severity of the harm suffered; and the duration or expected duration of the harm. Rivera v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934156 (July 22, 1994); Notice at 11-12, 14; Carpenter v. Dep't of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995). Objective evidence in support of a claim for non-pecuniary damages claims includes statements from the Complainant and others, including family members, co-workers, and medical professionals. See Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. N915.002 (July 14, 1992) ( Notice); Carle v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993). Non-pecuniary damages must be limited to compensation for the actual harm suffered as a result of the Agency's discriminatory actions. See Carter v. Duncan-Higgans, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Notice at 13. A proper award should take into account the severity of the harm and the length of time that the injured party suffered the harm. See Carpenter, supra. Additionally, the amount of the award should not be "monstrously excessive" standing alone, should not be the product of passion or prejudice, and should be consistent with the amount awarded in similar cases. See Jackson v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01972555 (April 15, 1999) (citing Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F. 2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989)). Finally, we note that in determining non-pecuniary compensatory damages, the Commission has also taken into consideration the nature of the Agency's discriminatory actions. See Utt v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070001 (Mar. 26, 2009); Brown-Fleming v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120082667 (Oct. 28, 2010). After a review of the entire record, we find that substantial evidence in the record supports the conclusion that Complainant is entitled to compensatory damages for emotional distress and other non-pecuniary harm. Additionally, we find that AJ2 erred when he limited the damages to a six-month period because, as we have found above, the timeframe during which the harassment occurred was from February 2005 through January 2009, which is almost four years. Complainant was first diagnosed with depression in 2005. A report from Complainant's psychologist dated March 21, 2006, noted that, as a result of Complainant's workplace conflicts, Complainant tested in the "severe" range of the depression and anxiety scales. She diagnosed him with "acute stress disorder." In July 2008, Complainant began experiencing symptoms of diabetes. His primary care physician excused him from work and stated that Complainant was receiving treatment for "exacerbation of diabetes due to work-related stress." Complainant was prescribed several medications to treat the diabetes. The record reflects that there was a history of diabetes in Complainant's family. At the hearing on damages Complainant admitted into evidence several scientific articles linking severe stress to the onset of diabetes. In September 2008 Complainant was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, which the psychologist attributed to Complainant's hostile work environment. Complainant was prescribed psychotropic drugs such as Ativan, Lorazapan, Effexor and Elavil. Complainant testified that, because of the workplace harassment, he frequently experienced panic or anxiety attacks, and during these attacks was bombarded with shortness of breath, blurry vision, increased heart rate, chest pains, and sweating. Complainant testified to having regular bouts of vomiting and diarrhea. Complainant testified that his anxiety would often result in debilitating headaches, which he continues to experience even in his new position at FAA. Complainant stated that he rapidly gained 50 pounds in 2008 because of all of the stress from the Agency's harassment. Complainant also testified that he suffered from low self-esteem and still lacks the ability to concentrate, which impacts his performance at work and damages his personal relationships. Complainant also stated that he suffered from chronic nightmares at least three to four times a week. Complainant often dreamed that Agency officials were telling lies about him, arresting him, and holding a gun to his head while laughing. The nightmares were so severe that it impacted the sleep of Complainant's wife, who had to move out of the master bedroom in order to sleep. Complainant's nightmares were still ongoing at the time of the hearing on damages. Complainant alleged that the Agency's harassment severely damaged his professional reputation. Complainant stated that he was once highly regarded within the Agency, but that the allegation that Complainant burglarized the facility destroyed his professional reputation. Complainant stated that his coworkers began to shun him. Complainant stated that the Agency's retaliation also caused him to second-guess himself as a worker, and caused him to question his ability to fulfill his role as the primary breadwinner of his family. Complainant testified that his lowest moment was when he was being interrogated in the Reno Police Department as a primary suspect in the burglary of the Agency's facility. Complainant testified that this experience made him realize that not only could the Agency force him out of his job, but it could also tear him away from his family. Complainant stated that the Agency's retaliation caused him to become paranoid, and he even feared that his new coworkers and supervisors would retaliate against him. For example, at his new position at FAA, Complainant stated that he experienced extreme anxiety and flashbacks where he relived the harassment from the Agency, especially when his new coworkers and supervisors made eye contact with him. Complainant stated that the flashbacks occured as frequently as every few days. AJ2 found that the Agency's discriminatory acts were responsible for Complainant's feelings that persisted even during the hearing on damages, such as Complainant being consumed by feelings of paranoia. Complainant's wife testified that she feared that Complainant would commit suicide after he was taken in for questioning at the Reno Police Department. Complainant corroborated this when he testified that he considered suicide on numerous occasions during the time period of the harassment. Complainant's wife stated that during the Agency's harassment Complainant often feared for his life, and believed that if he and his family did not flee Reno they would be in danger because the Agency would not give up until they destroyed him. Complainant testified that his supervisors had run a "campaign of terror" against him. Complainant was described by his wife as having once been an extremely social man who organized neighborhood barbecues, who because of the Agency's retaliation began to withdraw from his friends and isolate himself from his coworkers. Complainant's wife testified that they even stopped going out to eat because his anxiety was so severe that he would have severe digestive problems right after he ate, making it difficult to leave the home. Complainant's wife testified that the Agency's retaliatory actions brought their marriage to the brink of divorce and the strain on their relationship continued at the time of the hearing on damages. She stated that Complainant is a "broken man" and their relationship transformed from a relationship between a wife and husband to a relationship between a therapist and a patient. Complainant's wife stated that she only remains married to Complainant because of their daughter. Complainant's wife stated that Complainant and his daughter once enjoyed a close bond, but that their relationship deteriorated because of Complainant's inability to care for and interact with his daughter due to the physical and emotional suffering from the Agency's harassment. After careful consideration of the evidence of record, we find an award of $125,000 for non-pecuniary compensatory damages is appropriate. This amount takes into consideration the nature of the discriminatory acts, the severity of the physical and emotional harm suffered, and the length of time Complainant suffered the harm, and is consistent with prior Commission precedent. See Davis v. Dep't of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0720060003 (June 18, 2007) ($125,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages awarded where Agency's harassment resulted in complainant suffering from emotional and physical distress, including stress, fear, depression, loss of self esteem, insomnia, headaches, weight fluctuations, and a stress induced jaw disorder); George v. Dep't of Health and Human Services, EEOC Appeal No. 07A30079 (July 21, 2004) ($125,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages awarded where agency's reprisal and sex-based harassment resulted in the worsening of complainant's physical conditions, depression, and anxiety; complainant's testimony supported by testimony of complainant's husband who said that complainant was a different person, was emotionally destroyed, did not want to leave the house, and lost self confidence); Moore v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0720050084 (March 6, 2007) ($120,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages awarded where agency's race and reprisal discrimination resulted in complainant suffering from physical and emotional pain; complainant's psychiatrist testified that complainant was in serious cycle of depression and anxiety as result of agency's conduct). Accordingly, we conclude that an award of $125,000 is appropriate to compensate Complainant for the physical and emotional harm he suffered as a result of the agency's discrimination. Pecuniary Damages Compensatory damages may be awarded for pecuniary losses that are directly or proximately caused by the Agency's discriminatory conduct. See Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 8. Pecuniary losses are out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of the Agency's unlawful action, including job-hunting expenses, moving expenses, medical expenses, psychiatric expenses, physical therapy expenses, and other quantifiable out-of-pocket expenses. Id. Past pecuniary losses are losses incurred prior to the resolution of a complaint through a finding of discrimination, or a voluntary settlement. Id. at 8-9. Future pecuniary losses are losses that are likely to occur after resolution of a complaint. Id. at 9. Complainant requested compensation for services of his primary care physicians in the amount of $815. AJ2 found that more than half of this amount was attributable to services before July 2008, which AJ2 stated was before the commencement of the unlawful harassment. AJ2 ultimately ordered the Agency to pay $467 for charges from Complainant's primary care physicians. Because we have found that the harassment began in 2005, we find that Complainant should be reimbursed for the entire $815. Complainant also claimed an additional $1,870.12 for medical expenses, which the Agency did not oppose. As a result, we find that the Agency shall pay Complainant $2,218.12 in pecuniary compensatory damages. The Agency did not contest Complainant's request for compensation for sick leave, annual leave, and unpaid leave from July 2008 until his resignation in 2009. As a result, we accept AJ2's determination that Complainant should be compensated for this leave. AJ2 also denied Complainant's request for pecuniary damages related to his constructive discharge claim, such as for his job search and relocation expenses, back pay and/or front pay, reinstatement, unforeseen tax consequences, and his spouse's lost economic opportunity. Because we have found that Complainant cannot bring a constructive discharge claim for the first time during the damages phase of the hearing, we affirm AJ2's denial of these damages. Similarly, we deny Complainant's request in his amended appeal brief for compensation for commuting costs and future commuting costs related to his constructive discharge claim. Attorney's Fees and Costs The attorney's fees award is ordinarily determined by multiplying a reasonable number of hours expended on the case by a reasonable hourly rate, also known as a "lodestar." See 29 C.F.R. §1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B); Bernard v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861 (July 17, 1998). In determining the number of hours expended, the Commission recognizes that the attorney "is not required to record in great detail the manner in which each minute of its time was expended." Id. However, the attorney does have the burden of identifying the subject matters on which he spent his time by submitting sufficiently detailed and contemporaneous time records to ensure that the time spent was accurately recorded. Id. Further, a reasonable fee award may be assessed in light of factors such as: (1) the time required (versus time expended) to complete the legal work; (2) novelty or difficulty of the issues; (3) the requisite skill to properly handle the case; (4) the degree to which the attorney is precluded from taking other cases; (5) the relief sought and results obtained; and (6) the nature and length of the attorney-client relationship. See Cerny v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05930899 (Oct. 19, 1994). Complainant is only entitled to an award for time reasonably expended. It does not always follow that the amount of time actually expended is the amount of time reasonably expended. Elvin v. Dep't of Labor, EOC Request No. 01943425 (Aug. 31, 1995). Rather, "billing judgment" is an important component in fee setting, and hours that would not be properly billed to a private client are also not properly billed to the agency pursuant to a successful EEO claim. Id. The attorney for the prevailing party should make a "good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary." See Bernard, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861. To determine the appropriate prevailing market rate for an attorney, the Commission uses the Laffey Matrix. The Laffey Matrix is a schedule of hourly rates for attorneys, paralegals, and law clerks based on experience level. It is based on the hourly rates allowed by the District Court in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984). It is prepared by the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia for use in cases where a statute permits the prevailing party to recover "reasonable" attorneys' fees.2 42 U.S C. § 2000e-5(k). During the four-year litigation, Complainant was represented by eleven attorneys and numerous law clerks and paralegals from a metropolitan D.C. law firm. The firm requested compensation for 1432.6 hours of time spent by attorneys, paralegals, law clerks, and legal assistants, amounting to $314,621 in attorneys' fees. We will first address the hours claimed by Complainant's attorneys. AJ2 found that the issue was not factually or legally complicated and, as a result, the number of hours claimed was not reasonable. AJ2 found that this was a "garden variety discrimination case" and focused on the fact that Complainant only had to establish that he was subjected to discrimination "for about six to seven months." AJ2 noted that the greatest number of hours claimed was 341.5 hours by a specific attorney, which, AJ2 stated, "In my experience, the 341.5 hours claimed ... is excessive for the litigation of this straightforward individual discrimination case, even if [this attorney's] services constituted the total attorney hours claimed." AJ2 found that Complainant's counsel improperly "bundled" multiple activities into single time entries. For example, attorneys claimed 4.8 hours on May 29, 2009, for "Legal services: draft/revise Client's discovery responses; Review client documents to provide to Agency; Forward discovery responses to BW for review." AJ2 stated that, instead, each activity should have been listed separately. AJ2 also found that there was excessive and overlapping time billed. AJ2 found that there were numerous examples of two attorneys doing much of the same work on the same days. The AJ awarded none of the hours of the senior attorneys who worked on the case concluding that "it was not reasonable to have more than one moderately experienced attorney working on the case at any one time." AJ2 ultimately reduced the attorneys' total hours by 75 percent and awarded Complainant $95,186.78 for attorneys' fees and paralegal fees. With regard to the hourly rate, the AJ found that, while it was reasonable for Complainant to seek counsel outside of Reno, Nevada, he should have sought counsel in Sacramento or San Francisco instead of a firm in Washington, D.C., because it would have cut down on travel time and costs. Additionally, because one of the attorneys and one law clerk who did a large portion of the work were located in Denver, Colorado, the AJ found that the attorney compensation rate for all attorneys should be $250 per hour instead of the $290 per hour rate for D.C., and that the law clerk rate for all law clerks should be $125 per hour instead of the $145 per hour rate for D.C. After a review of the record, we find that AJ2 abused his discretion by reducing the attorneys' hours by 75 percent. Specifically, we find that AJ2 erred when he found that Complainant's attorneys were unreasonable when they spent so much time on various discovery activities such as the filing of multiple motions to compel and for sanctions. We note that AJ1 believed these motions had merit, as she granted Complainant's motion for sanctions against the Agency for its actions during the discovery phase, which AJ2 ultimately overruled in his damages decision. As a result, we do not find that the time spent on these activities can be considered unreasonable. Further, we do not find it unreasonable that a large number of attorneys, law clerks, and other support staff worked on preparing this case for litigation and for the damages hearing, as the record establishes that, throughout the four year litigation, staff at the firm changed and some of the attorneys who worked on the case were replaced by other attorneys, leading to an overall large number of attorneys who each worked on the case at some point in time. We note that this was not as easy case, as AJ2 determined. The record establishes that this case was made complex by the allegations of harassment involving reprisal, and that it was made more complex by the many motions filed by both parties, and the thousands of often unorganized documents gathered during discovery. We also find that AJ2 erred when he heavily relied on his finding that this was an "easy case" because the liability period was "only six to seven months," which we have found above was not correct; the liability period was instead almost four years. AJ2 did not take into consideration the fact that there were a large number of hours in this case because, in part, Complainant's counsel had to essentially prepare for the liability hearing twice. Specifically, AJ1 canceled the liability hearing two weeks before the hearing was set to take place, and it was not rescheduled until four months later, requiring Complainant's counsel to have to prepare for the hearing twice. Additionally, because the case was bifurcated into a liability phase and a damages phase, Complainant's counsel had to prepare for both the liability hearing and the damages hearing. It is reasonable that three preparations for hearings would result in a large number of hours expended by counsel. We also find that AJ2 erred when he found that time spent on drafting briefs such as opening statements at both hearings was unreasonable because opening statements were not required by either AJ. We note that the opening statements were referenced in the AJs' decisions and we reviewed them on appeal; these statements were useful and served a purpose. AJ2 found that it was unreasonable that Complainant had two attorneys at the deposition and two attorneys at the hearing. The Commission has held generally that where two attorneys perform the same service, such services will be considered duplicative, and only one attorney will be entitled to compensation, unless a showing is made that the case was unusually difficult or complex. Hodge v. Dep't of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 05920057 (Apr. 23, 1992). In Hodge, the Commission found that an Associate Attorney's presence at a hearing along with a Senior Attorney was not needed, and thus was not reasonable. Id. The Commission has followed this precedent and has not allowed attorney fee's where a second attorney's presence at a hearing is not shown to be reasonable. Jimenez v. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120083765 (June 12, 2012); Bynum v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01A33384 (May 26, 2004). We find that it was reasonable for Complainant to have two attorneys present at the depositions because both attorneys were very involved in preparing for the discovery and litigation and both focused their time and attention on different witnesses. Therefore, it was reasonable that both attorneys were needed in order to conduct thorough depositions of the witnesses. However, we agree with AJ2 that it was not reasonable for the senior-level partner to collect fees for his participation in the liability and damages hearings. The record establishes that two attorneys represented Complainant at the hearing; a mid-level experienced attorney who had worked on the case from almost the beginning, and a senior-level partner from the firm who performed very minimal work on the case prior to the hearing. In the Complainant's appellate brief, Complainant stated that the senior-level partner was "only consulted when his expertise was absolutely necessary" prior to the hearing. We note that of the senior-level partner's total 86.9 billed hours, 68.2 of those hours were spent traveling to the liability and damages hearings and for his presence at the hearings. In contrast, the mid-level attorney at the hearing had worked on the litigation for years and was very familiar with the facts of the case and the witnesses, and reasonably could have conducted the hearing without the assistance of the senior-level partner. Therefore, in following our precedent, we will reduce the senior-level partner's reasonable hours by 68.2 hours, which is the time attributed to the hearings, resulting in reimbursable hours of 18.7 hours for the minimal amount of work he otherwise performed for this case. We note that a law clerk was also present at the hearing, and this law clerk also assisted in preparation of the litigation. Therefore, fee reimbursement for the law clerk is reasonable. We agree with AJ2 that there are instances of duplication of time billed by numerous attorneys, law clerks, and paralegals for the same work throughout the time of the litigation. See e.g., Hodge v. Dep't of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 05920057 (Apr. 23, 1992) (Commission found that supervisory review of associate's services by partner in law firm is duplicative and not compensable). Additionally, Complainant should not receive attorneys' fees for time spent on work related to his unsuccessful national origin claim. Similarly, Complainant should not receive compensation for work performed on his constructive discharge claim or for requests for damages related to this claim, such as damages for his job search and relocation expenses, back pay, front pay, reinstatement, lost economic opportunity, unforeseen tax consequences, and his spouse's lost economic opportunity. We find that, while some of the time spent on this work is distinct, in some instances the hours spent on this work is intertwined with work the attorneys, law clerks, and paralegals conducted that is compensable. As a result, we find that a 20 percent reduction of the total hours each individual worked is appropriate. See Moresi v. Dep't of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0720090049 (March 29, 2010) (across-the-board 20 percent reduction in attorney's fees reasonable); Hyde v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120073964 (Nov. 24, 2009) (a 10percent across-the-board reduction appropriate when number of billing entries not sufficiently detailed); Blinick v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, EEOC Appeal No. 07A20079 (Feb. 3, 2004) (20 percent reduction of attorney's fees appropriate when complainant only successful on part of her complaint). We will next address the hourly fee requested by Complainant's attorneys. We find that AJ2 erred when he found that, because one attorney and one law clerk were located in Denver, the Denver hourly rate should be applied to everyone else, who worked in the Washington, D.C. area. We find that the Denver hourly rate should be applied only to those who worked in Denver, and the D.C. hourly rate should be applied to those who worked in D.C. The below chart breaks down the fees that are owed to Complainant: Fees for attorneys who worked on the case and who charged for their services:3 Attorney Number of Years Experience Total Hours Minus 20% Hourly Rate Total Fee To Be Paid To Complainant AW 11-19 1.3 1.04 $445.00 $462.80 BW 1-3 6 4.8 $225.00 $1,080.00 4-7 335.5 268.4 $250.00 $67,100.00 DS 1-3 4 3.2 $245.00 $784.00 4-7 15.9 12.72 $290.00 $3,688.80 EL 11-19 .5 .4 $445.00 $178.00 GMG 20+ 18.7 14.96 $505.00 $7,554.80 HD 1-3 .4 .32 $245.00 $78.40 JR 1-3 .14 .1 $245.00 $24.50 LH 4-7 .5 .4 $290.00 $116.00 8-10 .2 .16 $355.00 $56.80 NS 1-3 93 74.4 $245.00 $18,228.00 RHH 1-3 133 106.4 $245.00 $26,068.00 SH 4-7 2.5 2 $290.00 $580.00 TOTAL: $126,000.10 Fees for law clerks who worked on the case and who charged for their services: Law Clerk Total Hours Minus 20% Hourly Rate Total Fee to Be Paid To Complainant ACW 8.1 6.48 $145.00 $939.60 AE 8.2 6.56 $145.00 $951.20 BMP 225.5 180.4 $125.00 $22,550.00 HF 136.5 109.2 $145.00 $15,834.00 NHS .1 .1 $145.00 $14.50 NS 3.3 2.64 $145.00 $382.80 RHH 242.6 194.08 $145.00 $28,141.60 RL 1.5 1.2 $145.00 $174.00 ZW .9 .72 $145.00 $104.40 TOTAL: $69,092.10 Fees for paralegals who worked on the case and who charged for their services: Paralegal Total Hours Minus 20% Hourly Rate Total Fee To Be Paid to Complainant AAA 2.6 2.08 $145.00 $301.60 AB 4.2 3.36 $145.00 $487.20 AOA 4.7 3.76 $145.00 $545.20 CM 7.2 5.76 $145.00 $835.20 CS 21.4 17.12 $145.00 $2,482.40 DB .2 .16 $145.00 $23.20 GH 3 2.4 $145.00 $348.00 HD .4 .32 $145.00 $46.40 JH 17 13.6 $145.00 $1,972.00 KB .6 .48 $145.00 $69.60 KZ 46.5 37.2 $145.00 $5,394.00 LB 17.6 14.08 $145.00 $2,041.60 RAM .1 .1 $145.00 $14.50 RH .7 .56 $145.00 $81.20 SAB (Legal Assistant) 1.1 .88 $116.00 $102.08 TOTAL: $14,744.18 The total fees the Agency shall compensate Complainant for are $209,836.38. Costs A prevailing complainant is entitled to recovery of his costs in prosecuting the claims on which he prevailed. These include copying, postage, travel expenses, and so forth. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501 (e)(2)(ii)(C). Reasonable costs incurred directly by the prevailing complainant are compensable. Costs must be proved in the same manner as fees, and the complainant must provide documentation, such as bills or receipts. See EEO MD-110, Chapter 11, Section VI (E) (August 5. 2015). Complainant requested $19,940.60 for litigation expenses. AJ2 ultimately reduced the costs by 75 percent and awarded Complainant $1,391.30. We agree with AJ2's denial of $952 for services of a certified public accountant whose expert testimony was not admitted at the damages hearing because his testimony would have gone to Complainant's constructive discharge claim of back pay, front pay, and lost economic opportunity remedies. We also agree with AJ2 that at times Complainant's attorneys did not clearly allocate the litigation expenses to specific individuals who incurred the expenses, making it difficult to determine the costs incurred by each attorney, paralegal, or law clerk. However, we find that AJ2's reduction of all litigation costs by 75 percent was excessive, and was reflective of his erroneous belief that Complainant should have chosen counsel in San Francisco or Sacramento in order to cut down on travel costs. We find that it is more appropriate to reduce the award by 25 percent across the board. As a result, the Agency will pay Complainant $14,241.45 for litigation costs. Complainant requested reimbursement for transcripts for the depositions of himself and five other witnesses. AJ2 found that it was not appropriate to compensate Complainant for two copies of the transcripts, as ordinarily complainants are only compensated for one copy of the transcript, and Complainant had not demonstrated why extra copies were needed. Additionally, there was a cancellation fee for a video deposition in the amount of $330, which AJ2 found was not the responsibility of the Agency to pay. We agree with AJ2 and find that the Agency is responsible for compensating Complainant $2,859.50 for transcripts. AJ2 also denied Complainant's request for $3,085.83 for faxing/copying. Complainant indicated that the cost is $.15 per page, which AJ2 noted comes to 20,572 pages of copying and/or faxing in this case. While AJ2 found this number to be extraordinary, we do not agree. The record before us on appeal is thousands of pages long, and it is not beyond the realm of reason that there would be many more pages faxed or copied during the course of a four year long litigation. As a result, we find that the Agency will pay Complainant for $3,085.83 for faxing/copying. Complainant requested $1,705.38 for "Fed Ex/ UPS." We agree with AJ2 that there is nothing in the record that would explain what these charges were for or how they were related to the litigation. We also agree with AJ2 that Complainant should not be compensated for office supplies, fees associated with online legal research search engines, or for "miscellaneous" costs as these are either too vague or go to costs associated with the firm overhead. As a result, we find that the Agency will compensate Complainant a total of $20,186.78 for costs. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we REVERSE the Agency's final decision and ORDER the Agency to comply with the Order below. ORDER The Agency is hereby ORDERED to take the following remedial actions: 1. Within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall pay Complainant $125,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. 2. Within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall pay Complainant $2,218.12 in pecuniary compensatory damages. 3. Within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall pay Complainant $209,836.38 in attorneys' fees. The Agency will also calculate and award any additional attorney's fees and costs that were incurred during the instant appeal. Complainant will cooperate with the Agency in providing it with information and documentation necessary for calculating any additional attorney's fees and costs, as described in the section below titled "Attorney's Fees." 4. Within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall pay Complainant $20,186.78 in costs. 5. Within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency will calculate the monetary and/or retirement value of Complainant's sick, annual, and unpaid leave from when he left the workplace in July 2008 until his resignation in January 2009. The Agency will pay to Complainant the equivalent monetary value of the leave in question. Additionally, the Agency will correct Complainant's relevant personnel/retirement records. 6. Within one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall provide at least 16 hours of in-person training to the responsible management official(s) regarding his responsibilities with respect to Title VII with special emphasis on retaliation, preventing and responding to harassment, and their responsibilities under the federal sector EEO process. 7. The Agency shall consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against the responsible management officials and coworkers involved in the harassment of the Petitioner. The Commission does not consider training to be disciplinary action. The Agency shall report its decision to the compliance officer. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If any of the responsible management officials have left the Agency's employ, the agency shall furnish documentation of their departure date(s). 8. The Agency shall post the attached notice of discrimination, as described below. The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the Agency's calculation of leave and any other benefits due Complainant, including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. POSTING ORDER (G0914) The Agency is ordered to post at its Reno International Airport facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0610) If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0815) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations 10-20-2015 __________________ Date 1 We note that Nassar, supra, was issued one year after AJ1's liability decision. 2 The Laffey Matrix for 2003 - 2012 can be found at: http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/civil_Laffey_Matrix_2003-2012.pdf. 3 We note that there were many instances where staff worked on the case but did not charge for their services. 4 We note that total hours that are less than 0.1 hours after the 20 percent reduction will be rounded up to 0.1 hours. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 07-2013-0035 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 2 0720130035