Shaping Employment Discrimination Law
The Commission's most significant early interpretations
concerned the basic definition of discrimination, not provided in
the statutory language of Title VII. Other key legal issues
addressed by the Commission included pronouncements on how to prove
discrimination; what remedies were available under the law; and how
to reconcile the seniority rights of current "innocent" employees
with the rights of victims who, but for an employer's
discrimination, would have greater seniority. Some of EEOC's
contributions to the development of the law are discussed
below.
Religious Discrimination and National Origin
Discrimination
From its earliest days, employment discrimination law developed
through EEOC's decisions, policy guidances, and amicus briefs.
While the majority of EEOC's decisions during the 1960s involved
race discrimination, the general principles in the decisions
applied with equal force to all of the bases covered by Title VII.
Nevertheless, some early Commission policy issuances focused
exclusively on particular bases, such as religion or national
origin, attempting to establish the legal parameters for Title
VII's interpretation. For example, EEOC issued Guidelines on
Religious Discrimination in 1966 which required employers to make
reasonable accommodation for the religious practices of employees
and job applicants where such accommodation could be made without
an undue hardship on the business. The Guidelines placed the burden
of proving undue hardship on the employer.
In 1970, EEOC issued Guidelines on National Origin
Discrimination. There the Commission stated that Title VII's
protection extended beyond obvious, identifiable national origin
characteristics to characteristics that have a disparate impact on
national origin minorities, such as language requirements and
height and weight standards, and to stereotypical characteristics
such as a foreign sounding surname. Relatively few national origin
charges were filed in the early years, but the Commission took
pains to insure that the message was sent that all aspects of Title
VII would be vigorously enforced.
The Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination
The majority of charges filed during EEOC's early years of
operation involved claims of race discrimination against black
workers and applicants in hiring and promotion, in selection and
testing practices, and by the maintenance of segregated seniority
lines by employers. In reviewing these charges, the Commission
declared that discrimination did not merely take place through
intentional acts of overt discrimination against individuals the
generally accepted "disparate treatment" definition of
discrimination. Rather, the Commission held that discrimination
also occurred when neutral policies or practices had a
disproportionate, adverse impact on any protected class, usually
minorities or women. Consequently, EEOC focused early on broad
employment systems that operated as barriers to equal employment
opportunities. The Commission utilized statistics to demonstrate
the disparate impact of facially neutral hiring and employment
systems.
In 1966, EEOC issued Guidelines on Employment Testing
Procedures. This was the first public articulation of the principle
that Title VII prohibited neutral policies and practices that
adversely affected members of protected groups and could not be
justified by business necessity. Revisions to the Guidelines in
1970 further defined the types of proof necessary to validate any
screening test under Title VII to assure that systems and tests
accurately predict job performance or relate to actual skills
required by the jobs.
The disparate impact theory of discrimination reflected in
Commission decisions and in amicus briefs was adopted by some lower
courts. For example, an early Commission decision concluded that a
sixth grade education requirement for a labor position was
discriminatory because it had a disproportionate impact on black
workers and was not shown to be necessary to do the job.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court adopted the Commission's position in
the landmark decision, Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. (1971), in which EEOC submitted an amicus brief. In that
case, the Court invalidated an employer's requirement that
applicants have a high school diploma and/or pass aptitude tests
for hire and transfer into more desirable departments where prior
to the enactment of Title VII the company had restricted blacks to
labor positions. Specifically, the Court stated:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination, but
also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in
operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude [blacks] cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited . . .
Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.
This basic definition of discrimination, further elaborated in
later court decisions, paved the way for EEOC to challenge many
seemingly neutral employment practices that operated to restrict
the advancement of minorities and women.
Sex Discrimination
| Charges Filed in Fiscal Year
1966 |
| Race |
3,254 |
53.1% |
| Religion |
87 |
1.4% |
| Sex |
2,053 |
33.5% |
| National Origin |
131 |
2.1% |
| Not Specified |
608 |
9.9% |
EEOC had expected to receive very few charges of sex discrimination
in its early years. It had assumed that the vast majority of
charges would allege race discrimination because Title VII had been
debated and passed in a racially-tense environment and most of the
Congressional and media attention had focused on the problem of
race discrimination. It was a surprise to find that fully one third
of the charges (33.5 percent) filed in the first year alleged sex
discrimination. After all, the prohibition against sex
discrimination had been added as a last minute amendment by
Congressman Howard Smith of Virginia who opposed the civil rights
legislation and thought that Congress would reject a bill that
mandated equal rights for women.
Indeed, most supporters of Title VII initially opposed the Smith
amendment because they, too, thought that it would doom the
legislation. The amendment stayed in because female members of
Congress argued that there was a need to protect equal job
opportunities for women. Congresswoman Katherine St. George of New
York argued that she could think of "nothing more logical than this
amendment" and that while women did not need any special privileges
"because we outlast you, we outlive you, . . . we are entitled to
this little crumb of equality." The need for this "little crumb of
equality" was dramatically illustrated by the unexpectedly large
number of sex discrimination charges filed in that first year.
To address the unexpectedly large number of sex discrimination
charges that it received, the Commission developed early policy
guidance shaping a new law of sex discrimination. The agency first
issued Guidelines on Sex Discrimination in l965, which were further
expanded in l966, 1968, and 1972. Through its Guidelines,
Commission decisions and amicus briefs, EEOC authored many sex
discrimination precedents. For example, EEOC took on the matter of
statutory construction. EEOC declared that the Title VII provision
permitting sex discrimination if gender was a so-called bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the job should be narrowly
construed. The Commission's Guidelines stated that a BFOQ could not
be established on the basis of assumptions or stereotyped views of
the sexes; nor could it be based on preferences of clients,
customers or co-workers. EEOC also stated through the Guidelines
that it was a violation of Title VII to classify jobs as male or
female, or light or heavy, or to maintain separate seniority lists.
In addition, EEOC made clear that it was illegal sex discrimination
to refuse to hire or promote women because they were married or had
children, unless men were similarly treated. As with the disparate
impact theory, the Supreme Court endorsed this last interpretation,
among others, when it held in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp. (1971) that employers could not have hiring
policies for women with young children that were different from
those for men with children of a similar age.
When revised in 1968, EEOC's Guidelines on Sex Discrimination
further declared that so called state-protective laws were
unenforceable because they were discriminatory, and hence preempted
by federal law. EEOC found that these early 20th century laws which
purported to help women by providing special benefits such as extra
work breaks, shorter work hours, and early retirement actually
operated to discriminate against and exclude women from jobs.
Adopting the Commission's position, federal courts of appeal in
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company (1969) and
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific (1971), ruled that employers could
not rely on state laws limiting women to jobs that did not require
lifting over 25 to 30 pounds. These cases helped to open up many
better paid, formerly all-male, blue collar and similar type jobs
to women, and to bring these paternalistic, anachronistic practices
to an end.
Next: Early
Enforcement Efforts
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