Tammy S., Complainant, v. Chuck Hagel, Secretary, Department of Defense (Defense Intelligence Agency), Agency. Appeal No. 0120084008 Hearing No. 420-2007-00107X Agency No. DIA-00006-2006 (formerly 06-DI-03) DECISION On April 27, 2009, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's March 20, 2009, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission REVERSES the Agency's final decision. ISSUES PRESENTED The issues presented are: 1) whether the Agency properly found that Complainant had not established that she was subjected to unlawful harassment based on her sex and in retaliation for protected EEO activity; 2) whether liability can be imputed to the Agency for actions taken by an employee in connection with his private website; 3) whether the Agency's EEO Office and Office of General Counsel acted improperly in the course of processing Complainant's complaint, warranting a sanction. BACKGROUND Complainant served as a collateral-duty EEO Counselor at the Agency's Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, from 1995 through January 1999. Her full-time position was that of an Intelligence Officer. She first engaged in protected EEO activity on her own behalf in 1996, when she filed an informal complaint regarding the denial of a promotion in retaliation for her work as a collateral-duty EEO Counselor. That EEO complaint was settled at the informal stage. (Report of Investigation (ROI), Exhibit F-6). In January 1999, Complainant was promoted to the position of EEO Specialist, GS-13. She was the first person to serve in that role in a full-time capacity at the facility. In her role as the EEO Specialist, Complainant implemented policies set by Agency headquarters personnel regarding equal opportunity in the workplace. She instituted a recruitment program, in conjunction with the Special Emphasis Program members, which broadened the Agency's recruitment efforts beyond the universities from which it traditionally drew (which graduated predominantly White engineering students). Now included in recruitment efforts were historically Black colleges and universities and other schools in the region with a greater Hispanic, Asian, or American Indian student membership. (ROI, Ex. A). This worked to increase diversity at the facility. In November 2000, Complainant met with the Director of the facility to voice her opinion about an intranet site on the Agency's computer network, run by another Agency employee (GW). Complainant wanted to draw the Director's attention to a specific article entitled, "Trail of Beers," which was a play on the "Trail of Tears," an annual event held in the region each November to commemorate the history of Native Americans. GW's parody involved the participants drinking alcohol and stopping at numerous bars, and used off-color language to describe the activities. Complainant informed the Director that the article would likely be offensive to many at the facility. The Director reportedly spoke to GW about it, and informed him that he would not be able to publish his site on the Agency intranet anymore. (ROI, Ex. A). Also in November 2000, Complainant informed Agency management that in order to be a more inclusive workplace and not be seen as endorsing one particular religion, the Christmas Social should be renamed the Holiday Social, in compliance with the Guidelines on Religion in the Federal Workplace and Agency policy. (ROI, Ex. A). Complainant claims that as a result of her objections to the "Trail of Beers" and the issue regarding the Christmas Social, GW began to engage in a campaign of retaliation against her for this protected EEO activity. He challenged employees, through his intranet site, to wish each other "Merry Christmas" at the office to see what the "EEO Gestapo" would do about it. (ROI, Ex. A). Complainant noted that the workplace was predominantly Christian, and many employees asked her why they were not allowed to say "Merry Christmas" anymore. In December 2000, GW published a cartoon on his intranet site entitled the "Lord of the Lasers." He also e-mailed it to the entire facility. In this multi-picture, hand-drawn cartoon story, two superheroes (named Lord of the Laser and Photon Boy) are depicted trying to defeat "Dr. Mirrors." When they find Dr. Mirrors, they discover that it is "the sadly misguided mayor of Beltway City, the honorable Ms. Edna Ethel O'Doofus" also called "Ms. E.E.O'Doofus." In the cartoon, the main characters are shown shooting a woman's figure with laser guns, saying "Maintain 6 to 9 position," and answering "No problem, it is my favorite." (ROI, Ex. F-10). Complainant maintained that the cartoon was violent, sexually explicit, implied that she would have oral sex with GW, and showed her being killed by "phallic-shaped" laser guns. (ROI, Ex. A). She noted that the stated lesson of the cartoon at its end was that "Ms. E.E.O'Doofus would inconvenience the majority to protect the minority." Complainant stated that she had been informed by the Director that GW "resents the EEO system." (ROI, Ex. A). In March 2001, Complainant filed an EEO complaint which claimed that she had been subjected to sexual and religious harassment and retaliation, and subjected to a hostile work environment with respect to the above-described events. In June 2001, GW was issued a 12-day suspension for misuse of government equipment, failure to comply with a supervisory directive, and for creating a hostile environment. (ROI, Ex. F-9). According to Complainant, other Agency personnel showed their support for GW by taking up a monetary collection to reimburse him for lost pay and send his family to the beach during the suspension, and by erecting welcome back signs outside the facility gates when his suspension was over. (ROI, Ex. A). On March 6, 2002, Complainant and the Agency signed a settlement agreement in which she agreed to withdraw her complaint, and the Agency agreed to allow her to take a sabbatical so that she could return to school and earn her Master's degree. She was absent from the workplace from May 2002 through May 2003. (Ex. F-10, p. 321). Upon her return to the workplace in 2003, Complainant assumed a position as an Intelligence Analyst, GS-13. She did not resume any of her duties as an EEO Specialist or as a collateral-duty EEO Counselor. In September 2005, EEO training was conducted at the facility. The EEO course was part of an Agency program called "Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity in the 21st Century (DEO-21)," and the focus of this particular three-day class was "Prevention of Sexual and Religious Harassment in the Workplace." (ROI, Ex. F-11). GW was an attendee of the course at this time, although Complainant was not. The trainer invited each of the participants to introduce themselves and share something personal with the class. When given this opportunity, GW informed the class that he was the webmaster of his own website, external to the Agency, and he shared the website address with the class and encouraged them to view it. Co-workers who had been in the class informed Complainant about this announcement, and she viewed the website. This website contained the same images and writings for which GW was disciplined in 2001. In October 2005, Complainant contacted the Director to inform him of the public re-publication of the Lord of the Laser cartoon, and to advise him of sexual harassment and retaliation by GW. On October 24, 2005, the Director spoke to GW about the website, and GW then password-protected the site so that it was no longer publicly available. On a subsequent unspecified date, the Agency blocked access to GW's website from all facility computers so that it could not be viewed in the workplace. The Agency conducted a management inquiry into the allegations, which did not resolve the issue. The management inquiry was completed on November 28, 2005. Complainant initiated EEO counseling on December 1, 2005. She was issued her Notice of Final Interview on February 28, 2006. The management inquiry report also served as the EEO Counselor's report. On March 14, 2006, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of sex (female), religion (Christian), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity arising under Title VII (serving as an EEO Specialist and the filing of her complaint in March 2001) when: 1. she was subjected to harassment (sexual) when she learned in October 2005 that a co-worker, GW, published offensive material on his personal website which she believed contained explicit drawings and language of a sexual nature directed at her; 2. she was subjected to harassment (sexual) when in December 2000, a co-worker, GW, published offensive material on the classified MSIC network which she believed contained explicit drawings and language of a sexual nature directed at her; 3. she was subjected to harassment on the basis of religion when in November 2000, a co-worker, GW, took exception to her advising management that a poster advertising MSIC's "Christmas" social should be changed to read MSIC's "holiday" social, and challenged MSIC employees to say "Merry Christmas" and see what the "EEO Gestapo," referring to Complainant, could do about it; and 4. on February 8, 2006, Complainant notified the Equal Opportunity Office (EO) of her dissatisfaction with the processing of her EEO complaint, and alleged that she was not provided informal (pre-complaint) counseling regarding her allegation identified as claim 1 above, objecting to the substitution of the management inquiry for EEO counseling, to not having representation by counsel during the inquiry, and to the fact that she was not permitted to present any witnesses. The Agency issued a letter on May 15, 2006, in which it partially dismissed three of the issues of Complainant's complaint. It accepted for investigation Complainant's claim 1, as listed above. The Agency dismissed claims 2 and 3 under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1), as the same claim as claims previously raised in the EEO process. The Agency found that claims 2 and 3 were the same claims as those raised in Complainant's March 2001 EEO complaint, which was resolved by the settlement agreement signed on March 6, 2002. The Agency further found that claims 2 and 3 did not constitute a continuing violation, noting that Complainant had not raised other claims of discrimination or harassment which could have occurred between December 2000 and October 2005. The Agency dismissed claim 4 under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(8), as a claim alleging dissatisfaction with processing of a complaint. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Once the parties engaged in discovery, the Agency submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 17, 2007. Complainant submitted her Opposition Brief in Support of Response to the Agency's Motion for Summary Judgment on September 10, 2007. The Agency submitted a reply to the Complainant's opposition on September 17, 2007. During the hearing process, Complainant also raised a claim that she had been denied a reasonable amount of official time to process her complaint. The parties exchanged briefs on the matter. Motions to Compel regarding discovery requests were also filed. In a teleconference on December 12, 2007, the AJ indicated his intent to issue a decision without a hearing in favor of the Agency. Before the AJ issued his decision however, Complainant withdrew her hearing request on April 30, 2008, and requested a final agency decision on the record. Although the AJ issued his Order dismissing the hearing request on May 6, 2008, remanding the complaint to the Agency to issue a final agency decision, the Agency did not do so within the 60 days provided for at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). Complainant sent a request to the Commission on September 24, 2008, in which she asked the Commission to enforce its regulations order the Agency to issue a decision. She argued at that time that the Agency had acted in bad faith in the processing of her complaint, and asked the Commission to sanction the Agency.1 The Agency did not issue its final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b) until March 20, 2009, nearly 11 months after Complainant requested a decision on the record. In its final decision, the Agency concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. Therein, the Agency first affirmed the partial dismissal of Complainant's claims 2, 3, and 4. Specific to claim 4, the Agency noted that the investigator for the management inquiry did interview three of her witnesses, that she received a timely notice of her rights and responsibilities in the EEO process, and that she had not shown how she was aggrieved by the failure to have counsel represent her at that stage. The Agency found that Complainant had not established that she had been subjected to sexual harassment for which the Agency should be liable. It found that Complainant belonged to a protected class. However, it found that Complainant had not established that she had been subjected to unwelcome conduct based on her membership in the protected class. The Agency analyzed the content of GW's website and of the "Lord of the Laser" cartoon, finding that "the context of the cartoon seems to be a broad attack on the adverse impact of the equal employment opportunity program on the workplace, as the author perceives it." It noted that GW denied that the cartoon depicted Complainant, and that he stated that the drawings were not intended to be sexual in nature. After noting that Complainant's allegations that the references to the numbers six and nine, and that the shape of the laser guns was phallic-like, were support for her assertion that the cartoon was sexual in nature, the decision concluded that the "cartoon does not contain an overt depiction of sexual activity." It disputed Complainant's contention that references in the cartoon were connected to her role regarding the Christmas Social issue in December 2000. The Agency also concluded that Complainant had not shown that the harassing conduct was connected to her gender because the cartoon had been published five years before, and primarily focused on GW's opinions about EEO in the workplace. It stated, "The sexual angle is not overt and the Complainant was not mentioned by name." As to whether the content of the website unreasonably interfered with Complainant's work performance, it found that the materials appeared on a private website, not part of the work environment, and the only connection to the workplace in 2005 was GW mentioning it during an EEO class where Complainant was not present. It further stated, "A reasonable person would not necessarily find a cartoon on a private Internet site to be inherently offensive to her workplace, particularly given the site's disclaimers and the lack of connection to the office." Finally, the Agency found that Complainant had not established a basis for imputing liability to the Agency because it had taken "immediate and appropriate corrective action upon learning of the re-publication of the cartoon." It noted that GW is a co-worker of Complainant's, and so the Agency had a less strict standard to meet than if GW had been a manager. It found that the Director interviewed employees from the EEO class and counseled GW, who removed the cartoon from public view (password-protected his site). The Agency then, it asserted, promptly blocked access to GW's website from all MSIC computers. As to Complainant's claim of a hostile work environment based on her prior protected EEO activity, the Agency summarily concluded that, based on its finding that Complainant had not been subjected to sexual harassment, she had also failed to establish a claim of harassment based on reprisal. The Agency concluded that Complainant had not established that she had been discriminated against. Complainant's instant appeal followed. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL In her brief in support of her appeal (Complainant's Brief), filed on May 22, 2009, Complainant contends that the Agency's final agency decision should be reversed and a finding of discrimination entered in her favor. She argues that GW discussed his website in an EEO class so that employees would go back to their desks and pull up the content while at work, and then discuss it. She contends that the Agency misrepresented the immediacy of its actions to stop the harassment by GW in 2005, and that it took two months for the Agency to block access to GW's website from MSIC computers. Complainant argues that the cartoon was originally published on Agency computers, which would make it Agency property that should have been destroyed in 2002, and not allowed to be re-published on GW's internet site. She also notes that the Agency failed to discuss another aspect of GW's actions that she claimed constituted reprisal, a "Chinese parable" on the site that she claimed was a thinly veiled reference to her and her husband, a former MSIC employee who had progressively lost his vision. In the parable, it is said that it is not such a tragedy for the man to be losing his sight, given what he has to look at each day when he wakes up. In support of her claim that she was still being subjected to retaliation, Complainant argues that she was not able to do a rotational assignment in September 2006 because the employees in the receiving office did not want to interact with her; that a box of sexual harassment brochures addressed to her, but which had the word "Dufus" written across it in black marker, was delivered to her office in May 2006; and that she has been given lower appraisals and no awards for her performance. Complainant argues that the Agency improperly dismissed claims 2, 3, and 4 of her complaint. Complainant maintains that GW's cartoon clearly references her, is violent and sexual in nature, and demonstrates GW's hostility to her and to the EEO program in general. On July 6, 2009, the Agency submitted a brief in opposition to Complainant's appeal (Agency's Brief) in which it argues that its final agency decision should be affirmed. The Agency maintains that Complainant cannot establish that she was subjected to sexual harassment because of her sex and in reprisal for her EEO activity, because she cannot show that the actions were motivated by her sex, and because those actions were not severe or pervasive and did not affect a condition or privilege of her employment. It argues that Complainant cannot establish that the behavior complained of was unwelcome because Complainant voluntarily went to GW's public Internet website to view the materials on it when she heard that he had broadcast news about his website in the EEO class. It also maintains that Complainant was not subjected to reprisal because she did not identify any adverse treatment that was based on a retaliatory motive that was reasonably likely to deter her or others from engaging in protected EEO activity. The Agency's position is that Complainant must prove that she was subjected to sexual harassment, in order to prove that she was subjected to a larger pattern of harassment based on her sex and in reprisal for her EEO activity. The Agency disputes that the harassment was motivated by Complainant's sex, noting that she argued throughout her appeal brief that most of GW's behavior was motivated by his dislike of the EEO system. It also disputes Complainant's contention that the Agency was responsible for allowing GW to republish his writings on his own personal Internet site, and disputes that such action would constitute reprisal by the Agency, as it is insufficient to establish discriminatory animus by any of the Agency managers involved. The Agency disputes many of the assertions made by Complainant as factual in her brief, and disputes the notion that the Agency "owned" the cartoon drawn by GW because it had originally been published on the Agency intranet. It argues that Complainant did not amend her EEO complaint to include the denied job rotation in September 2006, and that it should not be considered within the context of the instant complaint. The Agency further argues that GW's cartoon is not sexual in nature. Finally, the Agency argues that it properly dismissed Complainant's claims 2, 3, and 4 when it accepted Complainant's complaint for investigation. On May 22, 2009, Complainant filed a Motion to Sanction, in which she argues that the Agency should be sanctioned for its conduct in the processing of her complaint. Complainant claims that the Agency purposefully delayed the processing of her complaint, and blatantly disregarded the timeframes contained in 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, most egregiously taking 11 months to issue the final agency decision from the date she requested it. She argues that the Agency did not properly conduct the informal EEO counseling stage, during which she would have been able to offer evidence, identify witnesses, and have legal representation. She argues on appeal, as she had before the AJ, that the Agency denied her a "reasonable" amount of official time to process her complaint, and that she was informed that she was limited to a total of 15 hours of official time, even during the hearing stage when she was attempting to serve and comply with time-consuming discovery requests and interrogatories. She states that the Office of General Counsel threatened to have pre-approved annual leave canceled so that it could schedule her deposition during that time period (although the leave ultimately was not canceled). Complainant also contends that the Agency's Office of General Counsel impermissibly interfered with the course of the investigation, and acted improperly, when it was permitted to question the witnesses in the complaint prior to their investigative interviews, and when it prepared GW for two hours before, and represented him during, his investigative interview. Complainant posits that because the Office of General Counsel accompanied GW to his EEO investigative interview, he was being represented by the Agency as a manager. Complainant argues that the Agency EEO Office and Office of General Counsel each knew that the Agency was engaging in impermissible behavior, citing a 2001 letter sent from the Commission's Office of Federal Operations, Federal Sector Programs, to the Agency's EEO Office which discussed the proper role of an Office of General Counsel in the EEO process. The Agency filed an Opposition to Complainant's Motion to Sanction on July 6, 2009, concurrent with its brief in opposition to the appeal. It argues that the Motion to Sanction should be denied for several reasons. The Agency notes that Complainant had raised her argument regarding official time before the AJ, and argues that she had been unable to specify how many hours she was denied that she should have instead been granted. The AJ did not issue a ruling on the official time request, but the Agency extended an offer of 30 additional hours of official time on December 12, 2007. It claims that Complainant and the AJ did not respond to this offer. As to the substitution of the management inquiry for more traditional EEO counseling, the Agency argues that Complainant had been unable to specify how exactly she was harmed by this process, noting that she was still issued a notice of rights and responsibilities and filed a formal complaint. The Agency adamantly maintains that its Office of General Counsel (OGC) had properly interviewed witnesses in the EEO investigation, and that it did not improperly influence their testimony in any way. It claims the OGC it needed to interview the witnesses before the EEO Investigator's fact finding conference so that it would "ensure that all pertinent lines of questioning are pursued since the OCI investigator will not have the benefit of previously interviewing the witnesses to learn the full scope of their personal knowledge concerning the allegations." As to her claim that she was threatened with the cancellation of her long-scheduled and pre-approved annual leave, the Agency notes that the leave was not canceled. Finally, as to the delays in processing her complaint and issuing a final agency decision, the Agency argues that Complainant knew that the AJ had planned to issue a decision granting the Agency's Motion for Summary Judgment, as per the discussion in the December 12, 2007, teleconference, and that she was advised that if she wanted a decision faster than the AJ stated he would be able to issue it, she had the option of asking for a final agency decision. That she took four months to withdraw her hearing request, was evidence, claims the Agency, that she could wait. The Agency complains that in actuality it was the party that was harmed as it did not have the benefit of a decision from an AJ on the merits of the complaint when issuing its final agency decision. It argues that Complainant "alleges no harm from this delay." On July 15, 2009, Complainant then filed a Motion to Strike the Agency's Reply to Complainant's Appeal and Response to Complainant's Motion to Sanction, arguing that each were untimely filed with the Commission. Complainant claimed that the Agency's EEO office received her Appeal Brief on May 29, 2009, as evidenced by the USPS Track and Confirm notification and signature on the certified, return receipt card, and that the 30-day period to file a response therefore expired on June 29, 2009. She argued that the Agency's Brief, dated July 6, 2009, was therefore untimely filed, and that the Agency should be held to the strict timeframes in the regulations, as she was during the processing of her complaint and hearing request. On July 27, 2009, the Agency filed an Opposition to the Complainant's Motion to Strike as well as its own Cross Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The Agency stated that its Office of General Counsel received Complainant's Brief and Motion for Sanctions on June 3, 2009, which would have placed the 30th day on July 3, 2009, which was a Friday and was the observation of the July 4th Federal holiday. It argued that its July 6, 2009, filing was therefore timely under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(d). The Agency further argued in its Cross Motion to Dismiss Appeal that because Complainant did not properly serve the Office of General Counsel with her Brief and Motion, which it argued was the proper "opposing party," not the EEO Office, her entire appeal should be dismissed as improperly served on the Agency. STANDARD OF REVIEW As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (Nov. 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law"). ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Motions to Strike and to Dismiss We first address the parties' contentions that the Agency's Brief in Opposition and Agency's Response to the Motion to Sanction were untimely filed with the Commission, and that Complainant's appeal was improperly served on the Agency, thereby mandating dismissal of her appeal. In view of the complicated nature of this case, we exercise our discretion to entertain the Agency's pleadings without regard to the timeliness of the filing with the Commission. We also decline to dismiss Complainant's appeal due to its alleged improper service, as we find that Complainant properly served the Agency's EEO office with her Appeal and Brief in a manner in accord with the regulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(b). Partial dismissal of three claims Claims 2, 3, and 4 of Complainant's complaint were dismissed by the Agency. Claims 2 and 3 were dismissed as stating the same claim as that in her complaint from 2001. We affirm the Agency's dismissal of these claims. Complainant signed a settlement agreement in March 2002 which settled her complaint and withdrew those claims from the EEO process. However, the facts surrounding the filing of Complainant's complaint in March 2001 will be used as background evidence for our analysis of claim 1. Claim 4 was dismissed as a claim that alleges dissatisfaction with the processing of her current complaint. Complainant specifically claimed that the Agency did not properly engage in the informal counseling process, did not allow her legal representation during its management inquiry into the re-publication of the cartoon, and did not allow her to present witnesses at that time. We find that the Agency properly dismissed this claim. These particular issues have been addressed in the course of the processing of the complaint, as Complainant has been represented by counsel, and her witnesses were interviewed during the investigation phase. Although the Agency may not have engaged in traditional counseling, we find that this did not unduly prejudice Complainant, as she still was given her notice of EEO rights and responsibilities, was able to file a formal complaint, and as Complainant came into the EEO process well-versed in her rights as a complainant. However, we caution the Agency that the pre-complaint processing procedures found at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 and more fully delineated in the EEO MD-110, Chapter 2, serve to aid in developing the claims in a complaint and serve to inform a complainant of valuable information about the EEO process. Deviations from these procedures are inadvisable. The Agency's departure from procedures will be addressed more fully in the section below discussing Complainant's Motion to Sanction. Sexual harassment and harassment based on reprisal It is well-settled that harassment based on an individual's protected bases or prior protected activity is actionable. See Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999). In order to establish a claim of harassment under these bases, a complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class and/or engaged in prior EEO activity; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical conduct related to her membership in her protected bases and/or her prior EEO activity; (3) the harassment complained of was based on her protected bases and/or prior EEO activity; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). Further, the incidents must have been "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [complainant's] employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 6 (March 8, 1994). Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976), and Coffman v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473 (Nov. 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000). We find that Complainant has established that she is a member of two protected classes, by virtue of her sex and having engaged in prior protected EEO activity, and that she was subjected to conduct based on her membership in these two classes. Complainant not only engaged in protected EEO activity on her own behalf, but she was the Agency's first full-time EEO Specialist at MSIC. She raised issues with management regarding GW's "Trail of Beers" and the Christmas Social. By doing so, she drew the ire of GW and many employees at MSIC who believed they could no longer wish each other "Merry Christmas," even though this is not what she had advocated. She was labeled the "EEO Gestapo," and GW's "Lord of the Laser" cartoon depicted her as "Ms. E.E.O'Doofus." Complainant testified that the Director told her that that GW "resents the EEO system." GW's cartoon used sexual imagery and language in reference to Complainant, which many co-workers recognized as such, and recognized that Complainant was the individual it was intended to depict. Complainant also argued that GW had published a "parable" which insinuated that her husband was lucky to be losing his vision as he would no longer have to look at her. Additionally, a box of fliers was delivered to her office with the word "Dufus" written in black marker on the box. The totality of this behavior implicates both Complainant's EEO activity and her sex. Although the Agency disputes that Complainant was depicted in the cartoon, and disputes the sexual nature of the cartoon, we find their arguments to be unpersuasive. A review of the "Lord of the Laser" cartoon, keeping in mind the context in which it was drawn, the relationship among GW, Complainant, and the other employees at MSIC, and the testimony of co-workers about how MSIC employees viewed the cartoon, is supportive of this conclusion. Co-worker 1 (CO-1) testified that, "It's obvious who they [the characters] are," in the cartoon and "it's obvious" that it's a "a male penis, okay shooting it like he's shooting, you know, at someone. And I think he said EEO Dufus, Ms. EEO Dufus or something like that in the cartoon kind of thing." (OCI transcript, pp. 178-180). Co-worker 2 (CO-2) testified that, "We only had one EEO person at that time and the caricature was such that it was pretty hard not to miss it if you had any inkling of what it was. I mean, everybody that I've seen that's seen the cartoon, immediately that's what they see." (OCI transcript, p. 199). He also stated that, "I heard about it and it became a discussion again around the building a little bit and people talked about it." (OCI transcript, p. 201). There is no question that Complainant found this conduct to be unwelcome. She stated in her Brief that, since her return to the Agency in May 2003, she avoids EEO activities at MSIC, tends to stay in her office, avoids the cafeteria where she would be likely to encounter GW and friends of GW, and she tries to avoid any contact with GW. Although the Agency did not accept the issue for investigation, Complainant also argued in her brief that employees in the workplace are openly hostile to her, which has had the effect of denying her a rotational assignment to another office because the employees in that office did not wish to work with her. We find that the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with Complainant's work performance and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. The Agency maintains that the re-publication of the "Lord of the Laser" cartoon on GW's public Internet website removes it from a connection to the workplace, and that it therefore cannot have interfered with Complainant's ability to function at work. The Agency also argues that Complainant had voluntarily gone to GW's website and opened the link to the cartoon, thereby exposing herself to the content. However, we find that the hostile environment consisted of more than just Complainant's exposure to the content of GW's website. GW announced his website at an EEO training class in September 2005, thereby re-introducing it into the workplace, after which many employees apparently went back to their desks and pulled up the site to view its content. Many then discussed it in the workplace. There is testimony in the record from CO-2 that, after GW announced his website, he "heard about it up and down the hall." (OCI transcript, pp. 201-202). The Agency further maintains that the actions of GW were not reasonably likely to deter a complainant or others from engaging in protected EEO activity, and that there was no evidence to support the proposition that GW published his cartoon to dissuade Complainant from participating in EEO activities. (Agency's Brief, p. 8). However, CO-1 testified that she had told a co-worker that she had decided against considering a position in the IG (Inspector General) office: "And I said I wouldn't be an IG, just like Brenda, afraid the same thing would happen to me that's happened to Brenda, you know, because she's had a tough time since she was the EEO counselor." (OCI transcript, p. 180). We find that the hostility to the EEO process shown by GW through the cartoon, the "parable" on his website, and his other writings is sufficient to demonstrate that he engaged in these actions in order to harass Complainant for her role in the EEO program, and for engaging in protected activity. Any other employee who might have been disposed to make similar objections to offensive material, to work to increase diversity and tolerance at MSIC, or to volunteer to be a collateral-duty or full-time EEO Counselor or Specialist would surely think twice before deciding if they themselves would want to be subjected to the same treatment. We additionally find that Complainant need not show that she was subjected to sexual harassment in order to establish that she was subjected to a pattern of harassment based on her sex and prior EEO activity. The Agency mistakes Complainant's burden here, and is attempting to impose an additional burden on what she is legally required to show by conflating the two types of harassment. Aspects of the unwelcome conduct perpetuated by GW are sexual as well as hostile to the EEO system, which we find sufficient to establish Complainant's claim. Liability of the Agency As to the element (5) of a claim of harassment, we now turn to whether there is a basis for imputing liability to the Agency for GW's actions. Complainant argued in her Brief on appeal that GW should be considered a supervisor for the purposes of the Agency's potential liability. She noted that he is a Team Leader, and that the Agency's preparation of his testimony before his investigative interview implied his status as a manager. (Complainant's Brief, p.1). The Agency agued in its Brief in opposition to Complainant's appeal that GW should be considered a co-worker of Complainant's, as he was never in any position to take any sort of adverse personnel action against Complainant. (Agency's Brief, p. 7). We find that GW should be considered a co-worker for the purposes of analysis of the Agency's liability, as he did not have the authority to take tangible employment actions against Complainant. An agency is liable for harassment by a co-worker or other non-supervisor when it "knows or should have known of the conduct, unless the agency can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action." See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d). Whether the agency's action is appropriate depends upon "the severity and persistence of the harassment and the effectiveness of any initial remedial steps." Taylor v. Dep't. of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 05920194 (July 8, 1992). The appropriateness of the agency's conduct in response to harassment depends upon "the particular facts of the case-the severity and persistence of the harassment, and the effectiveness of any initial remedial steps." Owens v. Dep't of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 05940824 (Sept. 5, 1996). "Appropriate corrective action" is a response that is reasonably calculated to stop the harassment. When an employer becomes aware of alleged harassment, the employer has the duty to investigate such charges promptly and thoroughly. See Rodriguez v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01953850 (Aug. 29, 1996). Complainant was subjected to harassment as perpetuated by a co-worker, GW, and she complained to Agency management about the dissemination of GW's website address in the September 2005 EEO class. Complainant raised the matter with the Director on October 24, 2005. She alleged that the re-introduction of the "Lord of the Laser" cartoon created a hostile work environment, and that the Agency failed to take immediate and appropriate remedial measures. We find that the Agency did not engage in immediate corrective action when it took two months to block GW's website from viewing in the workplace. Although the Agency claimed that it took "prompt" corrective action, it has not supplied a date, or any documentation in the record, which shows when it actually took action to block the website. Complainant asserted that it took the Agency two months to block employees from being able to view GW's website from Agency computers; there is no evidence of record to the contrary. In the absence of any justification for the Agency's delay, we find that taking two months to block GW's website on MSIC computers is not prompt, corrective action. Denial of official time to process her EEO complaint Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.605(b), a complainant "shall have a reasonable amount of official time, if otherwise on duty, to prepare the complaint and to respond to agency and EEOC requests for information." As further delineated in EEO MD-110, Chapter 6, § VIII.C., "reasonable" is defined as "whatever is appropriate, under the particular circumstances of the complaint, in order to allow a complete presentation of the relevant information associated with the complaint and to respond to agency requests for information." Complainant argued before the AJ that the Agency had inappropriately limited her to a total of 15 hours of official time to process her complaint. She framed the issue as one of retaliation by the Agency when it did not allow her to claim more hours than this during the course of the discovery period. The Agency argued before the AJ that Complainant was incorrect in filing an amendment to her complaint in order to address this issue, citing sections of EEO MD-110 to support its contention that Complainant should have raised the issue with Agency officials to obtain relief. Complainant responded that she had raised the matter of official time with the appropriate Agency officials and was advised that she was limited to 15 hours. Complainant claimed that the Office of General Counsel representative informed her that it was an Agency "standard operating procedure" that only 15 hours of official time were allowed to work on EEO complaints, although she was never shown this policy in writing, despite her requests for a copy of it. The AJ ordered Complainant to submit an accounting of the amount of time she claimed she was inappropriately denied. Although there is an indication that Complainant did submit this to the Agency, the record before the Commission at this time does not contain this information. Complainant need not establish that the Agency denied her official time as a form of reprisal. The Commission has held that allegations of per se violations of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.605(b) should not be processed in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108 because the focus is not on motivation, but rather on the justification to determine whether the complainant was denied a reasonable amount of requested official time. See Edwards v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960179 (Dec. 23, 1996). We note that an internal agency policy, such as Complainant alleges existed here, which places a strict cap on the number of hours a complainant can spend on an EEO complaint would violate 29 C.F.R. § 1614.605(b); the Agency is advised to analyze all requests for official time on a case-by-case basis. We find that Complainant should have been granted more than 15 hours in total to process her complaint. A case of this complexity, in which there was a hearing request and extensive discovery, would warrant far more time than that. Complainant asserted in her brief to the AJ on August 20, 2007, that she could account for the hours she expended working on her complaint. On December 12, 2007, the Agency extended an offer of 30 additional hours of official time to Complainant. The record does not indicate that Complainant either accepted or rejected this offer. On remand, we find that Complainant should submit to the Agency an accounting of the hours to which she claims she is entitled. The Agency shall grant Complainant the appropriate compensation for her time, whether in the form of compensatory time, restoration of annual leave, or administrative time, as applicable, for the reasonable amount of hours taken by Complainant to work on her complaint. Role of the Office of General Counsel EEO MD-110, Chap. 1, § III. (Nov. 9, 1999) provides, in relevant part: Heads of agencies must not permit intrusion on the investigations and deliberations of EEO complaints by agency representatives and offices responsible for defending the agency against EEO complaints. Maintaining distance between the fact-finding and defensive functions of the agency enhances the credibility of the EEO office and the integrity of the EEO complaints process. Legal sufficiency reviews of EEO matters must be handled by a functional unit that is separate and apart from the unit which handles agency representation in EEO complaints. The Commission requires this separation because impartiality and the appearance of impartiality is important to the credibility of the equal employment program. Generally speaking, the EEO office at an agency is responsible for the neutral counseling and investigation of the EEO complaint, and for developing an impartial and appropriate factual record from which a decision maker can render a decision on the allegations of discrimination. Once the process becomes adversarial, i.e., once a request for a hearing is submitted or an appeal is filed with the Commission, an agency's Office of General Counsel or other designated legal representative has a duty to represent the interests of the agency. During the informal counseling stage and the investigation into the accepted issues of the complaint, however, the agency representative should not have a role in shaping the testimony of the witnesses or the evidence gathered by the EEO Investigator. In the case of Rucker v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 0120082225 (February 4, 2011), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520110343 (April 26, 2011), the complainant claimed that the agency's Office of General Counsel had improperly injected itself into the EEO investigation by reviewing and assisting in the development of management affidavits before submission to the EEO investigator. We advised the agency that "it should be careful to avoid even the appearance that it is interfering with the EEO process." In this case, Complainant claims that the Office of General Counsel impermissibly interfered with the development of the record, and acted improperly, when it was permitted to question the witnesses in the complaint prior to their investigative interviews. She argued that the Office of General Counsel effectively "represented" GW and his interests during the investigation when it prepared GW for two hours before, and represented him during, his investigative interview. She claims that the Office of General Counsel threatened to cancel her pre-approved annual leave when scheduling her deposition toward the end of the discovery period, in an effort to intimidate her and retaliate against her. According to Complainant, she and her attorney offered to extend the discovery period, but the Agency declined. The Agency's barely-concealed disdain for Complainant is evident in its filings before this Commission on appeal and before the AJ. It is one thing for an Office of General Counsel to take seriously its duty to zealously represent its client agency in the course of defending an EEO complaint. It is another thing entirely to use the power of its office to intimidate a complainant and her witnesses, and to potentially affect the course of the investigation by pre-interviewing witnesses during the EEO investigation. The Agency's circular logic that it needed to interview the witnesses before the EEO investigator did, because the investigator did not know what the witnesses were going to testify to, is a self-serving justification for its actions. The EEO investigator is responsible for the development of an impartial record. It is in this role that the investigator would pursue the appropriate line of questioning of each witness. An agency representative should not step into the process until it becomes adversarial, either through the request for a hearing or the filing of an appeal. We find that the Agency acted with gross impropriety in this case. Motion for Sanctions Complainant argued in her Motion to Sanction that the Agency should be sanctioned for its conduct in the processing of her complaint. Complainant claims that the Agency purposefully delayed the processing of her complaint, and blatantly disregarded the timeframes contained in 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, most egregiously taking nearly 11 months to issue the final agency decision from the date she requested it. She argued that the Agency did not properly conduct the informal EEO counseling stage, and that she was denied official time (as discussed above). She also argued that the conduct of the Office of General Counsel when interviewing witnesses before they testified to the EEO investigator had affected the investigation. Complainant argued that, based on the Commission's decisions in Lomax v. Department of Veterans Affairs,2 DaCosta v. Department of Education,3) Reading v. Department of Veterans Affairs,4 and Royal v. Department of Veterans Affairs,5 the Agency should be sanctioned for failing to comply with the timeframes in 29 C.F.R. Part 1614. The Agency was required to issue a final agency decision within 60 days of the AJ's dismissal of Complainant's hearing request and his remand for a decision. It took the Agency nearly 11 months to do so, despite repeated requests from Complainant for the final decision. Complainant also argued that the Office of General Counsel interfered with the EEO process by attempting to intimidate her and her witnesses, denying her official time, threatening to cancel her leave, coaching and prepping GW, representing GW in his investigatory interview, and interviewing witnesses before they gave testimony to the investigator. She claimed that these actions, taken as a whole, would deter a reasonable person from pursuing a complaint in the EEO process, and that the Agency's Office of General Counsel had engaged in reprisal against her. The Agency opposed Complainant's Motion to Sanction, and argued that, although Complainant argued before the AJ that she had been denied a reasonable amount of official time to prosecute her complaint, she failed to articulate just how many hours she had requested and been denied. It further argued that she had not identified how she had been harmed by the substitution of the management inquiry for the informal EEO counseling process. It also argued that it had not improperly influenced the testimony of any of the witnesses during the investigation and that when attempting to schedule Complainant's deposition it was "simply trying to exercise its rights in defending against the complaint." We find that the Agency's actions warrant a sanction in this instance. The Commission found in the case of Royal v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 0520080052 (September 25, 2009) that delays in completing the Report of Investigation beyond the 180-day regulatory time frame warranted a sanction. In Royal, we held that "the agency's delay in completing the investigation within the 180-day regulatory period is no small non-compliance matter." Similarly, in this case, the Agency took nearly 11 months to issue a final agency decision on the record once Complainant withdrew her hearing request. Incredibly, the Agency argued that it was the aggrieved party, harmed by Complainant's withdrawal of her hearing request, presumably because it did not have the benefit of an AJ's decision to implement or reject, and instead had to write a final decision on the record. We find the Agency's failure to comply with either the spirit or the letter of the specific directives contained in the 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 regulations to be inexplicable and inexcusable. Our regulations require agency action in a timely manner at many points in the EEO process. Compliance with these timeframes is not optional. As the Commission stated in Royal v. Department of Veterans Affairs, supra, "the Commission has the inherent power to protect its administrative process from abuse by either party and must insure that agencies, as well as complainants, abide by its regulations." We further noted in Royal that when weighing the factors pertinent to tailoring an appropriate sanction, the effect on the integrity of the EEO process and protecting that process, is of "paramount" importance to the "Commission's ability to carry out its charge of eradicating discrimination in the federal sector." The Agency should consider itself on notice that future noncompliance with our regulations could subject it to the imposition of more stringent sanctions than those we impose here. In the case of Talahongva-Adams v. Department of Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 0120081694 (May 28, 2010), we found that the agency's failure to comply with the 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 regulations and failure to adhere to the process for properly processing a complaint warranted a sanction. In addition to the default judgment levied by the AJ in that case, we found that the agency's failure to properly implement the AJ's decision, to submit the complaint file to the Commission on appeal, or even to submit a brief to the Commission on appeal in a manner in accordance with the regulations, had a serious effect on the integrity of the EEO process. In that case, we ordered the EEO personnel at the Agency to undergo training in their responsibilities in the EEO process. We find that a similar sanction is warranted here. The EEO Office's and Office of General Counsel's disregard for the basic principles of neutrality and fairness which are required to fairly adjudicate an EEO complaint is clear. The actions of the Office of General Counsel in particular evidence contempt and disrespect for the EEO process, and its pervasive presence in the investigative process casts doubt on whether the investigation was fair and impartial. Therefore, we find that it would benefit these Agency personnel to undergo training in the EEO process, and the roles and responsibilities of an agency EEO office and of its legal representative, so that the Agency may better carry out the shared mission of all federal agencies and the Commission to eradicate discrimination in federal employment. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions of both parties on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we REVERSE the Agency's final decision, and REMAND Complainant's complaint for further processing in accordance with our Order below. ORDER The Agency is ORDERED to implement the following remedial action: 1. Within fifteen (15) days of the date on which this decision becomes final, commence a supplemental investigation to determine whether Complainant is entitled to compensatory damages as a result of the discrimination, and shall afford Complainant an opportunity to establish a causal relationship between the discrimination and any pecuniary or non-pecuniary losses. Complainant shall cooperate in the Agency's efforts to compute the amount of compensatory damages to which she is entitled for that portion of the discrimination which resulted from her sex or in reprisal for her previous EEO activity, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the Agency. The Agency shall issue a new agency decision awarding compensatory damages to Complainant within sixty (60) days of the date on which Complainant completes her submission of evidence. 2. Within sixty (60) days of the date on which this decision becomes final, the Agency shall grant Complainant appropriate compensation for her time, whether in the form of compensatory time, restoration of annual leave, or administrative time, as applicable, for the reasonable amount of hours taken by Complainant to work on her complaint. A copy of the Agency's determination of the number of hours of time to be restored to Complainant and/or for which she will be provided compensation, and the reimbursement action, if necessary, shall be provided to the Compliance Officer as set forth below. 3. Within ninety (90) days of the date this decision becomes final, provide at least eight (8) hours of training to the responsible management officials at MSIC regarding their responsibilities under EEO laws, with a special emphasis on the harassment. 4. Consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against the responsible management officials at MSIC. The Commission does not consider training to be disciplinary action. The Agency shall report its decision to the Compliance Officer. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If any of the responsible management officials have left the Agency's employ, the Agency shall furnish documentation of their departure date(s). 5. Within ninety (90) days of the date this decision becomes final, provide at least four (4) hours of training to the EEO management officials and to personnel in the Office of General Counsel regarding their responsibilities concerning EEO case processing and the appropriate role of an Office of General Counsel in the EEO process. 6. Post a notice of the finding of discrimination in accordance with the below-entitled paragraph, "Posting Order." The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying that the corrective action has been implemented. POSTING ORDER (G0900) The Agency is ordered to post at its MSIC facility in Redstone Arsenal, Alabama copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the Agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900) If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0610) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610) This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action"). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Bernadette B. Wilson Acting Executive Officer Executive Secretariat June 6, 2014 Date 1 This correspondence was docketed as EEOC Appeal No. 0120084008. Complainant's timely appeal of the Agency's subsequently-issued final agency decision was docketed as EEOC Appeal No. 0120092339 (June 10, 2010), which was closed as a duplicate appeal. 2 EEOC Appeal No. 0720070039 (Oct. 2, 2007), req. for recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 0520080115 (Dec. 26, 2007). 3 EEOC Appeal No. 01995992 (Feb. 25, 2000). 4 EEOC Appeal No. 07A40125 (Oct. 12, 2006). 5 EEOC Appeal No. 0720070045 (Sept. 10, 2007), req. for recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 0520080052 (Sept. 25, 2009). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 0120084008 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Washington, DC 20507 2 0120084008