U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Taylor G.,1 Complainant, v. Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Great Lakes Area), Agency. Appeal No. 0120120164 Agency No. 4J-600-015905 DECISION Complainant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) from the Agency's final decision on the issue of compensatory damages, concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission MODIFIES the Agency's final decision. ISSUES PRESENTED The issues presented are: (1) whether the Agency properly determined that Complainant was judicially estopped from recovering compensatory damages, among other relief, because he failed to properly disclose his EEO complaint in his bankruptcy proceedings; and (2) whether the Agency's alternative finding that Complainant was entitled to an award of $239.54 in pecuniary damages and $20,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages was appropriate. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Letter Carrier at the Agency's Post Office in Bensenville, Illinois. In an EEO complaint dated November 4, 2005, Complainant alleged that he was discriminated against and subjected to a hostile work environment based on race (African American) and in reprisal for prior protected activity when on July 7, 2005, the Agency issued him a notice of removal and terminated him on August 17, 2005. On April 30, 2007, Complainant filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division (Docket No. 07-07845). On December 2, 2008, Complainant's Chapter 7 bankruptcy case was dismissed. Complainant did not disclose his EEO complaint to the Chapter 7 bankruptcy court. Thereafter, on September 11, 2009, Complainant filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. In our February 9, 2011, decision, Larry D. Almon v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0720090023, we found that Complainant established that the Agency had discriminated against him based on race when it terminated his employment. We found that Complainant was entitled to compensatory damages and reinstatement. We reversed the Agency's final action, which had rejected the AJ's finding that Complainant proved that he was subjected to discrimination. We ordered the Agency, among other things, to provide Complainant with back-pay and conduct a supplemental investigation on Complainant's entitlement to compensatory damages. While Complainant's Chapter 13 bankruptcy case was pending, the Agency awarded Complainant $94,196.59 in back-pay. The Agency subsequently became aware of Complainant's pending Chapter 13 filing, notified the trustee, and stopped payment on the check of $94,196.59. On July 5, 2011, the Chapter 13 trustee filed a Motion for Turnover of Funds, noting that both the EEO claim against the Agency and any proceeds are the property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542. On July 8, 2011, Complainant filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss his Chapter 13 case. The court found that Complainant had the right to dismiss his case, and the case was dismissed on July 12, 2011. Thereafter, the Chapter 7 court granted the trustee's motion to reopen and reinstate Complainant's bankruptcy case. Therein, the court noted that Complainant's non-disclosure of his pending EEO case prevented the trustee from making informed decisions in administering Complainant's debts. The court noted that Complainant filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss just four days after the Chapter 13 trustee filed a motion seeking turnover of the $94,196.59. The Chapter 7 court found that Complainant's intent was to deprive his creditors of payment.2 Following the supplemental investigation ordered by the Commission, the Agency issued a final decision on damages on September 8, 2011. In its decision, the Agency initially found that Complainant was judicially estopped from pursuing a claim for compensatory damages because he failed to properly disclose his EEO complaint in his bankruptcy proceedings. The Agency noted that there was a direct nexus between his bankruptcy proceedings and the issues raised in the instant matter. The Agency noted that Complainant offered his bankruptcy as evidence in support of his claim for compensatory damages. The Agency noted that estoppel exists to prevent a debtor from benefiting personally from a failure to disclose an asset. The Agency therefore found that Complainant was judicially estopped from pursuing a claim for compensatory damages. In the alternative, assuming that Complainant was not judicially estopped, the Agency addressed Complainant's claim for compensatory damages. Therein, the Agency awarded Complainant $239.54 in pecuniary damages and $20,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. Regarding pecuniary compensatory damages, the Agency noted that Complainant claimed to have lost his home due to foreclosure in May of 2009. The Agency found, however, that Complainant did not present any official documentary evidence that identified the value of his home at the time he was forced to vacate the premises and the equity which he may have acquired in it. The Agency therefore found that no award of pecuniary damages with respect to the foreclosure on Complainant's home was warranted. Notwithstanding, the Agency found that Complainant was entitled to $239.54 in pecuniary damages for other expenses. In awarding Complainant $20,000 in non-pecuniary damages, the Agency indicated that Complainant did not present any documentary or corroborating evidence of mental or physical problems associated with his termination. The Agency also indicated that Complainant did not identify any long-term physical or mental problems associated with the termination. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant contends that the Agency improperly determined that he should not be awarded compensatory damages because of his bankruptcy petition. Complainant states that the bankruptcy trustee put him on a repayment plan to pay $52,790 of $102,693 owed to all creditors. Complainant further states that, as of May 31, 2011, he has paid $17,823 of payroll deductions towards his bankruptcy repayment plan. Complainant also asserts that the Agency's attorney interfered with the Commission's order in 0720090023. Complainant specifically states that the Agency's attorney improperly stopped payment on the check of his $94,196.59 back-pay award and wrongly turned over the award to the bankruptcy trustee. Complainant alleges that the Agency's attorney improperly interfered in his personal affairs by directly initiating contact with the trustee. Complainant maintains that his "personal affairs should not be of any concern to the Agency." Complainant alleges that the Agency unethically interfered in his bankruptcy proceedings and has implied that he is unwilling to pay his creditors, an assumption that is "untrue, defamatory, and insulting." Complainant also states that the Agency wrongly claimed that he failed to submit documentation supporting the loss of his home in foreclosure. Complainant indicates that the foreclosure proceedings began about two years after his termination. Complaint contends that the value of his home was about $240,000 with about $80,000 remaining on the mortgage. Complainant further states that after his home went into foreclosure, he and his family were forced to find rental housing, for which he has paid a total of $66,300 in rent for his three-year lease.3 The Agency raises no contentions on appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and ... issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law"). ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Judicial Estoppel and Bankruptcy The overall narrative of the Agency's argument is that it need not follow the Commission's orders in Appeal No. 0720090023 to remedy the discrimination because Complainant filed for bankruptcy. The Agency argues that Complainant must be judicially estopped from pursuing his claim for compensatory damages and back-pay because such interest lies with the bankruptcy trustee. We note that courts have generally held that when an individual later files for bankruptcy, his/her employment discrimination claims become assets of the bankruptcy estate. See Auday v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc., 698 F.3d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)). As a result, the individual, as the debtor, ceases to have an interest in the discrimination claim, unless the trustee abandons it. See Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc. 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004). Courts have held that when discrimination claims accrue before the bankruptcy petition, they belong to the bankruptcy estate, and the Trustee is the "real party in interest" to pursue them. See Auday, 698 F.3d, at 905 (citing Wieburg v. GTE Southwest, Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2001)). Courts have invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel upon a debtor for failing to disclose to a bankruptcy court his/her involvement in an employment discrimination lawsuit. See DeLeon v. Comcar Indus., Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003). Courts have applied a two-part test to determine whether judicial estoppel should apply in a legal proceeding: (1) Did the party to be estopped take an inconsistent position under oath in a separate proceeding, and (2) were the inconsistent positions "calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system" (citations omitted). E.g., Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 2017). This test reflects the important public policy interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial system; in this case, the bankruptcy court's interest in preventing debtors from benefitting from actions calculated to hide assets from their creditors. However, the EEOC has a different, and no less important, public policy interest in enforcing antidiscrimination laws and remedying discrimination. The Commission is specifically empowered "to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful ... practice," and to enforce its authority "through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay ... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b). That interest is not served by allowing a discriminating employer to benefit from a complainant's bankruptcy, least of all where it appears that the discrimination was a substantial contributing factor for the complainant declaring bankruptcy in the first place; and especially where, as here, the bankruptcy court has taken steps to protect its public policy interests. Based on these premises, we find that the Commission is not judicially estopped in seeking victim-specific relief, such as back-pay and compensatory damages, on behalf of a complainant who files for bankruptcy. As the Supreme Court noted in EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002), the Commission does not stand in the shoes of the victim employee. Therefore, we find that even if a complainant were properly estopped, the Commission cannot be estopped in obtaining relief on behalf of victims of discrimination. Application of judicial estoppel here would ground the Commission in the Complainant's shoes and would frustrate the Commission's broad authority to eradicate employment discrimination on behalf of federal government employees. The Commission clearly can pursue remedial relief here even if Complainant himself is foreclosed from obtaining such relief. See EEOC v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A., 928 F.Supp.2d 950, 955 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (citing Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 298) (The fact that ordinary principles of res judicata, mootness, or mitigation may apply to EEOC claims does not ... render the EEOC a proxy for the employee."); EEOC v. Hi-Line Electric Company, 805 F.Supp.2d 298, 307 (N.D. Tex. 2011) ("The EEOC plays an independent public interest role that allows it to seek relief on behalf of individuals who were allegedly discriminated against, even if that relief would otherwise be barred if those claims were brought by the allegedly aggrieved individual."). Here, the Commission, pursuant to its administrative authority under Title VII, specifically found the Agency liable for Complainant's discriminatory termination and ordered the Agency to remedy such discrimination through compensatory damages and back-pay, among other relief. The Commission's authority under Title VII dictates that it remedy the discrimination herein without regard to Complainant having filed for bankruptcy, a circumstance that was more than likely caused by Agency's discriminatory termination of him. See Stiehl v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120061271 (Jan. 18, 2007), req. for recon. den'd, EEOC Request No. 0520070311 (Mar. 23, 2007) (complainant who filed a petition under Chapter 7, allegedly misleading the bankruptcy court, not barred by judicial estoppel or lack of standing); Glover v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120071106 (May 1, 2007), req. for recon. den'd, EEOC Request No. 0520070749 (Feb. 11, 2008) (complainant who failed to disclose her EEO complaint, allegedly misleading a Chapter 13 bankruptcy court, not barred by doctrine of judicial estoppel). As such, we find that the Agency improperly interfered with Complainant's compensatory damages and back-pay as the Commission expressly ordered in Appeal No. 0720090023. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (back-pay should be denied only for reasons that would not frustrate Title VII's purpose of eradicating discrimination and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination). We note that the Agency's attorney found it appropriate to contact the bankruptcy trustee about Complainant's claims against the Agency. We find that the Agency was simply Complainant's employer, nothing else, and its obligation was to the Commission to remedy the discrimination that it was found to have caused. Whether Complainant has an interest in the back pay and compensatory damages award is a matter for the trustee and/or bankruptcy court, not the Agency. See J.P. Morgan Chase, 928 F.Supp.2d at 956 n.2 (noting that whether an award for monetary damages to the employee "might present issues related to pursuit of the award by the bankruptcy trustee or any other such complications related to such a 'windfall' ... is not the concern of this Court."). Pecuniary Damages (Foreclosure on Home) On appeal, Complainant states that the Agency wrongly claimed that he failed to submit documentation supporting the loss of his home in foreclosure. Complaint contends that the value of his home was about $240,000 with about $80,000 remaining on the mortgage. Complainant further states that after his home went into foreclosure, he and his family were forced to find rental housing, for which he has paid a total of $66,300 in rent for his three-year lease.4 We note that pecuniary losses are out-of-pocket expenses that are incurred as a result of the employer's unlawful action. Typically, these damages include reimbursement for medical expenses, job-hunting expenses, moving expenses, and other quantifiable out-of-pocket expenses. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Ch. II(A) (July 14, 1992) (Enforcement Guidance). For claims seeking pecuniary damages, such objective evidence should include documentation of out-of-pocket expenses for all actual costs and an explanation of the expense, e.g., medical and psychological billings, other costs associated with the injury caused by the agency's actions, and an explanation for the expenditure. Id. Upon review, we agree with the Agency here that Complainant has not demonstrated evidence for the recovery of the equity he lost in his home at the time it went into foreclosure. There is simply no accounting in the record demonstrating the amount of money he lost at the time of the foreclosure. Although we find that Complainant is not entitled to pecuniary damages for this matter, like the Agency, we will nonetheless address the harm suffered upon Complainant due to the foreclosure of his home as it relates to non-pecuniary compensatory damages below. Non-Pecuniary Damages Non-pecuniary losses are losses that are not subject to precise quantification, i.e., emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation, injury to credit standing, and loss of health. See Enforcement Guidance. There is no precise formula for determining the amount of damages for non-pecuniary losses except that the award should reflect the nature and severity of the harm and the duration or expected duration of the harm. See Loving v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01955789 (Aug. 29, 1997). The Commission notes that non-pecuniary compensatory damages are designed to remedy the harm caused by the discriminatory event rather than punish the agency for the discriminatory action. Furthermore, compensatory damages should not be motivated by passion or prejudice or "monstrously excessive" standing alone but should be consistent with the amounts awarded in similar cases. See Ward-Jenkins v. Dep't of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01961483 (Mar. 4, 1999). Evidence from a health care provider or other expert is not a mandatory prerequisite for recovery of compensatory damages for emotional harm. See Lawrence v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01952288 (Apr 18, 1996) (citing Carle v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC, Appeal No. 01922369 (Jan. 5, 1993)). Objective evidence of compensatory damages can include statements from Complainant concerning his emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character or reputation, injury to credit standing, loss of health, and any other non-pecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of the discriminatory conduct. Id. Statements from others including family members, friends, health care providers, other counselors (including clergy) could address the outward manifestations or physical consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness, anxiety, stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self-esteem, excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Id. Complainant's own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain his burden in this regard. Id. The more inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action. Id. The absence of supporting evidence, however, may affect the amount of damages appropriate in specific cases. Id. In the instant case, Complainant specifically averred that he endured unimaginable hardship due to his termination. Complainant averred that he received his termination letter after 18 years of service, which caused a great deal of emotional distress and sleepless nights for him. Complainant maintained that he has been traumatized mentally, emotionally, and financially, and stated there were times that "he did not know if he would make it." Complainant further indicated that he lost his home of 15 years in foreclosure, which he was ordered to vacate on June 1, 2009. Complainant averred that the foreclosure process required countless court appearances and numerous attorneys from October 2006 through May 2009. Complainant additionally indicated that he had to file for bankruptcy, which forced him to relinquish any interest in his home during the foreclosure proceedings. Complainant averred that he was forced to file bankruptcy to prevent his wages from being garnished. Complainant averred that his bankruptcy under Chapter 13 was a five-year plan, which continued until September 2014. Complainant also maintained that the anxiety and hardship of this matter became too great for his marriage, and after almost 28 years of marriage, he and his wife were on the verge of getting a divorce. Complainant also indicated that he experienced insomnia, became physically exhausted, and had difficulty concentrating and focusing. Complainant stated that he had provided two-thirds of his household income, which ranged from $80,000 to $90,000 per year total. According to Complainant, however, after his termination, he was unable to obtain comparable employment to sustain his family, and he felt humiliated and disappointed in himself. He stated he became anxious and stressed, and decided to seek help from the Employee Assistance Program in 2007 and 2009. Complainant additionally reported that he was forced to move into a rental properly and had to borrow money from family members to do so. The record also shows that Complainant experienced damage to his credit score. Complainant stated his termination affected his wife also, who developed ailments such as severe headaches, tension in her neck, and insomnia, and was prescribed medication for pain and tension. He stated that her headaches were so bad that she had further medical testing and still has headaches today.5 Complainant averred that none of the above existed prior to the discrimination. Considering the evidence of non-pecuniary damages submitted by Complainant, we find the Agency's award of non-pecuniary, compensatory damages in the amount of $20,000 to be inadequate. We note that damage awards for emotional harm are difficult to determine, and there are no definitive rules governing the amount to be awarded in given cases. In addition, a non-pecuniary damage award must be consistent with awards made in similar cases. We note that in awarding Complainant $20,000 in non-pecuniary damages, the Agency asserted that Complainant did not present any documentary or corroborating evidence of mental or physical problems associated with the termination. Notwithstanding, as noted above, evidence from a health care provider or other expert is not a mandatory prerequisite for recovery of compensatory damages for emotional harm. Further, also as noted above, Complainant's own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain his burden in addressing the outward manifestations of the emotional harm suffered. Moreover, the more inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action. As we found in 0720090023, Complainant was repeatedly subjected to racial epithets, including being called a "monkey" and "jungle monkey" on a continuing basis. We noted that Complainant's termination was the foreseeable result of the Agency's failure to adequately address and stop the racially charged comments directed at Complainant. Given the nature of the Agency's behavior and degrading conduct, Complainant's own statements along with the financial hardship he suffered due to his termination, we find that $150,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages is warranted in this case. We note that in its September 8, 2011, final decision on compensatory damages, the Agency did not dispute that it actions were the proximate cause of his emotional harm and financial difficulties. Our $150,000 award takes into account the severity of the harm suffered, and is consistent with prior Commission precedent. See, e.g., Padilla v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120090062 (Sep. 21, 2010) ($165,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages awarded where a hostile work environment caused the Complainant to have a strain on his relationships, suffered financial instability, and suffered emotional distress); Kloock v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A31159 (Feb. 5, 2004) ($150,000 in non-pecuniary damages where discriminatory removal resulted in depression, social withdrawal, weight gain, anxiety, sleeplessness, feelings of hopelessness, anger, paranoia, victimization, humiliation, constant fear of unjustified job loss, loss of self-esteem, severe financial strain, loss of his home and future home, added physical pain associated with his herniated disc, seriously deteriorated relationship with son and loss of hockey coach career); Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal Nos. 07A00025 and 01A03882 (Jan. 19, 2001) ($150,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages awarded where testimony of Complainant and his wife established that he was withdrawn, depressed, embarrassed, humiliated, lost self-esteem, and he experienced financial difficulties, emotional distress, personality changes, and severe strain on relationships); and Smith v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0720090050 (Sep. 17, 2013) ($120,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages awarded where Agency's discriminatory action was the proximate cause of her emotional and financial problems). CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, the Commission finds that the doctrine of judicial estoppel cannot be used here to prevent it from completely remedying the discrimination established in this case. We further find the Agency's award of compensatory damages to be inadequate. The Commission therefore MODIFIES the Agency's final decision. ORDER The Agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial actions within sixty (60) days of this decision is issued: 1) pay $239.54 in pecuniary damages and $150,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages to the real party in interest in this matter; and 2) to the extent the Agency has not turned over the back-pay amount to the bankruptcy trustee, and barring any court order to the contrary, it must pay the $94,196.59, plus interest, to be distributed in accordance with the orders of the bankruptcy court. The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying that the corrective action has been implemented. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1016) If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision was issued. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610) This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: _____________________________________ Bernadette B. Wilson's signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations ______4/17/18___________________ Date 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website. 2 Via letter dated August 24, 2011, the Agency notified the Commission that it intended to fully comply with whatever disbursement instructions it received from the bankruptcy court. 3 Although not addressed in the Agency's September 8, 2011, final decision, our disposition of the issue before us nonetheless necessitates that we address the Agency's decision to stop payment of the back-pay award to Complainant. 4 We note that, on appeal, Complainant only addresses pecuniary damages as it relates to the foreclosure of his home. He does not address the Agency's decision to only award him $239.54 in pecuniary damages for the other matters for which he claimed. Therefore, the Commission exercises its discretion not to address the Agency's decision to award him $239.54 for these other expenses. 5 Complainant is not entitled to compensatory damages for his wife. We note that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory damages are available to federal sector complainants, but not their family members. Carpenter v. Dep't of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652, fn. 4 (July 17, 1995). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 0120120164 13 0120120164