U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Cher B.,1 Complainant, v. Robert McDonald, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency. Appeal No. 0120140445 Hearing No. 410-2010-00455X Agency No. 200I-X002-2007103824 DECISION On November 15, 2013, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's October 8, 2013, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final order. ISSUES PRESENTED The issues presented are whether substantial evidence in the record supports the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judges' (AJ1, AJ2) decisions to: (1) find that the Agency did not subject Complainant to racial harassment; and (2) award Complainant $95,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages for retaliatory harassment. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Senior Attorney at the Agency's Office of Regional Counsel in Bay Pines, Florida. The Agency had transferred Complainant to its Bay Pines facility in March 2006, pursuant to an EEO settlement agreement. Complainant's first-level supervisor was the Assistant Regional Counsel (S1). Complainant's second-level supervisor was the Regional Counsel (S2). In September 2007, the Agency removed Complainant. Subsequently, Complainant filed a mixed case appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). In June 2009, the MSPB reversed the removal and reinstated Complainant, but found no discrimination. In October 2007, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that S1 and S2 subjected her to harassment on the bases of race (African-American) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity (EEO settlement agreement) when: 1. In March 2006, upon her arrival at the Bay Pines facility, she was assigned the heaviest caseload, with complex cases left unfinished by a retired attorney; 2. On December 15, 2006, she was issued written counseling for a confrontation with another employee, even though she insisted that she was not involved in the confrontation; 3. On December 15, 2006, she was informed that a copy of the written counseling would be placed in her Official Personnel File, contrary to standard personnel procedures; 4. Beginning on December 15, 2006, she was subjected to scrutiny and harassment about her style of preparing witnesses; 5. On March 7, 2007, she was informed that her performance rating period would be extended by an additional month because her performance was below the satisfactory level; 6. On April 11, 2007, she was ordered to attend an impromptu meeting with her supervisors; 7. On April 11, 2007, she was reprimanded for not following time and attendance procedures, and for lack of candor in relation to those events; 8. On April 30, 2007, she was placed on a 60-day performance improvement plan; 9. On May 4, 2007, she was informed that she would not receive a within-grade increase; 10. On June 21, 2007, she learned that, prior to her arrival at the Bay Pines facility, her coworkers were told that her transfer was pursuant to an EEO settlement agreement; 11. On July 9, 2007, she was issued her a three-day suspension. On June 19, 2012, after a hearing on the issue of liability (HT1), AJ1 issued a decision finding that S1 and S2 subjected Complainant to retaliatory harassment from December 2006 to July 2007,2 but did not subject Complainant to racial harassment. In finding retaliatory harassment, AJ1 found that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by S1 and S2 were unworthy of belief and were a pretext for retaliatory animus. Among other things, AJ1 found that S1 and S2 "launch[ed] their campaign of harassment" a few months after Complainant's arrival, which was calculated to follow "the six-month grace period after which one normally would not be able to make the proximity argument for retaliation." In finding no racial harassment, AJ1 found that the only evidence that Complainant's race may have been a factor was S2's comment that Complainant did not "fit the image of a government attorney." AJ1, however, found that it was unclear what S2's comment meant and that one ambiguous comment alone did not establish that the Agency was, more likely than not, motivated by race. In addition, AJ1 noted that S2 provided unrebutted testimony that she had hired several African-American attorneys before Complainant's transfer. Moreover, AJ1 noted that one of Complainant's own witnesses testified that management treated an African-American attorney more leniently than Complainant. On September 11, 2013, after a hearing on the issue of damages (HT2), AJ2 issued a decision ordering the Agency pay Complainant $95,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages.3 AJ2 found that, from approximately December 2006 to the spring of 2008, Complainant experienced the following as a result of the Agency's retaliatory harassment: embarrassment, stress, loss of professional standing, one panic attack, and the exacerbation of her lupus symptoms. AJ2, however, found that Complainant did not experience the following as a result of the Agency's retaliatory harassment: suicidal ideation, the dissolution of her marriage, and the loss of her house. Although Complainant and several witnesses testified about her having suicidal ideation, AJ2 found that her medical provider made no notation of discussing suicidal ideation with her until July 2007, at which time she denied having suicidal ideation. AJ2 stated, "I fail to see why [suicidal ideation] is something that the Complainant would have shared with her friends, but not [her medical provider]." Although Complainant testified about the dissolution of her marriage, AJ2 found that she did not prove with specificity exactly when her marriage dissolved, when the underlying personal relationship broke down, or when she stopped living with her husband. AJ2 stated, "The [C]omplainant did not provide much in the way of specifics . . . She relied primarily on what she asserted was the timing; however, she is at best unclear as to what the timing was." Although Complainant testified about the loss of her house, AJ2 found that she admitted on cross-examination that she lost her house because she had to borrow money to pay for her attorney's fees. On October 8, 2013, the Agency issued a final order fully implementing AJ1's decision and AJ2's decision. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant contends that AJ1 erred in finding no racial harassment and AJ2 erred in awarding only $95,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages for retaliatory harassment. Regarding racial harassment, Complainant argues that AJ1 "missed" that S1 viewed her "through the lens of stereotype." Specifically, Complainant asserts that, in American culture, African-American women are stereotyped as loud, sneaky, dishonest, manipulative, intuitive, flirtatious, and promiscuous. In addition, citing portions of S1's hearing testimony, Complainant asserts that he perceived her as such. Regarding non-pecuniary compensatory damages, Complainant argues that the amount awarded by AJ2 is too low. Specifically, Complainant asserts that AJ2 erred in finding that she did not experience the following as a result of the Agency's retaliatory harassment: suicidal ideation, the dissolution of her marriage, and the loss of her house. Regarding her suicidal ideation, Complainant asserts that she did not share it with her medical provider because she knew that the medical provider would prescribe medication, she did not want another prescription as she was already taking medication for other medical conditions, and she preferred holistic remedies. Regarding the dissolution of her marriage, Complainant asserts that she provided unrebutted testimony that she and her husband separated because of the stress of the harassment. Regarding the loss of her house, Complainant asserts that she provided unrebutted testimony that she could no longer make the mortgage payments after separating from her husband. Moreover, Complainant asserts that AJ2 erred in not recognizing that her emotional harm lasted seven years (2006 to 2013) because S1 continued to be in her chain of command. Complainant requests that the Commission order the Agency to remove her from S1's supervision. Finally, Complainant did not request a specific amount, but cites to previous Commission decisions awarding amounts ranging from $130,000 to $200,000. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEO MD-110, Ch. 9, at § VI.B. On appeal, the burden is squarely on the party challenging the AJ's decision to demonstrate that the AJ's factual determinations are not supported by substantial evidence. Id. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Racial Harassment To establish a claim of harassment, a complainant must show that: (1) they belong to a statutorily protected class; (2) they were subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on their statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See generally Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). Upon review of the record, we find that substantial evidence in the record supports AJ1's decision to find that the Agency did not subject Complainant to racial harassment. Specifically, in finding that discriminatory intent on the basis of race did not exist, AJ1 credited testimonial evidence that S2 had hired several African-American attorneys before Complainant's transfer and that management treated an African-American attorney more leniently than Complainant. HT1, at 104, 1201-02. In addition, AJ1 reasonably inferred that S2's ambiguous comment that Complainant did not "fit the image of a government attorney," without more, was insufficient to show discriminatory intent on the basis of race. Id. at 224-25, 294-96, 468-70, 1041-48, 1177. Although Complainant argues that S1's negative views of her stemmed from negative stereotypes of African-American women, we find that Complainant's mere speculation about the reason behind S1's perception of her is not enough to show that S1's conduct was based on her race. Non-Pecuniary Compensatory Damages for Retaliatory Harassment When discrimination is found, an agency must provide a complainant with a remedy that constitutes full, make-whole relief to restore her as nearly as possible to the position she would have occupied absent the discrimination. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transport. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975); Adesanya v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01933395 (July 21, 1994). Pursuant to Section 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a complainant who establishes unlawful intentional discrimination under Title VII may receive compensatory damages for, among other things, non-pecuniary losses (e.g., pain and suffering, mental anguish) as part of this "make whole" relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Non-pecuniary losses are losses that are not subject to precise quantification, i.e., emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation, injury to credit standing, and loss of health. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, at II.A.2 (July 14, 1992). There is no precise formula for determining the amount of damages for non-pecuniary losses except that the award should reflect the nature and severity of the harm and the duration or expected duration of the harm. See Loving v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01955789 (Aug. 29, 1997). The Commission notes that non-pecuniary compensatory damages are designed to remedy the harm caused by the discriminatory event rather than punish the agency for the discriminatory action. Further, compensatory damages should not "monstrously excessive" standing alone, should not be the product of passion or prejudice, and should be consistent with the amounts awarded in similar cases. See Ward-Jenkins v. Dep't of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01961483 (Mar. 4, 1999) (citing Cyngar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989)). Objective evidence of compensatory damages can include statements from a complainant concerning her emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character or reputation, injury to credit standing, loss of health, and any other non-pecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of the discriminatory conduct. See Lawrence v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01952288 (Apr. 18, 1996) (citing Carle v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (Jan. 5, 1993)). Statements from others including family members, friends, health care providers, other counselors (including clergy) could address the outward manifestations or physical consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness, anxiety, stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self-esteem, excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. See id. Evidence from a health care provider or other expert is not a mandatory prerequisite for recovery of compensatory damages for emotional harm. See id. A complainant's own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain her burden in this regard. See id. The more inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action. See id. The absence of supporting evidence, however, may affect the amount of damages appropriate in specific cases. See id. Upon review of the record, we find that substantial evidence in the record supports AJ2's decision to award Complainant $95,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages for the Agency's retaliatory harassment. Here, AJ2 found that, for approximately 18 months (December 2006 to the spring of 2008), Complainant experienced embarrassment, stress, loss of professional standing, one panic attack, and the exacerbation of her lupus symptoms. We find that the amount awarded by AJ2 is not "monstrously excessive" standing alone, is not the product of passion or prejudice, and is consistent with Commission precedent. In other cases, the Commission has awarded similar amounts for emotional harm. See Complainant v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0720130010 (Oct. 31, 2013) ($100,000 awarded in harassment case where complainant, for over four years, experienced stress, loss of confidence, high blood pressure, chest pains, anxiety, depression, loss of reputation, and disruption of life and social relationships); Diaz v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120101054 (July 18, 2012) ($75,000 awarded in harassment case where complainant, for over one year, experienced anxiety, fear, humiliation, loss of dignity, loss of self-esteem, feelings of shame, depression, a change in her personality, stress, sleeplessness, crying episodes, headaches, and body pains); Fivecoat v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 0720110035 (May 15, 2012) ($100,000 awarded in harassment case where complainant, for over two years, experienced anxiety, depression, stress, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of self-esteem, sleep problems, and humiliation); Robinson v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070015 (May 22, 2008) ($85,000 awarded in harassment case where complainant experienced injury to character, injury to reputation, injury to professional standing, loss of enjoyment of life, sleep problems, anxiety, stress, depression, loss of self-esteem, and excessive fatigue), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520080667 (Sept. 10, 2008); Crear v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 07A50079 (Jan. 26, 2006) ($70,000 awarded where complainant experienced anger, embarrassment, worry, disrespect, degradation, professional isolation, fear of losing her job, loss of appetite, and sleep problems). Although Complainant argues that AJ2 erred in finding that she did not experience suicidal ideation as a result of the Agency's retaliatory harassment, we find that AJ2 was entitled to draw a reasonable inference from the fact that she did not share any suicidal ideation with her medical provider. Although Complainant argues that AJ2 erred in finding that she did not experience the dissolution of her marriage as a result of the Agency's retaliatory harassment, the record supports AJ2's determination that Complainant was vague on the timing. For example, Complainant testified that her husband had left in the summer of 2007, but also testified that her husband was "in and out." HT2, at 68, 92. In addition, the medical provider's notes from November 2007 and August 2008 contained references to Complainant's husband. Id. at 85-88, 90-92. Although Complainant argues that AJ2 erred in finding that she did not experience the loss of her house as the result of Agency's retaliatory harassment, we disagree. When asked by the Agency on cross-examination why she did not have $1,400 a month to make her mortgage payments, Complainant testified that she was paying her attorney's fees, her utilities, and her creditors. Id. at 84. In addition, Complainant testified that she had borrowed approximately $180,000 from other individuals to pay her attorney's fees. Id. at 81-83. The Commission, however, has held that compensatory damages are not recoverable for injuries resulting from participation in the EEO process. See Rountree v. Dep't of Agric., EEOC Request No. 01941906 (July 7, 1995) (damages are available to the extent necessary to compensate a complainant for the agency's intentional discrimination in the workplace, but are unavailable for injuries arising from a complainant's participation in the EEO process), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05950919 (Feb. 15, 1996); Appleby v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01933897 (Mar. 4, 1994). Although Complainant argues that AJ2 erred in not recognizing that she continues to experience emotional harm by having S1 in her chain of command, we note that she did not testify during the damages hearing about any such continued emotional distress. CONCLUSION Substantial evidence in the record supports AJ1's decision to find that the Agency did not subject Complainant to racial harassment. Substantial evidence in the record supports AJ2's decision to award Complainant $95,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final order and REMANDS this matter for further processing in accordance with this Decision and the Order below. ORDER The Agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action, within one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days of the date this decision is issued: 1. The Agency shall pay Complainant $95,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. 2. The Agency shall pay Complainant $171,137.50 in attorney's fees and $14,481.04 in costs. 3. The Agency shall pay Complainant $850 as compensation for her delayed within-grade increase. 4. The Agency shall pay Complainant three days of back pay, plus interest, for her three-day suspension. 5. The Agency shall remove any reference of Complainant's three-day suspension from her personnel files. 6. The Agency shall provide eight (8) hours of EEO training to S1 and S2 regarding their responsibilities under EEO laws, particularly Title VII and retaliation. 7. The Agency shall consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against S1 and S2. The Commission does not consider training to be disciplinary action. The agency shall report its decision to the Compliance Officer. If the agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the agency decides not take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If any of the responsible management officials have left the agency's employ, the agency shall furnish documentation of their departure date(s). 8. The Agency shall take reasonable measures to ensure that S1 and S2 do not engage in any future retaliatory conduct towards Complainant. The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation that the corrective action has been implemented. POSTING ORDER (G1016) The Agency is ordered to post at its Office of Regional Counsel in Bay Pines, Florida copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision was issued, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1016) If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision was issued. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0416) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0610) This decision affirms the Agency's final decision/action in part, but it also requires the Agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final decision on your complaint. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations _1/9/17_________________ Date 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website. 2 AJ1 found that Complainant did not provide sufficient evidence to establish incident 1. Accordingly, AJ1 found that the retaliatory harassment did not begin until December 2006. 3 AJ2 also ordered the Agency to pay Complainant $171,137.50 in attorney's fees, $14,481.04 in costs, and $850 for the delay in receiving her within-grade increase. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 0120140445 2 0120140445