U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Clement M.,1 Complainant, v. Ray Mabus, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency. Appeal No. 0120140861 Hearing No. 510-2013-00107X Agency No. DON-11-69450-03092 DECISION Complainant filed a timely appeal from the November 4, 2013 Agency decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency. ISSUES PRESENTED 1. Did the Administrative Judge (AJ) improperly exclude Complainant's witness from being called at the hearing? 2. Was the holding of a hearing, via videoconferencing, improper? 3. Did the AJ engage in prohibited ex parte communication with a witness prior to the hearing? 4. Was the AJ's conclusion that the Agency did not violate the EPA or discriminate against Complainant based on sex supported by substantial evidence? BACKGROUND Complainant worked as an Information Technology (IT) Specialist at the Agency's Naval Engineering Facilities Command, Command Information Office, IT Division in Jacksonville, Florida. The IT Division was divided into two groups, Technical Support and Network Support. Technical Support was comprised of IT Specialists, such as Complainant. Network Support was comprised of Assistant Contract Technical Representatives (ACTRs). Except for the Lead IT Specialist who was a grade level GS-12, IT Specialists were paid at grade level GS-11. ACTRs were grade level GS-12 employees. There was also a GS-12 Portfolio Manager. Complainant was supervised by a Supervisory IT Specialist (S1) and his second level supervisor was the Command Information Officer (CIO). In his complaint, filed October 14, 2011, Complainant alleged that the Agency discriminated against him on the basis of sex (male) when it paid him at grade level GS-11 for performing the same or similar work as women who were being paid at the higher grade level of a GS-12. Following an investigation of his complaint, Complainant requested a hearing before an AJ. A hearing was held on July 30, 2013. The AJ issued a decision on September 5, 2013 finding no discrimination. The Agency adopted the AJ's decision. AJ's Decision The AJ did not find either an EPA violation or a Title VII violation. Regarding sex discrimination, the AJ found that Complainant had failed to establish a prima facie case, noting that he had not identified similarly situated employees outside of his protected group who were treated more favorably than he was under the same or similar circumstances. Regarding his claim of not being paid substantially the same as women performing the same work, the AJ concluded that the Agency did not violate the EPA. It was Complainant's claim that he was performing duties of the ACTRs who were paid at the higher GS-12 grade level. In concluding that Complainant did not perform the duties of an ACTR, the AJ examined the duties and responsibilities of an ACTR and those of an IT Specialist. He found that the main responsibility of ITs in Technical Support was to provide service and support for computers and computer-related equipment, including printers, copiers, scanners, telephones and other multi-media equipment. The AJ found that the main responsibility of ACTRs was to serve as a liaison in the administration of the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) contract. As such, the ACTRs addressed contractual issues regarding equipment, payment processing, ordering equipment and services associated with equipment, validate monthly premiums, assign equipment and submit task orders. In finding no EPA violation, the AJ found that Complainant was not responsible for performing, nor did he perform, ACTR work except for submitting task orders for telephones on occasion. Part of the work of the ACTRs included Move, Add, Change (MAC) work. MAC work involved the collection of identifying information such as names, email addresses, telephone numbers and linking them properly in a data bases with assigned computers, telephones and or Blackberries. Regarding Complainant's claim that he performed work which he claimed was the responsibility of an ACTR, the AJ found that Complainant did not substantially perform MAC work. In so finding, the AJ found that in 2009, Complainant performed about 1.5 percent of MAC work; in 2010, he performed approximately 2.3 percent; and in 2011, he performed approximately 3.4 percent. The AJ also found that the level of sophistication required to perform MAC work was not by itself sufficient to support a GS-12 grade level. ACTRs were also required to monitor the inventory of equipment to process payments for equipment and services. Complainant claimed that inventory performance was the sole responsibility of ACTRs. The AJ found that although ACTRs were responsible for monitoring the equipment inventory, the physical inventorying of counting existing equipment was a shared responsibility of all employees, regardless of grade level. Addressing Complainant's claim that he also performed work that the GS-12 Portfolio Manager, the AJ found that the Portfolio Manager was responsible for the management of software under the NMCI contract. The AJ also found that Complainant volunteered to assist the Portfolio Manager on a project involving her software responsibilities. He found that the CIO, Complainant's second level supervisor, allowed him to assist the Portfolio Manager in order to encourage Complainant to learn other areas to enhance his opportunities for growth and promotion. The AJ also found that the work Complainant performed was for a single project and the project was a learning opportunity provided to Complainant that would inure to his benefit. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Complainant's Contentions Complainant contends that the AJ erred when he excluded one of his witnesses. He avers that the excluded witness was his strongest witness and would be able to show that since he took over the telecommunications job, the witness was not required to perform MAC work because it was GS-12 work while the Complainant had to perform such work through September 2012. Complainant also argues that the excluded witness would have refuted the testimony of his supervisor and his second level supervisor, witnesses whom the AJ found to be credible. Complainant argues that the AJ engaged in ex parte communication with the Agency counsel when the AJ changed the trial to a video teleconference. He contends that the hearing was scheduled to be held in Jacksonville, Florida and the AJ changed it to a videoconference. Complainant also contends that the AJ first notified only the Agency of the change. Complainant contends in his appeal brief that the AJ misinterpreted the EPA when he found that Complainant did not perform the same amount of MAC work as did the ACTRs.2 He contended that the work that he performed between November 2007 and September 2012 consisted of substantially similar tasks to those performed by ACTRs' as core tasks. Complainant objects to the AJ's credibility findings. Agency's Contentions The Agency avers that the appeal should be denied because the AJ's decision, including his credibility findings, is based on substantial evidence. The Agency contends also that the AJ properly excluded the witness because his testimony would have been repetitive because it was substantially the same as Complainant's other witnesses; and that the AJ did not engage in ex parte communication when he scheduled the hearing from an in-person to a video conferencing. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Standard of Review EEOC 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) provides that all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. Exclusion of Witness Complainant contends that the AJ erred in excluding a witness before the hearing. The exclusion of witnesses by an AJ is a matter of discretion and the Commission gives "wide latitude" to an AJ in conducting a hearing. Corpus v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05A10457 (June 13, 2001); Siu v. Dep't of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 05A10219 (June 20, 2001). A party challenging an AJ exclusion of a witness on appeal must show that the AJ abused his discretion and that the testimony, if allowed and credited by the AJ, would have altered the decision. Corpus, supra. Complainant's Witness List of May 31, 2013, included in the record, proposed four witnesses and proffered their testimony. The excluded witness was identified. The excluded witness was to have testified about the work Complainant performed by Complainant requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility under the same job conditions as those performed by women paid at a higher grade level. The excluded witness was alleged to be performing in the same position that Complainant had occupied and he would have testified that he had not been assigned to perform the GS-12 level work that Complainant had been assigned. Complainant's argument concerning the exclusion of the witness is rejected. In the AJ's June 6, 2013 Order - Schedule Hearing - Witness Approval, he ruled that the witness was not approved to testify because even if his testimony was relevant, it would have been "unduly repetitive." At the hearing, the AJ noted his exclusion of the witness. HT at 6. He also asked the parties before hearing their opening statements whether "there [were] any objections so far with regards to any of my rulings," adding that this was their opportunity to make those objections for the record. HT at 8. There was no objection to the exclusion of the witness at the hearing. HT at 6, 8, 106. The Commission will not, on appeal, entertain an argument that the AJ improperly excluded a witness where the record does not indicate that there was an objection previously made. See David v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05A60603 (May 23, 2006). (exclusion of witness held proper where complainant did not oppose). Moreover, we also find no abuse of discretion on the part of the AJ in excluding the witness whose testimony the AJ determined would be repetitive. We have long recognized the AJs broad authority to regulate the conduct of administrative hearings. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(e); McCormick v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05970054 (June 11, 1998); Malley v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01951503 (May 22, 1997)(complainant excluded as witness in her complaint). This authority includes the AJ's discretion to limit the number of witnesses where testimony would be repetitious and, also, to exclude irrelevant or repetitious evidence. Armstrong v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 0120065232 (July 9, 2008); Moten v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm., EEOC Request No. 05940583 (Oct. 10, 1995). Ex Parte Communication, Video-conferencing Complainant argues that the AJ engaged in ex parte communications with the Agency when the AJ scheduled the hearing from an in-person hearing to a video-conferenced hearing and notified only the Agency. As a general rule, ex parte communications between a party and an AJ are prohibited. An ex parte communication is an "oral or written communication between decision making personnel of the EEOC and an interested party to the proceeding which does not provide for the participation of the other interested parties." Complainant v. Dep't of Veterans Aff., EEOC Appeal No. 0120111535 (Aug. 14, 2014); EEOC Handbook for Administrative Judges (AJ Handbook), at Ch. 1, § I.E (July 1, 2002). In order for ex parte communication to be prohibited, it must relate to the substance of the case. Foster, et al v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05920483 (Dec. 23, 1992)(ex parte communications between AJ and complainants related to a substantive issue were inappropriate); Bowers v. Dep't of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070012 (Mar. 22, 2010)(ex parte claims procedural and no evidence agency prejudiced by them); Martin v. Small Business Admn., EEOC Appeal No. 0120070096 (Aug. 29, 2008)(no evidence that AJ relied on ex parte communication in reaching ultimate finding); Cartwright v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01A51267 (Mar. 21, 2006)(ex parte communication about a procedural matter did not compromise AJ's objectivity); Kettler v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01921240 (Sept. 5, 1992)(no evidence to indicate complainant's opportunity for a fair hearing harmed by ex parte communication). The AJ stated at the hearing that he wanted everyone to be aware that "several weeks" prior to the hearing that he had spoken to a witness (W-1). HT at 35. The AJ explained that he did not "realize" that W-1 was going to be a witness. He stated that at the time, he was trying to set up the video conference and Agency counsel had provided him with the name of W-1. The AJ explained at the hearing that he wanted to call W-1 first to see if he was available before providing W-1's name to his (AJ's) IT. In Complainant's Witness List submitted to the AJ on May 31, 2013, Complainant identified W-1 as a proposed witness and proffered the testimony of W-1. ROI at 169, 172. In addition, in his affidavit, Complainant listed W-1 as one of the employees working in Technical Support. ROI at 178. Also, in his June 6, 2013 Order - Schedule Hearing - Witness, the AJ had approved W-1 as a witness for Complainant. The record contains a July 20, 2013 email from Agency counsel to witnesses, who were approved for the hearing, and to Complainant informing them where they needed to be for the hearing and that W-1 was to be at the hearing earlier to set up the video conferencing. We find that the AJ's contact with W-1 concerned logistics and there is no evidence that the AJ's contact affected his objectivity regarding the ultimate outcome. Santiago-Soto v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01880318 (Oct. 21, 1988(ex parte contact not improper but necessary logistic). Here, the AJ had approved W-1's appearance as a witness and W-1 was an IT Specialist located in the very division in a complaint that centered on issues pertaining to the responsibilities of IT Specialists. Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, the record does not support a finding that the AJ engaged in the kind of prohibited ex parte communication that would constitute an abuse of discretion.3 The AJ's communication with W-1 concerned the setting up and testing of the videoconference equipment.4 HT at 35. The Commission next addresses whether video conferencing of the hearing was proper. Objections to video conference raised on appeal are reviewed by the Commission under the abuse of discretion standard, on a case-by-case basis. Allen v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A51259 (Aug. 21, 2006) at n. 6 (propriety of video conferenced hearing addressed as matter of first impression).5 The Commission has recognized that it is appropriate to allow AJs "greater latitude" in determining whether to conduct a hearing by video conference. Id. While there is no "bright line" standard, there are a number of factors that the AJ nonetheless should consider before electing to proceed. Id. These factors include the availability and proximity to the participants of the video-conferencing facilities; the adequacy of the available video-conferencing facilities, including any technological issues; the cost to the respondent agency (if any) balanced against the savings in travel time for all parties, and the AJ; the number of expected participants; and the objections of the parties, if any.6 Should a party object to conducting the hearing by video conference, the AJ is required to "document for the record both the nature of the objection and his or her ruling on the objection, including the reasons." Id. The absence of an objection to the means by which a hearing is held is not dispositive; rather it is merely one of the factors to be considered. Id., at n. 7. The record contains an AJ Order - VTC Hearing - Re-File Exhibits, issued July 22, 2013. The Order advises that the hearing scheduled for July 30, 2013 would be conducted by video conference in Jacksonville, Florida. The record also contains a July 20, 2013 email from Agency counsel to witnesses, who were approved for the hearing, and, also to Complainant informing them where they needed to be for the hearing. In addition, a notice and the city where the hearing was to be held was provided by the AJ in his June 6, 2013 Order - Schedule Hearing - Witness Approval. We find that the AJ notified the parties of his intent to conduct a video conferenced hearing in his July 22, 2013 Order.7 Prior to this appeal, there is no evidence in the record, and Complainant has produced none, that he objected to the hearing going forward by video conference. It is significant is that Complainant was given an opportunity to object to any of the AJ's rulings at the opening of the hearing and he raised no objections. It also does not appear that the city of the hearing was changed for any of the witnesses from when the AJ first set down the case for hearing in Jacksonville, Florida in his June 6, 2013 Order. There were also no technological difficulties that occurred using videoconferencing and the AJ could observe and hear the witnesses. We, therefore, find that conducting the hearing via videoconference, in this instance, was not an abuse of discretion. EPA Violation Complainant has alleged an EPA violation. The United States Supreme Court articulated the requirements for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the EPA in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). To establish a prima facie case of a violation under the EPA, a complainant must show that he received less pay than an individual of the opposite sex for equal work, requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, under similar working conditions within the same establishment. Sheppard v. EEOC, EEOC Appeal No. 01A02919 (Sept. 12, 2000), req. for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05A10076 (Aug. 12, 2003). The "equal work" requirement does not mean that the jobs must be identical, but that the jobs must be "substantially" equal. See Miller v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01943457 (1995). There are three factors by which to measure the substantial similarity of jobs under the equal pay standard: equal skill, equal effort, and equal responsibility. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1620.14, 1620.15, 1620.16, 1620.17. The factors of equal skill, effort, and responsibility are not precisely definable. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14. Each factor is subject to a separate test, and each factor must be demonstrated for the equal pay standard to apply. Id. Skill includes consideration of such sub-factors as: experience, training, education, and ability. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a). Effort addresses the amount of physical or mental exertion needed to perform the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a). Responsibility concerns the degree of accountability required in performing the job, with emphasis on the importance of the job obligation. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a). Once a complainant has met the burden of establishing a prima facie case, the agency may avoid liability only by showing that the difference in pay is justified under one of the four affirmative defenses set forth in the EPA: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production of work (also referred to as an incentive or piecework system); or, (4) a differential based on any factor other than sex. Miller, supra, citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(i)-(iv). Initially, we note that Complainant challenged credibility findings made by the AJ. However, we accept the AJ's credibility findings because we do not find that documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or that the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management Directive 110, Ch. 9 § VI.B (Aug. 5, 2015). While testimony concerning what duties Complainant performed and whether the duties that he performed were substantially GS-12 work may have been in conflict, it was within the province of the AJ to determine credibility. We find that the AJ's conclusion that a violation of the EPA did not occur was based on substantial evidence. To prevail in an EPA violation claim, Complainant had to establish that he received less pay than women for equal work, requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, under similar working conditions. Complainant failed to do so. Although Complainant was paid at a lower grade level than the ACTRs, his evidence did not satisfy the requirements for an EPA claim. Even if his testimony that he primarily worked on MACs as part of his duties, as he has argued, working on MACs was not the only duty that the higher graded ACTRs performed. Other tasks that he performed that he testified were also higher graded work were not regularly performed by him and were not the core tasks of the ACTRs. The AJ's finding, therefore, that Complainant did not substantially perform higher graded duties was based on substantial evidence. Sex Discrimination Complainant contends that he was subjected to discrimination based on his sex. A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) where, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination. Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation for the actions in which it engaged is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983). Complainant has not shown that he was treated less favorably than others not in his protected group for a prohibited reason. Even if Complainant performed certain duties that the ACTRs performed or what he believed to be higher graded duties, Complainant has not shown that he was assigned those duties because of his sex. In failing to do so, he has not established a nexus between the Agency's alleged action and his protected status. The Commission notes also that men also occupied ACTR positions and that an IT Specialist was a male, GS-12. The AJ's finding that the Agency did not subject Complainant to sex discrimination is based on substantial evidence. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including evidence and contentions not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the finding that the Agency did not violate the EPA nor did it discriminate against Complainant based on sex. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0416) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION-EQUAL PAY ACT (Y0408) You are authorized under section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) to file a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction within two years or, if the violation is willful, three years of the date of the alleged violation of the Equal Pay Act regardless of whether you have pursued any administrative complaint processing. The filing of the civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations 10-19-16 __________________ Date 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website. 2 The record also contains Complainant's Reply to Agency's Brief in Opposition to Appeal, filed February 14, 2014. 3 In Bowers, supra, we cautioned the AJ to be mindful of the appearance of impropriety. 4 The record is silent as to why the AJ decided to initiate the call instead of having someone else do so since the IT Specialist he was contacting was approved to be a witness. 5 In Louthen v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A44521 (May 17, 2006), the Commission promulgated its policy concerning hearings conducted by telephone. 6 The Commission's preference remains that hearings be held in person. Allen, supra. However, the Commission recognizes that "with appropriate safeguards, video conferencing may provide an acceptable alternative to an in-person hearing, allowing the Commission to provide more, and more efficient, service to the federal sector." Id. 7 In Allen, the Commission noted that it contemplated that the AJ would provide the parties with "advance notice" of the AJ's intention to proceed by video conference, allowing the parties the opportunity to object. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 0120140861 2 0120140861