U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Gaynell A,1 Complainant, v. Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Great Lakes Area), Agency. Appeal No. 0120162728 Hearing No. 440-2013-00134X Agency No. 4J-530-0149-12 DECISION Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency's August 4, 2016, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission VACATES the Agency's final order. ISSUE PRESENTED The issue presented is whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge (AJ) properly issued summary judgment in favor of the Agency. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an EAS-17 Supervisor of Customer Services at the Northbrook, Illinois Post Office. In this position, Complainant supervised a group of employees in the delivery, collection, and distribution of mail, and in the provision of window service activities. Complainant began working in this position on March 13, 2010. On November 7, 2012, Complainant filed an EEO complaint in which she alleged that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of disability when: 1. On September 11, 2012, and September 27, 2012, she received harassing letters from her Postmaster, including ones concerning deadlines and threatening to remove her from the Agency because of her restrictions. Additionally, Complainant alleged that she was subjected to discrimination on the bases of sex (female) and disability when: 2. On unspecified dates, she was yelled at and called "stupid by the Postmaster;" 3. On unspecified dates, she was subjected to inappropriate sexual remarks by the Postmaster; 4. On an unspecified date, she was forced by the Postmaster to attend a training class; and 5. On two unspecified dates, she was sent home. In an investigative statement, Complainant stated that she has Major Depression, severe anxiety, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, hypertension, Diabetes and Panic Disorder. She further stated that within a few weeks of beginning her employment with the Agency, she told the Postmaster she is diabetic and stress "plays a major part as far as keeping [diabetes] under control." Regarding incident 1, Complainant stated that she received a harassing letter on September 11, 2012 from the Postmaster that threatened her removal because of her medical condition after she submitted her Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) papers on August 30, 2012. She stated that the Postmaster's letter stated that based on documentation she had submitted, her physician reported that she had long-term medical restrictions that prohibited her from performing her regular work assignment, and she could bid on different positions. Complainant further stated that the letter said that she had until October 5, 2012 to request reassignment, apply for disability retirement, or resign, and if she failed to exercise one of these options, the Agency could initiate action to remove her. Complainant further stated that she responded to the letter, and in response, the Postmaster issued her a second harassing letter on September 27, 2012 that stated that she must initiate one of the options outlined in the first letter by October 5, 2012, and if she had not accomplished one of the options by November 21, 2012, she could be subject to administrative action, including separation from the Agency. Regarding incident 2, Complainant stated the Postmaster would come into the post office and unto the workroom floor, walk over to her desk, and start "going off" by demanding and yelling why carriers were not at their cases or why overtime was so high. She further stated that the Postmaster would say he wanted employees written up, inquire why a carrier was out past 5:00, and say he told employees he wanted carriers' cases clear of everything. He also allegedly stated, "Are you really that stupid." She stated that the Postmaster's "verbal abuse was part of a daily ritual," and the Postmaster would be so loud that people in the lobby could hear and customers would leave in disbelief. Regarding incident 3, Complainant stated she did not document the ongoing incidents of sexual harassment the Postmaster subjected her to, but he told her that he bet her husband could not satisfy her like he could; called his private parts "Big Boy;" said he was "going to fuck me one day;" said he would take her to Vegas and "tear my ass up;" said he was "going to fuck" her; told her to "hurry up and being your pretty ass back to work so he can fuck" her; and asked if she had sex the previous night. Complainant further stated that he would be in a meeting, and the Postmaster would stray off subject and tell her about all the women he had been with, including a "stalker" who drove by his house and made his wife suspicious. Complainant stated that the Postmaster also told her that when he gets sexually involved with her, she could not stalk him. She also stated that the Postmaster grabbed his crotch. Complainant further stated that she told the Postmaster to stop and not to talk to her in such a manner. Complainant also alleged that she told the Postmaster he needed help and was delusional. She indicated that she started avoiding the Postmaster and pretending that the harassment was not affecting her. Complainant stated the Postmaster made sexual comments to her in his office and on the telephone continuously during the time period she worked for him. She averred that the sexual harassment started approximately right after she started working at the Northbrook Post Office and had been nearly a daily occurrence when he was in the office. Regarding incident 4, Complainant indicated that the Postmaster did not tell her that the training in the Palatine Processing and Distribution Center was only for Postmasters, and that she only found out this when she arrived at the training. She stated that the training instructor made it known that the training was only for Postmasters and became very agitated that supervisors attended the course. She averred that when she called the Postmaster and explained she was not supposed to be at the training, he responded, "Oh well." Complainant stated that the Postmaster felt she needed the training because she was the one that had to go out with carriers and keep the audit books updated, not him. Complainant opined that she did not think disability played a role in this action, but she thought sex was a factor because the Postmaster "just does whatever he wants to do." With respect to incident 5, Complainant stated that she was sent home on two occasions. She stated that in the first incident, she was on the telephone with a Safety Specialist from Palatine Processing and Distribution Center when the Postmaster came over to her desk and demanded that she get off the telephone. She stated that she tried to explain to the Postmaster that she was on the telephone regarding an accident report, but he told her he did not give a damn who she was talking with and to hang up. Complainant stated that she and the Postmaster "had words," and the Postmaster told her to get out of the building. Regarding the second incident, Complainant stated that when she told that Postmaster she was unable to walk 50 routes he had instructed her to walk, the Postmaster told her to go home. She stated that she then went to her primary doctor, who took her off work for a few days. The Postmaster (male) stated that he became aware of Complainant's medical conditions after she was hired, and he received FMLA papers regarding Complainant's conditions. Regarding incident 1, the Postmaster stated that he issued Complainant the letters because she was Absent without Leave (AWOL). He stated that he and Labor officials issued the letters to Complainant in an attempt to get her to return to work or to provide documentation for her absence. Regarding incident 2, the Postmaster stated that he never called Complainant stupid or yelled at her, and he acted professionally with his supervisors. He stated that he never acted in the manner Complainant claimed he did. Regarding incident 3, the Postmaster stated that Complainant's sexual harassment allegations are false, and he never made any of the alleged comments. He stated that Complainant never reported the alleged harassment to anyone, and the investigation was the first time he had heard such allegations. The Postmaster stated that he always conducts himself in a professional manner, and he never made any inappropriate sexual remarks. Regarding incident 4, the Postmaster stated that Complainant was not forced to attend training, and he never forced anyone to attend training. However, the Postmaster also stated that Complainant needed more training in delivery because she came from a mail processing background, and his job as Postmaster was to make sure his supervisors are fully trained in their job duties. Regarding incident 5, the Postmaster averred that he did not demand she get off the telephone with a safety specialist, nor did he send her home for the day. The Postmaster also stated that he did not demand that Complainant be sent home after she explained that she could not walk every route. He stated that he did not send Complainant home. "[Complainant] has never been sent home," the Postmaster stated. Report of Investigation (ROI), Affidavit B, p. 10. AJ's Decision After the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an AJ. Complainant timely requested a hearing. On February 19, 2014, the Agency submitted a motion for summary judgment in its favor, to which Complainant responded in opposition. The AJ granted the Agency's motion on July 19, 2016. In his decision, the AJ found that Complainant established prima face cases of sex and disability discrimination. The AJ further found that Complainant did not prove that the Agency's nondiscriminatory explanations for its actions were pretexts for unlawful discrimination. The AJ found regarding incident 1 that the letters sent by the agency were not harassing. The AJ found regarding incident 2 that Complainant was subjected to daily yelling and cursing by the Postmaster, but there was no evidence that these actions were related to her sex or disability. The AJ further noted that "the elephant in this case is Complainant's allegations of sexual harassment." The AJ dismissed incident 3 on the basis that it was not brought to the attention of an EEO Counselor, and is not like or related to a matter on which she was counseled. In so finding, the AJ reasoned that an allegation of sexual harassment "is vastly different" from what was alleged in incident 1. The AJ further determined that even if incident 3 can be construed to be like or related to incident 1, the Agency is not liable for the sexual harassment because Complainant never reported the Postmaster's conduct to any management official or any other person within or outside the Agency, including her psychiatrist or therapist. In so finding, the AJ noted that Complainant claimed that she talked with the Agency's Human Resources Shared Services Center about the harassment, and was told to contact the EEO Office, but she did not report any sexual harassment until she filed her formal complaint in November 2012. The AJ also noted that Complainant said that she informed her therapists that she had been sexually abused as child, but she could not tell them she had been sexually harassed by her boss because she was afraid. The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully adopting the AJ's findings. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant only addresses her sexual harassment allegations. Complainant maintains that she initially reported the sexual harassment to the Human Resources/Shared Services Department (HR) and was told she needed to file a complaint with the EEO office, which she did. Complainant contends that although she was initially reluctant to talk about sexual matters, she provided notice to the Agency of the discriminatory actions of her supervisor during the EEO process. Complainant further stated that all the allegations in her complaint are part of "one piece" and therefore related to incident 1. The Agency requests that we affirm its final decision. STANDARD OF REVIEW In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge's determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law"). ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS AJ's Dismissal of Sexual Harassment Allegations The AJ dismissed incident 3 on the basis that this matter was not raised during EEO Counseling, and is not like or related to the matters raised. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. §1614.107(a)(2) provides that an agency shall dismiss a portion of a complaint that raises a matter that has not been brought to the attention of an EEO Counselor and is not like or related to a matter that has been brought to the attention of an EEO Counselor. During counseling, Complainant alleged that the Postmaster harassed her on the basis of "physical and mental disability, and other forms of harassments" when he issued her letters that threatened her employment with the Agency. However, we note that both incident 1 and incident 3 concern alleged harassment by the Postmaster that occurred around the same time period. Additionally, Complainant's assertion that her counseled matter includes "other forms of harassment" demands an expansive reading of her harassment claim, inclusive of additional bases and incidents not explicitly raised during counseling. Moreover, we determine that all five incidents alleged in Complainant's complaint are part of a single claim of ongoing harassment. As such, we conclude that incident 3 is like or related to incident 1, and the AJ improperly dismissed this matter pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §1614.107(a)(2). Summary Judgment We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing). After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ erred when he concluded that there is no genuine issue of material fact in this case. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the Agency was inappropriate. Vicarious Liability The AJ concluded that Complainant could not prevail on her sexual harassment allegations because the Agency cannot be held liable for the alleged sexual harassment. The AJ based this on his determination that Complainant failed to report the alleged misconduct or take any other actions to stop the Postmaster from harassing her. An agency is subject to vicarious liability for harassment when it is created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. See Burlington Industries. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). In this case, it is undisputed that the Postmaster who allegedly harassed Complainant was empowered to take tangible employment actions against Complainant. Vance v. Ball State, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013); see also, Complainant v. Dept. of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0720140021 (Aug. 19, 2015). As such, the supervisory standard of harassment liability applies to this case. Where, as here, the harassment does not result in a tangible employment action, an agency can raise an affirmative defense to supervisory harassment by demonstrating: (1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior; and (2) that the complainant unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the agency or to avoid harm otherwise. See Burlington Industries, supra; Faragher, supra; Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999) (Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability). No affirmative defense is available when a supervisor's harassment results in a tangible employment action. Burlington Industries, at 762-63; Faragher, at 808. Here, the record reflects that the Agency had an anti-harassment policy that was issued in December 22, 2010. The policy apprised employees that harassment was prohibited by law and Agency policy, contained examples of harassment, and advised employees to report harassment to managers, supervisors, or Human Resources Managers. Additionally, three Northbrook employees interviewed for this case attested that posters containing information about the anti-harassment policy were posted in the facility during the relevant time period. Further, Complainant attested that she and other employees received required anti-harassment training. However, we note that the Agency was aware of Complainant's sexual harassment allegations at least shortly after she initiated EEO Counselor contact for this complaint on October 16, 2012. Thereafter, in order to avoid liability for harassment, the Agency had to promptly correct any reported harassing behavior. Waiting on the EEO process to resolve reported harassment does not promptly or effectively address such allegations because the EEO process cannot immediately address harassment. Thus, when an employer becomes aware of alleged harassment, it has the duty to investigate the charges promptly and thoroughly, beyond the EEO process. See Complainant v. Dep't of Commerce, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120625 (July 11, 2014). By "thoroughly" the Commission means "effectively," taking whatever action necessary to end the harassment and prevent misconduct from recurring. See Voigt v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal 01931799 (Dec. 20, 1994). In this case, there is no evidence that the Agency undertook an internal investigation of Complainant's harassment allegations or otherwise promptly did anything to prevent misconduct from recurring, including retaliation. Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, V.C.1 (June 18, 1999); see also Heidi B. v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0720140004 (Feb. 2, 2017) (Agency liable for harassment when it did not take any action to prevent retaliation and did not communicate to or educate the rest of the staff that such sexually harassing conduct was against Agency policy and would not be tolerated.). Therefore, we do not find that the Agency acted promptly to correct any harassing behavior.2 Additionally, regarding Complainant's response to the alleged harassment, we note that Complainant maintains that she reported the harassment to the Agency's HR hotline. It is unclear from the record the purpose of this hotline, the date of Complainant's conversation with HR, or the person with whom Complainant talked and their job title. Further, it is unclear from the record who the HR Managers were that Complainant was supposed to contact to report harassment, if the Agency apprised employees of those managers' contact information, and if reporting harassment on the HR hotline constitutes contacting HR Management. Nevertheless, we note that the Postmaster is the alleged harasser in this case. The Agency's policy advised employees to report harassment to managers, supervisors, or Human Resources Managers. The Postmaster is almost certainly the highest-ranking management official at any postal facility, and here, the Postmaster directly supervised Complainant. Moreover, there is no evidence that Complainant was supervised by any other person, or that the Agency provided Complainant with another supervisory official to whom she could report the harassment. Additionally, we find it reasonable that Complainant would be fearful of reporting harassment by the Postmaster who directly supervised her. Therefore, we do not find that Complainant acted unreasonably in reporting this matter, and as such, the Agency would be liable if Complainant was subjected to sexual harassment. Harassing Conduct Complainant alleges that she was subjected to conduct by the Postmaster that, if true, would constitute harassment. However, the Postmaster maintains that Complainant's sexual harassment allegations are false. As such, this case hinges on credibility determinations about the assertions of Complainant and the Postmaster. A hearing before an AJ is the only proper way to make such determinations. Complainant v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120111865 (July 9, 2014) (When no one besides the parties witnesses sexual conduct, resolving a sexual harassment claim will often depend on the credibility of the parties.). We note that the hearing process is intended to be an extension of the investigative process, designed to ensure that the parties have "a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement the record and, in appropriate instances, to examine and cross-examine witnesses." See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 7-1 (Aug. 5, 2015); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(e). "Truncation of this process, while material facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses is still ripe for challenge, improperly deprives Complainant of a full and fair investigation of her claims." Bang v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (Mar. 26, 1998). See also Peavley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05950628 (Oct. 31, 1996); Chronister v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05940578 (Apr. 25, 1995). Therefore, we find that the AJ erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Agency. Finally, because we determine that all five incidents alleged in Complainant's complaint are part of a single claim of ongoing harassment, and to avoid piecemeal adjudication of this matter, we remand the complaint for a hearing in its entirety. See Hester S. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120152890 (Dec. 20, 2017). CONCLUSION Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including Complainant's arguments on appeal, the Agency's response, and arguments and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission VACATES the Agency's final order and REMANDS this matter to the Agency in accordance with this decision and the Order below. ORDER The Agency is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The Agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, another Administrative Judge shall hold a hearing and issue a decision on the complaint (claims 1-5) in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109 and the Agency shall issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0617) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be in the digital format required by the Commission, and submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610) This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations 6-14-18 __________________ Date 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website. 2 Although Complainant was apparently on extended leave during this period, the Agency's obligation to promptly address and correct any harassing behavior was not extinguished by Complainant's absence. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 0120162728 11 0120162728