U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Fernando D.,1 Complainant, v. James N. Mattis, Secretary, Department of Defense (Department of Defense Education Activity), Agency. Appeal No. 0120162810 Hearing No. 570-2014-00414X Agency No. EU-FY13-014 DECISION Complainant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency's final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission VACATES the Agency's final order. ISSUE PRESENTED Whether there are genuine issues of material fact that require a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a First-Grade Teacher at the Agency's Ramstein Elementary School (ES), Germany. On December 17, 2012, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency subjected him to discrimination and harassment on the bases of race (Caucasian), sex (male), disability, age, and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when: 1. On December 10, 2012, the Principal asked to see a behavior plan for one of his students and directed him to revise it; 2. On December 3, 2012, the Superintendent attempted to discredit him during a meeting with Rarnstein ES staff; 3. On November 26, 2012, chairs were removed from his classroom; 4. On November 26, 2012, the Principal did not respond to his email inquiring about parking; 5. On November 16, 2012, the Principal sent a letter to the Language Arts Support Team designed to create dissent between him and other teachers; 6. From November 15, 2012, to present, the Principal began placing notes in his distribution box rather than respond to him via email; 7. On November 15, 2012, the Principal did not reply to his email inquiring about parking; 8. On November 15, 2012, the Principal did not reply to his email inquiring about his Professional Growth Plan; 9. On November 15, 2012, the Principal placed a note in his distribution box containing inaccurate information about a conference concerning a child with behavior problems; 10. On November 7, 2012, the Principal declined to write a letter of recommendation for him; 11. On November 5, 2012, the Principal implied that he was neglecting his students; 12. On October 30, 2012, the Principal criticized him over seating arrangements for one of his students; 13. On October 24, 2012, the Principal attempted to insert personal emails into the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) minutes; 14. On October 4, 2012, the Principal required him to fill out a form stating where he was located and what he was doing while he was on official time with the Federal Educators Association (FEA); 15. On September 17, 2012, the Principal accused him of charging the Administrative Officer; 16. On August 29, 2012, the Principal stated he was at a disadvantage because he was a male in early childhood education; 17. On December 6, 2011, the Principal prohibited him from cooking in his classroom for a student activity; 18. On May 6, 2011, the former Principal accused him of adding an item to meeting minutes; 19. On April 5, 2011, the former Principal blamed him for causing her to lose three friends; 20. On March 24, 2011, he received an unsigned letter in his distribution box stating he would lose his job and never teach again; 21. From March 24, 2011 to March 28, 2011, he was the victim of cyber bullying; 22. On March 7, 2011, the Superintendent condoned a coworker's use of the email system to cyber bully him; 23. From January 28, 2011, to January 31, 2011, the Former Principal created a divisive atmosphere designed to create turmoil centered on him; 24. In December of 2010, the Former Principal compelled his co-workers to make false statements against him; 25. On December 7, 2010, the Former Principal accused him of misquoting her; 26. On December 3, 2010, the Former Principal released information about him that resulted in his co-workers verbally attacking him; 27. On October 25, 2010, the Former Principal provided false information about him to the Superintendent; 28. On September 25, 2010, the Former Principal accused him of making a false claim; 29. On September 17, 2010, the Former Principal wrote the Superintendent and stated he had provided an untruthful account of a meeting; 30. On September 16, 2010, the Former Principal issued him a Memorandum for the Record (MFR); 31. In August of 2010, the Former Principal told the Administrative Officer and the School Information Assistant that he was "trouble" and to inform her of all their dealings with him; 32. On June 18, 2013, the Principal called him a union thug; 33. In October of 2013, the Principal accused him of yelling at a parent; 34. On September 24, 2013, the Principal accused him of driving around a bus; 35. On March 14, 2013, the Principal did not answer his question as to why a colleague needed to be present with him during a meeting with the Principal; 36. In March of 2013, the Principal forwarded an email he wrote about a first-grade teacher to a male teacher. As a result, the male teacher confronted him on March 31, 2013; 37. In March of 2013, the Principal wrote to a first-grade teacher that he was anti-Christian; 38. On March 29, 2013, the Principal bullied him through the email system when he forwarded an email about him to a male Teacher, who then distributed it to the Ramstein ES faculty; 39. On April 1, 2013, the Principal stated that he must tell him his whereabouts when he was working on Federal Educator Association business; 40. On June 4, 2013, the Principal requested to meet with him regarding a colleague referring to him as a "white boy"; 41. On June 4, 2013, the Principal questioned him about a child abuse report he made; 42. The Principal and the Assistant Principal inquired whether he was filming the special education vans on October 24, 2013; 43. On November 27, 2012, the Principal violated his privacy when he placed a letter regarding his reasonable accommodation request in the distribution box of his coworker; 44. On October 12, 2012, the Principal charged him as Absent Without Leave (AWOL); and 45. He was constructively discharged on June 30, 2014. Following the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC AJ. Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the assigned AJ granted the Agency's motion for summary judgment on March 24, 2016. The AJ, however, granted Complainant's motion for reconsideration and reissued his decision on May 4, 2016. Therein, the AJ again issued summary judgment in the Agency's favor. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. The AJ specifically observed that Complainant is an active union representative who often confronted management with objections and grievances that were in violation of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The AJ noted that even if management retaliated against Complainant for his union activities, this would be outside of the Commission's jurisdiction because union activity does not constitute as protected EEO activity. The AJ further found that even if Complainant did engage in EEO activities as a union representative, the record showed that he was not a very good classroom teacher. In so finding, the AJ noted that numerous parents complained about Complainant's teaching and asked to move their children out of Complainant's class. The AJ observed that Complainant was not patient with students and was sometimes blunt and insensitive to parents. The AJ additionally noted that the Principal criticized Complainant over seating arrangements because a student could not see the board for instruction and was in distress. The AJ observed that once this child was moved to a different class, he was above grade-level in all subjects and showed good behavior. The AJ moreover observed that the Principal denied saying that Complainant was at a disadvantage because he was a male in early childhood education, and that chairs were only removed from Complainant's classroom for a school holiday event. The AJ also found that the Principal only prohibited Complainant from cooking in his classroom because Air Force fire code regulations do not allow for a deep fryer in a classroom. The AJ also found that while the Former Principal acted unprofessional at times and harassed many of the teachers, it was not due to any protected class. Rather, she would scream and treat everyone in the same manner. In further finding no harassment, the AJ noted that Complainant has simply listed every possible disagreement with his superiors, a vast majority of which are nothing more than ordinary workplace issues. The AJ found that Complainant's claims collectively do not amount to a pattern or practice of a hostile work environment. In addressing Complainant's claim that his medical confidentiality was violated, the AJ noted that any such violation was "de minims," and therefore did not rise to the level of an improper disclosure of Complainant's medical information. With respect to Complainant's claim that he was charged with AWOL, the AJ noted that Complainant alleged that this was over his union business, and therefore outside of the Commission's jurisdiction. Lastly, as for Complainant's claim that he was constructively discharged, the AJ found that Complainant's work environment was not so intolerable that he had no choice but to resign. Rather, Complainant accepted a Voluntary Separation Incentive pay of $25,000, showing that his resignation was voluntary. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Complainant's Brief on Appeal On appeal, Complainant, through his attorney, asserts that he has participated in prior EEO activity when he served as a union representative for multiple teachers who filed union grievances and/or EEO complaints. Complainant states that he represented an employee who brought an EEO claim against an Assistant Principal who had been accused of making discriminatory statements. Complainant argues that the Principal refused to discipline the Assistant Principal for his discriminatory statements, which included sexual inappropriate comments towards a female teacher. Complainant argues that the Principal and Former Principal did nothing to protect him from retaliation from the Assistant Principal. Complainant maintains that several actions were taken against him because he represented several teachers making complaints against the Assistant Principal. Complainant maintains that the Union President corroborated his allegations that he was in fact subjected to retaliatory conduct by the Agency. Complainant further alleges that all his claims should be read together as a pattern and practice of retaliation, and the Agency improperly attempted to fragment his claims. Complainant maintains that he established a prima facie case of discrimination based on reprisal, and management attempted to intimidate him by issuing him letter of caution and reporting him to senior administrators. Complainant maintains that he established a prima facie case of discrimination based on a hostile work environment. Agency's Response In response, the Agency argues that Complainant is unable to establish a prima facie case of harassment. The Agency asserts that even if Complainant's allegations are true, its actions were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a prima facie case of harassment. The Agency maintains that Complainant's allegations are simply not severe enough to create an "abusive working environment" for a reasonable person. In so asserting, the Agency states that Complainant's allegations against his school administrators are mundane workplace disputes and challenges that all employees face. The Agency contends that even construing all inferences in Complainant's favor, he has not established that he has been subjected to discrimination and harassment as alleged. STANDARD OF REVIEW In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.E.R. § 1614.405(a) (staling that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.E.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110) at Chap. 9. § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge's determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's. and Agency's. factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chap. 9. § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo Standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker."' and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law"). ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Summary Judgment We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242. 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial, Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in Favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986): Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103. 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court. Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing). After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was not appropriate, as the AJ committed errors of law and fact, the record is not sufficiently developed, there are genuine issues of material fact and the credibility of witnesses is at issue, as explained below. Hostile Work Environment based on Reprisal To establish a prima facie case of hostile environment harassment, complainant must show that: (1) he belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See McCleod v. Social Sec. Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 01963810 (August 5, 1999) (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). Upon review, we find that genuine issues of material fact exist, at a minimum, as to prongs (2), (3), and (4) as to Complainant claim of a hostile work environment based on reprisal. In so finding, there is no dispute that Complainant worked as a Faculty Representative Spokesperson (FRS), helping employees file EEO complaints. The record reflects that Complainant was very active in assisting employees with their EEO related issues, and there is no dispute that both the Principal and Former Principal were aware of this protected EEO activity. We also note that Complainant's allegations of harassment and retaliation occurred during the same period he worked as the Faculty Representative Spokesperson (FRS), assisting employees with EEO matters. Moreover, we note that a Third-Grade Teacher attested: Yes, there is reason to believe that [management's] actions could reasonably be based on Complainant's sex . . . that his helping colleagues with their EEO complaints was not acceptable to management. [Complainant] always informed management of teacher complaints concerning harassment since it is the principal's duty to investigate and act on these complaints. Report of Investigation (ROI), at 623.2 As such, we find there are genuine issues of material facts as to whether the alleged harassment was based on Complainant's protected EEO activity. We further find that the AJ improperly made credibility determinations against Complainant in favor of the alleged harassers and there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Complainant was subjected to a severe or pervasive work atmosphere that amounted to a hostile work environment. In so finding, we note that two teachers attested in the ROI that they witnessed Complainant being subjected to a hostile work environment. These teachers further averred that the treatment of Complainant may have been due to his protected EEO activity and sex. Specifically, the Special Education Teacher of grades 1 and 2 attested that she heard the Former Principal make derogatory comments about Complainant helping other Teachers with their EEO activity, among other things. The Special Education Teacher answered: Q: Have you heard the [Former Principal] or [the Principal] make derogatory comments regarding Complainant's race, sex, age, medical condition, or his prior EEO activity? A: I have heard [the Former Principal] use derogatory comments about things he has done to help others as she felt it was none of his business. . . .He did an outstanding job of helping the teachers regardless of the flack he took from [the Former Principal]. He was always willing to help a teacher no matter how he was treated. . . . ROI, at 638. The Special Education Teacher further stated that the Former Principal was "outwardly hostile" to Complainant and would often scream at him during meetings, while not doing the same towards her and other employees. Id. at 636. The Special Education Teacher believed that the Principal subjected Complainant to harassment as well, stating that he was "more subtle with his harassment." The Special Education Teacher specifically answered: Q: Have you observed [The Former Principal] and [the Principal] harassing Complainant? A: I have definitely seen [the Former Principal] harassing Complainant many times. However, I have not seen [the Principal] harassing Complainant. I am not saying it does not happen, I believe that it is done in a more subtle way. Id. at 638. The Special Education Teacher continued answering, stating that Complainant is "treated with more hostility than other teachers by [the Former Principal]." Id. In addition, the Third-Grade Teacher also stated that Complainant had been receiving harassing emails and that she observed Complainant being bullied and treated differently in written forms of communication. Id. at 608-617. We note that the AJ, in finding that Complainant was not he was not a very good classroom teacher, simply credited the Principal over Complainant, the Special Education Teacher, and the Third-Grade Teacher identified herein. We note that the Special Education Teacher and the Third-Grade Teacher did not opine that Complainant was a bad teacher, but praised Complainant for his role in helping other teachers. The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as a "trial by affidavit." Redmand v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted that when a party submits an affidavit and credibility is at issue, "there is a need for strident cross-examination and summary judgment on such evidence is improper." Pedersen v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940339 (Feb. 24, 1995). "Truncation of this process, while material facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses is still ripe for challenge, improperly deprives Complainant of a full and fair investigation of her claims." Bang v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (Mar. 26, 1998). See also Peavley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05950628 (Oct. 31, 1996); Chronister v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05940578 (Apr. 25, 1995). The hearing process is intended to be an extension of the investigative process, designed to ensure that the parties have "a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement the record and, in appropriate instances, to examine and cross-examine witnesses." See EEO MD-110, at Ch. 7, § 1.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(e). We also find that the AJ improperly analyzed Complainant's medical confidentiality claim. in finding that any such violation was de minimis. Rather, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) requires employers to treat as confidential all information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of an employee. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(3)(B), 12112(d)(4)(C). 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that: "Information obtained . . . regarding the medical condition or history of any employee shall ... be treated as a confidential medical record." By its terms, this requirement applies to confidential medical information obtained from "any employee," and is not limited to individuals with disabilities. See Hampton v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A00132 (April 13, 2000). Improper Agency disclosure of such medical information constitutes a per se violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Vale v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05960585 (Sept. 5, 1997). The AJ should facilitate development of the record on this issue, as well. In summary, there are simply too many unresolved issues which require further development of the record and an assessment as to the credibility of the various management officials, other witnesses, and Complainant himself. Therefore, judgment as a matter of law for the Agency should not have been granted. CONCLUSION After a careful review of the record, including Complainant's arguments on appeal, the Agency's response, and arguments and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission VACATES the Agency's final order and REMANDS the matter for further processing by the Agency in accordance with this decision and the ORDER below. ORDER The Agency is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision is issued. The Agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall hold a hearing and issue a decision on Complainant's claims that the Agency subjected him to a hostile work environment because of his involvement in EEO matters and violated his right to medical confidentiality. The Agency shall thereafter issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0618) Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(c) and § 1614.502, compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. Within seven (7) calendar days of the completion of each ordered corrective action, the Agency shall submit via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP) supporting documents in the digital format required by the Commission, referencing the compliance docket number under which compliance was being monitored. Once all compliance is complete, the Agency shall submit via FedSEP a final compliance report in the digital format required by the Commission. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency's final report must contain supporting documentation when previously not uploaded, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant and his/her representative. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610) This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations July 19, 2018__________________ Date 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website. 2 The page numbers referenced herein are located at the bottom center of the page. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 0120162810 13 0120162810