U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Adina P.,1 Complainant, v. Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency. Appeal No. 0720110016 Hearing No. 550-2009-00087X Agency No. 4F-940-0141-08 DECISION Following its January 18, 2011, final order, the Agency filed a timely appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a). On appeal, the Agency requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of an EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) finding of discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. The Agency also requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of the relief ordered by the AJ. For the following reasons, the Commission REVERSES the Agency's final order. ISSUES PRESENTED The issues presented are: (1) whether the Agency properly determined that Complainant was judicially estopped from recovering compensatory damages, among other relief, because she allegedly failed to properly disclose her EEO complaint in her bankruptcy proceedings; and (2) whether the EEOC Administrative Judge acted with passion and prejudice due to bias against the Agency. BACKGROUND Complainant was hired as a Letter Carrier in San Francisco, California in 1986. In 1988, Complainant was diagnosed with osteoporosis of the spine and hip, and, as her condition worsened, she became unable to lift, carry, push, and pull the weights involved in performing her duties as a Letter Carrier. In 1992, upon her doctor's recommendation, the Agency accommodated Complainant's disability by removing her from all mail carrier duties in exchange for assignments performing administrative duties in the Agency's San Francisco Processing & Distribution Center. In 1995 Complainant was offered a position within her medical limitations in the Agency's Operations Program Support (OPS) Unit. On January 28, 2008, Complainant was removed from the OPS unit and given a job offer as a Letter Carrier. Complainant told management officials that she could not perform the duties of a Letter Carrier because of her medical condition. Ultimately, the Agency did not put Complainant in a position that complied with her medical restrictions and Complainant did not return to work. On August 8, 2008, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of disability (severe osteoporosis) when it failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. On or about April 9, 2009, Complainant filed a petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy because her lack of income made her unable to pay her debts. On May 18, 2009, the Agency submitted to the AJ the "Agency's Request for Dismissal and in the alternative Motion For Decision Without a Hearing," in which the Agency argued, amongst other things, that Complainant does not have standing in this action because the litigation is part of her bankruptcy estate, and as such, only the trustee of the estate has standing. Further, the Agency argued that Complainant should be judicially estopped from litigating this claim because she failed to list her EEO complaint as an asset on her bankruptcy forms. On June 15, 2009, the AJ denied the Agency's request and determined that neither lack of standing or judicial estoppel applied in this case. The Agency submitted a request for reconsideration, which the AJ denied on July 23, 2009. Subsequently, the AJ held a hearing on August 4-5, 2009, and issued a decision on December 8, 2010. The AJ found that the Agency failed to reasonably accommodate Complainant's disability when it removed her from her position on January 28, 2008. After considering all of the evidence that Complainant submitted regarding her damages as a result of the Agency's failure to reasonably accommodate her disability, the AJ ordered the Agency to return Complainant to work in the OPS unit position from which she was removed and provide Complainant with a reasonable accommodation and continue to provide her with accommodations in the future, or, in the alternative, provide Complainant front pay. The Agency was also ordered to award Complainant back pay, with interest, from April 4, 2008, until the date of the AJ's decision, and to restore all fringe benefits that Complainant would have earned and received during the back pay period. The Agency was also ordered to pay Complainant pecuniary damages in the amount of $3,054.54, non-pecuniary compensatory damages in the amount of $125,000, attorney's fees in the amount of $57,098.75, costs in the amount of $624.20, and post a notice of a finding of discrimination. The Agency subsequently issued a final order rejecting the AJ's decision and appealed the decision to the Commission. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Agency's Contentions on Appeal The Agency does not contest the AJ's finding of discrimination. Instead, the Agency raises three issues on appeal. First, the Agency asserts that Complainant did not have standing to litigate her claims through the hearing and/or receive damages because her assets reside with the trustee of her bankruptcy estate. The Agency asserts that Complainant does not have standing to bring this litigation in her own name, as her causes of action as a matter of law are a part of the bankruptcy estate administered by a trustee in bankruptcy. The Agency argues that all legal and equitable interests in property are given to the trustee in bankruptcy in order to be available to pay the creditors. Complainant as debtor no longer has a right to exercise control of her assets, including her causes of action, once they become part of the bankruptcy estate. The Agency concludes that as a matter of law, Complainant has no standing to continue this cause of action. Second, the Agency asserts that the AJ erred in not applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel to Complainant because she did not claim her EEO complaint as an asset with the bankruptcy court. The Agency asserts that Complainant's EEO complaint should be dismissed under the doctrine of judicial estoppel because she failed to claim her EEO complaint as an asset in her Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition forms. The Agency asserts that judicial estoppel is appropriate because Complainant filed a sworn petition in the bankruptcy court denying any causes of action while at the same time she asserted a cause of action before the Commission. Third, the Agency asserts that the AJ acted with passion or prejudice because she was biased against the Agency. The Agency asserts that the AJ exhibited a high level of commitment to Complainant's success and an untoward bias against the Agency, which was evidenced by her rulings on objections during the hearing. The Agency asserts that the AJ's credibility assessments and "nefarious character traits" that she assigned to management officials showed her bias towards the Agency. The Agency also asserts that since Complainant would only be able to keep $16,000 of any damages awarded to her (the rest would go to her creditors), the AJ's issuance of damages over that amount exhibited an intent to impose punitive damages on the Agency.2 Finally, the Agency asserts that the AJ erred when she awarded damages for incidents that occurred prior to the date that Complainant's cause of action accrued on June 10, 2008. Complainant's Contentions on Appeal In opposition to the appeal, Complainant contends that she has standing to pursue her EEO Complaint because she is a Chapter 13 debtor, and therefore has possession of her bankruptcy estate. Additionally, Complainant contends that judicial estoppel does not apply in this case because she amended her bankruptcy forms to reflect her EEO complaint. Complainant asserts that when she was interviewed by her bankruptcy attorney's paralegal, she informed the paralegal that she had a "claim" to get her job back, but did not know that she had to use the words "lawsuit" or "cause of action." Complainant stated that once she discovered that her EEO complaint was required to be in the bankruptcy papers and was not included, she contacted her bankruptcy lawyer who amended the documents. The bankruptcy petition was adjudicated after the documents were amended to include the EEO complaint. Finally, Complainant asserts that the AJ was not biased towards the Agency and did not act with passion or prejudice. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, at § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015). We note, as an initial matter, that neither party contests the AJ's finding of discrimination. After a review of the entire record, we agree with the AJ's finding that the Agency failed to reasonably accommodate Complainant's disability. Judicial Estoppel and Bankruptcy The overall narrative of the Agency's argument is that it need not follow the AJ's order below to remedy the discrimination that it agrees occurred, because Complainant filed for bankruptcy. The Agency further argues on appeal that Complainant must be judicially estopped from pursing her claim for compensatory damages and back pay because such interest lies with the bankruptcy trustee. We note that courts have generally held that when an individual later files for bankruptcy, his/her employment discrimination claims become assets of the bankruptcy estate. See Auday v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc., 698 F.3d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)). As a result, the individual, as the debtor, ceases to have an interest in the discrimination claim, unless the trustee abandons it. See Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc. 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004). Courts have held that when discrimination claims accrue before the bankruptcy petition, they belong to the bankruptcy estate, and the trustee is the "real party in interest" to pursue them. See Auday, 698 F.3d, at 905 (citing Wieburg v. GTE Southwest, Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2001)). Courts have invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel upon a debtor for failing to disclose to a bankruptcy court his/her involvement in an employment discrimination lawsuit. See DeLeon v. Comcar Indus., Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003). They have applied a two-part test to determine whether judicial estoppel should apply in a legal proceeding: (1) Did the party to be estopped take an inconsistent position under oath in a separate proceeding, and (2) were the inconsistent positions "calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system" (citations omitted). E.g., Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 2017). This test reflects the important public policy interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial system; in this case, the bankruptcy court's interest in preventing debtors from benefitting from actions calculated to hide assets from their creditors. However, the EEOC has a different, and no less important, public policy interest in enforcing antidiscrimination laws and remedying discrimination. The Commission is specifically empowered "to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful ... practice," and to enforce its authority "through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b). That interest is not served by allowing a discriminating employer to benefit from a complainant's bankruptcy, least of all where it appears that the discrimination was a substantial contributing factor for the complainant declaring bankruptcy in the first place. Based on these premises, we find that the Commission is not judicially estopped in seeking victim-specific relief, such as back-pay and compensatory damages, on behalf of a complainant who files for bankruptcy. As the Supreme Court noted in EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002), the Commission does not stand in the shoes of the victim employee. Therefore, we find that even if a complainant were properly estopped, the Commission cannot be estopped in obtaining relief on behalf of victims of discrimination. Application of judicial estoppel here would ground the Commission in the Complainant's shoes and would frustrate the Commission's broad authority to eradicate employment discrimination on behalf of federal government employees. The Commission clearly can pursue remedial relief here even if Complainant herself is foreclosed from obtaining such relief. See EEOC v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A., 928 F.Supp.2d 950, 955 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (citing Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 298) (The fact that ordinary principles of res judicata, mootness, or mitigation may apply to EEOC claims does not ... render the EEOC a proxy for the employee."); EEOC v. Hi-Line Electric Company, 805 F.Supp.2d 298, 307 (N.D. Tex. 2011) ("The EEOC plays an independent public interest role that allows it to seek relief on behalf of individuals who were allegedly discriminated against, even if that relief would otherwise be barred if those claims were brought by the allegedly aggrieved individual."). Here, the EEOC AJ and this Commission under its name and empowered authority has specifically found the Agency liable for its discriminatory failure to accommodate and ordered the Agency to remedy such discrimination through compensatory damages and back pay, among other relief. The Commission's authority under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act dictates that it remedy the discrimination herein without regard to Complainant having filed for bankruptcy, a circumstance that was more than likely caused by Agency's discriminatory failure to accommodate her. See Taylor G. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120120164 (Apr. 17, 2018) (complainant who failed to properly disclose his EEO complaint during bankruptcy proceedings not barred by from recovering compensatory damages, among other relief, by judicial estoppel or lack of standing); Stiehl v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120061271 (Jan. 18, 2007), req. for recon. den'd, EEOC Request No. 0520070311 (Mar. 23, 2007) (complainant who filed a petition under Chapter 7, allegedly misleading the bankruptcy court, not barred by judicial estoppel or lack of standing); Glover v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120071106 (May 1, 2007), req. for recon. den'd, EEOC Request No. 0520070749 (Feb. 11, 2008) (complainant who failed to disclose her EEO complaint, allegedly misleading a Chapter 13 bankruptcy court, not barred by doctrine of judicial estoppel). As such, we find that the Agency improperly interfered with Complainant's compensatory damages and back pay as ordered by Commission's AJ. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (back pay should be denied only for reasons that would not frustrate Title VII's purpose of eradicating discrimination and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination). We find that the Agency's obligation was to the Commission to remedy the discrimination that it was found to have caused. AJ Bias and Damages The Agency argues that the AJ acted with passion and prejudice. After a review of the entire record, including the hearing transcripts and the motions submitted by the parties and ruled upon by the AJ, we find that there is no evidence that the AJ acted with passion, prejudice, or bias. There is nothing in the record that would indicate that the AJ treated Complainant more favorably than the Agency or that she had a particular interest in Complainant's success. As we noted earlier, an AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. There is nothing in the record that would indicate that the AJ's credibility determinations were fueled by bias against the Agency. Additionally, the AJ's credibility determinations were supported by witness testimony and inconsistencies in the record. We note that the Agency did not point to any evidence that would establish that the AJ erred in any of her findings that the Agency's witnesses were not credible. Next, the Agency argues that Complainant should not have been awarded more than $16,000 because the bankruptcy court will make her give any additional money to her creditors. We find that it is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court to decide what to do with a debtor's assets. We find that the AJ was correct when she did not take into consideration what another court may do with a portion of the award.3 When deciding damages, the Commission seeks to grant Complainant "make whole relief" for the Agency's discriminatory acts. The AJ's award adequately compensated Complainant for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary harm she suffered as a result of the Agency's discrimination. Had the AJ reduced the award based upon what another court may do, she would not have been granting "make whole relief" to the Complainant. Further, the AJ provided a very detailed analysis of her award that was supported by substantial evidence in the record, and there is nothing in the record that would indicate that the AJ's awards were punitive in nature. With regard to the Agency's argument that the AJ erred when she awarded damages for incidents that occurred prior to June 10, 2008, we find that the Agency is incorrect in its assertion that the discrimination did not occur until June 10, 2008. The AJ accurately found that the Agency failed in good faith to reasonably accommodate Complainant when it removed her from her job in the OPS Unit on January 28, 2008. Therefore, in order to issue "make whole relief," Complainant is entitled to any damages she suffered beginning from January 28, 2008. Finally, we note that the Agency alleges an inconsistency with regard to the date that Complainant should begin to receive back pay. The AJ ordered the Agency to pay Complainant back pay from April 4, 2008, the day Complainant was told there was no more work for her, until the date of the AJ's decision, which was December 8, 2010. The AJ also ordered the Agency to provide Complainant with all fringe benefits associated with that back pay, including leave. The Agency asserts that Complainant received a paycheck until May 11, 2008, therefore her back pay should not begin until May 11, 2008. The record indicates that after Complainant was sent home and told there was no work for her, she used a combination of paid and unpaid leave from April 4, 2008, through May 11, 2008. Therefore, in being consistent with making Complainant whole for the damages she incurred as a result of the Agency's discrimination, we clarify that the Agency shall provide Complainant with back pay between April 4, 2008, and December 8, 2010, and reimburse her for the leave that she used between April 4, 2008, and May 11, 2008. The back pay award shall not compensate Complainant for the hours of paid leave that she took between April 4, 2008, and May 11, 2008. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, the Commission finds that the doctrine of judicial estoppel cannot be used to prevent it from completely remedying the discrimination established in this case. We further find that the AJ did not act with passion or prejudice due to bias against the Agency. The Commission therefore REVERSES the Agency's final order and REMANDS the matter to the Agency for remedial action in accordance with this decision and the ORDER below. ORDER To the extent that it has not already done so, the Agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial actions: 1. To the extent that it has not already done so, within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall return Complainant to work in her prior position in the OPS Unit and shall reasonably accommodate Complainant's disability. The duty to reasonably accommodate Complainant is ongoing. 2. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall determine the amount of back pay owed to Complainant, including any pay increases, interest, and all benefits (i.e., sick and annual leave, health and life insurance, Thrift Savings Plan contributions) she would have received had she remained employed between April 4, 2008, and the date she was placed back into her OPS Unit position. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date the Agency determines the amount of back pay and other benefits, the Agency shall pay that amount to Complainant. 3. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall reimburse Complainant for the leave that she used between April 4, 2008, and May 11, 2008. 4. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall pay Complainant $125,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. 5. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall pay Complainant $3,054.54 in pecuniary compensatory damages. 6. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall pay Complainant $57,098.75 in attorney's fees, 7. The Agency shall pay Complainant reasonable attorney's fees associated with this appeal, as discussed below in the statement entitled "Attorney's Fees." 8. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall pay Complainant $624.60 in costs. 9. Within ninety (90) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall provide a minimum of four hours of in-person or interactive training to all management officials in its San Francisco Processing & Distribution Center regarding their responsibilities with respect to the Rehabilitation Act, with a special emphasis on reasonable accommodation. 10. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against the responsible management officials. The Commission does not consider training to be disciplinary action. The Agency shall report its decision to the compliance officer. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If any of the responsible management officials have left the Agency's employ, the agency shall furnish documentation of their departure date(s). 11. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall post the attached notice of discrimination, as described below. The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the Agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits due complainant, including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented. POSTING ORDER (G0617) The Agency is ordered to post at its San Francisco, California Processing & Distribution Center facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision was issued, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer as directed in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. The report must be in digital format, and must be submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1016) If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision was issued. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0617) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be in the digital format required by the Commission, and submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610) This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations 4-25-18 __________________ Date 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website. 2 The Agency does not argue on appeal that the AJ's non-pecuniary compensatory damages of $125,000 was monstrously excessive or not consistent with amounts awarded in other cases. Instead, the Agency argues that Complainant's total award should not have exceeded $16,000 because that is the maximum amount the bankruptcy court will allow her to personally keep. 3 We make no finding regarding the rights or interests of third parties with respect to the monetary awards we order the Agency to pay Complainant. Carnes v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 07A60015 (April 6, 2006). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 0720110016 11 0720110016