U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Lauralee C.,1 Complainant, v. John F. Kelly, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Agency. Appeal No. 0720150002 Hearing No. 410-2012-00197X Agency No. HSHQ000122011 DECISION Following its October 14, 2014, final order, the Agency filed a timely appeal which the Commission accepts pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). On appeal, the Agency requests that the Commission affirm its partial rejection of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge's (AJ) default judgment in favor of Complainant. Specifically, the Agency is only challenging the AJ's decision awarding Complainant $423,116.35 in compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the amount of $131,262.50. For the following reasons, the Commission MODIFIES the Agency's final order. ISSUES PRESENTED The issues presented are whether the remedies ordered by the AJ, which included an award of $200,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages; $223,116.35 in pecuniary compensatory damages; and $131,262.59 in fees to four attorneys for work on Complainant's case, are supported by the record. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Deputy Regional Director (DRD) and a Senior Instructor/Law Enforcement Specialist for the Federal Protective Service in Washington, DC. On March 2, 2011, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging non-sexual harassment based on sex (female). She later amended the complaint to include the additional basis of reprisal for prior EEO activity, and additional incidents in support of her hostile work environment claim. Complainant alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment as a result of a series of incidents occurring between August 2, 2010, and November 16, 2012,2 which were articulated in the acceptance letters and the parties' briefs. Neither the Agency nor Complainant contested the description of the claims which formed the bases of the formal complaint. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge. Complainant timely requested a hearing. On August 1, 2012, the AJ issued an Acknowledgment and Order to the parties in the case, and on August 27, 2012, the parties initiated discovery. Between August 27 and October 11, 2012, the parties exchanged discovery requests and responses. On October 11, 2012, in a status call with the AJ, the Agency was directed to conduct an expedited investigation. In a follow-up order dated October 19, 2012, the Agency was given 90 days (January 17, 2013) to complete the investigation. On January 31, 2013, the Agency advised that the case was just being assigned to an investigator. Complainant subsequently requested a show cause order as to why sanctions should not be issued against the Agency for its failure to timely complete an expedited investigation. A settlement conference was scheduled and held February 19 and 26, 2013. The parties were unable to reach settlement, and Complainant was advised to proceed with filing a motion to compel. Subsequently, on March 11, 2013, Complainant filed the motion, as well as a request for sanctions. On March 26, 2013, the AJ issued a show cause order, directing the Agency to explain why sanctions should not be ordered as a result of its failure to timely complete an expedited investigation. The Agency submitted a response on April 16, 2013, attributing the delay to the AJ's failure to issue a signed order concerning the investigation, and arguing that Complainant had suffered no prejudice. On August 13, 2013, the AJ issued a default judgment in favor of Complainant and an order to Complainant to submit evidence regarding damages. In that decision, the AJ cited the Agency's consistent, willful disregard of the AJ's orders by failing to timely produce responsive discovery, and providing inaccurate and incomplete responses to discovery requests. Additionally, the AJ opined that the Agency failed to offer good cause for its "complete administrative failure." The AJ also found that the Agency's contention that Complainant suffered no prejudice as a result of its delays was inaccurate. But for the Agency's delay, the supplemental investigation would have been completed and the parties would have been able to exchange discovery on the additional claims by mid-March, the AJ found. The AJ further found that the discovery period would have been closed at the time the default judgment was entered, and the case would have been ready for a hearing and would not have had to be put on hold due to funding issues. Complainant was ordered to submit evidence of damages within thirty days of receiving the order. Complainant filed a brief in support of damages on September 30, 2013. Complainant requested non-pecuniary compensatory damages at the cap amount of $300,000.00, and pecuniary compensatory damages in the amount of $1,903,163.02. In a decision issued on September 5, 2014, the AJ determined that Complainant was entitled to $200,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages, and $223,116.35 in pecuniary compensatory damages. Additionally, the AJ awarded a total of $131,262.50 in fees to four attorneys. The Agency declined to implement the AJ's decision with respect to remedies, and filed the instant appeal. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL In its partial appeal of the AJ's decision, the Agency objects the AJ's decision to award Complainant $423,116.35 in total compensatory damages, and $131,262.50 in attorneys' fees. The Agency argued that the AJ's compensatory damages award is both (1) monstrously excessive standing alone, and (2) is completely out of line with the amounts awarded in similar cases where complainants have pre-existing emotional and psychological harm prior to the agency's discrimination. The Agency submits that the AJ erred when she awarded Complainant $200,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages because the AJ failed to take into account the many other sources of emotional stress Complainant had in her life. Additionally, the Agency argues that the AJ did not properly "limit the Agency's liability [only] to the additional harm or aggravation caused by the Agency's conduct," nor did she include a reduction reflecting the chronic nature of Complainant's pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder. The Agency also submits that, prior to issuance of the default judgment, Complainant was only alleging psychological injuries, but afterward she maintained physical harm. Additionally, the Agency contends that it is difficult to discern from the AJ's decision exactly what she determined Complainant's pecuniary damages to be, and why she awarded $223,116.35. The Agency requests that the Commission modify the compensatory damages award to a more appropriate range between $5,000.00 and $50,570.34.3 With respect to the attorneys' fees award, the Agency argues that the AJ disregarded the goal of the fee-shifting statute under Title VII by awarding an excessive, unwarranted, and unsubstantiated attorneys' fees. Additionally, the Agency argued that the amount awarded appears to be a miscalculation as it represents 107% of the claimed amount. Although Complainant sought $122,150.00, the AJ awarded $131,262.50. There was no explanation provided as to the additional $9,112.50. The Agency requests that the Commission lower the attorneys' fees award to $35,205.00 which it claims represents an actual, reasonable rate in the instant matter. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission notes that the Agency does not contest the sanction of a default judgment here, nor does it dispute the AJ's determination regarding its failure to comply with her orders throughout the processing of this matter. Consequently, we need not address these issues further. Compensatory Damages Compensatory damages may be awarded for the past pecuniary losses, future pecuniary losses, and non-pecuniary losses which are directly or proximately caused by the agency's discriminatory conduct. See Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Enforcement Guidance), EEOC Notice No. 915.002, at 8 (July 14, 1992). Objective evidence of compensatory damages can include statements from the complainant concerning his or her emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character or reputation, injury to credit standing, loss of health, and any other non-pecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of the discriminatory conduct. Statements from others, including family members, friends, health care providers, or other counselors (including clergy) could address the outward manifestations or physical consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness, anxiety, stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self-esteem, excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Lawrence v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288 (Apr. 18, 1996) (citing Carle v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (Jan. 5, 1993)). Evidence from a health care provider or other expert is not a prerequisite for recovery of compensatory damages for emotional harm. Complainant's own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain her burden in this regard. The more inherently degrading or humiliating the agency's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action. The absence of supporting evidence, however, may affect the amount of damages appropriate in specific cases. See Banks v. U.S. Service, EEOC Appeal No. 07A20037 (Sept. 29, 2003). An award of non-pecuniary compensatory damages should reflect the extent to which the agency's discriminatory action directly or proximately caused the harm as well as the extent to which other factors also caused the harm. Johnson v. Dep't of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01961812 (June 18, 1998). It is the complainant's burden to provide objective evidence in support of her claim and proof linking the damages to the alleged discrimination. Papas v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01930547 (Mar. 17, 1994); Mims v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01933956 (Nov. 24, 1993). The Commission recognizes that not all harms are amenable to a precise quantification; the burden of limiting the remedy, however, rests with the employer. Chow v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01981308 (Feb. 12, 2001). Moreover, the amount of an award should not be "monstrously excessive" standing alone, should not be the product of passion or prejudice, and should be consistent with the amount awarded in similar cases. Cygnar v. Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571, 574 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Nonpecuniary Damages Complainant requested non-pecuniary compensatory damages at the cap amount of $300,000.00, and pecuniary compensatory damages in the amount of $1,903,163.02. The AJ found that Complainant submitted evidence in the form of doctor's reports that support her claim for non-pecuniary compensatory damages, and documentation in the form of receipts and statements for medical expenses, psychiatric expenses, physical therapy expenses, legal fees, and other out-of-pocket expenses in support of her claim of pecuniary compensatory damages which established that the expenses she incurred were directly related to the discrimination. Complainant was diagnosed with several new medical conditions, as well as "reactivation of a previously diagnosed condition," since the Agency began subjecting her to discriminatory harassment. Some of the conditions with which Complainant was diagnosed have only one known significant contributing factor or cause, i.e., stress. Complainant was diagnosed with depression, reactivation of post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD),4 insomnia, gastrointestinal distress, pancreatitis, irritable bowel syndrome (IBS), and temporomandibular joint disorder (TMJ). Complainant reported that, as a result of the discrimination she suffers from emotional pain, and that she now feels "hollow, exhausted, hopeless and helpless." Complainant reported that she cries all the time, and that she cannot exercise anymore due to severe anxiety resulting in panic attacks. Complainant stated she lives in constant fear which has resulted in her inability to leave her house unless she is attending a medical appointment or purchasing groceries. Complainant questioned whether she will be able to trust or rely upon anyone again. She complained of having her reputation harmed, and of a loss of interest in interacting with others and sustaining personal relationships. The Agency contends the compensatory damages award is monstrously excessive standing alone, and is completely out of line with the amounts awarded in similar cases where complainants have pre-existing emotional and psychological harm prior to the agency's discrimination. One of the chief arguments the Agency raises in support of these contentions is that the AJ failed to take into account the many other sources of emotional stressors Complainant had in her life. We find the Agency's argument to be without merit. The record reflects that the AJ took account of several factors that limited Complainant's damages award. The AJ explicitly stated that, among other things, Complainant's pre-existing medical condition limited the overall damage award to which she was entitled. While acknowledging that Complainant suffered emotional harm from the hostile work environment, the AJ reasoned that Complainant was diagnosed with PTSD previously, and that she has experienced some emotional harm from circumstances unrelated to her job with the Agency. While her conditions may have been exacerbated by the Agency's actions, the AJ clearly found that the Agency was not the sole cause of Complainant's emotional and psychological harm. Based on the record before us, we disagree with the Agency's contentions that the AJ failed to take in to account prior sources of emotional stress that Complainant was subjected to when determining the non-pecuniary compensatory damages award, or that the award amount of $200,000.00 is too high. Taking into account the evidence of non-pecuniary damages submitted by Complainant, we find no reason to lower the amount the AJ awarded in the instant matter. This amount takes into account the duration of the harassment, the nature and severity of the harm suffered by Complainant, the existence of previous conditions, and it is consistent with prior Commission precedent. In the instant case, the AJ found that "[t]he record reveals the severe ongoing harassment that the Agency has subjected Complainant to because of her sex and in retaliation for her protected EEO activity has resulted in her leave of absence. Since April 2010, Complainant notified the Agency that she was subjected to discriminatory harassment creating a hostile work environment yet, the Agency has never conducted an internal investigation into her harassment allegations, or taken any preventative or corrective measures to address Complainant's work environment." We determine that the AJ's award is consistent with amounts awarded in similar cases. See Brendon L. v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120141161 (Feb. 3, 2015) (awarding $150,000 in non-pecuniary where ccomplainant was subjected to harassment nearly every day for almost two and one-half years. The harassment led Complainant to skip family dinners, become less communicative, have difficulty sleeping, become isolated at work and home, have panic attacks and blood pressure issues, experience embarrassment, and humiliation); Brown-Fleming v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120082667 (Oct. 28, 2010)(awarding $150,000 in non-pecuniary damages for a complainant who suffered from depression, anxiety, stress, insomnia, difficulty concentrating, disassociation, crying spells, social isolation, damage to her professional reputation, withdrawal from relationships, short-term memory loss, nightmares, panic, worsening abdominal pain, worsening hypertension, dramatic weight-loss, and worsening psoriasis brought on by stress); Blount v. Dep't of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070010 (Oct. 21, 2009)(awarding $200,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages for a complainant who suffered from severe depression, an inability to work, and difficulty in meeting child and spousal support obligations). Pecuniary Damages The Agency contends that the evidence submitted is insufficient to substantiate the damages Complainant requested. The Agency claims that AJ failed to analyze the causal connection between the Agency's conduct and each portion of the award, and argues for a maximum pecuniary damages award of $25,570.34. We find that record evidence includes voluminous documentation from Complainant to support her claim for pecuniary losses associated with the discriminatory harassment. Complainant submitted documentation that she maintained supported her demand for $1,903,163.02 in pecuniary damages. After reviewing the documentation, the AJ determined that an award of $223,116.35 was more appropriate. The AJ found that the damage award was limited to the information provided in "legitimate receipts," and that much of what was submitted was not sufficient to substantiate the damages requested. Complainant requested a significantly higher amount than the ultimate award, and the AJ explained how and why the award was limited. For example, Complainant's claim regarding retirement losses was not included in the award, as the AJ reasoned that these damages were calculated at a GS 14, Step 6 level, a position Complainant never held. Additionally, with respect to Complainant's claim for out-of-pocket moving expenses based on the Agency's failure to advise her on FMLA rights, the AJ found that Complainant could not prevail; even if she had qualified under FMLA, it would have only been for 12 weeks, which would have limited damages to that time frame. The AJ was also unable to find evidence causally relating the FMLA claim to the discrimination. Upon review of the AJ's decision and the record, we find no basis to disturb the AJ's decision with respect to the amount of pecuniary damages awarded. Attorney's Fees Title VII authorizes the award of reasonable attorney's fees. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). To establish entitlement to attorney's fees, Complainant must first show that she is a prevailing party. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). A prevailing party for this purpose is one who succeeds on any significant issue, and achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing the action. Davis v. Dep't of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05970101 (February 4, 1999) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 427, 433 (1983)). The attorney's fees award is ordinarily determined by multiplying a reasonable number of hours expended on the case by a reasonable hourly rate, also known as a "lodestar." See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B); Bernard v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861 (July 17, 1998). In determining the number of hours expended the Commission recognizes that the attorney "is not required to record in great detail the manner in which each minute of his time was expended." Id. However, the attorney does have the burden of identifying the subject matters on which he or she spent time by submitting sufficiently detailed and contemporaneous time records to ensure that the time spent was accurately recorded. Id. Further, a reasonable fee award may be assessed in light of factors such as: (1) the time required (versus time expended) to complete the legal work; (2) novelty or difficulty of the issues; (3) the requisite skill to properly handle the case; (4) the degree to which attorney is precluded from taking other cases; (5) the relief sought and results obtained; and (6) the nature and length of the attorney-client relationship. See Cerny v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05930899 (Oct. 19, 1994). Complainant is only entitled to an award for time reasonably expended. It does not always follow that the amount of time actually expended is the amount of time reasonably expended. Elvin v. Dep't of Labor, EOC Request No. 01943425 (Aug. 31, 1995). Rather, "billing judgment" is an important component in fee setting, and hours that would not be properly billed to a private client are also not properly billed to the agency pursuant to a successful EEO claim. Id. The attorney for the prevailing party should make a "good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary." See Bernard, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861. The Agency contends that there appears to be a calculation error with respect to the final awarded amount, $131,262.50, as $9112.50 of the total award is unaccounted for and that this has resulted in Complainant receiving 107% of her claimed amount of attorney's fees without any analysis to support the award. The record indicates that the AJ awarded $9000.00 in attorney's fees to Legal Group 1; $106,000.00 in attorney's fees to Law Firm 1; $7000.00 in attorney's fees to Attorney A; and $150.00 in attorney's fees to Attorney B. The record contains fee petitions to support a total of $122,150.00 in attorney's fees and costs. Finding no clear indication in the AJ's damages decision to support the $9112.50 overage, we find that the Agency is entitled to an adjustment in the amount of the attorney's fee award to reflect the actual amount claimed in the fee petitions. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we MODIFY the Agency's final order, and REMAND this matter to the Agency for further processing in accordance with this decision and the Order below. ORDER To the extent that it has not already done so, within sixty (60) days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency shall: 1. Pay Complainant $200,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. 2. Pay Complainant $223,116.35 in pecuniary compensatory damages. 3. Pay Complainant's attorneys of record $122,150.00 in attorney's fees and costs as articulated in the AJ's previous Damages Decision dated August 15, 2014. The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying that the corrective action has been implemented. POSTING ORDER (G0617) The Agency is ordered to post at its Federal Protective Service, Washington, D.C. facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision was issued, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer as directed in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. The report must be in digital format, and must be submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0610) If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0617) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be in the digital format required by the Commission, and submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610) This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations __9/25/17________________ Date 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website. 2 The Commission notes that by letter dated February 14, 2013, the Agency accepted Complainant's amended claims of discrimination to include additional incidents in support of the hostile work environment claim, and the additional basis of reprisal for prior EEO activity. 3 In its brief on appeal, the Agency argues that appropriate non-pecuniary compensatory damages would be in the range of $5, 000 to $25,000. The Agency further argues that the appropriate amount of pecuniary damages would be $25,570.34, comprised of expenses for mental health counseling, other psychiatric expenses, prescriptions, and credit card interest. 4 The Commission notes that Complainant was first diagnosed with PTSD in 1997 following sexual assault by a fellow military member. The AJ noted that, while the Agency was not responsible for any of Complainant's pre-existing decisions, it was liable for all aggravation of those preexisting conditions. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 0720150002 2 0720150002