U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Carmina E.,1 Complainant, v. Jeff B. Sessions, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency. Appeal No. 0720150011 Hearing No. 460-2012-0045X Agency No. P2011-0143 DECISION Following its September 30, 2014, final order, the Agency filed a timely appeal which the Commission accepts pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). On appeal, the Agency requests that the Commission AFFIRM its rejection of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge's (AJ) remedial determination. Specifically, the Agency disputes the AJ's issuance of front pay, and future pecuniary damages. For the following reasons, the Commission MODIFIES the Agency's final order. ISSUE PRESENTED Wether the AJ erred in granting Complainant front pay and future pecuniary damages. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Material Handler Supervisor at the Federal Correctional Complex, Trust Fund Department in Oakdale, Louisiana. Complainant filed an EEO complaint which alleged, among other things, discrimination based on sex when a coworker sexually harassed her. A hearing was held regarding this matter and the AJ determined that Complainant was subjected to discriminatory harassment and that the Agency was liable for the coworker's actions as the Agency did not take prompt and immediate action to stop the harassment. Once the AJ determined that the Agency was liable for the harassment, the AJ issued a separate decision regarding damages. During the damages phase, the AJ, among other things, ordered Complainant to submit a verified statement of fees and costs. On May 27, 2014, Complainant filed "Complainant's Brief in Support of Fee Petition." The Agency did not file a response. The parties were also afforded an opportunity to file closing briefs. On May 28, 2013, Complainant filed "Complainant's Close of Record Brief Regarding Damages." The Agency did not file a closing brief on damages. The AJ found that Complainant suffered severe emotional distress as a result of her coworker's sexual harassment; including, but not limited to feelings of shame, fear, discomfort, despair, rage, stress, and frustration. The AJ noted that the coworker's harassing behavior included: (1) battery of Complainant; (2) assault of Complainant; (3) puerile, salacious and demeaning comments about her made to her and coworkers; and (4) workplace confrontations. The AJ also found that the Agency's failure to take immediate and appropriate action to end the harassment further contributed to Complainant's severe emotional distress, as the Agency did not ensure that her harasser was kept away from her. As a result of the harassment she suffered in the workplace, Complainant filed a claim with the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), which was accepted. Complainant's treating physician reported that he had been treating Complainant continuously since December 2010, and expected her treatment to continue for the indefinite future. Complainant's physician diagnosed her with adjustment disorder with depression and severe anxiety. He attributed Complainant's depression and anxiety to her coworker's sexual harassment, and the Agency's failure to take immediate and appropriate corrective action to end the harassment and make her whole. Complainant was prescribed medication to treat her depression, anxiety, and sleep disturbances. In March 2013, Complainant's physician noted that her future was still very uncertain. The physician further opined that Complainant was unable to function completely and safely in her previous capacity in the prison system. She missed the positive aspects of her job but noted that when she left the job and met someone in a public setting with whom she worked, she became nauseous. The record also indicated that anytime she left her house she suffered anxiety about meeting employees from the Agency that she might know. The physician also found that Complainant had suicidal thoughts from December 2010 until the hearing. He observed that the "intensity" of Complainant's depression became so great that she had suicidal ideations and a plan. Although she did not make an attempt, her friends and family were concerned that she would hurt herself. The physician noted that despite the medication that Complainant used, she continued to be extremely symptomatic. He indicated that as a result of her inability to function, Complainant became unable to care for her daughter, and in January 2011, her daughter began living with her grandmother for a period of two years. The physician found that Complainant struggled with the shame and guilt over feeling that she abandoned her daughter. He opined that she would need ongoing treatment for her depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. He thought that Complainant would require ongoing psychiatric and therapy sessions for at least two years. The physician noted that Complainant's emotional distress was significant and her efforts to recover had been painstakingly slow. The AJ noted Complainant had spent $1,382.60 in medical expenses related to her physician's treatment of her that was not covered by OWCP. The AJ also found that the record demonstrated that Complainant was expected to suffer future pecuniary damages in the amount of $4,000.00 for her out-of-pocket expenses incurred relating to her treatment. The AJ found that as a result of the harassment, Complainant lost weight and sleep, suffered from headaches, and increased her alcohol and tobacco intake. The AJ determined that given the severity and duration of the harassment, the medical evidence presented in the case, the emotional and mental harm suffered by Complainant, and the amounts awarded in similar cases, Complainant was entitled to $150,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. The AJ also determined that Complainant was entitled to a loss of future earning capacity and benefits because it was unlikely that she would be able to return to working in a job with comparable wages within commuting distance of her home. Moreover, Complainant, at that time, remained unable to do meaningful work beyond simple labor, particularly given her anxiety about being in public. As noted by her physician, Complainant had found some work assisting the elderly in cleaning their houses and taking them shopping, but it was reasonable to assume that this type of work was well below the pay and benefits that she would have received as a Materials Handler Supervisor at the Agency. Thus, the AJ found that it was likely, given the geographical location where Complainant lived, her work background, and her lingering mental and emotional impairments, that she would not be able to return to the workplace or to earn a salary comparable to that held before her injuries. The AJ found that because Complainant would have been working, absent the discrimination, she, as a matter of equity, was entitled to back pay from the period of time that she stopped working in December 10, 2010 to the date of the decision, which would include a calculation of the amount of overtime she would have received, extrapolated from the overtime she worked from May to December 10, 2010, offset by her workers' compensation benefits. The AJ found also that Complainant was also entitled to leave restoration from the date that she left her position in December 2010 to the date of the decision, along with all other benefits, including contributions to her retirement program, to which she would have been entitled from December 10, 2010 to the date of the decision. Finally, the AJ found that Complainant was entitled to front pay for a period of two years beginning from the date of the decision that would include a calculation of the amount of overtime she would have received, extrapolated from the overtime she worked from May to December 10, 2010, offset by the workers' compensation benefits she received during the two-year period. The AJ's determination was based on the fact that Complainant was unable to return to full-time work because of the Agency's harassment. As such, the AJ ordered the Agency to calculate the amount of lost future earnings and benefits beginning two years from the date the decision became final, which would coincide with the expiration of front pay, through the date of Complainant's eligibility for law enforcement retirement. Finally, the AJ ordered the posting of a notice regarding the Agency's conduct, training for Agency officials, and attorney's fees. The Agency subsequently issued the instant final order where it accepted the AJ's finding of liability, and Complainant's entitlement to back pay and benefits, non-pecuniary compensatory damages, some pecuniary damages, and attorney's fees and costs. The Agency rejected part of the AJ's decision, however, finding that the AJ erred in awarding front pay and future pecuniary damages for lost earnings and benefits. This appeal followed. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, the Agency contends, among other things, that the AJ's finding that Complainant was entitled to front pay and loss of future earning capacity is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Specifically, the Agency maintains that the AJ improperly concluded that Complainant was entitled to an award of front pay because her medical documentation showed that she would not be able to work for the foreseeable future. The Agency cited two prior Commission decisions in support of its position. They are Finlay v. USPS, EEOC Appeal No. 01942985 (Apr. 29, 1997); and York v. Dept. of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01930435 (Feb. 25, 1994). According to the Agency, the Commission has held that in order to be entitled to an award of front pay, an employee must be available to work. In York, the Agency maintains that the Commission determined the complainant was not entitled to front pay because she had been approved for disability retirement and hence deemed unable to work. The Agency argued that the AJ found Complainant's medical evidence demonstrated that she was not able to work for the foreseeable future. The Agency maintains that the facts of the Finlay and York cases are identical to the present case with regard to Complainant's availability to work, and therefore the legal conclusions of Finlay and York are also controlling. As availability to work is a required prerequisite with regard to an award of front pay, the Agency maintains that the AJ's decision in this regard constitutes an error of law, and should not be upheld. The Agency also argues that the AJ improperly concluded that Complainant was entitled to an award of future pecuniary damages for loss of future earning capacity. Specifically, the AJ awarded Complainant damages for loss of future earning capacity from the date that her award of front pay expired until the date she became eligible for federal law enforcement retirement at age 50. The Agency maintains that the AJ failed to require Complainant to present any evidence that would allow a specific numerical value to be placed on the amount of the loss. The Agency maintains that this determination specifically invokes the legal reasoning applied in Brinkley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05980429 (Aug. 12, 1999). The Agency contends that Complainant failed to present any evidence similar to that presented in the Brinkley case which would have allowed the AJ to calculate the specific value of the loss of future earning capacity. Therefore, the Agency maintains that the AJ incorrectly ordered it to obtain evidence of Complainant's lost earning capacity, calculate the amount of the loss and award that amount to Complainant. The Agency maintains that the Brinkley case clearly established that it was Complainant's burden to provide evidence of lost earning capacity, not the Agency's. Thus, the Agency contends that it was clear error for the AJ to order the Agency to collect such evidence and determine the proper amount of the loss, and, consequently, the award for loss of future earning capacity should not be upheld. In response, Complainant, among other things, maintains that the Agency's brief misstates and ignores many of the AJ's factual conclusions and omits controlling Commission precedent. Accordingly, Complainant requests that the Commission deny the Agency's appeal and affirm the decision of the AJ. Specifically, Complainant contends that the AJ properly awarded front pay. Complainant explains that generally, the Commission has awarded front pay when reinstatement is otherwise appropriate, but is not possible through no fault of the employee. For example, in Brinkley, the Commission found that the fact that front pay is awarded in lieu of reinstatement implies that the complainant is able to work but cannot do so because of circumstances external to the complainant. Complainant maintains that the Commission has identified three circumstances where front pay may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement: (1) where no position is available; (2) where a subsequent working relationship between the parties would be antagonistic; or (3) where the employer has a record of long-term resistance to antidiscrimination efforts. Complainant contends that the AJ found that two of the three circumstances existed in this case. First, the harasser was still working at the facility, and secondly, the Agency had not completed an investigation into Complainant's allegations for almost three years and the Agency stipulated that the harasser had not been disciplined. Further, Complainant maintains that it is unrealistic to conclude that, given the deep-rooted nature of Complainant's emotional distress, the antagonistic relationship could be cured through transferring the aggressors, because so many aggressors contributed to the unlawful treatment endured by Complainant. Further, the involved managers and human resources officials had demonstrated resistance to EEO laws and regulations through their actions in handling Complainant's allegations of harassment. At the time of the AJ's decision, Complainant notes that the Agency had neither investigated the allegations of harassment, nor disciplined the harasser. Given both the antagonistic relationship and the Agency's resistance to anti-discrimination efforts, Complainant maintains that reinstatement would not have been possible because of circumstances external to her. Complainant also notes that the Agency cited to the Commission's decision in York in an attempt to support its claim that because Complainant could not return to the Agency she was not entitled to front pay. However, she argues that York is inapplicable to the instant situation because, in York, none of the three circumstances that make front pay appropriate were present. The denial of front pay in York was, in part, based upon the fact that the harassing supervisor had retired from the workplace, as such, the only reason Complainant was unable to go back to work was due to health reasons. Finally, Complainant maintains that, given that the Agency has conceded that its actions created the circumstances that render Complainant unable to go back to Oakdale Prison, the Agency's attempt to now bar her from an award of front pay controverts the purpose of equitable relief. Complainant contends that like backpay, front pay is a form of equitable relief that is intended to "place the party in the position he would have been but for the prohibited discrimination." Thornhill v. Dep't of Veterans Aff., EEOC Appeal No. 01892899 (June 26, 1990); see also Norte v. Dep't of Energy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120055353 (Apr. 17, 2007) ("The Commission noted that back pay, front pay, lost retirement benefits and the expunction of personnel records constituted equitable relief."). Complainant also contends that the AJ properly awarded damages for loss of future earning capacity. According to Complainant, the Commission has explained that, "future pecuniary damages for the loss of future earning capacity," are appropriate, "[w]here complainant has shown that his future earning power has been diminished as result of the agency's discrimination." Moore v. US. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0720050084 (Mar. 6, 2007). "Proof of entitlement to loss of future earning capacity involves evidence suggesting that the individual's injuries have narrowed the range of economic opportunities available to her. Generally, the party seeking compensation for loss of earning capacity needs to provide evidence which demonstrates with reasonable certainty or reasonable probability that the loss has been sustained." Lemons v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120102516 (Nov. 16.2011). Complainant maintains that, contrary to the Agency's assertion otherwise, under the standards set forth in Lemons, she has satisfied her burden to establish that she is entitled to damages for loss of future earning capacity. Although the Agency correctly states that the Commission has awarded such damages where Complainants have presented more specific and detailed information regarding diminished earning capacity, the Agency fails to cite to any case that requires the type of evidence the complainant presented in Brinkley. The Commission, according to Complainant, did not hold that a complainant was required to present evidence of the type presented in Brinkley when making a claim for future pecuniary damages for loss of future earning capacity. To the contrary, the Commission regularly awards future pecuniary damages for loss of future earning capacity where a complainant has submitted evidence similar to Complainant's evidence in the instant matter. Finally, Complainant contends that the AJ, in ordering the Agency to obtain evidence of Complainant's lost earning capacity, and to calculate the amount of loss, and award that amount to Complainant, merely utilized language that the Commission has used in prior cases when affirming awards of damages for loss of future earning capacity. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, at § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015). At the outset, we note that the Agency accepted the AJ's finding of liability, attorney's fees, back pay and other relief, and non-pecuniary compensatory damages. We affirm that part of the Agency's final order. The Agency's appeal therefore is limited to the AJ's determination regarding front pay and future pecuniary damages for lost earnings and benefits. Based upon our review of the record, we find that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the AJ's findings with respect to both of these matters. With respect to the AJ's award of front pay, we note that the AJ did not determine that Complainant was unable to work as was the case in York. In fact, the AJ noted that Complainant had found some work assisting the elderly in cleaning their houses and taking them shopping. Complainant may not have been able to return to her position as a Materials Handler Supervisor position, but the Agency did not establish that she was unable to work. We find support in the record for the AJ's determination that Complainant was prevented from returning to work by circumstances beyond her control, i.e., the undisciplined harasser was still working at the facility, and secondly, the Agency had not completed an investigation into Complainant's allegations for almost three years, which indicated a record of long-term resistance to antidiscrimination efforts. Moreover, we find support in the record for the AJ's determination that Complainant was entitled to an award reflecting her loss of future earning capacity and benefits because it was unlikely that she would be able to return to working in a job with comparable wages within commuting distance of her home due to her lingering mental and emotional impairments caused by the Agency's discriminatory actions. As for the Agency's contention that it is being made to provide evidence that Complainant should be providing, we note that the Commission often directs Agencies to calculate the amount of a complainant's entitlement to monetary relief such as back pay, benefits and, in this case, future earnings and benefits because the Agency is in a better position to determine what a complainant was entitled to and therefore what they have lost. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we MODIFY the Agency's final order as set forth in this decision. The Agency is directed to comply with the Order below. ORDER The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial actions within one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days of the date this decision is issued: 1) The Agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay, with interest, and other benefits due Complainant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501, from the period of time that Complainant stopped working on December 10, 2010 to the date the decision in this case becomes final, which would include a calculation of the amount of overtime she would have received, extrapolated from the overtime she worked from May to December 10, 2010, offset by the worker's compensation benefits Complainant received. In addition, Complainant is entitled to leave restoration from the date that she left her position in December 2010 to the date when the decision becomes final. Calculations should include not only Complainant's wages, but also Agency contributions to health benefits, life insurance premiums, and Thrift Savings Plan. Complainant shall cooperate in the Agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and benefits due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the Agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back pay and/or benefits, the Agency shall issue a check to Complainant for the undisputed amount. Complainant may petition for clarification or enforcement of the amount in dispute. The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." 2) The Agency shall calculate the amount of front pay for a period of two years beginning from the date of the decision becomes final and shall include a calculation of the amount of overtime she would have received, extrapolated from the overtime she worked from May to December 10, 2010, offset by the workers' compensation benefits Complainant receives while receiving front pay. Calculations should include not only Complainant's wages, but also Agency contributions to health benefits, life insurance premiums, the Civil Service Retirement System, and Thrift Savings Plan. 3) The Agency shall pay Complainant past pecuniary damages in the amount of $1,382.60. 4) The Agency shall pay Complainant future pecuniary losses in the amount of $4,000.00. 5) The Agency shall calculate the amount of lost future earnings and benefits beginning two years from the date the decision becomes final, which will coincide with the expiration of front pay, through the date of Complainant's eligibility for law enforcement retirement. Complainant shall cooperate in the Agency's efforts to compute the amount of lost future earnings and benefits due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the Agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of lost future earnings, the Agency shall issue a check to Complainant for the undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date the Agency determines the amount it believes to be due. Complainant may petition for clarification or enforcement of the amount in dispute. The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." 6) The Agency shall pay Complainant $150,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. 7) The Agency shall pay Complainant's attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $190,744.16. 8) The Agency is ordered to provide eight hours of training on recognizing and addressing allegations of sexual harassment and the EEO process to all employees at the Federal Correctional Complex, Trust Fund Department in Oakdale, Louisiana 9) The Agency shall consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against the co-worker who subjected Complainant to harassment and the management officials who failed to take prompt and effective action to end the harassment. The Commission does not consider training to be disciplinary action. The Agency shall report its decision to the Compliance Officer. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If any of the responsible management officials have left the Agency's employ, the Agency shall furnish documentation-of their departure date(s). The Agency is further directed to submit a Report of Compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The Report shall include evidence that the corrective action has been implemented. This will include a detailed accounting of the calculations of the back pay, overtime, leave and benefits restored, front pay, and the loss of future earning capacity, along with an explanation of how the Agency calculated these amounts. POSTING ORDER (G0617) The Agency is ordered to post at its Federal Correctional Complex, Trust Fund Department in Oakdale, Louisiana copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision was issued, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer as directed in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. The report must be in digital format, and must be submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1016) If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision was issued. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0617) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be in the digital format required by the Commission, and submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0610) This decision affirms the Agency's final decision/action in part, but it also requires the Agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final decision on your complaint. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M.'s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations _1/9/18_________________ Date 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 0720150011 2 0720150011