U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Miriam B.,1 Complainant, v. Robert McDonald, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency. Appeal No. 0720150022 Hearing No. 570-2008-00024X Agency No. 200400202007101104 DECISION Following its February 26, 2015, final order (FAD), the Agency filed a timely appeal which the Commission accepts pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). On appeal, the Agency requests that the Commission affirm its partial rejection of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge's (AJ) order of relief for a finding that the Agency subjected an employee to reprisal discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Agency's FAD is AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part. The complaint is REMANDED for compliance. ISSUES PRESENTED 1. Did the AJ correctly conclude that Complainant was entitled to $102,839.18 in attorneys' fees for discriminating and subjecting Complainant to a hostile work environment based on reprisal? 2. Was the AJ correct to order for the Agency to post notices of the finding of discrimination in all offices of the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) and to send such notices to every VBA employee using existing mass e-mail lists? 3. Was the AJ correct in not awarding Complainant a greater amount of non-pecuniary compensatory damages, restoration of all of her sick and annual leave, restoration of duties removed as a result of the reprisal discrimination, and restoration of the structure of the Agency's EEO office? BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an EEO Manager/Team Leader at the Agency's Central Office in Washington, D.C. Complainant was named as a witness in an EEO complaint filed by a co-worker against the Associate Deputy Undersecretary for Management (S1) in 2006. AJ Liability Decision, p. 4. On March 3, 2007, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her and subjected her to a hostile work environment on the basis of reprisal2 for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when: 1. S1 subjected her to harassment;3 2. S1 removed duties that were previously assigned to her.4 At the conclusion of the investigation into the allegations, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of her right to request a hearing before an AJ. Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ assigned to the case issued a decision on summary judgment in favor of the Agency, which was reversed on appeal. AJ Liability Decision, p. 1. The case was remanded for a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on September 10-12, 2012, and issued a decision on March 5, 2014 finding that S1 subjected Complainant to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment because of her participation in EEO activity. Id. at p. 12. On January 21, 2015, a different AJ issued a decision awarding Complainant remedies for the reprisal discrimination.5 AJ Decision On Relief, p. 33. The Agency subsequently issued a FAD adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant was subjected to reprisal discrimination, and portions of the AJ's award of remedies. FAD, p. 2. However, the Agency rejected the AJ's award of $102,839.18 in attorneys' fees, and the AJ's order that it post a notice of the finding of discrimination in all Agency facilities and send the notice via e-mail to all employees. Id. The Agency appealed these aspects of the AJ's order on relief. Complainant cross appealed arguing for a higher award of attorneys' fees and compensatory damages, as well as for other relief. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL I. Agency's Contentions On Appeal The Agency contends that the AJ erred in awarding Complainant $102,839.18 in attorneys' fees and ordering that the Agency post notices of the finding of discrimination in all VBA offices and send them by mass e-mail to employees. Agency's Brief in Support of Appeal (Agency Brief), p. 2. The Agency contends that the AJ's across-the-board reduction of attorneys' fees by only 10% was not sufficient, and that the appropriate reduction is between 15% to 50% or $51,419.59 to $87,413.30. Id. at p. 4. Further, the Agency contends that even if an across-the-board reduction of 10% were made, the AJ neglected to make such a reduction, which would result in a total award of $92,555.18. Id. at p. 5. Next, the Agency contends that the AJ did not have any justification for ordering a wider posting of the notice of discrimination than at the facility where the discrimination occurred. Agency Brief, p. 3. The Agency contends that the discrimination occurred at a single facility. Id. II. Complainant's Contentions On Appeal Complainant contends that: (1) the AJ's across-the-board reduction of attorneys' fees by 10% is contrary to law and an abuse of discretion; (2) the Agency's request for further reduction of attorneys' fees is unsupported by the record; (3) the non-pecuniary damages award should be increased to $60,000; (4) the AJ erred in denying Complainant's request for restoration of her duties; (5) the AJ erred in refusing to restore the proper structure of the EEO office; (6) the AJ erred in denying her request for restoration of sick and annual leave because the record demonstrates Complainant utilized that leave to escape the retaliatory work environment; (7) the AJ's order regarding the posting notice was not an abuse of discretion or contrary to law; and (8) the AJ erred by disallowing time spent by an attorney at hearing. See generally, Complainant's Brief in Support of Cross Appeal and Opposition to Agency's Brief in Support of Appeal. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. EEOC Management Directive 110 (MD-110), Chap. 9, at § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. MD-110, Chap. 9, at § VI.B. The following discussion evinces that the AJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and further that the conclusions of law were correct. I. The AJ's Award Of $102,839.18 In Attorneys' Fees Is Supported By Substantial Evidence In The Record Attorneys' fees will be computed by determining the "lodestar": the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. MD-110, at Ch. 11, § VI.F.1. The number of hours should not include excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours. Id. A reasonable hourly rate is based on "prevailing market rates in the relevant community" for attorneys of similar experience in similar cases. Id. The hours spent on unsuccessful claims should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee only where the unsuccessful claims are distinct in all respects from the successful claims. MD-110, Ch. 11, § VI.F.1. Successful and unsuccessful claims are not fractionable when they are closely intertwined and involve the same common core of facts. See Mannon v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0720070074 (Apr. 4, 2012). The Commission and courts generally use the Laffey Matrix to determine the hourly rate for Washington, D.C. area attorneys. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd in part, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Laffey matrix is a chart compiled yearly by the United States Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia. It provides a schedule of hourly rates prevailing in the Washington, D.C. area in each year, going back to 1981, for attorneys at various levels of experience. Piper v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 339 F. Supp. 2d 13, 24 n. 8 (D.D.C. 2004). A reasonable fee award may be assessed in light of factors such as: (1) the time required (versus time expended) to complete the legal work: (2) novelty or difficulty of the issues: (3) the requisite skill to properly handle the case; (4) the relief sought and results obtained: and (5) the nature and length of the attorney-client relationship. See Cerny v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05930899 (Oct.19, 1994). The AJ explained that Complainant's attorney's hourly rates were computed in accordance with the Laffey Matrix, used to determine prevailing market rates. AJ Decision On Relief, p. 22. Complainant requested $119,864.50 in attorneys' fees. Id. at p. 32. The AJ made specific reductions to this amount for the initial consultation, travel time and hearing attendance totaling $5,598.75. AJ Decision On Relief, p. 32. Additionally, the AJ reduced the remaining $114,265.75 by 10%, or $11,426.58, for duplicative billing by Complainant's attorneys. Id. Therefore, Complainant received attorneys' fees totaling $102,839.18. Id. The Agency erroneously arrived at the conclusion that the AJ did not reduce the attorneys' fees by 10% due to the mistaken belief that the award of $102,839.18 did not already include the 10% reduction. Agency Brief, p. 5. Further, the Agency's argument that there should be a greater reduction for duplicative entries by Complainant's attorneys is unsupported by arguments. See, e.g., Agency Brief, p. 5. The AJ reduced the fees by 10% because of duplication of efforts by attorneys staffed on Complainant's case. The AJ offered as examples multiple itemized entries where senior counsel consulted with junior counsel and vice versa; the fact that two attorneys spent time preparing to depose a witness but only one attorney conducted the deposition; and transition of the case from one attorney to another. AJ Decision On Relief, p. 29. In arguing for a greater across-the-board reduction, the Agency contends that cases support a 15%-50% reduction of fees where there have been "numerous excessive, redundant, and inadequately documented entries." Agency Brief, p. 5. However, the AJ concluded that the instances of duplication only supported a reduction of 10%. Id. The AJ's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and the Agency does not provide arguments based on evidence in the record for why the duplications should result in a greater reduction. Further, Complainant's arguments for a greater award of fees are not supported. The AJ was correct to award $102,839.18 in attorneys' fees. II. The AJ's Order That The Agency Post A Notice Of The Finding Of Discrimination In All Agency Offices And Distribute By Mass E-mail To All Employees Is Not Supported By The Record The Agency argues that the AJ erred in ordering that a notice of the finding of discrimination be posted in every Agency facility, and for the Agency to distribute the notice utilizing mass e-mail lists. Relief for a finding of discrimination includes "notification to all employees of the agency in the affected facility of their right to be free of unlawful discrimination and assurance that the particular types of discrimination will not recur." 29 C.F.R § 1614.501(a)(1) (emphasis added). On a case-by-case basis, there may be justification for ordering a wider posting of the notice of discrimination. Mohar v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. Appeal No. 0720100019 (Aug. 29, 2011), request for recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 0520120027 (Mar. 29, 2012). While a wider posting of a notice of a finding of discrimination may sometimes be warranted, there is no indication that the present case requires notification to employees outside of the Agency facility where the discrimination occurred. The finding of discrimination involved one supervisor and the events comprising the finding of discrimination took place at the Central Office. Additionally, the AJ did not explain why a wider posting is warranted. Therefore, the Agency is required to post a notice of the finding of discrimination at the Central Office where the discrimination occurred, and to send electronic copies of the notice to employees at that facility. The AJ's order for a wider posting is not supported by the record. III. The AJ Correctly Accorded Other Relief To Complainant Except That Complainant Is Also Entitled To Restoration Of Duties That Were Removed As A Result Of Reprisal Discrimination Complainant contends that relief should include: an award greater than $7,500 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages; restoration of duties that she had prior to the discrimination; restoration of the proper structure of the Agency's EEO office; and restoration of 213.25 hours of sick leave and 227 hours of annual leave taken as a result of the discrimination. Complainant's Brief, p. 6. a. Non-pecuniary Compensatory Damages A Complainant who establishes her claim of unlawful discrimination may receive compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses (e.g. pain and suffering, mental anguish). 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b)(3). For an employer with more than 500 employees, such as the Agency, the limit of liability for non-pecuniary damages is $300,000. Id. While there are no definitive rules governing the amount of non-pecuniary damages to be awarded, non-pecuniary damages must be limited to the sums necessary to compensate the injured party for actual harm, even where the harm is intangible, and should take into account the severity of the harm and the length of time that the injured party has suffered the harm. Carter v. Duncan-Higgins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Carpenter v. Dep't of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995). The amount of the award of non-pecuniary compensatory damages should not be "monstrously excessive" standing alone, should not be the product of passion or prejudice, and should be consistent with the amount awarded in similar cases. See Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F. 2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571, 574 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Evidence from a health care provider or other expert is not a prerequisite for recovery of compensatory damages for emotional harm. Lawrence v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288 (Apr. 18, 1996) (citing Carle v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (Jan. 5, 1993)). Complainant's own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain her burden in this regard. The more inherently degrading or humiliating the agency's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action. Id. The absence of supporting evidence, however, may affect the amount of damages appropriate in specific cases. See Banks v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 07A20037 (September 29, 2003) (citing, Lawrence, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288). The AJ awarded Complainant $7,500 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages for harm caused by the hostile work environment she experienced for nine months. AJ Decision On Relief, p. 15. The AJ concluded that Complainant did not suffer an "extended period of harm, abusive behavior and speech, and public embarrassment and humiliation to justify significant compensatory damages." AJ Decision On Relief, p. 14 (citing, Richardson v. Dep't of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No; 0120070003 (May 22, 2008), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520080622 (July 22, 2008) ($62,795 awarded to complainant where manager referred to women by derogatory terms, used racial slurs, excluded complainant and the other African-American supervisor from meetings, denigrated and rebuked her in public)). Rather, the AJ concluded that Complainant's migraine headaches due to elevated blood pressure, heart palpitations, nervousness, crying and anxious overeating was similar to a case where a complainant experienced anxiety due to retaliatory harassment and was awarded $3,000 in compensatory damages. AJ Decision On Relief, p. 16 (citing, Complainant v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0720130023 (April 25, 2014). As a result, the AJ awarded $7,500 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages. The AJ's decision on compensatory damages is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and is not excessive. b. Restoration of Sick and Annual Leave "Where there has been a finding of discrimination, the complainant is entitled to back pay for time lost from work during the applicable periods, as well as the restoration of any leave used because of the agency's discriminatory actions." MD-110, at Chap. 11 § III.K (citing, Cox v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 0720050055 (Dec. 24, 2009)). "The restoration of leave taken for purposes of avoiding or recovering from a discriminatory hostile work environment is a valid component of equitable relief." Id. (citing, Burton v. Dep't. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0720090046 (June 9, 2011). The AJ awarded Complainant 18 hours of annual leave and 30.75 hours of sick leave, which he explained was supported by Complainant's testimony that she took leave on several occasions, including on a number of Mondays to avoid the hostile work environment she was subjected to between July 2006 and April 2007. AJ Decision On Relief, p. 9. The AJ concluded that Complainant did not demonstrate that the discrimination caused her to utilize 227 hours of annual leave and 213.25 hours of sick leave during 2006 and 2007. Id. The AJ's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record. c. Restoration of Complainant's Duties A complainant who prevails in whole or in part on a claim of discrimination is entitled to full relief which places him/her in the position s/he would have been in absent the agency's discriminatory conduct. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-419 (1975). Restoration of duties which were removed as a result of discrimination constitutes permissible relief. See, e.g., Carpenter v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC App. No. 07A50027 (Mar. 18, 2005). The AJ did not order for the Agency to restore Complainant's duties because he found that Complainant did not provide "evidence of what duties she is currently performing or that she is not currently performing the duties alleged in her complaint as having been removed." AJ Decision On Relief, p. 11. The AJ concluded that many of the duties Complainant alleged to have been removed related to removal of her role as a team leader. Id. The AJ reasoned that the Commission would not involve itself in the Agency's business activities. Id. However, the AJ who issued the decision on liability found that one of the most significant actions of the reprisal discrimination consisted of removing duties that were previously assigned to Complainant. AJ Liability Decision, p. 6, 11. This included removing her briefing responsibilities, removing her responsibilities associated with the EEO tracking system, and disallowing her from attending projects such as Limited English Proficiency conferences. Id. at 11-12. The AJ found that the supervisor's testimony regarding the removal of Complainant's duties to be indicative of pretext. Id. Therefore, to the extent feasible, Complainant should be awarded relief of restoration of her duties. The AJ's decision not to award such relief was incorrect. d. Restoration of Structure of EEO Office Agency EEO directors must "be under the immediate supervision of the agency head." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(b)(4); see also, MD-110, at Chap. 1 § III.B. The AJ concluded that ordering the Agency to modify the structure of its EEO office was outside the scope of relief that could be accorded to Complainant. AJ Decision On Relief, p. 18. While the Agency is advised of regulations mandating that the EEO director must report directly to the head of the agency, there is insufficient information about the Agency's structure from which to conclude that there has been a regulatory violation in this particular case. Therefore, the AJ was correct not to order modification of the structure of the EEO office as relief. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed, the Agency's FAD is AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part. That part of the Agency's decision which implemented the AJ's finding of reprisal discrimination, and portions of the remedies order, is affirmed. The Agency's decision not to fully implement the AJ's order for it to post a notice of finding of discrimination throughout the Agency, and send via e-mail to employees throughout the Agency, is also affirmed. However, that part of the Agency's decision which did not implement the AJ's award of attorneys' fees is reversed, and the Agency's decision which implemented the AJ's decision not to restore Complainant's duties is also reversed. The complaint is REMANDED for compliance with this decision and the Order below. ORDER Within one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days from the date this decision becomes final, the Agency is ORDERED to take the following actions:6 1. Restore to Complainant 18 hours of annual leave and 30.75 hours of sick leave; 2. Upgrade the performance evaluation at issue and provide any resulting awards; 3. Pay Complainant $l,500.00 in past pecuniary compensatory damages; 4. Pay Complainant $7,500 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages; 5. Pay Complainant $102,839.18 in attorney's fees and $2,242.52 costs; 6. Provide Complainant with training substantially equivalent to the training provided at the 2007 Federal Dispute Resolution Conference. Complainant is to have input regarding the selection of the training she will attend. The Agency must identify the training and enroll Complainant in the course; 7. To the extent feasible, restore Complainant's duties which were found to have been removed as a result of the reprisal discrimination; and 8. Post at the VBA in Washington, D.C., copies of the notice discussed below. POSTING ORDER (G0617) The Agency is ordered to post at its Central Office, Washington, D.C., facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision was issued, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer as directed in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. The report must be in digital format, and must be submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1016) If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision was issued. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0617) Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be in the digital format required by the Commission, and submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0610) This decision affirms the Agency's final decision/action in part, but it also requires the Agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final decision on your complaint. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations 03/20/18 __________________ Date 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website. 2 Complainant withdrew race as a basis for the complaint. AJ Liability Decision, p. 1. 3 Complainant's allegations included that S1 ordered her to "stay out" of an EEO complaint brought by a co-worker; and increased surveillance of her whereabouts. AJ Liability Decision, p. 1-4. 4 Complainant's allegations included that S1 reassigned her program briefing responsibilities to a co-worker; reassigned EEO tracking system responsibilities; and removed Complainant's team leader duties. AJ Liability Decision, p. 1-4. 5 A different AJ was assigned because of the previous AJ's retirement. AJ Decision on Relief, p. 1. 6 An order for the Agency to provide training to the responsible management official, along with considering disciplinary action, is not being included because the official has retired. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 07-2015-0022 10 0720150022