



**U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION**  
**Office of Federal Operations**  
**P.O. Box 77960**  
**Washington, DC 20013**

[REDACTED]  
Chara S.,<sup>1</sup>  
Complainant,

v.

Denis R. McDonough,  
Secretary,  
Department of Veterans Affairs,  
Agency.

Appeal No. 2022003889

Hearing No. 430-2020-00326X

Agency No. 2004-0558-2019103742

DECISION

On July 10, 2022, Complainant filed an appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency's June 24, 2022 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the final order.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether the AJ's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Agency was appropriate, or whether genuine disputes of material fact exist that require a hearing.

Whether the Administrative Judge properly denied Complainant's request to sanction the Agency.

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<sup>1</sup> This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

Whether the Agency properly dismissed several of Complainant's claims.

Whether the Agency's final order properly found that Complainant was not subjected to discrimination, reprisal, and a hostile work environment.

### BACKGROUND

Complainant worked as an Emergency Management Specialist, GS-0089-12, at the Agency's Medical Center in Durham, North Carolina. On June 12, 2019, Complainant filed (and subsequently amended) a formal EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her and subjected her to a hostile work environment on the bases of disability (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:

1. On October 29, 2018, her supervisor (S1) discussed her EEO complaint with her peers.
2. From November 2018 through March 2019, S1 made numerous negative comments about the working relationships of Complainant's coworkers, which caused her to become hypervigilant and paranoid.
3. On December 5, 2018, S1 cancelled Complainant's medical leave request and directed her to reschedule her leave.
4. On December 18, 2018, February 29, 2019, and March 26, 2019, S1 and a coworker (CW1) made Complainant uncomfortable when they began talking about smoking marijuana.
5. On December 18, 2018, S1 asked Complainant to organize a departmental emergency management and safety fair and asked her to tell everyone that it was her idea.
6. On March 11, 2019, CW1 cancelled and diverted Complainant's planned work-related events and programs.
7. In March 2019, Complainant's training was denied because the administrative office filed her paperwork late.
8. On April 11, 2019, Complainant missed a call from S1; however, S1 did not inform her that she was supposed to participate in the call.

9. On April 12, 2019, S1 reprimanded Complainant in an email by accusing her of not accepting his call while she was off duty.
10. On April 15 and 18, 2019, during a staff meeting, S1 increased Complainant's workload.
11. On May 10 and 14, 2019, S1 directed Complainant to cancel the region-wide emergency and safety fair and directed her not to contact the executive leadership team.
12. On May 13, 2019, S1 failed to place the three orders Complainant asked him to file for the fair.
13. On May 13, 2019, S1 reprimanded Complainant for sending training records without his approval.
14. On May 16, 2019, S1 informed Complainant not to provide a courtesy copy of a document to the Associate Director.
15. On May 17, 2019, S1 lied to Complainant about the Associate Director giving her a deadline to complete a task.
16. On May 17, 2019, Complainant's recent training was cancelled due to medical reasons.
17. On May 17, 2019, S1 removed Complainant from the Duke Coalition Group, assigned her to read all compliance regulations for all of the Agency's programs and requested a written summary of the regulations by the end of the month.
18. On May 28, 2019, S1 embarrassed Complainant when he blamed her for not knowing she could attend a day conference.
19. On June 4, 2019, S1 wrote Complainant up for excessive sick leave usage and for missing a meeting.
20. On June 4, 2019, Complainant and her coworkers overheard S1 say that if Complainant, "doesn't get on board with their program, they would get rid of her."

21. On June 4, 2019, S1 called Complainant a liar during an after-action call meeting and suggested that she may be having some "mental issues."
22. On June 6 and 7, 2019, Complainant included a disclosure of a conversation between her provider and psychologist in her employment discrimination complaint.
23. On June 6, 2019, S1 texted Complainant about work assignments while she was in the emergency room.
24. On June 6, 2019, S1 required Complainant to update him on her location during her tour of duty.
25. On June 7, 2019, the Chief Engineer asked questions before signing her reasonable accommodation paperwork.
26. On April 17 and June 6, 2019, Management failed to recognize Complainant publicly as an Emergency Management Specialist.
27. On June 6 and July 22, 2019, S1 failed to process Complainant's Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) request.
28. On June 6, 2019, S1 marked Complainant as being absent without leave (AWOL).
29. On July 29, 2019, management denied Complainant's request for a reasonable accommodation.
30. On July 29, 2019, management forwarded a humiliating email message to Complainant depicting a caricature of her sending out daily weather reports.
31. On December 30, 2019, S1 denied Complainant's leave request.
32. On June 6, 2019, S1 harassed Complainant while she was in the emergency room with high blood pressure.
33. On June 6, 2019, S1 retaliated against Complainant by texting her for over an hour while she was being treated.

34. On an unspecified date in June, the Engineering Chief denied Complainant's reasonable accommodation request.
35. On June 7, 2019, S1 ridiculed Complainant, angrily calling her a liar, which led to hostility at work.
36. On unspecified dates in June 2019, S1 required Complainant to report by text or email her movements through the facility each day.
37. On July 22, 2019, S1 denied Complainant's request for Family and Medical Leave act leave.
38. On July 29, 2019, management denied Complainant's reasonable accommodation request.
39. On July 29, 2019, Complainant received a demoralizing email message and cartoon depicting her sending out daily weather reports.

The Agency dismissed allegations (2), (4), (5), (8), (11), (12), (14), (16), (18), (22), and (25) for failure to state a claim. In addition, the Agency dismissed allegations (32) – (39) as being identical to allegations that were already raised. Finally, allegations (3), (6), and (7) were dismissed as independent discrete acts for untimely EEO Counselor contact. Complainant's Appeal Brief (CAB) 140-46, 152-53.<sup>2</sup>

Between August 2019 and January 28, 2020, Complainant corresponded with the Agency's EEO Office, repeatedly insisting that allegations (26) through (39) were never processed. The investigative report (IR) was submitted to Complainant on April 14, 2020. IR 114. Complainant was also provided with notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing on April 22, 2020.

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<sup>2</sup> The Commission has reviewed the full record and can find no basis to disturb the Agency's dismissal of these claims nor either Administrative Judge's denial of Complainant's attempts to revive these claims. Notwithstanding, the Commission will consider these claims as background evidence in support of Complainant's overall hostile work environment claim.

Between May and October 2020, Complainant filed motions to amend her complaint and a motion for default judgment against the Agency for its failure to timely complete the investigation. The AJ initially assigned to the case (AJ1) denied all three motions. On November 25, 2020, after allowance of time for discovery and dispositive motions, the Agency moved for summary judgment. On August 18, 2021, AJ1 issued a notice of intent to issue a decision without a hearing.

On May 11, 2022, the matter was reassigned to a second AJ (AJ2). AJ2 noted that in response to AJ1's notice of intent to issue a summary judgment decision, Complainant submitted a multi-document response that featured voluminous records and extensive briefings. On June 23, 2022, AJ2 entered summary judgment in favor of the Agency after determining that the record failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged conduct or personnel actions at issue occurred because of Complainant's disability or previous EEO activity. AJ2 also noted that Complainant filed several unnecessary motions on matters that had been conclusively adjudicated by AJ1, including a renewed request for a hearing, several additional motions to amend her complaint, and reconsideration of previously denied motions. AJ2 denied all of those motions.

On June 24, 2022, the Agency issued a final order fully implementing AJ2's decision. The instant appeal followed.

### CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant contends that the AJs erred in not granting her motion for sanctions and default judgment against the Agency for its failure to timely process and investigate her complaint. Further, Complainant argues that several of her claims were improperly dismissed. Complainant contends that the AJ erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Agency and failed to consider all supporting evidence. Complainant argues that the Agency allowed harassing conduct in the workplace to escalate which caused her physical and mental harm. Accordingly, Complainant requests that the Commission reverse the final order.

### STANDARD OF REVIEW

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that

the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

### ANALYSIS

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, *de novo*. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a)(stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a *de novo* review...”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed *de novo*).

#### *Default Judgment as a Sanction*

As an initial matter, we note that Complainant sought a default judgment against the Agency for what she claimed to be the Agency’s failure to complete its investigation of the instant complaint within the regulatory time frame. In her appeal brief she highlighted the fact that the Agency was required to complete its investigation either within 180 days of the most recent amendment to the complaint or within 360 days of the filing of the original complaint. CAB 147-48. According to Complainant, the Agency did not complete its investigation until 134 days after the expiration of the period for doing so. CAB 16, 88.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(f)(3)(v) provides that when a party fails without good cause shown to respond fully and in a timely fashion to an AJ’s order, the AJ shall take appropriate action.

That action may include entry of default judgment against the Agency as a sanction, but given its severity, it should be reserved only for the most egregious acts of agency non-compliance, such as failure to abide by an AJ's orders or requests. Clinton C. v. Dep't of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 2021003662 (Nov. 9, 2022), req. for recon. den. EEOC Request No. 2023001155 (May 25, 2023). Mere delays in the processing of a complaint, without a showing of egregious conduct on the part of the Agency is not sufficient to justify the imposition of default judgment. Id.

In its acceptance notices to Complainant, the Agency noted that either party could ask for a 90-day extension, that the Agency would "make every good faith effort to complete the investigation within the prescribed period," and, "where workload demands make it impossible to complete a timely investigation," the EEO Office would work with Complainant to seek a mutual agreement to extend the period to the extent necessary to complete the investigation. CAB 148. Moreover, Complainant could have asked for a hearing at any time after the expiration of either of the two time periods listed above, and ultimately did. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.108(f), (h). Complainant herself admitted that the investigator had requested a voluntary 90-day extension several times and that she rejected his request each time. CAB 15-16.

We find no evidence that the investigator or any other official involved with processing this complaint had willfully or unjustifiably failed to comply with the orders of AJ1 or AJ2, or otherwise engaged in any other egregious conduct that would justify the imposition of a default judgment. Indeed, the record amply demonstrates that the investigator attempted to negotiate in good faith to extend the time frame in order to complete the investigation as quickly as possible, but that Complainant had repeatedly rejected his requests. We therefore find that AJ1 and AJ2 did not abuse their discretion and acted properly in denying Complainant's motion for a default judgment against the Agency. We now turn to the merits of the instant complaint.

In order to successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Such a dispute would indicate that a hearing is necessary to produce evidence to support a finding that the Agency was motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus.

### *Hostile Work Environment*

In order to establish a prima facie case of harassment, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of five elements: (1) that she is a member of a statutorily protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome conduct related to her protected class; (3) that the harassment complained of was based on her protected class; (4) that the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) that there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Celine B. v. Dep't of Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 2019001961 (Sept. 21, 2020); Humphrey v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (Oct. 16, 1998). See also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Flowers v. Southern Reg'l Physician Serv. Inc., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001). The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994).

In other words, to prove her hostile work environment claim, Complainant must establish that she was subjected to conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive that a "reasonable person" in Complainant's position would have found the conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant must also prove that the conduct was taken because of a protected basis. Only if Complainant establishes both of those elements – hostility and motive – will the question of Agency liability present itself.

As to hostility, the Commission has long held that routine work assignments, instructions, and admonishments do not rise to the level of harassment because they are common workplace occurrences. Ryan C. v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 2019005353 (March 23, 2021). Unless it is reasonably established that the common workplace occurrence was somehow abusive or offensive, and that it was taken in order to harass Complainant on the basis of her protected classes, we do not find such common workplace occurrences sufficiently severe or pervasive to rise to the level of a hostile work environment or harassment as Complainant alleges. Id. In granting summary judgment in favor of the Agency, AJ2 found that all of the allegations on which he ruled involved common workplace occurrences.

For example, as to allegation (1), the AJs found that the discussion to which Complainant referred involved her use of sick leave, not her EEO complaint. IR 158-59. Concerning allegation (9), S1 tried to call Complainant multiple times concerning an emergency at the facility but was unable to reach her. IR 287-88. Regarding allegation (10), neither AJ1 nor AJ2 found evidence that Complainant's workload was increased beyond the parameters of her position description. IR 294. With respect to allegation (13), S1 sent an email to all staff regarding the need for supervisory authorization of external communications and he did not single out Complainant. IR 296, 529. With regard to allegation (15), the Associate Director never set a deadline for the task in question or instruct S1 to set a deadline. IR 435.

As to allegation (17), S1 did not remove Complainant from the Duke Coalition Group and only directed her to become familiar with the regulations governing her own program. IR 299-301. Concerning allegations (19) through (21), all of which involved occurrences that took place on June 4, 2019, S1 counseled Complainant after checking her leave records and finding that she had called in sick 16 times. IR 304. As to the conversation referenced in allegation (20), the incident occurred around 5:30 p.m., but S1 had left work two hours earlier. IR 308-10. As to the "liar" incident referenced in allegation (21), S1 had expressed concerns about the stress that Complainant was experiencing on the job and how it was affecting her mental stability. IR 392-83. We note that allegation (22) appears to relate to Complainant's own disclosure and not any action by an Agency official.<sup>3</sup>

Regarding allegations (23) and (24), incidents that occurred on June 6, 2019, S1 was having difficulties locating and communicating with Complainant and thought that she was conducting work-related training at the facility's emergency room. He did not know that Complainant was in the emergency room herself. IR 316-17, 319, 324-25, 396-400, 444, 534. With respect to allegations (26), (27), and (28), the AJs found no evidence that S1 failed to publicly acknowledge Complainant's work, failed to process her leave request, or charge her with AWOL. IR 494. With regard to allegation (30), the email in question had nothing to do with Complainant. Regarding allegation (31), S1 merely asked Complainant to modify her leave request, and that he approved the request once Complainant had done so. IR 352, 516.

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<sup>3</sup> In addition, as alleged, such a claim would not constitute a violation of the Rehabilitation Act prohibition of disclosing confidential medical information.

After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find, as did AJ1 and AJ2, that none of the incidents were severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment, either individually or collectively. Even if the conduct in question was sufficiently severe or pervasive, Complainant's claim of hostile work environment would still fail under the motive element. Indicators of unlawful motive include discriminatory statements or past personal treatment attributable to those responsible for the personnel action that led to the filing of the complaint, unequal application of Agency policy, deviations from standard procedures without explanation or justification, and inadequately explained inconsistencies in the evidentiary record. Tammy S. v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 2021000578 (May 5, 2022).

When asked why she believed that her disability and prior EEO activity were factors in the above-described incidents, Complainant averred that she had to deal with the same people against whom she had prevailed in one of her previous complaints and that management only hired her under Schedule A because they had to.<sup>4</sup> IR 163-68. Apart from her own assertions, Complainant has presented neither affidavits, declarations, or unsworn statements from witnesses other than herself nor documents which contradict or undercut the explanations provided by S1 and the other management witnesses. Complainant has likewise not presented any documentary or testimonial evidence that would cause us to question S1's truthfulness as a witness or would raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of at least one of the indicators of unlawful motive listed above. We therefore find that AJ2 properly granted summary judgment in the Agency's favor on Complainant's hostile work environment claim.

Furthermore, to the extent Complainant claims that she was subjected to disparate treatment regarding these claims, the Commission finds that Complainant has not proffered any evidence that would be sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether S1's explanations for his actions were pretext for disability discrimination or reprisal. Ingrid C. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 2021003868 (Oct. 19, 2022).

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<sup>4</sup> The "Schedule A" hiring authority is a non-competitive appointment authority used for hiring applicants with disabilities. See generally 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(u).

*Denial of Reasonable Accommodation – Allegation (29)*

An agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of an individual with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o) and (p). In order to establish that she was denied a reasonable accommodation, Complainant must show that: (1) she is an individual with a disability as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is “qualified” as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the Agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation), No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002).

The term ‘qualified,’ with respect to an individual with a disability, means that the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). The term “position” is not limited to the position held by the employee but may also include positions that the employee could have held as a result of reassignment. Therefore, in determining whether an employee is “qualified,” an agency must look beyond the position which the employee presently encumbers. Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation.

We will assume, for purposes of analysis, that Complainant is an individual with a disability. As an accommodation for her PTSD, Complainant requested that she be reassigned to a different supervisor and be allowed to telework on a 50 percent basis. S1 did not grant this particular accommodation, but instead granted an alternative accommodation that included: email communication for all nonessential and non-emergent communication; texting with supervisor during high-stress situations; supervisory emails, texts, and phone calls in lieu of face-to-face communication; an amended tour of duty; and modifications to her workspace which would include headphones, physical barriers, and white noise machines, if requested. IR 492-93. According to the Reasonable Accommodation Specialist, there was no record of Complainant’s request being denied. Rather, Complainant expressed her desire to resolve the matter of her accommodation request through the EEO process rather than the interactive process. IR 460-62.

Complainant presented no evidence demonstrating that these alternative accommodations were ineffective. Thus, Complainant has not presented any facts that tend to raise a dispute as to whether the Agency fully complied with its obligation under the Rehabilitation Act to provide her a reasonable accommodation.

### CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record, we AFFIRM the Agency's final order.

### STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0124.1)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC's Office of Federal Operations (OFO) **within thirty (30) calendar days** of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, **that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration.** A party shall have **twenty (20) calendar days** from receipt of another party's request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015).

Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at <https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx>. Alternatively, Complainant can submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507.

In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant's request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604.

An agency's request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party's request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.

Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party's request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).

#### COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0124)


You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court **within ninety (90) calendar days** from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by their full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, **filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.**

#### RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. **You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission.** The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests.

Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:



Carlton M. Hadden, Director  
Office of Federal Operations

January 21, 2025  
Date