



U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

[REDACTED]
Eve E.,¹
Complainant,

v.

Denis R. McDonough,
Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency.

Appeal No. 2024003830

Agency No. 2003-740-2024-156841

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) from the Agency's decision dated June 4, 2024, dismissing her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission REVERSES and the Agency's final order and REMANDS the matter.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether the Agency properly dismissed Complainant's formal EEO complaint for lack of standing.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Chief Medical Officer (physician), VM-602-15, at the Agency's VA Texas Valley Coastal Bend Health Care System facility in Harlingen, Texas.

¹ This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

Complainant also worked as a private practice provider outside the Agency where, among other things, she performed after-hours trauma surgeries for a private non-profit hospital in Corpus Cristi, Texas. When her private practice work involved caring for veterans, Complainant was sometimes paid through the Agency's third-party administrator, TriWest. According to the Agency, TriWest Health Care Alliance is a third-party contractor who administers care through the Department of Defense and has a national contract with the Veteran's Health Administration for delivery of care in the VA's Community Care Network.

On February 13, 2024, Complainant filed a formal complaint which the Agency framed as alleging that the Agency subjected her to discrimination on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female), color (Black), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when, on January 11, 2024, Chief of Staff for the VA Texas Valley Coastal Bend Health Care System terminated Complainant's Network Provider Privileges with the VA Texas Valley Coastal Bend Health Care System, and that Complainant had been "terminated for cause" from the VA Network and will not be compensated for the services earlier billed as an In-Network Provider.

The Agency dismissed this claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1) for failure to state a claim, finding that Complainant lacked standing to bring the complaint because she was not filing a complaint regarding an event as the result of being an employee, former employee, or applicant for employment of the Agency. Complainant filed the instant appeal.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant states the basic assertion of her complaint is that after she engaged in protected EEO activity in her regular VA job, the same local VA health care system got her fired from a separate private sector job. She asserts this is a harm likely to discourage a reasonable person from engaging in EEO activity. She states there is a connection between her prior EEO activity and the challenged action in that it occurred while her EEO case was pending, she was told the decision was based on information provided by the Agency, and none of the statutory grounds for network exclusion appear applicable.

The Agency contends on appeal that Complainant fails to state a claim because her complaint does not concern an adverse action taken by the Agency that affects Complainant in her capacity as a Chief Medical Officer (with Compensation and Pension privileges only) at the VA Texas Valley

Coastal Bend Health Care System. The dispute is exclusive to the employment relationship between Complainant and TriWest Healthcare Alliance, and based on the common law of Agency test, Complainant was a contractor of TriWest Healthcare Alliance and not a joint employee of TriWest Healthcare Alliance and the Agency. The Agency further asserts that the complaint fails to state a claim because Complainant does not provide sufficiently well-pled facts to support her claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Agency's decision to dismiss a complaint is subject to de novo review by the Commission, which requires the Commission to examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker and issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). The Commission should construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the complainant and take the complaint's allegations as true. See Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997). Thus, all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the complaint's allegations must be made in favor of the complainant.

ANALYSIS

The issue here is whether the Agency properly dismissed Complainant's complaint for failure to state a claim on the basis that Complainant was not its employee. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(a) provides that complaints of discrimination shall be processed in accordance with Part 1614 of the EEOC Regulations. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(c) provides that within covered departments, agencies, units, Part 1614 applies to all employees and applicants for employment.

In Serita B. v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120150846 (Nov. 10, 2016), the Commission reaffirmed its longstanding position on "joint employers" and noted that it is found in numerous sources. See, e.g., EEOC Compliance Manual Section 2, "Threshold Issues," Section 2-III(B)(1)(a)(iii)(b) (May 1, 2000) (Compliance Manual); EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms (Dec. 3, 1997) (Enforcement Guidance), "Coverage Issues," Question 2; Ma v. Dep't of Health and Human Services, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01962389 & 01962390 (May 29, 1998). We reiterate the analysis set forth in those decisions and guidance documents in this decision.

The term "joint employer" refers to two or more employers that each exercise sufficient control of an individual to qualify as the worker's employer. Compliance Manual, Section 2- III(B)(1)(a)(iii)(b). To determine whether the Agency has the right to exercise sufficient control, EEOC considers factors derived from common law principles of agency. See Enforcement Guidance, "Coverage Issues," at Question 2. EEOC considers, inter alia, the Agency's right to control when, where, and how the worker performs the job; the right to assign additional projects to the worker; whether the work is performed on Agency premises; whether the Agency provides the tools, material, and equipment to perform the job; the duration of the relationship between the Agency and the worker; whether the Agency controls the worker's schedule; and whether the Agency can discharge the worker. Compliance Manual, Section 2 - III(A)(1) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992)); EEOC v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 550 F. App'x 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2013) ("Entities are joint employers if they 'share or codetermine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment'" (quoting Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Ma, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01962389 & 01962390).

The language of the contract between the Agency and the staffing firm is not dispositive as to whether a joint employment situation exists. In determining a worker's status, EEOC looks to what actually occurs in the workplace, even if it contradicts the language in the contract between the staffing firm and the agency. Baker v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A45313 (Mar. 16, 2006) (while contract between staffing firm and agency provided that contract personnel were employees of staffing firm under its administrative supervision and control, agency actually retained supervisory authority over the contract workers).

On the factor of the right to control when, where, and how the worker performs the job and to assign additional projects, complete agency control is not required. Rather, the control may be partial or joint and still point to joint employment. Shorter v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120131148 (June 11, 2013) (where both staffing firm and agency made assignments, this pointed to joint employment); Complainant v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120143162 (May 20, 2015), request for recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 0520150430 (Mar. 11, 2016) (where staffing firm wrote and issued complainant's appraisal with input from agency, this pointed toward joint employment).

Likewise, where both the agency and staffing firm provided tools, material, and equipment to perform the job, this pointed to joint employment. Elkin v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120122211, 2012 WL 5818075 (Nov. 8, 2012). Similarly, where a staffing firm terminates a worker after an agency communicates it no longer wants the worker's services, this supports a finding that the agency has joint or de facto power to discharge the worker. See, e.g., Complainants v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal Nos. 0120141963 & 0120141762 (Jan. 28, 2015); see also Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 550 Fed. App'x at 254, 256 (where defendant removed staffing firm's workers from job site without challenge from staffing firm, and after such removals staffing firm generally fired worker, this pointed to joint employment); Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of America, Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 414-15 (4th Cir. 2015). The EEOC considers an entity's right to control the terms and conditions of employment, whether or not it exercises that right, as relevant to joint employer status. Enforcement Guidance, "Coverage Issues," at Question 2, Example 5 (where an entity reserves the right to direct the means and manner of an individual's work, but does not generally exercise that right, the entity may still be found to be a joint employer).

In assessing the right to control, EEOC does not consider any one factor to be decisive and emphasizes that it is not necessary to satisfy a majority of the factors. In particular, the fact that an individual performs work pursuant to a contract between the federal government and an outside organization and is paid and provided with benefits by that organization, on its own, is not enough to show that joint employment does not exist. Rather, the analysis is holistic. All the circumstances in the individual's relationship with the agency should be considered to determine if the agency should be deemed the worker's joint employer. Enforcement Guidance, "Coverage Issues," at Qs. 1 and 2. In sum, a federal agency will qualify as a joint employer of an individual if it has the requisite right to control the means and manner of the individual's work, regardless of whether the individual is paid by an outside organization or is on the federal payroll. See id., at Q. 2.

Here, in finding that Complainant was not an Agency employee, the Agency's decision fell short of the required analysis and lacked sufficient support. The Agency's analysis relied solely on the unsworn statements of the Agency's Chief of Staff and Health System Specialist. Many of Chief of Staff's responses directed the EEO counselor to "contact TriWest for details of their contract with VHA." (Complaint File, pp. 39-40). There is no discussion of the day-to-day supervision of Complainant's work and neither that information, nor the contract, is not included in the record.

It does not appear that Complainant was asked about her day-to-day work or supervision of her work. It is also not clear who retained the ability to terminate Complainant's network privileges, whether the Agency had input into that, and under what circumstances the Agency could provide such input. Because the record does not contain sufficient information about Complainant's day-to-day work and supervision, we are unable to determine based on the record before us whether the Agency was a joint employer of Complainant. While Complainant ultimately bears the burden to prove discrimination, it is the burden of the Agency to have evidence or proof in support of its final decision. See Marshall v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05910685 (Sept. 6, 1991). The Agency has not met its burden here. Therefore, it improperly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim based on lack of standing.

Although not mentioned in the dismissal decision, on appeal, the Agency raised issue with Complainant's pleadings. To the extent the Agency requires further clarification from Complainant regarding the nature of her claims, she should be given an opportunity on remand to clarify her allegations.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we REVERSE the Agency's final decision dismissing Complainant's complaint, and we REMAND this matter to the Agency for further processing in accordance with the ORDER below.

ORDER (E0224)

The Agency is ordered to process the remanded claims in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108. The Agency shall acknowledge to the Complainant that it has received the remanded claims **within thirty (30) calendar days** of the date this decision was issued. The Agency shall issue to Complainant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify Complainant of the appropriate rights **within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days** of the date this decision was issued, unless the matter is otherwise resolved prior to that time. If the Complainant requests a final decision without a hearing, the Agency shall issue a final decision **within sixty (60) days** of receipt of Complainant's request.

As provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," the Agency must send to the Compliance Officer: 1) a copy of the Agency's letter of acknowledgment to Complainant, 2) a copy of the Agency's notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights, and

3) either a copy of the complainant's request for a hearing, or a copy of the final agency decision ("FAD") if Complainant does not request a hearing.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0719)

Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(c) and § 1614.502, compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. Within seven (7) calendar days of the completion of each ordered corrective action, the Agency shall submit via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP) supporting documents in the digital format required by the Commission, referencing the compliance docket number under which compliance was being monitored. Once all compliance is complete, the Agency shall submit via FedSEP a final compliance report in the digital format required by the Commission. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency's final report must contain supporting documentation when previously not uploaded, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant and his/her representative.

If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). **If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.** See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409.

Failure by an agency to either file a compliance report or implement any of the orders set forth in this decision, without good cause shown, may result in the referral of this matter to the Office of Special Counsel pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(f) for enforcement by that agency.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0124.1)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC's Office of Federal Operations (OFO) **within thirty (30) calendar days** of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, **that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration.** A party shall have **twenty (20) calendar days** from receipt of another party's request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015).

Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at

<https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx>

Alternatively, Complainant can submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant's request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604.

An agency's request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party's request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.

Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party's request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. **Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration.**

The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0124)

This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court **within ninety (90) calendar days** from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action **after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days** of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by their full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. **Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.**

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. **You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission.** The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests.

Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:



Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

November 26, 2024
Date