



U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

████████████████████
Bertram K.,¹
Complainant,

v.

William P. Barr,
Attorney General,
Department of Justice
(Federal Bureau of Investigation),
Agency.

Appeal No. 2020000974

Agency No. FBI-2019-00166

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) from an Agency final decision, dated September 30, 2019, dismissing a formal complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405.

BACKGROUND

During the relevant time, Complainant worked as a contract security officer at an FBI facility in Pocatello, Idaho.

According to the Agency, Complainant was assigned to an entrance for construction contractors. Complainant was specifically assigned with checking construction workers in and out, as well as issuing badges to them. On March 1, 2019, Complainant was removed from his position with the Agency. Believing that his removal was discriminatory, Complainant contacted and EEO Counselor. Informal efforts to resolve Complainant's concerns were unsuccessful. Subsequently, on April 19, 2019, Complainant filed a formal complaint based on sex and "race/color (Hispanic)".

¹ This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

In its September 30, 2019 decision, the Agency dismissed the formal complaint on the grounds that Complainant was a contractor, not an Agency employee. The Agency determined that Complainant was employed by Paragon Systems Inc, which contracted with Federal Protective Services (FPS). The FBI, in turn, contracts with FPS to provide security for the FBI buildings that do not have FBI police. The Agency reasoned that Paragon supervised Complainant and provided him with assignments. The Agency further noted that it did not pay Complainant, provide him with insurance, or retirement benefits.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. §1614.103(a) provides that complaints of employment discrimination shall be processed in accordance with Part 1614 of the EEOC regulations. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(c) provides that within the covered departments, agencies and units, Part 1614 applies to all employees and applicants for employment.

In Serita B. v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120150846 (November 10, 2016), the Commission reaffirmed its long-standing position on “joint employers” and noted it is found in numerous sources. See, e.g., EEOC Compliance Manual Section 2, “Threshold Issues,” Section 2-III(B)(1)(a)(iii)(b) (May 12, 2000) (Compliance Manual)²; EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms (Dec. 3, 1997) (Enforcement Guidance), “Coverage Issues,” Question 2; Ma v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., EEOC Appeal Nos. 01962389 & 01962390 (May 29, 1998). We reiterate the analysis set forth in those decisions and guidance documents in this decision.

Agencies often conclude that an individual is not an employee based solely on the fact that the individual performs work pursuant to a contract between the federal government and an outside organization and the outside organization, not the federal government, controls the pay and benefits of that individual. See, e.g., Helen G. v. Dep’t of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120150262 (Feb. 11, 2016); Nicki B. v. Dep’t of Educ., EEOC Appeal No. 0120151697 (Feb. 9, 2016). These elements are just two of the factors relevant to joint employment under the Commission’s long-standing position and it is not at all surprising that they would be present when an individual working under a federal contract for a federal agency raises a complaint of discrimination.

The term “joint employer” refers to two or more employers that each exercise sufficient control of an individual to qualify as the worker’s employer. Compliance Manual, Section 2-III(B)(1)(a)(iii)(b). To determine whether the Agency has the right to exercise sufficient control, EEOC considers factors derived from common law principles of agency. See Enforcement Guidance, “Coverage Issues,” at Question 2. EEOC considers, *inter alia*, the Agency’s right to control when, where, and how the worker performs the job; the right to assign additional projects

² The EEOC Compliance Manual and other guidance documents, as well as federal-sector appellate decisions, are available online at www.eeoc.gov.

to the worker; whether the work is performed on Agency premises; whether the Agency provides the tools, material, and equipment to perform the job; the duration of the relationship between the Agency and the worker whether the Agency controls the worker's schedule; and whether the Agency can discharge the worker. EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 2-III(A)(1) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992)); EEOC v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 550 F.App'x 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2013) ("Entities are joint employers if they 'share or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment'") (quoting Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Ma, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01962389 & 01962390.

The language of the contract between the agency and the staffing firm is not dispositive as to whether a joint-employment situation exists. In determining a worker's status, EEOC looks to what actually occurs in the workplace, even if it contradicts the language in the contract between the staffing firm and the agency. Baker v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A45313 (Mar. 16, 2006) (while contract between staffing firm and agency provided that contract personnel were employees of staffing firm under its administrative supervision and control, agency actually retained supervisory authority over the contract workers).

On the factor of the right to control when, where, and how the worker performs the job and to assign additional projects, complete agency control is not required. Rather, the control may be partial or joint and still point to joint employment. Shorter v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120131148 (June 11, 2013) (where both staffing firm and agency made assignments, this pointed to joint employment); Complainant v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120143162 (May 20, 2015), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520150430 (Mar. 11, 2016) (where staffing firm wrote and issued complainant's appraisal with input from agency, this pointed toward joint employment). Likewise, where both the agency and staffing firm provided tools, material, and equipment to perform the job, this pointed to joint employment. Elkin v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120122211, 2012 WL 5818075 (Nov. 8, 2012). Similarly, where a staffing firm terminates a worker after an agency communicates it no longer wants the worker's services, this supports a finding that the agency has joint or de facto power to discharge the worker. See, e.g., Complainants v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal Nos. 0120141963 & 0120141762 (Jan. 28, 2015); see also Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 550 Fed. App'x at 254, 256 (where defendant removed staffing firm's workers from job site without challenge from staffing firm, and after such removals staffing firm generally fired worker, this pointed to joint employment); Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of America, Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 414-15 (4th Cir. 2015). The EEOC considers an entity's right to control the terms and conditions of employment, whether or not it exercises that right, as relevant to joint employer status. Enforcement Guidance, "Coverage Issues," at Question 2, Example 5 (where an entity reserves the right to direct the means and manner of an individual's work, but does not generally exercise that right, the entity may still be found to be a joint employer).

In assessing the right to control, EEOC does not consider any one factor to be decisive and emphasizes that it is not necessary to satisfy a majority of the factors.

In particular, the fact that an individual performs work pursuant to a contract between the federal government and an outside organization and is paid and provided with benefits by that organization, on its own, is not enough to show that joint employment does not exist. Rather, the analysis is holistic. All the circumstances in the individual's relationship with the agency should be considered to determine if the agency should be deemed the worker's joint employer. Enforcement Guidance, "Coverage Issues," at Qs. 1 and 2. In sum, a federal agency will qualify as a joint employer of an individual if it has the requisite right to control the means and manner of the individual's work, regardless of whether the individual is paid by an outside organization or is on the federal payroll. See id., at Q. 2.

Here, the Agency makes reference to numerous factors in its final decision. The Agency's dismissal decision, however, lacks adequate analysis of those factors. Instead, it simply states that Paragon provides assignments and supervision, lists things the Agency does not provide, and concludes Complainant is not an employee.

The record is similarly deficient. While, as noted above, the contract language is not dispositive, it should be considered. The record contains neither a copy of the Agency's contract with FPS, nor the sub-contract with Paragon. There are no documents related to Paragon. Further, the record does not include affidavits from the relevant Paragon officials and/or Agency officials regarding the day-to-day responsibilities and management of Complainant's security officer position. While the Agency states in its decision that Complainant is tasked with checking construction workers in and out of the facility, there is no evidence to support this statement. In fact, the limited record is simply comprised of the EEO Counselor's Report, the Notice of Right to File a Discrimination Complaint, and the formal complaint.

It is the burden of the Agency to have evidence or proof in support of its final decision. See Marshall v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05910685 (Sept. 6, 1991). In this case, we find that the Agency has failed to substantiate its dismissal of the complaint.

CONCLUSION

The Agency's final decision is hereby **REVERSED**. The case is **REMANDED** to the Agency for further processing as set forth in the **ORDER** below.

ORDER (E0618)

The Agency is ordered to process the remanded claims in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108 et seq. The Agency shall acknowledge to the Complainant that it has received the remanded claims **within thirty (30) calendar days** of the date this decision was issued. The Agency shall issue to Complainant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify Complainant of the appropriate rights **within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days** of the date this decision was issued, unless the matter is otherwise resolved prior to that time. If the Complainant requests a final decision without a hearing, the Agency shall issue a final decision **within sixty (60) days** of receipt of Complainant's request.

As provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," the Agency must send to the Compliance Officer: 1) a copy of the Agency's letter of acknowledgment to Complainant, 2) a copy of the Agency's notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights, and 3) either a copy of the complainant's request for a hearing, a copy of complainant's request for a FAD, or a statement from the agency that it did not receive a response from complainant by the end of the election period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0719)

Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(c) and § 1614.502, compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. Within seven (7) calendar days of the completion of each ordered corrective action, the Agency shall submit via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP) supporting documents in the digital format required by the Commission, referencing the compliance docket number under which compliance was being monitored. Once all compliance is complete, the Agency shall submit via FedSEP a final compliance report in the digital format required by the Commission. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency's final report must contain supporting documentation when previously not uploaded, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant and his/her representative.

If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). **If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.** See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409.

Failure by an agency to either file a compliance report or implement any of the orders set forth in this decision, without good cause shown, may result in the referral of this matter to the Office of Special Counsel pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(f) for enforcement by that agency.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) **within thirty (30) calendar days** of receipt of this decision. A party shall have **twenty (20) calendar days** of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)

This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court **within ninety (90) calendar days** from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action **after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days** of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. **Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.**

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.

Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. **You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission.** The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Carlton M. Hadden". The signature is written in a cursive style and is positioned above a horizontal line.

Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

February 11, 2020

Date