Milan W. Allen, Complainant, v. Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary, Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)), Agency. Appeal No. 0120072053 Agency No. 065400020 DECISION On March 21, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's February 8, 2007, final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). On January 3, 2006, complainant filed an EEO complaint claiming discrimination based on race (African-American) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when he was subjected to harassment/hostile work environment, and the agency denied his requests for approval, i.e., (a) in June-July 2005, the agency denied his request for a two-year Intergovenmental Personnel Act (IPA) assignment to manage the GLOBE project at Texas Southern University; (b) in March 2006, the agency denied his proposal for a NOAA Educational Mini-Grant to offset the residential, travel, and per diem expenses of the IPA proposed in (a); and (c) in April 2006, the agency did not approve his application to serve as a representative to the Program Coordination Office for one year. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided his right to request a hearing but did not do so. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f). The agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b) and concluded that complainant failed to prove that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged. At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked as a Satellite Hydrologist at the agency's National Weather Service, NOAA, facility in Chanhassen, MN. In 2004, complainant received an agency fellowship to work in Washington, D.C. for ten months. The agency explained, through the testimony of complainant's supervisors, its reasons for denying complainant's requests, i.e., he had been away from his assigned duty station for ten months beginning in September 2004, at a substantial cost to the office; he was needed to perform the duties of his position; and the office could not provide the supporting costs of the IPA and detail to the Program Office. Complainant asserted that the agency's reasons for denial of his requests were pretext for discrimination. In his appeal submission, complainant argued that the GLOBE project was important to NOAA, and his skills and assigned duties were not important and not needed; in support, he presented his managers' criticism of his performance and work product; selections from his personal log dated in 2004, and correspondence between the agency and the union dated in 2004. Harassment Claim As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). It is well-settled that harassment based on an individual's protected status is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive; usually, however, a single incident or a group of isolated incidents will not be regarded as discriminatory harassment. Frye v. Department of Labor, EEOC Request No. 05950152 (February 8, 1996); Backo v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960227 (June 10, 1996); see also Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In this matter, while complainant is a member of a protected class based on his race and has filed a prior EEO complaint, he has not shown that the agency's actions were based on racial animus or taken in reprisal. Further, we find that they were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to rise to the level of illegal harassment. See Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997), citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's employment). Moreover, complainant has not shown that the alleged harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.1 See Humphrey v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (October 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. Although complainant's claims do not establish illicit harassment, they are properly considered as claims of disparate treatment. Disparate Treatment Claim Generally, claims of disparate treatment, such as complainant's, are examined under the tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). For complainant to prevail, s/he must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Once complainant has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the agency is successful, the burden reverts back to the complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reason(s) for its action was a pretext for discrimination. At all times, complainant retains the burden of persuasion, and it is his/her obligation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983). To establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination, a complainant must show that: (1) s/he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) s/he was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra); Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (September 25, 2000). For purposes of further analysis, we assume, arguendo, and without so finding, that complainant established a prima facie case based on race and reprisal. Once a complainant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proceeding moves to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra. We note that the agency's burden, while not onerous, must provide a specific, clear, and individualized explanation for the treatment accorded the complainant. Id. In the matter before us, we find that the agency has met its obligation to explain to complainant its reasons for not approving his applications for details, i.e., the agency, through its local managers, stated that he had been away for ten months and was needed to perform his assigned duties and that the organization could not support the costs of his requested details. Thus, the agency met its obligation and framed the factual issue "with sufficient clarity so that [complainant] had a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Id. The ultimate burden of persuasion now returns to the complainant to demonstrate by preponderant evidence that the reasons given by the agency for its actions are pretext, or a sham or disguise for discrimination. The complainant must show that the agency's action was more likely than not motivated by discrimination, that is, that the action was influenced by legally impermissible criteria, i.e., race and reprisal. Absent a showing that the agency's articulated reason was used as a tool to discriminate against him, complainant cannot prevail. Complainant argued that neither the type of work he performed nor his performance of that work was important or essential to his managers, so that he was not needed at the office and should have been allowed to detail. Even if his contentions were true, complainant failed to address the costs issue or explain how the agency would benefit from his service elsewhere. For these reasons, we find that complainant has failed to demonstrate that the agency's reasons, as stated above, were pretext. Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we find that complainant did not prove by preponderant evidence that the agency discriminated against him based on race or in reprisal. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the agency's final decision is affirmed. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0701) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action"). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations _____7-12-07_____________ Date 1 See Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (rev. October 17, 2002). ?? ?? ?? ?? 2 0120072053 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P. O. Box 19848 Washington, D.C. 20036 5 0120072053