00-7863 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT CURTIS COWAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut BRIEF OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING THE APPELLANT AND REVERSAL C. GREGORY STEWART General Counsel PHILIP SKLOVER Associate General Counsel VINCENT J. BLACKWOOD Assistant General Counsel PAUL D. RAMSHAW Attorney EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1801 L Street, N.W., Rm. 7816 Washington, D.C. 20507 (202) 663-4736 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii STATEMENT OF INTEREST 1 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 Statement of the Facts 3 Decisions Below 4 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 ARGUMENT 8 COWAN WOULD, IF TERMINATED, SUFFER HARM THAT COULD NOT BE REMEDIED BY DAMAGES, AND THE CHALLENGED POLICY IS RETALIATORY ON ITS FACE. 8 The district court's basis for finding no irreparable harm is erroneous as a matter of law. 9 The challenged policy, which requires employee agents to release claims and withdraw pending lawsuits before they can continue working as Allstate agents, violates § 704(a) on its face. 15 CONCLUSION 20 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 21 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES FEDERAL CASES Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) 2 Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1975) 18 EEOC v. Board of Governors, 957 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1992) 19, 20 Galvin v. New York Racing Association, 70 F. Supp. 2d 163 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 166 F.3d 1200 (2d Cir. 1998) 11, 12, 14 Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) 15, 16 Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1991) 19 Loveridge v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 788 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1986) 12, 13 Marshall v. Parking Co. of America—Denver, Inc., 670 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1982) 18 Otokoyama Co. Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 175 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 1999)) 8 Roso-Lino Beverage Distributings, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984) 11 Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) 4 Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970) 11 Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997) 17 Wright v. Giuliani, 2000 WL 1591121 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2000) 8 STATE CASES Chambers-Dobson, Inc. v. Squier, 472 N.W.2d 391 (Neb. 1991) 13, 14 Lawyer v. Lawyer, 702 S.W.2d 790 (Ark. 1986) 13 STATUTES Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 1 Fed. R. App. P. 29(a) 2 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 00-7863 CURTIS COWAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut BRIEF OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING THE APPELLANT AND REVERSAL STATEMENT OF INTEREST The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the agency charged by Congress with the enforcement of the federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination and retaliation, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Private Title VII actions play an essential role in combating employment discrimination. Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974). Since Title VII's enforcement scheme requires that employees be free to file charges of discrimination and Title VII lawsuits, the Commission is particularly concerned about the adoption by employers of policies that tend to prevent employees from filing charges or from filing and pursuing lawsuits against their employers alleging violations of Title VII. In this case, the plaintiff is challenging an Allstate policy that requires him to release all his employment-discrimination claims and withdraw his pending lawsuit if he wishes to continue selling the company's products to the thousands of accounts he has developed and serviced over 16 years. The Commission believes this policy constitutes a flagrant violation of § 704(a) of Title VII, and it accordingly offers its views, pursuant to the authorization in Fed. R. App. P. 29(a). STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE Whether Allstate violated § 704(a) of Title VII because it barred Cowan from continuing to sell the company's policies unless he first released any employment discrimination claims he had against the company and withdrew his pending Title VII lawsuit. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Statement of the Facts: Curtis Cowan is a 53-year-old African-American who has been employed as an insurance agent by Allstate since 1984. Joint Appendix (“JA”) 37-38. He sells life, property, auto and home insurance policies for Allstate, and has been very successful. JA 37. He has approximately 2,000 pending accounts, and has recently earned an annual income of around $200,000. Id. Cowan filed a charge with the EEOC and the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in October 1996 alleging that Allstate was discriminating on the basis of race in enforcing its rules and in distributing potential clients to its agents. JA 38. In April 1998 he filed a pro se complaint in federal court based on these allegations. JA 3, 38. In the fall of 1998, after undergoing a kidney transplant, he became paralyzed. JA 38. After intensive rehabilitation work, he became mobile with a wheelchair and sought to return to work. JA 38, 45-46. His return was delayed by Allstate's failure to modify his office bathroom, and Cowan filed a charge alleging that failure was retaliatory. JA 38-40, 43-44. In late 1999 Allstate announced that it was terminating its employer-employee relationship with its 6,000 employee agents as of June 30, 2000. JA 181-82. Allstate encouraged its employee agents to continue selling the company's products, but to do so as “exclusive agents” in an independent-contractor capacity. JA 182-83. Employee agents who wished to become exclusive agents, however, were required to sign a release of all employment discrimination claims and to withdraw any pending employment discrimination lawsuits. JA 71-74, 105, 151, 182. Decisions Below: On May 2, 2000, Cowan filed a motion in his pending Title VII action seeking a preliminary injunction ordering Allstate to retain him as an employee agent, and directing the company not to fire him at the end of June solely because he refused to withdraw his lawsuit and release his claims. JA 7, 21-22. After a hearing, a magistrate issued a recommended ruling granting a preliminary injunction. JA 282-95. The magistrate concluded that Cowan had demonstrated irreparable harm. JA 288-93. He acknowledged that, under Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974), losing one's job, and suffering the financial hardships and emotional distress that often result, is normally not by itself sufficient to constitute irreparable harm. JA 286-87. Here, however, the magistrate judge concluded that there were unusual factors that caused this threatened termination to constitute irreparable harm. Specifically, the magistrate judge noted, “if Mr. Cowan is denied the entitlement to become an exclusive agent because he will not sign a release, then he will be terminated and the accounts in his book of business will be distributed to other sales agents.” JA 288. Furthermore, because of a non-compete clause in his contract, “he will be unable to recreate or replace his book of business within the next two years.” Id. Accordingly, he will be prevented from continuing his business relationships with his thousands of clients, and he will lose the attendant good will and customer loyalty, which will probably be impossible to evaluate. Id. The magistrate judge concluded that terminating Cowan would therefore be comparable to closing a family business or terminating a franchise, events which this Court has held will often constitute irreparable harm. JA 288-91. Moreover, the magistrate judge noted, it would be particularly difficult for Cowan, who is 53 years old and confined to a wheelchair, to recreate a comparably lucrative insurance business. JA 291-92. Based on these circumstances, the magistrate judge concluded that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in Cowan's favor, because he would suffer much more by being terminated than Allstate would by having him continue working for the company as an employee. JA 293-94. The magistrate judge also concluded that there were serious questions going to the merits of Cowan's claim, since his refusal to withdraw his lawsuit was clearly protected activity, and under the challenged program Allstate's refusal to allow him to become an exclusive agent appeared to result directly from that protected activity. JA 294. On June 29, the district court issued an order rejecting portions of the recommended ruling and denying the preliminary injunction. JA 9, 463-66. The court ruled that Cowan had no ownership interest in his book of business, and that he was an at-will employee and therefore not “entitled” to continue as an Allstate agent in either an employee or independent-contractor capacity. JA 464-65. After noting that the restrictive covenant in Cowan's employment contract lasts only two years and prohibits him only from selling to his former Allstate clients and from selling insurance near his old office, the court concluded that “[t]here is insufficient evidence . . . that the plaintiff will be unable to obtain other employment or a comparable business opportunity in the event he leaves the employ of Allstate,” because he is “a very productive, talented and valued member of Allstate's insurance sales staff.” Id. The court therefore concluded that Cowan had failed to establish irreparable harm and was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. JA 466. The court accepted the magistrate's ruling “to the extent that it is not contrary to the [court's decision].” Id. The district court rejected Cowan's request for a stay pending appeal, JA 474-75, but this Court granted a stay. Accordingly, Cowan has continued to work for Allstate as an employee. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The district court rejected the magistrate judge's finding of irreparable harm largely because Cowan did not “own” his book of business, and he was not “entitled” to become an exclusive agent. The district court erred in ruling that since Allstate was not obligated to allow Cowan to become an exclusive agent and acquire his book of business, the company was free to attach whatever conditions it chose to that offer. Allstate was not free to attach conditions that violate Title VII. The district court therefore erred in ruling that the harms Cowan will suffer if he is terminated and not permitted to become an exclusive agent are irrelevant in assessing whether he showed irreparable harm. Moreover, since Allstate acknowledges that it intends to take an adverse action against Cowan – denying him the opportunity to continue as an Allstate agent – because he insists on engaging in protected activity – pursuing his Title VII lawsuit – the challenged policy is retaliatory on its face. Therefore, the magistrate judge correctly ruled that Cowan has established a likelihood of success on the merits. ARGUMENT COWAN WOULD, IF TERMINATED, SUFFER HARM THAT COULD NOT BE REMEDIED BY DAMAGES, AND THE CHALLENGED POLICY IS RETALIATORY ON ITS FACE. A preliminary injunction may be granted when “the party seeking the injunction establishes that ‘(1) absent injunctive relief, it will suffer irreparable harm, and (2) either (a) . . . it is likely to succeed on the merits, or (b) . . . there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation, and . . . the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the moving party.'” Wright v. Giuliani, 2000 WL 1591121, *4 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2000) (quoting Otokoyama Co. Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 1999)). The magistrate judge concluded that both elements of this standard were met, but the district court disagreed. We believe the district court erred. First, the district court's reasons for rejecting the magistrate judge's finding of irreparable harm were erroneous as a matter of law. Second, although the district court did not address this point, the illegality of Allstate's conduct is manifest. Therefore, plaintiff has, a fortiori, shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits. The district court's basis for finding no irreparable harm is erroneous as a matter of law. The magistrate judge set out in detail the circumstances which supported his conclusion that Cowan will suffer irreparable harm if his employment is terminated and he is not allowed to continue to sell insurance for Allstate. The magistrate relied heavily on his finding that, without an injunction, Cowan will “lose his book of business” and the attendant good will and customer loyalty, and he will be “denied his entitlement to become an exclusive agent.” JA 288. The district court accepted most of the magistrate judge's findings but reached the opposite conclusion. The court emphasized two factors in rejecting the recommended decision: that Cowan does not “own” the book of business in the first place and therefore cannot “lose” it; and that Cowan was not “entitled” to become an exclusive agent for Allstate, but had to “satisf[y] the requirements . . . established by Allstate.” JA 464. These findings – which are not inconsistent with the magistrate judge's findings – demonstrate that the district court missed the point. Whether or not Cowan held legal title to his “book of business,” or had a contractual right to become an exclusive agent for Allstate, it is undisputed that, but for his refusal to dismiss his Title VII action, he would have been permitted to remain an Allstate agent and continue his relationship with his clients. Accordingly, the loss of his client base and the loss of his status as an agent are harms that will surely flow from Allstate's alleged retaliation. The district court accordingly should have considered them in deciding whether plaintiff showed irreparable harm. In holding that plaintiff failed to show irreparable harm, the district court also emphasized that the restrictive covenant in his employment contract did not prohibit him from selling insurance after he left Allstate, but only from selling to his former Allstate clients or near his old office, and only for two years. The court concluded, therefore, that he failed to establish that he will be unable to obtain employment or a “comparable business opportunity” if his relationship with Allstate is severed. But this seriously overstates the plaintiff's burden. The plaintiff was not required to prove that he will be permanently ruined without an injunction, only that he will suffer irreparable injury. Cf. Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (finding irreparable harm where plaintiff showed that defendant's termination of its distributorship would destroy its 11-year-old business, without requiring plaintiff to prove it could not acquire another distributorship somehow); Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding irreparable harm where defendant terminated plaintiff's 20-year-old family dealership, without requiring plaintiff to prove he could not continue to earn money selling cars); Galvin v. New York Racing Ass'n, 70 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169-72 (E.D.N.Y.) (holding that defendant's seven-month suspension of plaintiff's credentials as racetrack veterinarian constituted irreparable harm, without requiring plaintiff to prove he could not build up a new practice from scratch), aff'd, 166 F.3d 1200 (2d Cir. 1998). The magistrate's findings support the conclusion that, even if there is a possibility that Cowan, by virtue of his skill and hard work, may eventually reestablish himself in the insurance business, there is a substantial risk that he will not, especially given his age and disability, and that the losses he will suffer cannot be remedied with damages. This is enough to establish irreparable injury. See Galvin, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 169-72 (finding irreparable harm where defendant's act prevented plaintiff from continuing to serve the clients in his practice). The magistrate judge did not address this Court's decision in Loveridge v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 788 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1986). However, we believe that Loveridge can be distinguished from this case. In addressing the termination of an exclusive sales representative for a clothing manufacturer, this Court distinguished its loss-of-franchise and loss-of-business decisions, and held that Loveridge's termination did not threaten irreparable harm — in large part because he could be reinstated to his former position and any interim economic injury could be adequately remedied by monetary damages. Id. at 916-18. But Cowan is in a significantly different position. The good will inherent in Loveridge's position sprang principally from his customers' approval of the clothes the defendant manufactured, id. at 917, and stores wishing to sell that manufacturer's clothes had to purchase them through Loveridge. The relationship between a customer and an insurance agent is quite different. A person wishing to purchase insurance has many insurance agents among whom she can choose, and her decision to continue using the same agent is usually based more on her personal relationship with that agent than on her desire to purchase a particular insurance company's policies. See Chambers-Dobson, Inc. v. Squier, 472 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Neb. 1991) (there is a “‘confidential personal relationship' between an insurance customer and an insurance agent.”) In addition, unlike in Loveridge, a substantial portion of an insurance agent's income is based, in pyramidal fashion, on the renewals of policies he sold his clients over the years. See Lawyer v. Lawyer, 702 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Ark. 1986) (“[W]hen an insurance agent stays with the same company, . . . his renewal commissions increase as he writes more and more policies; they become a growing part of his regular earnings.”) The district court's optimistic projections about Cowan's ability to earn a living by starting over and selling policies issued by another company to a new set of clients ignore this important factor. Moreover, in Loveridge this Court ruled that the plaintiff could be reinstated to his former position as exclusive sales representative with no irreparable damage to his ability to earn his living in that position. 788 F.2d at 917. In the case at bar, however, if Cowan is terminated, the thousands of clients he has developed over 16 years will be distributed to other agents, and those agents will naturally attempt to develop good personal relationships with those clients. Cf. Galvin, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 171, 191 (discussing evidence that when veterinarian left his practice for eight months to take a prestigious position, many of his clients switched to other veterinarians and “did not switch back to him” when he returned; and noting that this “lack of client loyalty” would probably be exacerbated for someone whose absence had stigma attached to it). No court order can restore Cowan to the relationship he had with those clients before the other agents intervened. See Galvin, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 169, 191 (“a monetary award will not necessarily enable [plaintiff, a veterinarian] to regain his clients and reestablish his lost practice”); Chambers-Dobson, 472 N.W.2d at 396 (“Continuity of coverage is an essential element in the ‘confidential personal relationship' between an insurance customer and an insurance agent.”). Furthermore, any effort to determine the ongoing economic harm Cowan would suffer after reinstatement would be highly speculative and would run the risk of undercompensating Cowan for Allstate's unlawful conduct. Galvin, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 170 (when a professional's relationship with his clients is significantly disrupted, “[t]he great difficulty in calculating exactly what has been lost, in terms of the value of the business as a going concern and the goodwill it has developed, makes equitable relief appropriate”). The challenged policy, which requires employee agents to release claims and withdraw pending lawsuits before they can continue working as Allstate agents, violates § 704(a) on its face. There is a strong likelihood that Cowan will prevail on the merits. Cowan alleges that Allstate violated § 704(a) of Title VII by refusing to designate him as an exclusive agent unless he agreed to dismiss his Title VII action against Allstate. In light of the fact that Allstate does not deny that it imposed this condition, there is little doubt that Cowan will prevail. The mere fact that, as the district court stressed, Allstate was not required to offer Cowan the independent-contractor position and book ownership does not mean that the company could put discriminatory or retaliatory conditions on its offer. Once an employer decides to offer a particular benefit or privilege to its employees, Title VII prohibits the employer from offering that benefit or privilege in a discriminatory or retaliatory manner. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984) (“A benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free . . . not to provide the benefit at all.”). Hishon is particularly relevant here. The employer in Hishon was a law firm that was allegedly discriminating in how it considered associates for partnership. The firm was arguably not obligated to consider its associates for partnership at all. Moreover, when the associates became partners, they presumably became non-employees no longer protected by Title VII. In spite of these facts, the Supreme Court held that the firm could not discriminate in how it considered its associates for partnership. 467 U.S. at 75. Similarly here, Allstate was not obligated to offer independent-contractor status and book ownership to its employee agents; and once they became independent contractors, they arguably would no longer be protected by Title VII. But like the defendant in Hishon, Allstate was not free to offer these privileges in a way that violated Title VII. Cowan should therefore prevail on the merits of his claim under the traditional paradigm for addressing retaliation claims. To establish a violation of § 704(a), a plaintiff must show he engaged in a protected activity, he suffered (or was about to suffer) an adverse employment action, and there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 639 (2d Cir. 1997). Cowan clearly engaged in protected activity when he filed his lawsuit and pursued his discrimination and retaliation claims, and he just as clearly engaged in protected activity when he refused to release his claims and withdraw the lawsuit. Allstate took an adverse action against Cowan by refusing to allow Cowan to continue selling Allstate products as an independent contractor. The causal connection is explicitly stated in the Reorganization Program, because the primary condition for becoming an independent-contractor agent under the program was that Cowan had to release his claims and withdraw his lawsuit. While § 704(a) does not expressly state that refusing to withdraw a Title VII lawsuit is a protected activity, the logic of the section and the Congressional purpose in enacting it compel the conclusion that refusing to withdraw a pending lawsuit is a protected activity. It cannot be the case that suing your employer is a protected activity, but later refusing to withdraw the suit is not protected. If that were the case, then an employer sued under Title VII could threaten to fire the plaintiff unless she withdraws the lawsuit without fear of liability for retaliation. Employers willing to take this step would be able to immunize themselves in significant part from Title VII liability. If filing a Title VII lawsuit is a protected activity under § 704(a), as it clearly is, then it must be the case that refusing to withdraw a lawsuit one has already filed – or, putting it in other words, choosing to continue to prosecute that lawsuit – is a protected activity as well. Cf. Marshall v. Parking Co. of America—Denver, Inc., 670 F.2d 141, 142-43 (10th Cir. 1982) (employee's dismissal was retaliatory under the FLSA when it resulted from his refusal to release a claim of back pay under pressure from his employer); Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 180 (8th Cir. 1975) (employer in FLSA retaliation case asked employee to sign her back-wage check over to the employer and still sign a receipt for those wages, and then fired her for refusing to sign the receipt until she had actually received the wages; court ruled that employee's refusal to sign the receipt was protected activity). Allstate may argue that it did not adopt the Reorganization Program as a way to retaliate against Cowan for his having filed a lawsuit, and the company therefore had no retaliatory intent. Or, in another version of the same argument, Allstate may argue that it had a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for adopting the challenged policy. We would respond first that Cowan does not need to establish retaliatory intent, because he is challenging a retaliatory policy. As the Seventh Circuit held in EEOC v. Board of Governors, 957 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1992), in commenting on the ADEA's anti-retaliation provision, which parallels Title VII's: Nothing in Section 4(d) requires a showing of intent in retaliatory policy cases. To the contrary, Section 4(d) is concerned with the effect of discrimination against employees who pursue their federal rights, not the motivation of the employer who discriminates. Cf. Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 1991) (employer had policy of discontinuing its grievance procedure if the employee filed a charge; court ruled this policy violated § 704(a) without addressing whether employer acted with retaliatory intent). Second, the fact that Allstate had non-retaliatory business reasons for adopting its Reorganization Program is irrelevant if the challenged provision violates § 704(a). As the Board of Governors court stated, When charged with unlawful retaliation . . . , an employer may offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for taking an adverse action against an employee who has engaged in protected activity, i.e., that the employer took the adverse action for some reason unrelated to the employee's participation in protected activity. However, the employer may not proffer a good faith reason for taking retaliatory action. 957 F.2d at 427-28. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Commission respectfully urges this Court to reject the district court's analysis as erroneous and either grant Cowan the requested injunctive relief or remand the case to the district court. Respectfully submitted, C. GREGORY STEWART General Counsel PHILIP SKLOVER Associate General Counsel VINCENT J. BLACKWOOD Assistant General Counsel PAUL D. RAMSHAW Attorney EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1801 L Street, N.W., Rm. 7816 Washington, D.C. 20507 (202) 663-4736 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I, Paul D. Ramshaw, attorney for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as amicus curiae, hereby certify that according to my word processor, the relevant portions of this brief contain 3,938 words. Paul D. Ramshaw November 27, 2000 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing brief were served by mailing them on this date first class, postage prepaid, to the following counsel of record: Emanuel N. Psarakis, Esq. Andrew S. Golden, Esq. ROBINSON & COLE LLP 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103-3597 Scott R. Lucas, Esq. Mary Alice S. Canaday, Esq. MARTIN LUCAS & CHIOFFI 1177 Summer Street Stamford, CT 06905 Paul D. Ramshaw Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1801 L Street, N.W., Room 7816 Washington, DC 20507 (202) 663-4737 April 21, 2003