Congress charged the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”) with interpreting and enforcing federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). This appeal raises important questions regarding the length of the period for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC when an employee lives in a state or locality that has its own “fair employment practices agency.” The enforcement scheme of the federal anti-discrimination laws is significantly impeded where, as here, a district court dismisses an action based on its erroneous conclusion that a charge filed with the EEOC was untimely. The Commission therefore offers its views to the Court. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2).

Did a 300-day limitations period apply to the plaintiff’s EEOC charge, and was his charge filed with the Commission within that 300-day period?

Statement of the Case

Plaintiff Climmons Jones, Jr., who is African American, worked as a security officer at a shipping center operated by defendant Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx”). Compl./R. 1/Page ID 1, 4; Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss/R. 22/Page ID 71. One of his duties was to watch an X-ray monitor to detect weapons in packages about to be loaded on FedEx aircraft. Compl./R. 1/Page ID 4; Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss/R. 22/Page ID 71. On August 4, 2017, Jones failed to detect a weapon. Compl./R. 1/Page ID 3-4. Twelve days later, FedEx terminated him, allegedly because he failed to detect that weapon. Id. at 4. According to Jones, the consequences for failing to detect a weapon were harsher for him and another African American officer than they were for certain white officers. Id. at 5–7.

Jones filed a charge alleging discrimination with the EEOC on April 25, 2018, 252 days after his termination. Compl./R. 1/Page ID 8. After processing his charge, the Commission issued him a notice of his right to bring suit against FedEx. Dismissal and Notice/R. 1-1/Page ID 10. In explaining the basis for closing its file on the charge, the EEOC completed a standard form, and it did not place a checkmark next to the statement “Your charge was not timely filed with EEOC.” Id.

Jones subsequently filed a pro se Title VII action in district court alleging race discrimination. Compl./R. 1/Page ID 1, 4, 9. FedEx moved to dismiss, arguing that Jones had not filed a discrimination complaint with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission (“THRC”), and thus he had only 180 days to file his charge with the EEOC. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss/R. 17/Page ID 42–44. FedEx argued that his EEOC charge, filed 252 days after his termination, was therefore untimely, and the case should be dismissed. Id. at 44–45.

The district court accepted FedEx’s argument and dismissed the case with prejudice. Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss/R. 22/Page ID 78–80. As relevant here, the court acknowledged that “Jones argues that he should have 300 days in which to file his [EEOC] charge, because the Tennessee Human Rights Commission prohibits race discrimination in employment.” Id. at 78. The court held, however, that “[t]he existence of a state agency is not enough; instead, the person aggrieved must have actually ‘instituted proceedings’ which [sic] said agency.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). The court noted that Jones had not “allege[d] that he filed a charge with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission, so the 300-day deadline does not apply in this case.” Id. at 78-79. Jones moved to alter or amend the judgment, and the district court denied that motion. Order Den. Mot. to Alter or Amend J./R. 29/Page ID 109–11.

Argument

Jones’s EEOC charge was timely filed.

A. Jones had 300 days in which to file his EEOC charge, and he filed his charge within that period.

Title VII provides that employees who wish to pursue discrimination claims against their employers generally must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), reproduced in addendum at A-3. But if an employee “has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice” under state or local law, the employee has 300 days to file her charge with the EEOC. Id., p. A-3. Such state or local agencies are known as “fair employment practices agencies” (“FEPAs”), and the Supreme Court has held that the EEOC may institute proceedings with a FEPA on behalf of an employee. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 816 (1980) (“[N]othing in [Title VII] suggests that the state proceedings may not be initiated by the EEOC acting on behalf of the complainant rather than by the complainant himself . . . .” (final alteration in original) (quoting Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525 (1972))); cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70 (explaining FEPAs).

In cases involving a FEPA, Title VII imposes another requirement relevant to this case: in general, no EEOC charge “may be filed . . . before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), p. A-2. This statutory provision “give[s] States and localities an opportunity to combat discrimination free from premature federal intervention.” EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 110 (1988). But a FEPA can waive its right to process a charge exclusively for 60 days. The Supreme Court has held that when it does so, FEPA proceedings have been “terminated” within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 114–22; see also id. at 125 (“[W]e find that . . . the [FEPA’s] waiver of the 60-day deferral period ‘terminated’ its proceedings . . . .”). At that point, the EEOC may deem any charge it has received to be filed and may begin to process it immediately. See id. at 112; see also Love, 404 U.S. at 526 (the EEOC may hold a charge “in ‘suspended animation,’ automatically filing it upon termination of the state proceedings”).[2]

The EEOC has entered into “worksharing agreements” with most FEPAs. These agreements “typically provide that the state or local agency will process certain categories of charges and that the EEOC will process others, with the state or local agency waiving the 60-day deferral period in the latter instance.” Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. at 112. In addition, “[i]f the [FEPA] has a ‘worksharing’ agreement with the EEOC, a complainant ordinarily need not file separately with federal and state agencies.” Fort Bend Cty. v. Davis, No. 18-525, 2019 WL 2331306, at *2 (U.S. June 3, 2019). During the period relevant here, the EEOC and the THRC had such a worksharing agreement. See Worksharing Agreement Between Tennessee Human Rights Commission & the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Memphis District Office, For Fiscal Year 2018 (“Agreement”) (attached to Jones’s judicial-notice motion docketed in this Court May 14, 2019; relevant excerpts reproduced in addendum at A-9 through A-11).

Under the Agreement, the EEOC and the THRC “each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving . . . charges.” Agreement § II(A), p. A-10. Furthermore, “[t]he EEOC’s receipt of charges on the FEPA’s behalf will automatically initiate the proceedings of both the EEOC and the FEPA” for the purposes of the Title VII provisions discussed above. Id. The Agreement also addresses how “the primary responsibility for resolving charges” will “be divided” between the THRC and the EEOC. Id. § III, p. A-10. Under the Agreement, “[t]he EEOC . . . will process all Title VII . . . charges that [it] originally receive[s],” id. § III(A), p. A-11, and the THRC “waives its right of exclusive jurisdiction to initially process such charges for a period of 60 days for the purpose of allowing the EEOC to proceed immediately with the processing of such charges before the 61st day,” id. § III(A)(1), p. A-11.

Therefore, when Jones submitted his race-discrimination charge to the EEOC 252 days after he was terminated, three things automatically happened as a result of the worksharing agreement: the EEOC, acting as the THRC’s agent, instituted a THRC proceeding; the THRC terminated that proceeding (pursuant to its waiver); and the EEOC instituted an EEOC proceeding. Accordingly, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss/R. 22/Page ID 78–79, Jones did institute proceedings with the THRC because the EEOC initiated such proceedings on his behalf. As a result, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), p. A-3, the 300-day limitations period governed. In addition, because the THRC terminated its proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), p. A-2, on the same day Jones submitted his charge to the EEOC, the charge was deemed immediately filed with the Commission, well within the 300-day period.

Supporting this analysis, the Commission’s Title VII regulations make clear that when the EEOC receives a Title VII charge from an employee, the Commission must institute proceedings on behalf of that employee with any FEPA with subject-matter jurisdiction over the charge, and a FEPA’s waiver of its exclusive-processing rights with respect to a relevant category of charges results in the automatic termination of FEPA proceedings and the automatic initiation of EEOC proceedings. Under those regulations, where, unlike here, such a FEPA “has not waived its right to the period of exclusive processing” of a document received by the EEOC, the document “shall be” sent to the FEPA for processing. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(4)(i), p. A-6. But where, as here, a charge “on its face” falls “within a category of charges over which the [FEPA] has waived its [exclusive-processing] rights,” then “the charge is deemed to be filed with the Commission upon receipt of the document.” Id. § 1601.13(a)(4)(ii)(A), p. A‑7. “Such filing is timely if the charge is received within 300 days from the date of the alleged violation.” Id.

This Court has not yet issued any published opinions addressing how a worksharing agreement like the one at issue here affects a charge submitted only to the EEOC more than 180 days after the alleged discriminatory action. But this Court has analyzed closely related questions concerning how a worksharing agreement affects a discrimination charge submitted after 180 days only to a FEPA, reaching conclusions that support the position we advance here. In Brown v. Crowe, 963 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1992), this Court concluded that “[b]y filing [such a] charge with the THRC—which, under [a] worksharing agreement, acted as agent for the EEOC, and vice versa—[an employee] simultaneously filed his charge with the EEOC.” Id. at 898 (going on to hold that the limitations period was equitably tolled). And in Nichols v. Muskingum College, 318 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2003), this Court held in relevant part that the state charge “was constructively terminated pursuant to [a similar] worksharing agreement and should be deemed filed with the EEOC on th[e] same date [it was submitted to the state].” Id. at 682. In reaching that conclusion, this Court “[a]dopt[ed] th[e] approach” of the Eleventh Circuit in Griffin v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 883 F.2d 940 (11th Cir. 1989). Nichols, 318 F.3d at 682. As Nichols explained, Griffin held that a FEPA’s waiver of the exclusive-processing period in a worksharing agreement “created an instantaneous ‘constructive termination’” of FEPA proceedings. Id. (quoting Griffin, 883 F.2d at 943).

Moreover, every court of appeals to consider the impact of materially identical worksharing agreements has held that: (1) in order to qualify for the 300-day limitations period under Title VII, employees need file charges only with the EEOC because the EEOC automatically initiates FEPA proceedings on behalf of the employee; and/or (2) FEPA proceedings are automatically terminated when the FEPA has prospectively waived its right to exclusive processing. See, e.g., Velázquez-Pérez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 276–77 (1st Cir. 2014) (automatic initiation); Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers, 192 F.3d 322, 325–28 (2d Cir. 1999) (automatic initiation); Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d 304, 310-11 (2d Cir. 1996) (automatic termination); Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 919 F.2d 874, 879 (3d Cir. 1990) (automatic termination); Puryear v. Cty. of Roanoke, 214 F.3d 514, 518–21 (4th Cir. 2000) (automatic initiation); Griffin v. City of Dallas, 26 F.3d 610, 612–14 (5th Cir. 1994) (automatic initiation and termination); Johnson v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 280 F.3d 1125, 1129–30 (7th Cir. 2002) (automatic termination and automatic filing with the EEOC when submitted to the FEPA); Worthington v. Union Pac. R.R., 948 F.2d 477, 479–82 (8th Cir. 1991) (automatic termination); Green v. L.A. Cty. Supt. of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1476–80 (9th Cir. 1989) (automatic termination and automatic filing with the EEOC when submitted to the FEPA); Rodriguez v. Wet Ink, LLC, 603 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 2010) (automatic initiation); G riffin, 883 F.2d at 943–45 (automatic termination).

For all of the foregoing reasons, Jones—like all other employees submitting race discrimination charges to the EEOC that are governed by materially identical worksharing agreements—had 300 days to file his charge with the EEOC, and his charge was deemed filed with the EEOC the day he submitted it. That ultimate conclusion is reflected in multiple decisions issued by this Court. See, e.g., Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The alleged unlawful employment practice in this case did occur in Ohio, a deferral state, and thus the 300–day period in which to file an EEOC charge under Title VII applies.”); Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 177 F.3d 394, 407 (6th Cir. 1999) (similar); EEOC v. Penton Indus. Publ’g Co., 851 F.2d 835, 837 n.5 (6th Cir. 1988) (similar). It is also memorialized in information that the EEOC’s website provides about the submission of EEOC charges. See, e.g., EEOC, Timeliness, https://www.eeoc.gov/field/memphis/

timeliness.cfm (instructing that individuals in Tennessee “ha[ve] 300 days from the date of alleged harm to file a charge with [the EEOC] against an employer with 15 or more employees for discrimination based on race”); cf. EEOC, Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/fepa.cfm (“If the charge is initially filed with EEOC and the charge is also covered by state or local law, EEOC dual files the charge with the state or local FEPA . . . .”).

B. This Court should consider Jones’s timeliness argument.

1. FedEx may contend in its appellee brief that Jones failed to make the argument just advanced in district court and therefore forfeited it. This Court should reject any such contention and hold that Jones’s EEOC charge was timely filed.

Jones—whose pro se briefs must be liberally construed, see, e.g., Wallace v. FedEx Corp., 764 F.3d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 2014)—argued in his opposition to FedEx’s motion to dismiss that his EEOC charge was timely. Jones expressly contended that Tennessee has a state agency that enforces a state law prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race and that he therefore had 300 days, instead of only 180 days, to file his EEOC charge. Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss/R. 18/Page ID 48-49. Jones thus accurately summarized the governing rule, and this Court may consider any arguments in support of that rule on appeal, including arguments predicated on the worksharing agreement. See, e.g., Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d 473, 483 (6th Cir. 2017); cf., e.g., Ford, 81 F.3d at 307 (considering similar argument based on worksharing agreement made for the first time on appeal, noting that it was a “new legal argument that concerns an issue already considered . . . by the district court”).

Even if Jones forfeited those arguments, this Court can and should rule on them. As this Court has explained, “a federal appellate court is always empowered to resolve any issue not considered below ‘where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt or where injustice . . . might otherwise result.’” Brown, 963 F.2d at 898 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 2008). For all of the reasons already described, the resolution of the issue presented here is “beyond any doubt,” Brown, 963 F.2d at 898; the answer follows directly from the governing language in the statute, regulations, and worksharing agreement, and it is amply supported by precedent in the Supreme Court, this Court, and other courts of appeals. Cf., e.g., Erie Cty. v. Morton Salt, Inc., 702 F.3d 860, 874 (6th Cir. 2012) (addressing impact of fact not considered in district court “because the resolution of the case is beyond doubt”); Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding district court should have determined whether the governing worksharing agreement meant that the 300-day limit governed, even though the plaintiff argued for the 300-day limit for the first time in a motion for reconsideration, reasoning that the district court made a “manifest error of law” by not addressing the issue).

In addition, “injustice would result” if Jones, “who is appearing pro se, were to ‘lose [his] day in court’ because []he failed to uncover the worksharing agreement until after the district court dismissed the case.” Green, 883 F.2d at 1477; cf., e.g., Brown, 963 F.2d at 898. That is particularly so because “any neglect on the part of” Jones was “minimal.” Mayhew v. Allsup, 166 F.3d 821, 823 (6th Cir. 1999). As a pro se plaintiff, Jones reasonably did not know that he needed to locate the governing worksharing agreement and then advance arguments based on the agreement to support the position that is reflected in court decisions and the EEOC’s website—that employees in Tennessee and other states with materially identical worksharing agreements have 300 days to file an EEOC charge. See supra pp. 9–10. Moreover, it is worth noting that lawyers representing FedEx have acknowledged in other cases the ultimate conclusion advanced by Jones here—that employees in Tennessee have 300 days to file race and sex discrimination charges with the EEOC.[3]

In any event, this Court should consider the worksharing agreement for one of two alternative reasons. First, this Court has explained that “judicial notice is generally not the appropriate means to establish the legal principles governing the case.” Toth v. Grand Trunk R.R., 306 F.3d 335, 349 (6th Cir. 2002). Instead, courts are “entitled—and indeed required—to determine the applicable law.” United States v. Dedman, 527 F.3d 577, 587 (6th Cir. 2008). Significantly, Title VII authorizes the Commission to “enter into written agreements with [relevant] State or local agencies” in “furtherance of . . . cooperative efforts,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b); see also id. § 2000e-4(g)(1), and, of course, the signatories of such agreements are federal and state or local governments. It follows that worksharing agreements are part of the governing law and must be considered when relevant to a court’s decision. Cf., e.g., Ford, 81 F.3d at 307 n.5 (noting that worksharing agreements “are much more like government regulations than any sort of contract,” describing such agreements as, “[i]n a sense, . . . localized subsets of federal regulations,” and observing that such agreements “have the same impact on [plaintiffs] as a statute or regulation”).

In the alternative, even if the worksharing agreement at issue here is an “adjudicative fact” that may be considered only if it is judicially noticed, this Court should take such notice of the agreement because it “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); United States v. Ferguson, 681 F.3d 826, 834 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting “[t]his standard applies to appellate courts taking judicial notice of facts supported by documents not included in the record on appeal”). Indeed, at least one other court of appeals has taken judicial notice of a comparable worksharing agreement on appeal. See Scott v. Gino Morena Enters., LLC, 888 F.3d 1101, 1106 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018). And in an older case predating this Court’s clarification that judicial notice is generally not the appropriate means to establish the legal principles governing a case, this Court explained that “[m]any cases have recognized that a Court may take judicial notice of the rules, regulations and orders of administrative agencies issued pursuant to their delegated authority.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Zantop Air Transp. Corp., 394 F.2d 36, 40 (6th Cir. 1968).

Conclusion

This Court should reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

Relevant District Court Documents

Docket #	Document Description	PgID #
1	Complaint	1–9
1-1	Notice of Right to Sue	10
17	Motion to Dismiss	42–45
18	Opposition to Motion to Dismiss	46–50
22	Order Dismissing Case	71–80
24	Motion to Alter Judgment	82–86
29	Order Denying Motion to Alter Judgment	109–11

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Enforcement provisions

* * *

(c) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State or local authority; time for filing charges with Commission; commencement of proceedings

In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (a) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State or local authority.

* * *

(e) Time for filing charges; time for service of notice of charge on respondent; filing of charge by Commission with State or local agency; seniority system

(1) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency.

* * *

29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 – Filing; deferrals to State and local agencies.

(a) Initial presentation of a charge to the Commission.

(1) Charges arising in jurisdictions having no FEP agency are filed with the Commission upon receipt. Such charges are timely filed if received by the Commission within 180 days from the date of the alleged violation.

(2) A jurisdiction having a FEP agency without subject matter jurisdiction over a charge (e.g., an agency which does not cover sex discrimination or does not cover nonprofit organizations) is equivalent to a jurisdiction having no FEP agency. Charges over which a FEP agency has no subject matter jurisdiction are filed with the Commission upon receipt and are timely filed if received by the Commission within 180 days from the date of the alleged violation.

(3) Charges arising in jurisdictions having a FEP agency with subject matter jurisdiction over the charges are to be processed in accordance with the Commission's deferral policy set forth below and the procedures in paragraph (a)(4) of this section.

(i) In order to give full weight to the policy of section 706(c) of title VII, which affords State and local fair employment practice agencies that come within the provisions of that section an opportunity to remedy alleged discrimination concurrently regulated by title VII, the ADA, or GINA and State or local law, the Commission adopts the following procedures with respect to allegations of discrimination filed with the Commission. It is the intent of the Commission to thereby encourage the maximum degree of effectiveness in the State and local agencies. The Commission shall endeavor to maintain close communication with the State and local agencies with respect to all matters forwarded to such agencies and shall provide such assistance to State and local agencies as is permitted by law and as is practicable.

(ii) Section 706(c) of title VII grants States and their political subdivisions the exclusive right to process allegations of discrimination filed by a person other than a Commissioner for a period of 60 days (or 120 days during the first year after the effective date of the qualifying State or local law). This right exists where, as set forth in § 1601.70, a State or local law prohibits the employment practice alleged to be unlawful and a State or local agency has been authorized to grant or seek relief. After the expiration of the exclusive processing period, the Commission may commence processing the allegation of discrimination.

(iii) A FEP agency may waive its right to the period of exclusive processing of charges provided under section 706(c) of title VII with respect to any charge or category of charges. Copies of all such charges will be forwarded to the appropriate FEP agency.

(4) The following procedures shall be followed with respect to charges which arise in jurisdictions having a FEP agency with subject matter jurisdiction over the charges:

(i) Where any document, whether or not verified, is received by the Commission as provided in § 1601.8 which may constitute a charge cognizable under title VII, the ADA, or GINA, and where the FEP agency has not waived its right to the period of exclusive processing with respect to that document, that document shall be deferred to the appropriate FEP agency as provided in the procedures set forth below:

(A) All such documents shall be dated and time stamped upon receipt.

(B) A copy of the original document, shall be transmitted by registered mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate FEP agency, or, where the FEP agency has consented thereto, by certified mail, by regular mail or by hand delivery. State or local proceedings are deemed to have commenced on the date such document is mailed or hand delivered.

(C) The person claiming to be aggrieved and any person filing a charge on behalf of such person shall be notified, in writing, that the document which he or she sent to the Commission has been forwarded to the FEP agency pursuant to the provisions of section 706(c) of title VII.

(ii) Such charges are deemed to be filed with the Commission as follows:

(A) Where the document on its face constitutes a charge within a category of charges over which the FEP agency has waived its rights to the period of exclusive processing referred to in paragraph (a)(3)(iii) of this section, the charge is deemed to be filed with the Commission upon receipt of the document. Such filing is timely if the charge is received within 300 days from the date of the alleged violation.

(B) Where the document on its face constitutes a charge which is not within a category of charges over which the FEP agency has waived its right to the period of exclusive processing referred to in paragraph (a)(3)(iii) of this section, the Commission shall process the document in accordance with paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section. The charge shall be deemed to be filing with the Commission upon expiration of 60 (or where appropriate, 120) days after deferral, or upon the termination of FEP agency proceedings, or upon waiver of the FEP agency's right to exclusively process the charge, whichever is earliest. Where the FEP agency earlier terminates its proceedings or waives its right to exclusive processing of a charge, the charge shall be deemed to be filed with the Commission on the date the FEP agency terminated its proceedings or the FEP agency waived its right to exclusive processing of the charge. Such filing is timely if effected within 300 days from the date of the alleged violation.

* * *

Worksharing Agreement Between Tennessee Human Rights Commission and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Memphis District Office, For Fiscal Year 2018

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Tennessee Human Rights Commission, hereinafter referred to as the FEPA, has jurisdiction over allegations of eight (8) or more employees occurring within the State of Tennessee based on race, color, creed, national origin, religion, sex and age (40 or older) pursuant to Title 4 Chapter 21 of the Tennessee Code Annotated and discrimination against persons with a disability under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-50-103. * * *

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, hereinafter referred to as the EEOC, has jurisdiction over allegations of employment discrimination occurring throughout the United States where such charges are based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, all pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)) (hereinafter referred to as
Title VII). * * *

B. In recognition of, and to the extent of the common jurisdiction and goals of the two (2) Agencies, and in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants contained herein, the FEPA and the EEOC hereby agree to the terms of this Worksharing Agreement, which is designed to provide individuals with an efficient procedure for obtaining redress for their grievances under appropriate State and Federal laws.

II. FILING OF CHARGES OF DISCRIMINATION

A. In order to facilitate the assertion of employment rights, the EEOC and the FEPA each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges, including those that are not jurisdictional with the agency that initially receives the charges. The EEOC’s receipt of charges on the FEPA’s behalf will automatically initiate the proceedings of both the EEOC and the FEPA for the purposes of Section 706 (c) and (e)(1) of Title VII.

* * *

III. DIVISION OF INITIAL CHARGE-PROCESSING RESPONSIBILITIES

In recognition of the statutory authority granted to the FEPA by Section 706(c) and 706(d) of Title VII as amended . . . , the primary responsibility for resolving charges between the FEPA and the EEOC will be divided as follows:

A. The EEOC and the FEPA will process all Title VII, ADA, GINA, and ADEA charges that they originally receive.

1. For charges originally received by the EEOC and/or to be initially processed by the EEOC, the FEPA waives its right of exclusive jurisdiction to initially process such charges for a period of 60 days for the purpose of allowing the EEOC to process immediately with the processing of such charges before the 61st day.

* * *

[1] The Commission takes no position on the merits of Jones’s underlying discrimination claim.

[2] Section 2000e-5(c) also imposes a requirement that the relevant state or local law “prohibit[] the unlawful employment practice alleged.” There is no dispute in this case that Tennessee law prohibits the type of discrimination alleged here.

[3] See, e.g., Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Hutson v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 2:15-cv-2411, R. 54-1, Page ID 153 (W.D. Tenn.) (filed Oct. 3, 2016) (“A charge of discrimination in Tennessee must be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act . . . .”); Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Johnson v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 2:14-cv-2511, R. 51-1, Page ID 766 (W.D. Tenn.) (filed July 22, 2015) (same).

[4] On May 28, 2019, this Court docketed a second motion filed by Jones for judicial notice of the worksharing agreement. The second motion—which was submitted by Jones at the same time as his opening brief—appears to be identical to the first motion, except that only the first motion attached the actual worksharing agreement.