09-1859-cv _______________________________________________________ IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT _______________________________________________________ SHARON KAYTOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELECTRIC BOAT CORP., Defendant-Appellee. _______________________________________________________ On Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut Hon. Dominic J. Squatrito, Judge _______________________________________________________ BRIEF OF THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF KAYTOR AND IN FAVOR OF REVERSAL _______________________________________________________ JAMES L. LEE GAIL S. COLEMAN Deputy General Counsel Attorney U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LORRAINE C. DAVIS OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Acting Associate General Counsel Office of General Counsel 131 M Street, NE, Room 5SW24L CAROLYN L. WHEELER Washington, DC 20507 Assistant General Counsel (202) 663-4055 gail.coleman@eeoc.gov TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Statement of Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Statement of the Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Statement of the Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 A. Statement of Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 B. District Court Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Summary of Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Whether Kaytor endured a gender-based hostile work environment is a genuine issue of material fact that should be decided by a jury. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 A. Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 B. In light of the off-color comments that McCarthy made to and about Kaytor, a reasonable jury could find that his death threats were "because of" her sex. . . . . . . . .8 C. Taking all of Kaytor's evidence as true and looking at the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that Kaytor endured "severe or pervasive" harassment.. 10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Anti-Virus Certification Form Certificate of Service TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Abeita v. TransAmerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2001). . . .6, 8, 9 Bator v. Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1994). . . . . . . 13 Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1994) . . . . . . 11 Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2001). . . . . . .7 Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2007). . . . . .7, 13 EEOC v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2008). . . .9 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) . . . . . . 12 Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001) . . . . . . 8, 9 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 11, 12, 13 Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2000) . .9 Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). . . 12 Mormol v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 364 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6, 12 Nat'l RR Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) . . . . . . . . . . 10 Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 2001). . . . . 8, 9 Readco, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 81 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . .11, 12-13 Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2004) . . . . . . 12 U.S. v. George, 532 F.3d 933 (D.C. Cir. 2008). . . . . . . 13 Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8, 11 Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Statutes and Rules Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Fed. R. App. P. 29(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Miscellaneous EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, 1990 WL 1104701 (Mar. 19, 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 STATEMENT OF INTEREST The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is charged by Congress with interpreting, administering, and enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. This case raises an important issue related to Title VII involving the standard by which a jury can find "severe or pervasive" harassment. Given the importance of this issue to effective enforcement of Title VII, the EEOC offers its views to the Court. The EEOC files this brief pursuant to Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1. In light of McCarthy's off-color comments to and about Kaytor, could a reasonable jury find that his death threats were "because of" her sex? 2. Taking all of Kaytor's evidence as true and looking at the totality of the circumstances, could a reasonable jury find that Kaytor endured "severe or pervasive" harassment? STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Statement of Facts Sharon Kaytor was an administrative assistant for Electric Boat Corporation, a company that designs and constructs nuclear submarines for the U.S. Navy. (R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 14; R.42, Gastiger Decl. ¶ 3.) From 1998 to 2005, Kaytor worked for Daniel McCarthy in Electric Boat's engineering department. (R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 18-19.) Kaytor testified that her relationship with McCarthy started out professionally but that by 2004 or 2005, their relationship had soured. (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 176, 187; R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 200.) She testified that McCarthy leered at her "many times" and that he often made "off-color comments" to her. (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 176-77, 245; R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 192.) After McCarthy overheard Kaytor tell her female coworkers that she was going to the gynecologist, Kaytor testified, McCarthy told her, "You are going where every man wants to be." (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 177.) He also told coworker Linda Christie – who then reported the comment to Kaytor – that Kaytor was "spreading her legs for the doctor." (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 177; R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 241; R.42-2, Def's Int'l Investig. Rpt. at 5.) Twice, McCarthy told Kaytor that she had a "flat ass." (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 176, 179-80.) When other engineers would stop by Kaytor's desk, McCarthy would come out of his office and stand there until they left. (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 246.) Once, he came up to Kaytor's desk, sniffed her scarves, and told her, "They smell like you." He then leaned closer but walked away when Kaytor turned her back and started typing. (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 177; R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 203-04.) For Administrative Assistant's Day, McCarthy gave Kaytor a pussy willow plant and a card referencing "pleasure," a gift which Kaytor interpreted as a thinly veiled reference to sex. (R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 209-10, 212-13, 215, 224-25.) Kaytor testified that McCarthy began threatening her in 2005, while he was going through a divorce. (R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 188-89, 191; R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 242.) He told her, "I'd like to see you in your coffin." (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 176-77.) At least six times, he said, "I'd like to come to your home. I'd like to choke you." (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 176-77, 186-87.) He also told her, "I wish you were retired so I could come to your home and choke you." (R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 188.) On three or four other occasions, Kaytor said, McCarthy told her that he wanted to kill her. (R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 241.) He sometimes made these comments "out of the blue," and sometimes in response to Kaytor's mentioning that she intended to complain to Human Resources or upper management about his conduct. (R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 188; R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 242-43.) Kaytor testified that she thought her relationship with McCarthy had soured "because I believe he had designs on me [and] things did not go his way." (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 176; see also R.44-2, Kaytor Dep. at 255.) Many of his comments offended or even scared her. (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 182-84, 207-08, 242; R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 191-92, 204-05, 224-25.) When McCarthy made the "flat ass" comment, she testified, she was "in shock" and later told McCarthy that the comment was inappropriate. (R.56- 1, Kaytor Dep. at 183-84.) When he told her as she left for a gynecologist appointment that "you are going where every man wants to be," Kaytor thought, "Oh my God, what did he just say to me?" and willed herself to "blow it off, blow it off, brush it off." (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 207.) When McCarthy threatened to choke her, again Kaytor initially "brushed it off," but eventually she became concerned. (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 186-87; R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 191-92.) By the end, she testified, "I felt intimidated. I felt like he was exhibiting a little bit of violence." (R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 191-92.) When McCarthy said that he wanted to kill her, Kaytor said, "he had this horrid look on his face. . . . I was scared to death." (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 242.) In late April or early May 2005, Kaytor complained to Human Resources about McCarthy's conduct. (R.42, Gastiger Decl. ¶ 6.) Electric Boat immediately transferred her away from McCarthy and investigated her allegations. (Id. ¶ 8.) The investigator substantiated some of Kaytor's complaints but concluded that McCarthy had probably not sexually harassed her. (R.42-2, Def's Int'l Investig. Rpt. at 5, 15-17.) Kaytor did not return to her previous position working with McCarthy but she remained employed with Electric Boat. (R.42, Gastiger Decl. ¶ 9.) In 2007, Kaytor returned from a medical leave of absence exhibiting signs of paranoia. (R.42, Gastiger Decl. ¶ 10; R.44-3, Filip Dep. at 49.) Electric Boat referred her to an off-site physician to examine her psychiatric fitness for duty. (R.43, Hurley Decl. ¶ 12.) Kaytor refused to see the doctor, and Electric Boat fired her for insubordination. (R.42, Gastiger Decl. ¶¶ 13-14.) Kaytor sued Electric Boat, alleging that Electric Boat had subjected her to a hostile work environment and had retaliated against her in violation of Title VII and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. (R.1, Compl, ¶ 1.) Electric Boat moved for summary judgment on all claims. (R.39, Motion.) B. District Court Decision The district court granted summary judgment to Electric Boat. With respect to her hostile environment claim,<1> the district court considered McCarthy's leering and off-color comments separately from his death threats. (R.60, Order at 20-22.) The court held that the leering and off- color comments "were episodic over a number of years, and are not sufficiently severe to overcome their lack of pervasiveness." (Id. at 21 (citing Mormol v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 364 F.3d 54, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2004).) Turning to McCarthy's death threats, the court said, "the Plaintiff has not offered any facts from which a reasonable jury could infer that these threats were made because of the plaintiff's sex." (Id. at 22 (citing Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2001).) The court said that Kaytor could recall only one instance where McCarthy had threatened to "kill" her and one where he had threatened to "choke" her (id.), although Kaytor had testified about numerous threats without remembering their precise dates. Noting that Kaytor herself had characterized McCarthy's threats as "out of character," the court concluded that the threats "were not pervasive." (Id.) For these reasons, the court held that Kaytor's hostile environment claim must fail as a matter of law. (Id.) SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT In awarding summary judgment to Electric Boat, the district court misapplied the law and wrongly usurped the jury's fact-finding function. It was for the jury, not the court, to determine whether McCarthy's death threats were based on Kaytor's sex and, if so, whether Kaytor experienced severe or pervasive harassment. Looking at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Kaytor, a reasonable jury could find for Kaytor on both issues. This Court should therefore remand for further proceedings. ARGUMENT Whether Kaytor endured a gender-based hostile work environment is a genuine issue of material fact that should be decided by a jury. A. Standard of Review In reviewing an award of summary judgment, this Court examines the record de novo, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and making all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2007). Courts should use summary judgment sparingly in discrimination cases because juries have "special advantages" over judges in assessing individuals' motivations and state of mind. Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2001). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [non-movant] on the evidence presented." Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 788 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Readco, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 81 F.3d 395, 298 (2d Cir. 1996)). B. In light of the off-color comments that McCarthy made to and about Kaytor, a reasonable jury could find that his death threats were "because of" her sex. The district court committed legal error by looking at McCarthy's death threats separately from the rest of Kaytor's evidence. It is a central premise of hostile environment law that what matters is not the details of each individual allegation, but the combined effect of all of them – the "totality of the circumstances." Nat'l RR Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002); Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 617 (2d Cir. 2001); Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, the court should have viewed McCarthy's death threats in the context of his other, gender-based words and actions. This Court has instructed that "incidents that are facially sex-neutral may sometimes be used to establish a course of sex-based discrimination – for example, where the same individual is accused of multiple acts of harassment, some overtly sexual and some not." Alfano, 294 F.3d at 375. For this reason, "courts should avoid disaggregating a hostile work environment claim, dividing conduct into instances of sexually oriented conduct and instances of unequal treatment." Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 695 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). A reasonable jury might conclude from McCarthy's leering and "off- color comments" that his general approach towards Kaytor was infected with gender animus. Even though McCarthy's death threats did not specifically reference Kaytor's gender, a jury could find that he would not have made the same threats to a man. A jury could reasonably infer that facially gender-neutral abuse carries an "earmark of bias" when carried out by an individual with a history of sex-based abuse. Alfano, 294 F.3d at 377; Raniola, 243 F.3d at 621-22 (sex-based verbal abuse may indicate that other adverse treatment was also "because of" sex); Gregory, 243 F.3d at 700 (same); Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); see also EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d 306, 317-18 (4th Cir. 2008) (jury could find coworker harassment lacking religious content, including unplugging individual's computer and hiding his time card, was based on religious animus where same coworkers perpetrated explicitly religious harassment); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560-64 (6th Cir. 1999) (use of sex-specific slurs in some incidents of harassment justified the inference that all of the incidents were sex-based). Behavior need not reference gender at all in order to violate Title VII. See EEOC v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 842 (9th Cir. 2005) ("offensive conduct that is not facially sex-specific nonetheless may violate Title VII if there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of qualitative and quantitative differences in the harassment suffered by female and male employees"); Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("A woman may prove sex-based discrimination in the workplace even though she is not subjected to sexual advances or propositions."); EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment § C(4), 1990 WL 1104701 (Mar. 19, 1990) ("harassment not involving sexual activity or language [ ] may also give rise to Title VII liability if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive and directed at employees because of their sex"). Assuming the truth of Kaytor's evidence, as the Court must for purposes of summary judgment, a reasonable jury could conclude that McCarthy's evident gender bias infected not only his crass remarks to and about Kaytor but also his seemingly gender-neutral death threats. The district court erred by keeping this question from a jury.\ C. Taking all of Kaytor's evidence as true and looking at the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that Kaytor endured "severe or pervasive" harassment. For three reasons, the district court erred in holding that Kaytor could not establish "severe or pervasive" harassment. First, the district court wrongly excluded McCarthy's death threats from its legal analysis because it erroneously failed to consider that the threats may have been "because of" sex as discussed above. Second, the court erred by focusing on the pervasiveness of the alleged conduct and not on its severity. Third and most significant, the court usurped the function of the jury by basing its decision on its own opinion as to whether the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of Kaytor's employment rather than deciding whether a reasonable jury could find that it was. See Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 605 (2d Cir. 2006) ("hostile work environment claims present ‘mixed question[s] of law and fact' that are ‘especially well-suited for jury determination'") (citations omitted); Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 530 (4th Cir. 1994) (whether harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the victim's working conditions is "quintessentially a question of fact"). Title VII is violated when sex-based harassment is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations omitted); see also Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 70 (question is "whether the harassment is of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse"). The test for a hostile work environment has both a subjective and an objective component. Mormol, 364 F.3d at 58. Factors for a jury to consider in deciding whether a work environment is objectively hostile include: (1) frequency of the conduct, (2) severity of the conduct, (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance. Id. (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). An employer illegally alters working conditions in violation of Title VII when gender-based harassment "is either so severe or so pervasive as to alter the working conditions of a reasonable employee." Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 149 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (establishing "severe or pervasive" standard). The more severe the harassment, the less pervasive it must be in order to establish liability. Abeita v. TransAmerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 1998); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). In appropriate circumstances, even one incident of harassment may be severe enough to support a finding of a hostile work environment. Mormol, 364 F.3d at 59. In assessing severity or pervasiveness, this Court has cautioned that harassment may be actionable even if the facts do not resemble "the most egregious of cases." Schiano, 445 F.3d at 606. "Prior cases in which we have concluded that a reasonable juror could find that the work environment was objectively hostile," the Court said, "do not ‘establish a baseline' that subsequent plaintiffs must reach in order to prevail." Id. In this case, the district court erred by not considering that McCarthy's repeated death threats to Kaytor might qualify as severe harassment within the meaning of Harris. Kaytor testified that McCarthy told her, "I'd like to see you in your coffin" (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 176- 77), and that he threatened on multiple occasions to choke her or to kill her. (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 176-77, 186-87; R.44-1, Kaytor Dep. at 188, 241.) Although Kaytor initially doubted McCarthy's sincerity, by the end of their tenure together she was "scared to death." (R.56-1, Kaytor Dep. at 242.) A reasonable jury could find that these threats were severe, and that, through them, McCarthy had created a hostile working environment. Because credibility determinations are within the role of the jury, not the court, Dillon, 497 F.3d at 251, Kaytor's testimony cannot be discounted based on the fact that she has paranoia. (R.44-3, Filip Dep. at 49); see Bator v. Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 1994) (court may not make credibility determinations regarding plaintiff with paranoia at summary judgment stage). "Mental illness is not a generic badge of incompetence or dishonesty," U.S. v. George, 532 F.3d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and employees with paranoia may truly be victims of gender discrimination. To whatever extent the evidence of paranoia may have influenced the district court's ruling, that influence was misplaced. CONCLUSION The district court took an unduly narrow view of the evidence in ruling that Kaytor could not establish a severe or hostile work environment. A reasonable jury, looking at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Kaytor, could find that Kaytor endured a severe or hostile work environment because of her gender. For the foregoing reasons, the EEOC respectfully requests that this Court reverse the award of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. Respectfully submitted, JAMES L. LEE Deputy General Counsel ______________________ GAIL S. COLEMAN LORRAINE C. DAVIS Attorney Acting Associate General Counsel U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION CAROLYN L. WHEELER Office of General Counsel Assistant General Counsel 131 M Street, NW, Room 5SW24L Washington, DC 20507 (202) 663-4055 gail.coleman@eeoc.gov ANTI-VIRUS CERTIFICATION FORM (Second Circuit Local Rule 32(a)(1)(E)) CASE NAME: Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corp. DOCKET NUMBER: 09-1859 I, Gail S. Coleman, certify that I have scanned for viruses the PDF version of the Amicus Brief that was submitted in this case as an email attachment to briefs@ca2.uscourts.gov and that no viruses were detected. NAME AND VERSION OF ANTI-VIRUS DETECTOR USED: Symantec AntiVirus Program 10.1.6.6000, Version 7/21/2009 rev. 6. _____________________________ GAIL S. COLEMAN Attorney U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of General Counsel 131 M Street, NE, Room 5SW24L Washington, DC 20507 (202) 663-4055 gail.coleman@eeoc.gov CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Gail S. Coleman, hereby certify that I filed one original and nine copies of the foregoing amicus brief with the Court by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, on this 22nd day of July, 2009. I also certify that I submitted the amicus brief in PDF format as an e-mail attachment to briefs@ca2.uscourts.gov, and that I e-mailed a copy of the PDF version to all parties. I further certify that I served two paper copies of the foregoing amicus brief this 22nd day of July, 2009, by first-class mail, postage pre- paid, to the following counsel of record: Cynthia R. Jennings Michael Kent Clarkson 55 Filley Street Morgan Brown & Joy Windsor, CT 06095 200 State Street, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02109-2605 _________________________ Gail S. Coleman Attorney U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of General Counsel 131 M Street, NE, Room 5SW24L Washington, DC 20507 *********************************************************************** <> <1> The EEOC expresses no view on the district court’s disposition of Kaytor’s other claims.