Carol Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corporation
 00-1395-II


  No. 00-1395-II
  _________________________________________

  IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
  FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
  __________________________________________

 CAROL WILKERSON,

   Plaintiff-Appellant,
  v.

 GRINNELL CORPORATION,

   Defendant-Appellee.

  _______________________________________________________

  On Appeal from the United States District Court
  for the Southern District of Georgia
  _______________________________________________________

  BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
  OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AS AMICUS CURIAE
  _______________________________________________________

 GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS  EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
 Associate General Counsel    COMMISSION
       Office of General Counsel
 PHILIP B. SKLOVER   1801 L Street, N.W., Room 7030
 Associate General Counsel  Washington, D.C. 20507
        (202) 663-4724

 CAROLYN L. WHEELER
 Assistant General Counsel

 ANNE NOEL OCCHIALINO
 Attorney
 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

 Carol Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp.
 No. 00-1395-II

  Counsel hereby certifies that the following persons or entities have
  an interest in the outcome of this case:
  1. Charles H. Brown - Counsel for Defendant-Appellee.

   Kelly O. Coogan - Counsel for Defendant-Appellee.

   B. Avant Edenfield - District Judge, United States District Court for
   the Southern District of Georgia.

   Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae.

   David L. Gordon - Counsel for Defendant-Appellee.

   Grinnell Corporation - Defendant-Appellee.

   Becky D. Livingston - Counsel for Defendant-Appellee.

   Julie S. Northup - Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant.

   Anne Noel Occhialino, Attorney for Amicus Curiae, EEOC.

   Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate General Counsel, EEOC.

   Debra E. Schwartz - Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant.

   Philip B. Sklover, Associate General Counsel, EEOC.

   G. R. Smith - Magistrate Judge, United States District Court for the
   Southern District of Georgia.


       C1 of 2
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (con't)

   Carolyn L. Wheeler, Assistant General Counsel, EEOC.

   Carol Wilkerson - Plaintiff-Appellant.



 _____________________________
        Anne Noel Occhialino

 C1 of 2
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
            PAGE
 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C1 of 2
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
 STATEMENT OF INTEREST
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings . . . . . . . 3
   Statement of Facts
   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   District Court Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
 ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT
  COURT'S ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
  FAVOR OF GRINNELL BECAUSE WILKERSON'S INTAKE
  QUESTIONNAIRE, WHICH WAS SIGNED UNDER
  PENALTY OF PERJURY, WAS VERIFIED AND
  SATISFIES TITLE VII'S CHARGE-FILING
  REQUIREMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 Wilkerson's intake questionnaire was verified . . . . . . . 12
     TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)

            PAGES
 B. Wilkerson's verified intake questionnaire constitutes
   a charge of discrimination under Title VII . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 II.    EVEN IF WILKERSON'S INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRE
  WAS UNVERIFIED, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE
 THE DISTRICT COURT BECAUSE UNVERIFIED
  INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRES SUBSEQUENTLY
 AMENDED SATISFY TITLE VII'S CHARGE-FILING REQUIREMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . 20

 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
 CASES          PAGE(S)

 Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969) . . . 12,14,
 23, 24, 26

 Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 19
  (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc)

 Buffington v. General Time Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1186
  (M.D. Ga. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  8

 Casavantes v. California State Univ., 732 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1984)   26

 *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
  467 U.S. 837 (1984)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  . . . .  21

 Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968) . . . .23

 *Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237 (11th Cir. 1989) . . . . .12, 19,
 21

 E.E.O.C. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590 (1981) . . . . . 22,23

 E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. 107 (1988) . . . . . . .21

 E.E.O.C. v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980) . . . . .15

 E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14  (2d Cir. 1981) . . . .  26

 E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 18, 23

 Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 228 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2000),
  petition for cert. filed, - S. Ct. - , 69 USLW 3481
  (U.S. Apr. 02, 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  26

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (con't)

 CASES          PAGE(S)

 *Georgia Power Co. v. E.E.O.C., 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969) . . . .15, 18, 19,
 21, 25

 Harper v. Plumbmaster Inc., 77 FEP 1058 (E.D. Penn. 1998) . . . . . . . 13


 Lane v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 749
   (D. Md. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
   . 13

 Lawrence v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 132 F.3d 447
   (8th Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
   .  8, 13

 Malone v. K-Mart Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (M.D. Ala. 1999) . . . .  25

 Peterson v. City of Wichita, 888 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1989) . . . . . . .26

 Philbin v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321
 (7th Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 24, 26

 Pijnenburg v. West Georgia Health System, Inc.,
  No. Civ.A 4:98-187JRE, 2000 WL 555987
  (M.D. Ga. March 20, 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  8

 *Price v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 687 F.2d 74
  (5th Cir. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
  . 25, 26

 Shempert v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 151 F.3d 793
   (8th Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
   . . . . 27

 Tillman v. City of Boaz, 548 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1977). . . . . . . . . . . 19

 Vason v. City of Montgomery, 240 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . 19

     TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (con't)

 CASES          PAGE(S)

 *Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228
  (5th Cir. 1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  12, 14,
  21, 23, 24, 25

 Whitmore v. O'Connor Management, Inc., 156 F.3d 796
  (8th Cir. 1998)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
  . .  8

 FEDERAL STATUTES

 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10,
 12, 15, 27

 42 U.S.C. §§  2000e, et. seq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . .   1, 3

 FEDERAL REGULATIONS

 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 29, 22

 29 C.F.R. §  1601.12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 .  15, 19

 29 C.F.R. §  1601.12(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 .passim

 29 C.F.R. § 1601.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . 13

 29 C.F.R. § 1601.3(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 9, 11, 12, 13

 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . .
 .  9, 12, 13

 29 C.F.R. § 1626.6  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .
 . . . . 19

 29 C.F.R. § 1626.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
 . . . 19

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (con't)


 MISCELLANEOUS          PAGE(S)

 EEOC Compliance Manual, Vol. I, Ex. 1-B to § 1.7
  at 1:0007 (BNA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

 31 Fed. Reg. 10269 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 22



  No. 00-1395-II
  _________________________________________

  IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
  FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
  __________________________________________

 CAROL WILKERSON,

   Plaintiff-Appellant,
  v.

 GRINNELL CORPORATION,

   Defendant-Appellee.

  _______________________________________________________

  On Appeal from the United States District Court
  for the Southern District of Georgia
  _______________________________________________________
  BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
  OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AS AMICUS CURIAE
  _______________________________________________________

 STATEMENT OF INTEREST

  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is the agency
  charged with the enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
  of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII").  This case raises
  important issues concerning
 when an EEOC intake questionnaire satisfies Title VII's charge-filing
 requirements.  Specifically, this appeal raises the issue of whether
 the district court erred in holding that, although the plaintiff, Carol
 Wilkerson, signed her timely filed EEOC intake questionnaire under
 penalty of perjury, the questionnaire was unverified and therefore did
 not qualify as a Title VII charge of discrimination.  Assuming, arguendo,
 that the questionnaire was unverified and that Wilkerson later filed an
 untimely formal charge, this case also raises the issue of whether an
 unverified intake questionnaire that is later amended under 29 C.F.R. §
 1601.12(b) through the filing of a formal charge satisfies Title VII's
 charge-filing requirements.

 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

  1.      Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment
  for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's EEOC intake
  questionnaire was unverified and therefore did not constitute a charge
  of discrimination under Title VII, even though the plaintiff signed
  her intake questionnaire under penalty of perjury.
  2.         Assuming that the intake questionnaire was unverified and that
  plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination outside the charge-filing
  period, whether under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) the plaintiff's charge
  of discrimination relates back to the date she filed her intake
  questionnaire and cures its verification defect, therefore satisfying
  Title VII's charge-filing requirements.

 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

  Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
  On August 11, 1999, Wilkerson filed this action alleging that defendant
  Grinnell Corporation ("Grinnell") violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
  et seq., by subjecting her to a hostile work environment, by retaliating
  against her for complaining about discrimination, and by terminating
  her on August 19, 1997, because of her sex and race.  Doc. 1.<1>  On
  March 9, 2000, Grinnell filed a motion for summary judgment.  Doc. 15.
  The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, and on June
  21, 2000, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation ("R &
  R") recommending that Grinnell's motion for summary judgment be granted.
  Doc. 24.  By order and judgment entered July 17, 2000, the district
  court adopted the R & R, entered judgment in favor of Grinnell, and
  dismissed this case with prejudice.  Docs. 27, 28.
  On July 26, 2000, Wilkerson filed a timely notice of appeal.  Doc. 29.
  On September 6, 2000, Wilkerson filed a brief with this Court.
  On October 10, 2000, Grinnell filed a response brief.  By order dated
  February 26, 2001, this Court appointed counsel to represent Wilkerson
  and requested the filing of a supplemental brief and participation in
  oral argument on the issue of whether a timely filed but unverified
  intake questionnaire constitutes a charge of discrimination under Title
  VII.
 Statement of Facts
  In July 1995, Wilkerson, a black female, began working for Grinnell as
  a machine operator.  Doc. 24, Pg. 1.  During her employment, Wilkerson
  received one three-day suspension and four employee warning notices for
  substandard work and inappropriate conduct.  Doc. 17-Pgs. 2-3.  On August
  19, 1997, Grinnell terminated Wilkerson's employment.  Id. at ¶ 11.
  Either that day or the next, Wilkerson called the Savannah Local Office
  of the EEOC and said she believed she had been wrongfully terminated.
  Doc. 18-Pgs. 132-33.  The EEOC immediately sent Wilkerson an intake
  questionnaire.  Id. at 133.  On August 21, 1997, Wilkerson filled
  out the intake questionnaire and returned it to the EEOC.  Doc. 18,
  Ex. 10-Pg. 3.
  On the first page of the intake questionnaire Wilkerson wrote her name
  and address, Grinnell's name and address, the date Grinnell hired her,
  and the names and positions of the officials she worked with.  Id. at 1.
  On the second page of the questionnaire, Wilkerson indicated that she
  had been discharged and laid-off and stated that she believed these
  actions were taken against her because of her race and sex.  Id. at 2.
  She also stated that the most recent date of discriminatory action
  taken against her was August 19, 1997, and that this action was taken by
  two white males, Jimmy Harris and Tommy Alderman.  Id.  In response to
  questions on pages two and three of the intake questionnaire concerning
  the actions taken against her and her reasons for believing they were
  discriminatory, Wilkerson attached eight handwritten pages detailing
  events leading up to her termination.  Id. at 2-3 & attachment.  On page
  three of the intake questionnaire, Wilkerson signed her name and put the
  date under the statement, "I swear or affirm under penalty of perjury
  that the provided information is truthful and correct, to the best of
  my knowledge."  Id. at 3.
  In September, 1997, Wilkerson called the EEOC and inquired about
  her charge.  Doc. 18, Pg. 139.  She was told that "there was a lot of
  people before me and they take them as they come."  Id.  Since Wilkerson
  knew that the EEOC was aware of her discharge date, Wilkerson replied,
  "okay."  Id.
  Wilkerson did not have any other contact with the EEOC until June,
  1998, when she called again and spoke with investigator Martin Frazier.
  Id. at 139, 263.  Frazier told her that the EEOC had sent out "a set
  of questions in October that's supposed to have been back the 1st
  of December," and that because she had not returned the questions,
  her charge was not timely.  Id. at 139, 263.  When Wilkerson denied
  having received the questions,<2> Frazier said, "'Okay.  Then we'll
  just go ahead and go with your questionnaire thing.  We'll go ahead
  and send you your charge and we'll contact Grinnell.'"  Id. at 139.
  Wilkerson "just let it go at that."  Id.
  On June 24, 1998, Frazier signed a Notice of Charge of Discrimination
  that the EEOC sent to Grinnell.  Doc. 18, Ex. 18; Appellee's Br. at
  3, n.2.  The notice
 states that Wilkerson "alleges that she was discharged from her
 employment, disciplined and intimidated in her employment because of
 her race, Black, and sex, female."  Doc. 18, Ex. 18.  The charge number
 written on the notice is "115980472," which appears to be the same number
 written on Wilkerson's intake questionnaire.  Id.; Doc. 18, Ex. 10.
 The box next to "Enclosure: Copy of Charge" is not marked.  Id.
  On April, 30, 1999, the EEOC sent Wilkerson a Dismissal and Notice
  of Rights stating that it could not investigate her charge because it
  had not been filed within the applicable time limit.  Doc. 18, Ex. 19.
  Wilkerson, who was upset, called the EEOC and left a message but did
  not hear anything back.  Doc. 18, Pg. 140.
   Wilkerson's prepaid legal services company referred her to Michael
   Edwards, an attorney.  Id. at 140-41.  Edwards told Wilkerson that
   something was wrong and advised her to return to the EEOC and ask
   for a copy of her file.  Id. at 141, 265.  Wilkerson went to the
   EEOC office and eventually talked with Lynn Jordan, the Director of
   the Savannah Local Office, who told her, "'Well, we just noticed
   in your file that you did file on time and we're going to issue a
   revocation or something and reopen up your case.'"  Id. at 144-45.
   Although Wilkerson expressed concern that the statute of limitations
   was running out, Ms. Jordan said it was not.  Id.
  On July 2, 1999, the EEOC sent Wilkerson a Revocation of Notice of Right
  to Sue stating that it revoked the April 30, 1999, Dismissal and Notice
  of Rights.  Doc. 18, Ex. 20.  After Wilkerson received the revocation
  letter, Edwards told her to return to the EEOC and ask it to issue
  a right-to-sue letter.  Doc. 18, Pgs. 145-46.  Wilkerson requested a
  right-to-sue letter, which the EEOC issued on July 8, 1999.  Id. at 146;
  Doc. 18, Ex. 21.  On August 11, 1999, Wilkerson filed this lawsuit pro
  se.<3>
 District Court Decision
  In a July 17, 2000 order, the district court adopted the magistrate
  judge's seven-page report and recommendation finding that Grinnell's
  motion for summary judgment should be granted.  In the R & R, the
  court concluded that "[b]ecause plaintiff's intake questionnaire
  was not made under oath or affirmation, it cannot be considered
  a charge for Title VII statute of limitations purposes."  Doc. 24,
  Pg. 6.  In reaching this conclusion the court relied on cases from the
  Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and from district courts within the
  Eleventh Circuit holding that unverified intake questionnaires do not
  constitute charges of discrimination because they do not satisfy Title
  VII's oath or affirmation requirement.  Id. at 5 (citing Whitmore
  v. O'Connor Management, Inc., 156 F.3d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 1998);
  Lawrence v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 132 F.3d 447, 450 (8th Cir. 1998);
  Pijnenburg v. West Georgia Health System, Inc., No. Civ.A 4:98-187JRE,
  2000 WL 555987at *5 (M.D. Ga. March 20, 2000); Buffington v. General
  Time Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1186, 1193 (M.D. Ga. 1988)).  In the R & R,
  the court went on to state, "[b]ecause plaintiff's intake questionnaire
  does not constitute a charge, her actual charge, filed June 24, 1998,
  was untimely by more than 120 days."  Doc. 24, Pg. 6.  Although the
  court acknowledged that Wilkerson had filed a formal charge outside the
  charge-filing period, the court failed to include any legal analysis
  of the possible significance of this later filing.  Instead, the court
  concluded that Wilkerson's case should be dismissed.  Id.

 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

  The district court made a factual error in concluding that Wilkerson's
  EEOC intake affidavit was unverified.  Title VII requires that
  charges be made under "oath or affirmation."  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
  The Commission's implementing regulations require that charges be
  verified.  29 C.F.R. § 1601.9.  The Commission has defined "verified"
  to mean a "sworn declaration in writing under penalty of perjury."  29
  C.F.R. § 1601.3(a).  Because Wilkerson signed her intake questionnaire
  under the statement, "I swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that
  the provided information is truthful and correct to the best of my
  knowledge," it was verified within the meaning of section 1601.3(a),
  and the court erred in concluding otherwise.
  In addition to satisfying Title VII's "under oath or affirmation"
  requirements,  Wilkerson's intake questionnaire satisfies Title VII's
  requirement that a charge be in writing and contain "such information
  and be in such form as the Commission requires."  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
  As required by the Commission's regulations, the questionnaire identifies
  the parties and "describe[s] generally the action or practices complained
  of," which include Wilkerson's claims of race and sex discrimination and
  her claim that her August 19, 1997, termination was discriminatory.
  Once Wilkerson made it clear that she wanted to file a charge of
  discrimination, the evidence suggests that the EEOC treated the intake
  questionnaire as a charge by assigning it a charge number and by sending
  to Grinnell on June 24, 1998, a notice of charge of discrimination.
  Because Wilkerson's timely filed intake questionnaire fulfills the
  charge-filing requirements set forth by Title VII and in the Commission's
  regulations, and because the EEOC treated it as a charge, the EEOC intake
  questionnaire constitutes a charge of discrimination under Title VII.
  Assuming, arguendo, that the district court correctly concluded that the
  intake questionnaire was unverified and that Wilkerson actually filed a
  formal charge of discrimination on June 24, 1998, this Court should still
  reverse and remand this case.  Under the Commission's regulations, to
  which this Court must defer, Wilkerson's formal charge of discrimination
  relates back to the date of her timely filed intake questionnaire and
  cures its verification defect.  See 29 C.F.R.    § 1601.12(b) (stating
  that a "charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions
  . . . including failure to verify the charge" and that the amendments
  "will relate back to the date the charge was first received").  It is
  in keeping with precedent from this Court, and with the majority of the
  courts of appeals that have considered the issue, to hold that under
  29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) an unverified intake questionnaire amended by
  the filing of a formal charge outside the statute of limitations period
  satisfies Title VII's charge-filing requirements.

 ARGUMENT

 THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 IN FAVOR OF GRINNELL BECAUSE WILKERSON'S INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRE, WHICH
 WAS SIGNED UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, WAS VERIFIED AND SATISFIES TITLE
 VII'S CHARGE-FILING REQUIREMENTS.

  The district court's finding that Wilkerson's intake questionnaire was
  not made under oath or affirmation is contrary to the record and to
  the Commission's regulations, which define "verified" as signed under
  penalty of perjury.  See
 Doc. 24, Pg. 6; 29 C.F.R. § 1601.3(a).  Because the district court
 erroneously found that the questionnaire was unverified, the court
 inadvertently asked and answered the wrong question.  Instead of
 considering whether Wilkerson's verified intake questionnaire satisfies
 Title VII's charge-filing requirements, the court asked whether
 Wilkerson's unverified intake questionnaire qualifies as a Title
 VII charge.  Since the questionnaire was verified and satisfies Title
 VII's other charge-filing requirements, an issue the district court
 never reached, this Court should reverse the district court's entry of
 summary judgment in favor of Grinnell.
  A.  Wilkerson's intake questionnaire was verified
  Title VII requires that charges "be in writing under oath or
  affirmation."  42  U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).  The purpose of this requirement
  is to protect employers from having to defend themselves against
  frivolous charges.  See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
  F.2d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1969) ("the purpose of certain of the procedural
  requirements of Section 2000e-5 is to protect employers from unfounded
  charges and harassment"); Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 418 F.2d
  355, 357 (6th Cir. 1969) ("Congressional intent in requiring an oath
  is to prevent the harassment of respondents by reckless charges.").
  The Commission has promulgated regulations interpreting Title VII's
  "under oath or affirmation" requirement.  See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.9 &
  1601.3(a).  Under these regulations, a charge must be "verified," which
  means "supported by an unsworn declaration in writing under penalty of
  perjury."  29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.9 & 1601.3(a).  "The EEOC's interpretation
  of statutes which it is charged with enforcing is entitled to great
  deference."  Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237, 1240 (11th
  Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
  The district court erred in concluding that Wilkerson's intake
  questionnaire "was not made under oath or affirmation."<4>  Doc. 24,
  Pg. 6.  In reaching this conclusion, the court apparently overlooked the
  fact that Wilkerson signed her intake questionnaire under the line, "I
  swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that the provided information
  is truthful and correct to the best of my knowledge."  Doc. 18,
  Ex. 10-Pg. 3.  Since the questionnaire was "supported by an unsworn
  declaration in writing under penalty of perjury," it clearly satisfies
  the Commission's regulations governing the verification of charges.
  See 29 C.F.R.   §§ 1601.9 & 1601.3(a); Lane v. Wal-Mart Stores East,
  Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 749, 753-54 (D. Md. 1999) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.3
  and holding that the plaintiff's charge of discrimination was verified
  where the plaintiff signed her name under a statement reading, "I declare
  under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct");
  Harper v. Plumbmaster Inc., 77 FEP 1058, 1059 (E.D. Penn. 1998)
  (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.3 and holding that the plaintiff's charge of
  discrimination was verified where the last sentence of the plaintiff's
  charge stated, "I swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that I have
  read the above charge and that it is true to the best of my knowledge,
  information, and belief"); cf. Lawrence v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 132
  F.3d 447, 449 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the plaintiff's intake
  form "was not verified, or in other words, was not signed . . . under
  penalty of perjury").
  The purpose of Title VII's "oath or affirmation" requirement, to
  prevent employers from having to defend against frivolous charges,
  was also clearly fulfilled in this case.  Wilkerson verified the intake
  questionnaire when she signed it on August 21, 1997, well before Grinnell
  received notice of her claims of discrimination.  Doc. 18, Ex. 18.
  Because Grinnell never had to defend itself against a reckless charge,
  the purpose of Title VII's oath or affirmation requirement was served.
  See Weeks, 408 F.2d at 231 (stating that the purpose of Title VII's
  procedural requirements, which is to "protect employers from unfounded
  charges and harassment," is served as long as the Commission does not
  serve the charges on the employer until the charge has been sworn);
  see also Blue Bell Boots, 418 F.2d at 357 (stating that the purpose of
  the oath requirement "can be served by requiring verification before
  action is taken by the Commission").
   Since Wilkerson's intake questionnaire was verified, the district
   court's reasoning that Wilkerson's intake questionnaire does not satisfy
   Title VII's charge-filing requirements because it was unverified does
   not address the legal issue presented by this case.  That issue-whether
   Wilkerson's timely filed verified intake questionnaire satisfies
   Title VII's charge-filing requirements-is one the district court never
   reached, but which is readily answered through a review of the contents
   of the questionnaire.
  B.  Wilkerson's verified intake questionnaire constitutes a charge of
  discrimination under Title VII

  Section 706(b) of Title VII requires that charges be filed in writing
  under oath and that they "contain such information and be in such form
  as the Commission requires."  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).  The Commission's
  regulations "establish very minimal requirements for the sufficiency
  of charges."  E.E.O.C. v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 483 (5th
  Cir. 1980).  Under these regulations, a charge is sufficient when the
  Commission receives "a written statement sufficiently precise to identify
  the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained
  of."  29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).  Thus, "[a]ll that is required is that
  [the charge] give sufficient information to enable EEOC to see what the
  grievance is all about."  Georgia Power Co. v. E.E.O.C., 412 F.2d 462,
  466 (5th Cir. 1969) (footnote and citation omitted).  Because Wilkerson's
  intake questionnaire provided more than enough information to enable
  the EEOC to determine the nature of her complaint, the questionnaire
  satisfies the minimal requirements of a Title VII charge as set forth
  in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).<5>
   On the first page of the intake questionnaire Wilkerson wrote her name
   and address, Grinnell's name and address, the date Grinnell hired her,
   and the names and positions of the officials she worked with.  Id. at 1.
   On the second page of the questionnaire, Wilkerson indicated that she
   had been discharged and laid-off and stated that she believed these
   actions were taken against her because of her race and sex.  Id. at 2.
   She also stated that the most recent date of discriminatory action
   taken against her was August 19, 1997, and that this action was taken by
   two white males, Jimmy Harris and Tommy Alderman.  Id.  In response to
   questions on pages two and three of the intake questionnaire concerning
   the actions taken against her and her reasons for believing they were
   discriminatory, Wilkerson attached eight handwritten pages detailing
   events leading up to her termination.  Id. at 2-3 & attachment.
  Thus, the information contained in Wilkerson's timely filed intake
  questionnaire is more than sufficient to satisfy the liberal charge
  requirements of   29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).  The EEOC's policy is that,
  "consistent with 29 C.F.R. 1601.12(b)," it will consider an intake
  questionnaire to be a Title VII charge of discrimination when the
  questionnaire "constitutes the only timely written statement of
  allegations of employment discrimination."  EEOC Compliance Manual,
  Vol. I, Ex. 1-B to § 1.7 at 1:0007 (BNA).  In this case, the evidence
  in the record establishes that the EEOC treated Wilkerson's timely
  filed intake questionnaire as a charge of discrimination.
  Wilkerson testified that in June of 1998 she called the EEOC and spoke
  with investigator Martin Frazier.  Doc. 18, Pg. 139.  After Wilkerson
  denied receiving the October 1, 1997, letter that the EEOC purportedly
  sent her, Frazier said, "'Okay.  Then we'll just go ahead and go with
  your questionnaire thing.  We'll go ahead and send you your charge and
  we'll contact Grinnell.'" Id.  Frazier followed through on his statement
  by preparing a June 24, 1998, notice of charge of discrimination
  notifying Grinnell that a Title VII charge had been filed against it.
  Doc. 18, Ex. 18.  Significantly, no charge is attached to the notice,
  and the box on the notice next to "Enclosure: Copy of Charge," is not
  marked.  Id.  The EEOC charge number written on the notice, "115980472,"
  also appears to match the number written on the top right-hand corner
  of the first page of the intake questionnaire, which further indicates
  that the EEOC treated the intake questionnaire as a charge.  See Doc. 18,
  Ex. 10, Pg. 1; Ex. 18, Pg. 1.
  Thus, contrary to the factual finding of the district court, Doc. 24,
  Pgs. 3 & 6, and to Grinnell's Statement of Material Facts,<6> Doc. 17,
  ¶ 13, the record indicates that Wilkerson never completed the filing
  of a formal charge of discrimination.  The record clearly establishes,
  however, that the EEOC treated the intake questionnaire as a charge once
  Wilkerson made it clear that she had intended to file one.  See Doc. 24,
  Pg. 6; Doc. 17, ¶ 13.<7>  In this case, the intake questionnaire clearly
  fulfilled the primary purpose of a charge, which is to put the EEOC on
  notice that the respondent may have engaged in conduct that violates
  Title VII.  See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984)
  ("The function of a Title VII charge [ ] is to place the EEOC on notice
  that someone . . . believes that an employer has violated the title.");
  Georgia Power, 412 F.2d at 466 (stating that "'[a]ll that is required
  [of a charge] is that it give sufficient information to enable EEOC to
  see what the grievance is all about'") (citation and footnote omitted).
  Finally, precedent from this Court dictates the conclusion that
  Wilkerson's verified intake questionnaire constitutes a Title VII charge
  of discrimination.<8>  See Clark, 865 F.2d at 1240-41; Georgia Power,
  412 F.2d at 466.  In Clark, this Court held that a plaintiff's intake
  questionnaire sufficed as an ADEA charge of discrimination under the
  Commission's regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.6 & 1626.8, which are
  substantially similar to the Commission's regulations governing Title
  VII charges of discrimination.<9>  See Clark, 865 F.2d at 1240-41; 29
  C.F.R. § 1601.12.  In Georgia Power, this Court's predecessor held that
  a charging party's letter was an effective Title VII charge where it was
  "'sufficiently precise to identify the parties and to describe generally
  the action or practices complained of.'"  Georgia Power, 412 F.2d at 466
  (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11(b) (1966)).  A finding that Wilkerson's
  verified intake questionnaire constitutes a charge of discrimination
  under Title VII is also in keeping with the well-established principle
  that EEOC charges should be liberally construed.  See, e.g., Tillman
  v. City of Boaz, 548 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Charges filed with
  the EEOC must be liberally construed because they are made by persons
  who are unfamiliar with the technicalities of formal pleadings and who
  usually do not have the assistance of an attorney.") (citations and
  footnote omitted).

 II.  EVEN IF WILKERSON'S INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRE WAS UNVERIFIED, THIS COURT
 SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT BECAUSE UNVERIFIED INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRES
 SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED SATISFY TITLE VII'S CHARGE-FILING REQUIREMENTS.

  Even if the district court correctly found that Wilkerson's intake
  questionnaire was unverified, and assuming, arguendo, that Wilkerson
  did file a formal verified charge of discrimination on June 24, 1998,
  this Court should hold that the unverified intake questionnaire satisfies
  Title VII's charge-filing requirements.<10>  See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)
  (permitting charges to be amended to cure verification defects and
  stating that such amendments "will relate back to the date the charge
  was first received").  The issue of whether an unverified intake
  questionnaire can be subsequently amended to cure a verification defect
  is an issue of first impression in this Circuit, see Vason v. City of
  Montgomery, 240 F.3d 905, 907 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting the circuit
  split regarding the validity of the Commission's regulation permitting
  amendment of charges to cure verification defects, but not reaching the
  issue), although this Court's predecessor has upheld the Commission's
  relation-back regulation with respect to unverified charges and letters
  that were subsequently amended to cure verification defects.  See Weeks,
  408 F.2d at 231 (holding that an unsworn charge that is later sworn is
  an effective charge under Title VII); Georgia Power, 412 F.2d at 465-67
  (holding that unsworn timely filed letter was amended through the filing
  of an untimely sworn EEOC charge).
  Title VII does not expressly speak to the question of when a charge must
  be verified.  Where a statute is silent or ambiguous on a particular
  issue and where the agency charged with its enforcement fills the gap
  by regulation, the question for the court is whether the regulation
  is based on a permissible construction of the statute.  See, e.g.,
  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
  467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).  If so, it is entitled to deference.
  See id. at 845; E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. 107,
  115 (1988); Clark, 865 F.2d at 1240.  With respect to Title VII, the
  Supreme Court has typically deferred to the Commission's interpretation
  of ambiguous statutory language where, as here, the issue concerns
  a procedural matter.  See Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. at 125
  (O'Connor, J., concurring) (deference is "particularly appropriate"
  where regulation involves a "technical issue of agency procedure").
  Deference is also particularly appropriate where the Commission's
  interpretation is set forth in a regulation that was adopted soon
  after the passage of Title VII and has remained consistent thereafter.
  See E.E.O.C. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981)
  ("contemporaneous construction" of Title VII procedural issue "deserves
  special deference when it has remained consistent over a long period
  of time") (citation omitted).
  Here, Section 1601.12(b) represents the EEOC's long-standing,
  consistently-held interpretation of Title VII's verification requirement.
  The charge and relation-back provisions now found in 29 C.F.R. §
  1601.12(b) were initially promulgated in 1966, just two years after
  Title VII was passed.  See 31 Fed. Reg. 10269 (1966) (announcing that
  charge requirements in § 1601.11 would include amendment and relation
  back language).  Despite minor changes in the citation and wording,
  the substance of the regulation has remained essentially the same.
  Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (2000) ("A charge may be amended to
  cure technical defects or omissions, including the failure to verify
  the charge . . . . Such amendments . . . will relate back to the date
  the charge was first received.") with 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11 (1966) ("A
  charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including
  failure to swear to the charge . . . and such amendments relate back
  to the original filing date").  Significantly, although Congress has
  amended Title VII several times, including amendments to § 706(b) in
  1972, it has not overridden the regulation by adding a limitations
  requirement in § 706(b) or by adding a verification requirement in
  § 706(e).  See Associated Dry Goods, 449 U.S. at 600 n.17 (Congress's
  silence and failure to disapprove expressly EEOC regulation "suggests
  its consent to the Commission's practice") (citation omitted).<11>
  Moreover, the EEOC's interpretation of the verification requirement --
  that an otherwise valid, unverified charge may be verified outside the
  limitations period and still be timely -- is a reasonable construction
  of § 706(b) and is consistent with   the purposes of both the
  charge and the verification requirements.  See Philbin v. General
  Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1991)
  ("The EEOC's interpretation of the statute as allowing technical
  amendments to relate back to the date of filing is not unreasonable.").
  The purpose of a charge is, principally, to put the EEOC on notice
  that the respondent may have engaged in conduct that violates Title
  VII and/or other federal employment discrimination laws.  See, e.g.,
  Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68 ("The function of a Title VII charge [ ]
  is to place the EEOC on notice that someone . . . believes that an
  employer has violated the title.").  That purpose is fulfilled where,
  as in this case, the charge is "sufficiently precise to identify the
  parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained
  of," as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).
  As discussed, supra, the purpose of the verification requirement
  is to ensure that employers are not required to answer to frivolous
  charges.  See Blue Bell Boots, 418 F.2d at 357 ("Congressional intent
  in requiring an oath is to prevent the harassment of respondents by
  reckless charges.").  That purpose is satisfied as long as the charge
  is sworn to or affirmed before the employer is required to cooperate
  in the investigation, which is what happened in this case since
  Grinnell did not receive notice of Wilkerson's charge until after it
  was verified through the filing of a formal charge on June 24, 1998.
  See Appellee's Br. at 3 n.2; Weeks, 406 F.2d at 231 (stating that the
  "purpose of certain of the procedural requirements of Section 2000e-5
  is to protect employers from unfounded charges and harassment," and
  noting that the Commission does not investigate charges or serve them on
  employers until they are sworn).  Since Congress did not specify that
  Title VII charges must be verified within the charge-filing period,
  and since the Commission's interpretation of Title VII's charge-filing
  requirements fulfills their purpose, it is eminently reasonable for the
  Commission to permit timely filed but unverified charges to be amended
  after the expiration of the statute of limitations for filing charges.
  The conclusion that 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) permits Wilkerson's unverified
  intake questionnaire to be amended after the charge-filing period
  expires is also dictated by precedent from this Court upholding the
  validity of the Commission's regulations allowing amendment of charges
  to cure verification defects.  See Weeks, 408 F.2d at 231 (holding that
  an unsworn timely charge that is later sworn is an effective charge
  under Title VII); Georgia Power, 412 F.2d at 466-67 (holding that an
  employee's unsworn letter constitutes a charge of discrimination for
  purposes of Title VII when the employee later files a formal sworn
  charge); see also Malone v. K-Mart Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1300
  (M.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) plaintiff's
  verified charge related back to her timely filed EEOC letter).<12>
  Finally, this conclusion is consistent with decisions from the majority
  of appellate courts that have addressed this issue.  See Philbin
  v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 324 (7th
  Cir. 1991) (holding that an intake questionnaire subsequently verified
  was a charge of discrimination for purposes of Title VII where the EEOC
  assigned a charge number to the claim and notified the employer, and
  where the plaintiff signed the intake questionnaire); Peterson v. City of
  Wichita, 888 F.2d 1307, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding validity of
  § 1601.12(b) and holding that the plaintiff satisfied Title VII's charge
  requirements where the plaintiff timely filed an unsworn discrimination
  complaint and later filed a formal charge); Casavantes v. California
  State Univ., 732 F.2d 1441, 1443 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that the
  plaintiff's filing of an intake questionnaire satisfied the Title VII
  charge requirement where the plaintiff later filed a formal charge);
  Blue Bell Boots v. E.E.O.C., 418 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1969) (holding
  that Title VII charges of discrimination may be sworn after charge-filing
  period expires).  Cf. Price v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 687 F.2d 74,
  78-79 (5th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that unverified intake questionnaire
  may constitute charge if EEOC waives verification requirement);
  E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1981)
  (upholding validity of Commissioner's charge verified by Commissioner
  after term had expired).  But see Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 228
  F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the EEOC's regulation permitting
  a charge of discrimination to be verified after the expiration of the
  applicable limitations period is contrary to the plain language of Title
  VII and is therefore invalid), petition for cert. filed, - S. Ct. - ,
  69 USLW 3481 (U.S. Apr. 02, 2001); Shempert v. Harwick Chem. Corp.,
  151 F.3d 793, 796-97 (8th Cir. 1998) (EEOC regulation does not apply
  to permit untimely, verified charge to relate back to date plaintiff
  filed unverified intake questionnaire since latter is not "a charge").

 CONCLUSION

  Contrary to the district court's conclusion, Wilkerson's timely filed
  intake questionnaire, which was signed under penalty of perjury,
  complied with Title VII's "under oath or affirmation requirement."
  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Because the intake questionnaire also
  satisfied the minimal requirements of a charge, see 29 C.F.R. §
  1601.12(b), it satisfies Title VII's charge-filing requirements.
  Assuming, arguendo, that the intake questionnaire was unverified
  and that Wilkerson did file a charge of discrimination on June 24,
  1998, the intake questionnaire still qualifies as a Title VII charge
  of discrimination because the formal charge relates back to cure the
  intake questionnaire's verification defect.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).
  Therefore, the Commission urges this Court to reverse the district
  court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

  Respectfully submitted,

 GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS
 Associate General Counsel

  PHILIP B. SKLOVER
 Associate General Counsel

 CAROLYN L. WHEELER
 Assistant General Counsel

 ________________________
 Anne Noel Occhialino
 Attorney
 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION
 Office of General Counsel
 1801 L Street, N.W., Room 7030
 Washington, D.C. 20507
 (202) 663-4724

 May 4, 2001

 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

  I, Anne Noel Occhialino, hereby certify that this brief complies with
  the type-volume limitations imposed under Fed. R. App. P.  32(a)(7)(B)(i)
  and 29(d).  The brief contains 6,162 words.



        _______________________
        Anne Noel Occhialino

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

   I, Anne Noel
        Occhialino, hereby certify that I served two copies of the
        foregoing brief this 4th day of May, 2001 by first-class mail,
        postage pre-paid, to the following:
 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
 Carol Wilkerson:

 Julie S. Northup
 Debra E. Schwartz    THOMPSON, ROLLINS, SCHWARTZ & BOROWSKI, LLC
 750 Commerce Drive, Suite 100
 Decatur, Georgia 30030
 (404) 377-7717; fax (404) 377-5119

 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
 Grinnell Corporation:

 Becky Livingston
 Kelly O. Coogan
 Charles H. Brown
 David L. Gordon
 Jackson Lewis Schnitzler & Krupman
 1900 Marquis One Tower
 245 Peachtree Center Avenue, N.E.
 Atlanta, GA 30303
 _____________________
 Anne Noel Occhialino
 Attorney
 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION
 Office of General Counsel
 1801 L Street, N.W., Room 7030
       Washington, D.C. 20507


 1 All of the documents in the record are contained in volume 1.
 Citations to "Doc." refer to the record entry numbers listed on the
 district court docket sheet.

 2 The record contains an unsigned letter dated October 1, 1997, with
 a notation that it was sent out on October 2, 1997.  Doc. 18, Ex. 9.
 Wilkerson, however, has denied under oath that she received it.  Doc. 18,
 Pg. 147.

 3 Although Edwards prepared the complaint, he told Wilkerson that he was
 too busy to continue with the case.  Doc. 18, Pg. 143.  Wilkerson signed
 and filed the complaint.  See id.

 4 In reaching this cursory conclusion, the court failed to refer to the
 Commission's regulations at 29 C.F.R §§ 1601.9 & 1601.3(a).  Doc. 24,
 Pg. 6.

 5 The EEOC does not contend that Wilkerson's intake questionnaire
 constitutes a charge under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a), which sets forth
 specific requirements for a charge of discrimination.

 6 Grinnell's stipulation that Wilkerson filed a charge on June 24, 1998,
 Doc. 17, ¶ 13, may constitute a waiver of any argument to the contrary.
 Thus, this Court may simply assume that Wilkerson filed a formal
 verified charge on June 24, 1998, and consider the application of the
 relation-back provision in 29 C.F.R.                   § 1601.12(b).
 See infra at 20-27.

 7 Although Grinnell's Statement of Material Facts states that Wilkerson
 filed a charge of discrimination on June 24, 1998, "alleging that 'she
 was 'discharged from her employment, disciplined, and intimidated in
 her employment because of her race, Black, and sex, female,'" Grinnell
 was quoting from the notice of charge of discrimination.  Doc. 17, ¶
 13; Doc. 18, Ex. 18. During Wilkerson's deposition the parties referred
 to Exhibit 18 as "the EEOC charge of discrimination," but, as discussed
 above, Exhibit 18 consists only of the June 24, 1998, notice of charge of
 discrimination-no formal charge is attached.  Doc. 18, Pg. 262; Doc. 18,
 Ex. 18.

 8 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit decided before October 1, 1981
 are binding on the Eleventh Circuit.  See Bonner v. City of Prichard,
 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc).

 9 Unlike Title VII's charge-filing requirements, the ADEA permits charges
 to be filed over the phone and does not require charges to be verified.
 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.6 & 1626.8.

 10 Although the Commission does not believe that the facts of this
 case present the issue of whether an unverified intake questionnaire
 subsequently amended satisfies Title VII's charge-filing requirements,
 the Commission has addressed this issue because this Court requested
 that Wilkerson's appointed counsel brief the Court on this question.

 11 Congress was also presumably aware that before 1972, courts of appeals
 had uniformly held that Title VII charges could be verified outside the
 charge-filing period.  See Blue Bell Boots, 418 F.2d at 357; Weeks,
 408 F.2d at 230-31; Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357,
 360 (7th Cir. 1968).

 12 Although this Court recently questioned whether cases decided before
 Congress' 1972 amendments to Title VII's oath requirements are still
 binding, see Vason v. City of Montgomery, 240 F.2d 905, 908 n. 2 (11th
 Cir. 2001), the Commission agrees with the Fifth Circuit that the holdings
 of Weeks and Georgia Power remain intact.  See Price v. Southwestern Bell
 Tel. Co., 687 F.2d 74, 77 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Prior to passage of the
 1972 amendments to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, we rejected
 arguments that charges must be formal and sworn to within the applicable
 time period . . . and [we] freely permitted amendments of technically
 deficient charges [ ] pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)'s predecessor,
 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11(b) . . . .Although 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), as amended
 in 1972, now requires the filing of charges in writing under oath or
 affirmation by both private parties and the EEOC, we are not persuaded
 the amended statute compels a different conclusion.") (citing Sanchez
 v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970); Georgia Power,
 412 F.2d 462; Weeks, 408 F.2d 228).